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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation presents a case study of the violent conflict in Poso district, Central 
Sulawesi province from 1998 to 2007. Po so was one of several areas in eastern 
Indonesia that became sites of intense inter-religious and inter-ethnic fighting following 
President Soeharto's resignation in 1998. An estimated 600-1000 people were killed in 
violence in Poso that began in December 1998 and had not completely ceased even in 
early 2007. 
Existing studies of the post-Soeharto conflicts have identified a common structural 
context that many of these conflicts shared. Impending political reforms after 
Soeharto' s resignation created local uncertainties over how groups could access state 
employment and contracts; the stakes were particularly high in areas with a relatively 
even religious demographic and where state resources were unusually important to the 
local economy. Moreover, these uncertainties arose at a time when the repressive 
capacity of the state was greatly weakened. This dissertation finds that this structural 
context is most accurately treated as part of the enabling context for violence in Poso. 
This context did not cause the violence, nor make it inevitable, nor does it explain the 
intensity, scale or forms of violence in the district. An over-reliance on structure also 
excludes agency and contingency from the explanation of violence. 
The central question of the dissertation is to identify the process by which violence 
escalated and declined in Poso and what this can tell us about why the Poso violence 
occurred. My approach is to explore this question through attention to six elements of 
analysis: how the violence was organised, the role of identity, the relative importance of 
national and local contexts, the forms of violence, the effect of previous violence on 
local actors, and the motivations of perpetrators of violence. 
This dissertation finds that violence in Poso was a collective enterprise, mostly 
perpetrated by local actors, for which individuals bear responsibility but in which no-
one was in complete control. The lack of complete control is not to say that the 
escalation of violence was the result of unimagined consequences - those leading 
attacks at the times that violence escalated intended to effect an increase in the scale of 
the conflict- but the motivations of both leaders and rank-and-file derived in part from 
their expenence of the conflict and not simply from pre-existing interests and 
intentions. 
This conclusion derives from the six elements of analysis outlined above. It is not my 
contention, on the basis of this dissertation, that this model will also adequately explain 
the escalation and decline of the other inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflicts that took 
place after Soeharto resigned. Nevertheless, the six elements of analysis that I propose 
in this dissertation are not derived from specific events in Poso, and it should be 
possible to apply this approach to other conflict settings. Similar histories of the 
Maluku, North Maluku and possibly the West and Central Kalimantan conflicts, 
produced by attention to these six elements of analysis, could provide a stronger basis to 
understand the extent to which these conflicts shared similar reasons for and processes 
of escalation and decline. 
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CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION 
Following President Soeharto' s May 1998 resignation, several locations in eastern 
Indonesia became the sites of intense inter-religious and inter-ethnic fighting. The first 
location affected was Poso district in Central Sulawesi province, approximately 1,700 
kilometres east of the national capital, Jakarta. 1 Before the outbreak, Poso was a little-
known district populated by approximately 420,000 people, of whom just over half 
were Muslims and most of the remainder were Christians. Violence in the district began 
in December 1998, and had not ceased completely even in early 2007. An estimated 600 
- 1000 people have been killed in the district, more than half of whom met their deaths 
in 2000 and 2001. 
Soon after the first fighting in Poso, further inter-religious and inter-ethnic fighting 
quickly followed in Maluku (1999-2005) and North Maluku (1999-2001) provinces, as 
well as in Central Kalimantan and West Kalimantan. 2 While the locations and ferocity 
of this fighting were a surprise for most, many observers expected some violence during 
the democratic transition immediately after the 32 years of Soeharto's authoritarian 
rule.3 Accounts of this transition written just before the conflicts started (or only shortly 
thereafter) also highlighted the rising inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions in the 
final years of Soeharto's New Order regime, albeit sometimes with a focus on anti-
Chinese rioting and sentiment.4 Past instances of "regime change" in Indonesia also 
contributed to pessimism that the post-Soeharto transition would be violent. For 
instance, 1945-9 was a period both of war against the returning Dutch forces and of 
widespread social violence in Indonesia, although few specific details of the latter are 
known.5 Later, in 1965-6, mass killings ofthose labelled communists, perpetrated with 
1 This dissertation uses the word "district" to refer to the Indonesian kabupaten, "sub-district" for 
kecamatan and "ward" for kelurahan. "Village" will refer to both desa and its component dusun, unless 
this usage creates confusion in which case "sub-village" may also be used. 
2 The first fighting in West Kalimantan actually took place in 1997, when Soeharto was still in power. 
3 For instance, see John Mcbeth, "Political Update" in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?, ed. 
GeoffForrester (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), p. 24. For a concise review of 
several studies of the association of political transition and violence, see Gerry van Klinken, Communal 
Violence and Democratisation in Indonesia: Small Town Wars, (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 26-27. 
4 See, for example, Leo Suryadinata, "A Year of Upheaval and Uncertainty: The Fall of Soeharto and the 
Rise ofHabibie", Southeast Asian Affairs, 1999, pp. 113-114 and particularly 118-120; Stefan Ekl6f, 
Indonesian politics in crisis: the longfall ofSuharto, I996-I998, (Copenhagen S, Denmark: NIAS, 
1999), p. 236. For a comprehensive study of anti-Chinese violence, see Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese 
Violence in Indonesia, I996-I999, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006). 
5 For an initial attempt to outline some of the violence during the period, focussing on East Java, see 
William H. Frederick, "Shadows of an unseen hand: Some patterns of violence in the Indonesian 
revolution, 1945-1949" in Roots of violence in Indonesia : contemporary violence in historical 
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tacit or direct support from the military, followed the 30 September 1965 "coup" that 
eventually led to Soeharto assuming power. 
As was the case with the violent conflicts following Soeharto's fall, each of these 
previous two periods of violence involved killings in diverse locations around the 
country. (One difference though was that Jakarta and Java were key sites of violence in 
1945-9 and 1965-6, but not in the post-Soeharto period.) As the precise nature of the 
violence and its targets differed from region to region (and indeed some regions saw 
little or no fighting), two of the key texts on these previous periods have adopted a 
focus on local factors, the better to explain events in each area. For instance, Audrey 
Kahin's edited volume on the regional dynamics of the 1945-9 revolution was born out 
of her observation that "many of the generalisations being drawn on the basis of 
national-level histories of the revolution and the accounts of leaders in the Republic of 
Indonesia's central government . .. . did not accord with the nature of events in the 
Minangkabau region of West Sumatra."6 Cribb introduces an edited volume on the 
1965-6 killings by noting the likelihood that "a host of local factors in each region 
determined the scope and scale of each bout of killing", despite also observing that all 
of the killings were in some sense precipitated by a national event.7 
As I set out to address the central question of this study - the process by which violence 
escalated and declined in Poso and what this can tell us about why the Poso violence 
occurred - it became clear that local factors, agents and contingency were an integral 
part of the answer. The relevance of the local is perhaps not surprising: if local case 
studies were judged necessary to explain adequately the violence of 1945-9 and 1965-6, 
then it follows that individual case studies should also be important to explain the post-
Soeharto violence, which superficially appears less closely bound by a unifying theme 
than either of these two previous periods. 
perspective, ed. Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (Leiden: KITLV, 2002), pp. 143-170. 
6 Audrey Kahin, "Preface" in Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity from Diversity, ed. 
Audrey Kahin (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), p. ix. 
7 Robert Cribb, "Introduction: Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia" in The 
Indonesia Killings of I 965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali, ed. Robert Cribb, (Clayton: Centre of 
Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, 1990), p. 21. 
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Violence in Poso 
Violence in Poso began in December 1998 with several days of small scale 
disturbances, which started on Christmas eve. (By coincidence, Christmas fell during 
the Islamic fasting month, Ramadan, in 1998.) The peak of the December disturbances 
was a riot on 28 December in which rival crowds of Muslim and Christian clashed. No-
one was killed during the December rioting, but at least 130 buildings were burned and 
eighty people were injured. The police arrested several Christian youths who were 
implicated in the early moments of the violence as well as an older Christian man 
whose role in the riot police deemed to amount to rebellion. The younger brother of the 
incumbent district head, a Muslim, was also subsequently taken into police custody on 
suspicion of engaging in provocation. 
Sixteen months passed before a second period of rioting in Poso in April 2000, which 
again took place within the city limits. This time the riot did not take place on a date of 
religious significance. Instead, the fighting followed immediately after a provincial-
level politician warned via the press that a second riot would occur in Po so if the wrong 
man were chosen for a senior bureaucratic appointment in the district. This April 2000 
riot produced the first fatalities of the Poso conflict, as six people were killed in five 
days of rioting, three of them shot dead when police opened fire into a crowd. Property 
damage was also much more severe than in the December violence, with most 
Christian-owned houses in two city wards being set ablaze and several churches 
destroyed or damaged. 
Although relatively few people were killed in the first two periods of violence, 
Christians fared worse than Muslims, particularly in terms of damaged and destroyed 
property. Their losses fed into a pre-existing anxiety among Poso's Christian 
community, including members of the indigenous Pamona ethnic group, that they were 
being marginalized in regional politics and cut off from political positions, civil-service 
posts, and land ownership by wealthy Muslim migrants, particularly those from South 
Sulawesi province. As a result, immediately after the April 2000 violence, a sub-section 
of the Christian community centered around men directly affected by the riot began to 
plan for an attack on those whom they termed ''perusuh" (rioters) and "provokator" 
(provocateurs). The result was a third period of violence that lasted for two weeks, from 
late May-June 2000. Although Christian forces had compiled a loose list of Muslim 
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provocateurs, Christian attacks during this period were directed more broadly at Poso' s 
Muslim community. 
The May-June 2000 violence was on a much larger scale than anything that had 
occurred previously in Poso. For two weeks there was an almost complete breakdown 
of law and order in the district, and at least 246 people, mostly Muslims, were killed. 
Widespread arson destroyed many village and government buildings, and tens of 
thousands of individuals fled from the district in all directions. During the peak of the 
unrest, many police and village officials abandoned their posts. A few police and 
military officers even joined with crowds and took part in the violence themselves. 
The single worst incident during the May-June 2000 violence took place at and around 
the Walisongo Islamic boarding school, about nine kilometers south of the city. After a 
clash at the boarding school, the Muslim men who remained there were killed. The 
men, women and children who fled were rounded up over the course of the next few 
days and the men among these captives were killed. In all, around one hundred Muslims 
were killed in this massacre; and some of the women taken prisoner appear to have been 
sexually assaulted before being released. 
The May-June 2000 violence marked a shift to protracted violent conflict in Poso 
district. The violence created a group of angry young Muslim men who had seen family 
members killed or their houses destroyed, and who later recalled that their only thought 
after this period of the conflict was of how they could take revenge. 8 News of the 
violence, including gruesome photos of the remains of murder victims, also drew in 
mujahidin from other parts of the country, who trained and fought with local Muslim 
men.9 Sporadic violence gradually escalated to a fourth period of conflict in June-July 
2001 and a fifth in October-December 2001. During this time, the death toll in Poso 
continued to mount, with around 100 people killed in the course of 2001. 
8 Interviews with Poso men, July 2003. 
9 Mujahidin, the plural of mujahid, in this context means fighters in a holy war. This was the term of self-
reference these fighters used, reflecting their belief that they were engaged in a jihad (holy war) in which, 
if killed, they would die as holy martyrs in God's cause. The word is now in common use in the English 
language, appearing in the Collins dictionary (2003 edition), and as such is not italicised in this 
dissertation. 
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Facing a rising death toll (and having received intelligence reports of a terrorist training 
facility in Poso ), the central government then acted to bring representatives of the 
Muslim and Christian communities to the negotiating table in late December 2001. The 
resulting deal-called the Malino Agreement-initially brought about some peace and 
security (in part attributable to a large increase in security force deployment to Poso 
earlier in December), with clashes between crowds becoming rare by late 2002. Low-
intensity violence continued for at least another four years after this, however, and more 
than 100 people were killed in Poso-related violence between 2003 and 2007. 
The Study of Post-Soeharto Violence 
The post-Soeharto conflicts, Poso included, have already been the subject of numerous 
academic and semi-academic studies. Many of these texts are case studies of individual 
conflicts, and the reader will find Poso-specific examples cited throughout this 
dissertation. The case studies of the Poso conflict typically do not deal with the conflict 
overall; the existing literature on the conflict includes studies that present chronologies 
of certain periods of violence, 10 as well as thematic studies. 11 
More recently Bertrand, Sidel and van Klinken have also produced monographs that 
analyse and explain the post-Soeharto conflicts in Indonesia as a set. 12 Brubaker and 
Laitin' s characterisation of the country case study of ethnic violence well describes the 
approach of these three single-author monographs: the authors organise the studies 
around a core argumentative line to link each conflict as part of a set, but they also 
1° For instance, see Lorraine Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi: Where People Eat 
Fish and Fish Eat People", Indonesia 72 (2001): 45-79, which presents preliminary chronologies of the 
first three periods of violence; Human Rights Watch, Breakdown: Four Years of Communal Violence in 
Central Sulawesi. December 2002, which focusses on violence in 2001 and 2002; Arianto Sangaji, 
Rumput Kering di Balik Anyir Darah: Konteks dan Dinamika Tragedi Kemanusiaan Paso, unpublished 
manuscript, March 2004, which, in addition to a brief chronology of the violence from 1998-
2001 ,includes several chapters on the structural context of the conflict. 
11 For instance, see Lorraine Aragon, "Mass Media Fragmentation and Narratives ofViolent Action in 
Sulawesi's Poso Conflict", Indonesia 79 (2005): 1-55, which examines the depiction of the conflict in 
various categories of media publications; Lorraine Aragon, "Elite Competition in Central Sulawesi" in 
Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and 
Gerry van Klinken, (Leiden: KITLV, 2007), pp. 39-66, which examines local politics and corruption; 
Arianto Sangaji, Peredaran Ilegal Senjata Api di Sulawesi Tengah, (Palu: Yayasan Tanah Merdeka, 
2005), which addresses the question of illegal weapons in Po so; International Crisis Group, Jihad in 
Central Sulawesi, Asia Report no. 74, 3 February 2004, a study oflndonesia's jihadist networks and their 
activities in Poso; Dave McRae, "Criminal Justice and Communal Conflict: A Case Study of the Trial of 
Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva and Marinus Riwu", Indonesia 83, (2007): 79-117, which examines 
the criminal justice response to the conflict. 
12 Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004); John T. Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); van Klinken, 
Small Town Wars. 
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provide additional contextualising narratives consisting of "intertwined supporting, 
subsidiary or qualifying arguments". 13 
Each of these three authors first maps out a common structural context for the post-
Soeharto conflicts, which I outline briefly below. Most individual-conflict case studies 
also present a similar formulation of this context. In summary, this context is that the 
impending reform of electoral mechanisms and likely decentralisation of government 
functions after Soeharto's resignation created local-level uncertainties over how 
different groups could seek and secure access to state employment and contracts in 
post-New Order Indonesia. The stakes were particularly high in parts of eastern 
Indonesia such as Po so, Maluku and North Maluku, where civil service employment 
and state contracts were unusually important to the local economy .14 In addition, each 
of these three sites was among the eight provinces with the most even ratio of Christians 
and Muslims (using provincial-level data). With this relatively even religious 
demographic (35 per cent Christian: 63 per cent Muslim in 1998 in Poso ), tensions 
arose between Christians and Muslims over bureaucratic appointments, as Muslims had 
generally succeeded in increasing their share of civil service jobs in the last years of 
Soeharto's rule. Moreover, at the very moment that it seemed as though there could be 
big losers in the contest between these rival groups, the repressive capacity of the state 
was greatly weakened. 
The limitations of this structural context as an explanation for the violence are well-
known and widely recognised. The structural context "over-predicts" the occurrence of 
violence, as there are areas of Indonesia that share this structural context but were not 
violent. Put differently, presented solely with a data-set of these structural factors, one 
13 Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence", Annual Review of Sociology 
24 (1998): 436-7. 
14 Van Klinken takes this line of analysis furthest, devising a vulnerability index based on rates of 
deagrarianisation since the 1970s and the proportion of non-agricultural workers employed as civil 
servants. By this method, Central Sulawesi province ranks third most vulnerable. (Van Klinken's two 
most vulnerable provinces, Bengkulu and Southeast Sulawesi, have both been peaceful.) The usefulness 
of this index for Poso is also somewhat undermined by van Klinken's use of provincial-level data, as 
Poso represents only 6 per cent of Central Sulawesi's population (20 per cent before changes to Poso's 
boundaries) and all other districts in the province have been free of comparable post-Soeharto violence. 
See van Klinken, Small Town Wars, pp. 40-44; BPS Sulteng, Sulawesi Tengah Dalam Angka 2005 (Palu: 
BPS Sulteng, 2006), p. 82. 
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could not accurately predict where violence actually occurred; instead, it is possible 
only to work backwards from a list of sites ofviolence and identify common features. 15 
An over-reliance on structure also excludes agency and contingency from the 
explanation of violence. I will return to this point in the conclusion of this dissertation; 
for now let us note that such an exclusion runs counter to our common-sense view of 
the world (and probably also to that of the actors in the violent conflict that is the topic 
of this dissertation). 16 However much a particular structural context may support 
violence, in the end it is people who decide to fight. Many observers would also be 
deeply dissatisfied with the mitigation of individual responsibility for violent acts that 
can follow from a structural focus. For instance, in the specific context of one of the 
post-Soeharto conflicts, van Klinken has asserted, "No explanation that ignores agency 
can do justice to the victims of this war."17 Similarly, but in a more general account of 
historiography, Shaw highlights the continuing relevance of agency to "the important 
business [of historians] .... of assigning blame for the greatest human catastrophes of 
holocaust, war and enslavement."18 
Nor can the structural context readily explain the changes in motivations and shifts in 
the lines of confrontation that take place during protracted violent conflict. The 
experiences of combatants during the conflict, the entry of new actors or the effects of 
violence are often important parts of the explanation of such shifts, and the influence of 
these factors cannot be predicted from the initial circumstances. In view of these 
limitations, I argue in this study that we can most accurately treat the structural context 
outlined above as part of the enabling context for violence in Poso. This context did not 
cause the violence, nor make it inevitable, nor does it explain the intensity, scale or 
forms of violence in the district. 
There is of course more to the analyses of Bertrand, Sidel and van Klinken than simple 
structural context. Each author also identifies a "core argumentative line" to explain 
15 For a pessimistic account of the place of analysis of statistical and demographic factors in the study of 
violence, see Paul R. Brass, Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective 
Violence, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 7. 
16 On this point, see David Gary Shaw, "Happy in Our Chains? Agency and Language in the Postmodem 
Age", History and Theory 40 (December 2001): 2. 
17 Gerry van K1inken, "The Ma1uku Wars", Indonesia 71 (2001): 17. 
18 Shaw, "Happy in Our Chains?", p. 3. 
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why violence took place, and to a greater or lesser extent also describe the process by 
which violence was produced. 
Bertrand admittedly does not so much discuss processes as historicise the structuralist 
context, by way of what he terms an historical institutionalist approach. Bertrand asserts 
that a nation's national model - "the principles that define a nation" and which 
"establish inclusion/exclusion of its members and the terms of inclusion" - is 
encapsulated in its institutions. 19 Formation of state institutions is preceded by periods 
of debate over the national model, and institutions embody compromises on the terms of 
inclusion for different groups. At critical junctures, times of actual or anticipated 
institutional change, ethnic violence may occur as groups attempt to improve their lot or 
defend what they have. The third critical juncture in Indonesia's modem history, 
Bertrand asserts, came at the end of the Soeharto regime, when new president B. J. 
Habibie, badly needing democratic credentials, set about reforming political institutions 
and the electoral mechanism. 
For each violent conflict he discusses, Bertrand provides a historical narrative of the 
place of specific groups within the national model. For Kalimantan, he charts the 
history of Dayak resentment at their marginalisation under Soeharto after a brief period 
of institutional representation under the Dutch in the late 1940s. When Soeharto-era 
institutions began to weaken, the Dayaks attacked the Madmese, "who most vividly 
represented the changes brought about by the New Order regime."2° For the Maluku 
conflict (the study in Bertrand's volume of greatest direct relevance to Poso), Bertrand 
argues that New Order policies had disrupted the balance between Muslims and 
Christians, with Muslims making significant gains in the 1990s against previous 
Christian domination of bureaucratic positions and associated patronage. Habibie's 
reforms thus made Muslims anxious they might lose their gains, and Christians anxious 
they might suffer further losses.21 Violence was the result. In incorporating local 
histories into his account, Bertrand is able to give some role to local context despite the 
national scope of the critical juncture he identifies. 
19 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. 4. 
20 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. 56. 
21 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, pp. 114-115. 
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Bertrand also describes the violence that occurred in each of the sites he investigates, 
but only cursorily identifies a few processes that might have contributed to the 
escalation of violence. He is quite frank in stating that his approach "cannot explain 
why one form of conflict will erupt rather than another", nor can it explain "the 
intensity and scale" of any particular violent conflict.22 Each time Bertrand addresses 
these questions and the precise processes by which violence escalates, he emphasises 
his view that they are of secondary importance to the context that enables violence. This 
view is well-captured in his approving citation of National Commission for Human 
Rights (Komnas HAM) member Munawir Sjadzali's observation, "If leaves are dry, it 
doesn't matter how many matches one throws in, they will bum."23 As I have stated 
above, I will argue in this dissertation that the limitations of Bertrand's approach go 
further - not only is the institutional context not able to explain what forms violence 
may take, it cannot explain why violence occurs at all. If we adopt my view, then the 
study of processes becomes an essential part of understanding the post-Soeharto 
violence. As a result, it will be precisely these sorts of questions and processes that I 
wish to address in this dissertation. 
Van Klinken describes each of the violent conflicts he analyses as "local politics by 
other means" and argues that violence resulted when politically-motivated individuals 
perceived an opportunity to mobilise local constituencies along ethnic and religious 
lines to win local power for themselves. In van Klinken's words, "control over the 
bureaucracy was important enough for the urban middle class in those places to go to 
war over it"?4 As a consequence of his conviction that the violence was political, van 
Klinken turns to social movements literature to analyse the post-Soeharto violence. His 
method is to study the process by which local elites went to war in terms of five 
mechanisms derived from the social movements text, Dynamics of Contention. The 
basic argument of Dynamics of Contention is that common causal processes producing 
different outcomes depending on context can be identified in a wide range of 
phenomena that would otherwise be studied as discrete classes of events ( eg. 
revolutions, ethnic and religious violence, democratisation episodes).25 For the post-
22 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. 133. 
23 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. 111. 
24 Gerry van Klinken, "Communal Conflict and Decentralisation in Indonesia", (Brisbane, Australian 
Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2007), p.9. 
25 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), pp. 36-37,306-313. 
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Soeharto violence, van Klinken studies each site of conflict in terms of one of five 
processes: the formation of a bounded identity in a group (West Kalimantan), the 
escalation of a conflict to involve many more actors (Poso ), the polarisation of actors to 
opposed extremes (North Maluku), the mobilisation of otherwise apathetic people 
(Maluku) and the constitution of a previously unorganised or apolitical group into a 
single political actor (Central Kalimantan).Z6 Throughout, van Klinken's emphasis is on 
local actors exploiting available mobilisational resources in the form of patron-client 
ties and organisations to seize opportunities to pursue political gains. 
Van Klinken's attention to processes by which people mobilised and perpetrated 
violence is welcome, but his emphasis on the political is a key limitation of his study. I 
will myself discuss the links with local politics evident in the first two periods of 
violence in Po so, but I have found two elements of van Klinken' s approach misleading. 
First, his conviction that the violence was essentially political makes him less sensitive 
to shifts in the motivations and dynamics of violence during the conflict, and indeed to 
changes in the make-up of the group of individuals recognised as leaders. As much is 
apparent in his chapter on Poso, when he first asserts that each of the first four periods 
of violence in Poso took place at a time of political transition, but then concedes in his 
description of the third period that neither side had any hope of influencing bureaucratic 
outcomes. 27 As I will argue in greater detail in the body of this dissertation, the longer 
the conflict progressed, the less sense it made to discuss the violence in terms of local 
politics. To be sure, there were always people seeking political advantage out of 
developments in Poso, but we grant these people too great a degree of importance if we 
accept van Klinken's assertion that "the people who determined the course of the 
conflict by their key roles in mobilisation and coalition building were politically 
motivated."28 
The excessive focus on those individuals who were particularly concerned with political 
outcomes leads to the second point, van Klinken's depiction of local elites as avowedly 
rational, cool-headed, wholly politically motivated actors who appear dispassionate in 
mobilising the rank-and-file for violence. For instance, in his account of the Kalimantan 
conflicts, in which Dayak and Malay groups fight the Madurese specifically from 
26 Van Klinken, Small Town Wars, p. 11. 
27 Van Klinken, Small Town Wars, pp. 76, 83. 
28 Van Klinken, Small Town Wars, p. 138. 
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among a number of other possible ethnic opponents, van Klinken depicts this choice as 
essentially arbitrary and detached, motivated by political expediency.29 The impression 
is almost of elites choosing a cleavage to exploit as one would choose a dish from a 
menu. He writes of the expulsion of the Madurese in Central Kalimantan, "Key 
protagonists postured with feigned indignation, then moved on to other issues. It 
seemed as if only the international conflict mediation groups, and of course the victims, 
took it all seriously."30 Van Klinken's conviction that elites were cool-headed and 
politically motivated appears in part a reaction to a dominant public discourse in 
Indonesia that regards the conflicts as the result of social anomie based in supposed 
cultural traits such as religious intolerance or predisposition to violence. 31 He is right to 
observe that this public discourse explains little, but he then goes too far in the opposite 
direction in the formulation of his own analysis. From my interviews and the 
information I have gathered, I have not found the leaders of violence in Poso to be so 
detached, and I will present examples of local figures acting against their own political 
interests by perpetrating violence or conversely, examples where actors continue to 
perpetrate violence even after their political interests have been served. Indeed, I will 
argue during this study that to explain the motivations for violence, we need to take 
greater account of enmity for their opponents harboured by leaders. We also need to 
examine the influence of one violent act in motivating subsequent violence or changing 
the priorities of local actors. 
Side! chooses the position of Islam in Indonesian public life as his key variable, and 
argues that changes in the position of Islam at national level determined the sets of 
agents who took part in the Poso conflict and the forms of violence. His study begins 
with the assertion that there have been three distinct forms of religious violence in 
Indonesia since the mid-1990s, which have taken place in successive temporal phases. 
To explain this violence and the shifts in forms, perpetrators and targets, Side! argues, 
we must first consider the way religious institutions and identities have become avenues 
29 In an earlier work on Central Kalimantan, van Klinken is quite explicit about what he perceives as the 
arbitrariness of the choice: "I am arguing, in other words, that the anti-Madurese campaign was for these 
ethnic associations only their secondary objective. The primary objective was to dominate provincial 
politics, informally if not formally. To achieve that, the Madurese could almost have been selected at 
random from among the other perhaps equally abundant settlers- Javanese, Banjar, Bugis- as a common 
enemy." See Gerry van Klinken, "Indonesia's New Ethnic Elites", in Indonesia; In search of transition, 
ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Irwan Abdullah (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002), internet copy not 
paginated. 
30 Van Klinken, Small Town Wars, p. 136. 
31 Van Klinken, Small Town Wars, pp. 6, 138. 
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of access to Indonesia's political class, the state and its resources. Under these 
circumstances, shifts in the position of Islam and the basis of claims to represent Islam 
have similar consequences to the critical junctures that Bertrand identifies. 
The first shift of relevance to Poso that Sidel discusses is the ascendency of forces 
promoting Islamism at national level under the Habibie presidency. Habibie's rise to 
power mean~ that forces promoting Islam had gained central political access, but they 
now needed to push downward and outward into the democratising and decentralising 
polity to capture local power.32 Once Sidel shifts his attention to local level and the 
processes by which "religious pogroms" occurred in Poso, Maluku and North Maluku 
from 1998-2001 his argument becomes very similar to van Klinken's. The post-
Soeharto violence was essentially political, as competing local networks of politicians, 
businessmen and gangsters mobilised potential voters along religious lines. Whole 
communities mobilised and fought each other, causing many deaths and destroying 
entire villages in each attack. The motives of these politicians, businessman and 
gangsters were political, namely to develop a local power base to protect or wm 
bureaucratic access that had previously been determined at central level. In this 
endeavour they had the support of local religious organisations and institutions, which 
were themselves anxious about their own authority and the bounds of religious identity 
in the face of competition from other cross-cutting associational ties. 33 Given the 
similarity between van Klinken's and Sidel's arguments regarding local politics and 
violence, it is unclear why the additional part of Sidel' s explanation - the national 
position of Islam - is necessary to explain the occurrence of violence. Sidel himself 
never sufficiently clarifies this point. 
The first phase of violence in Poso (1998-2001) ended, Sidel argues, for two reasons. 
First, the violence successfully removed local uncertainties over the bounds of religious 
identities and the sources of access to local power. Second, Indonesia's new president, 
Megawati Soekamoputri, who rose to power in mid-2001, was more intent on 
intervening in the violence?4 Megawati's rise to power is in fact part of the second 
structural shift Sidel identifies, namely the eclipse and evisceration at national level of 
forces promoting Islamism, reversing gains made during the 1990s. Islamist parties did 
32 Sidel, Riots, Jihad, Pogroms, pp. 133-135, 190. 
33 Sidel, Riots, Jihad, Pogroms, pp. 190-191. 
34 Sidel, Riots, Jihad, Pogroms, pp. 165-167. 
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poorly in the 1999 elections, and the decision of Islamist parties to support the secular-
nationalist Megawati marked the end of the possibility of achieving Islamism through 
national politics. This structural shift led to a second phase of violence in Maluku and 
Poso from 2000-2004 (but primarily in 2000-2001), perpetrated by full-time jihadist 
paramilitaries who were mainly recruited from Central Java. Atrocities against local 
Muslim populations in Poso and Maluku were a powerful symbol of the neglect of the 
protection and promotion of Islam, and this phase of jihad was intended both to assist 
vulnerable co-religionists mid to "reawaken seemingly lapsed religious sensibilities and 
solidarities". 35 
The limitation of Sidel' s argument is his focus on the national. In the body of this 
dissertation I will take issue with the accuracy of Sidel's identification of the timing of 
the shifts in forms and targets of violence, as well as his characterisation of the 
perpetrators. Once we draw the nature and timing of these shifts into question, the 
causal relationship that Sidel posits between national trends and developments in Poso 
must inevitably also become questionable. I should stress at this point that I am not 
arguing that Poso is a world unto itself (as should be clear from my acknowledgement 
of the common structural context that Poso shares with the other post-Soeharto 
conflicts). Rather, I argue that an understanding of the escalation and decline of 
violence in Poso must be grounded in greater attention to the ways in which the local 
context, and indeed the actions of local agents, produce developments that run counter 
to national trends. 
Several of the elements of my approach should by now be clear from the above 
discussion. While acknowledging the structural context that Poso shares with other 
post-Soeharto violent conflicts, I have chosen to focus on the processes by which the 
violence escalated and declined. Specifically, I will investigate what we can learn about 
why the Poso violence occurred and took on particular forms. Six important elements of 
analysis recur in the study of these processes for each of the periods of violence in Poso: 
The first element is to identify who the perpetrators were and to examine how the 
violence was organised. My primary focus is on leaders, their sources of authority and 
how they were able to exercise this authority. My focus on leaders derives from my 
35 Side!, Riots. Jihad, Pogroms, pp. 212,221. 
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recognition of their important role in influencing the course of the violence - when 
leaders forged a path into violence in Poso, more people turned to violence than might 
otherwise have done, and the violence took place on a broader scale. But my analysis is 
relational, acknowledging Sewell's insight that individuals exercise agency with others 
and in relation to others. Sewell observes that occupancy of particular social positions 
or positions in collective organisations enable and constrain the degree of agency 
individuals are able to exercise. 36 More specifically, leaders cannot lead without 
followers, nor can they lead where the rank-and-file will not follow. These insights 
suggest ways in which examination of the organisation of violence can shed further 
light on the agency of leaders. What ties, organisational or otherwise - were leaders 
able to establish with the rank-and-file and what forms of violence did different types of 
combatant "organisations" enable? How much of the violence was under leaders' 
control and to what extent leaders were able to pursue a particular agenda by promoting 
or perpetrating violence? I have chosen the word "leaders" rather than the more 
common "elite" to emphasise that in the context of the Poso violence, this was not a 
category with fixed membership. 
The second element is identity and its salience to the violence. The central questions in 
this element are, how did combatants define their group identity and its bounds, and 
who they were fighting against? I do not intend to seek particular insights on the general 
nature of religious and ethnic identities - this dissertation will occupy the analytical 
middle ground that sees such identities as neither wholly constructed nor wholly 
innate.37 I will devote more attention to exploring the applicability to Poso of a concept 
frequently encountered in the study of violence, namely the process of totalisation -
whereby an individual's status as friend or foe comes to be wholly defined by one 
identity marker alone.38 
36 William H. Sewell, "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and Transformation", American Journal 
of Sociology 98,1 (July 1992): 21. 
37 For a survey of the range of theoretical positions regarding ethnic identity, see Horowitz, The Deadly 
Ethnic Riot, pp. 43-56. 
38 See for example, Valli Kanapathipillai, "July 1983: The Survivor's Experience" in Mirrors of Violence: 
Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia, ed. Veena Das, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
p. 341; Veena Das, "Specificities: Official Narratives, Rumour, and the Social Production ofHate", 
Social identities, 4, 1 (1998), pp. 1 09-130; Patricia Spyer, "Fire Without Smoke and Other Phantom's of 
Ambon's Violence: Media Effects, Agency and the Work oflmagination", Indonesia 74 (October 2002): 
28. 
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The third element is the effect of violent acts on actors in Poso. As mentioned in review 
of van Klinken, each violent act may shift actors' priorities or motivate further violence. 
Not all the effects of violence are "productive" (i.e. produce further violence), however, 
and I will also discuss inhibiting effects. The underlying point is that once violence 
starts, it is no longer sufficient to analyse events solely in terms of factors that predate 
the start of the fighting. 
A related element is the specific forms of violence at different times during the conflict. 
A by no means exhaustive list would include confrontations between crowds armed 
with rocks, machetes, traditional weapons, home-made firearms and even factory-
standard firearms; arson; bombings of public transport and public places; attacks by 
smaller groups who have shot, knifed, hanged or beheaded their victims and sometimes 
mutilated or burned the corpses. How can we explain the manifestation of violence in 
specific forms, and can the choice of the form of violence contribute to our 
understanding of the escalation and decline of fighting in Poso? 
A fifth element, which I have already raised in the preceding discussion, is the relative 
importance of local and national contexts to understanding violence in Poso. In 
particular, I will seek indications of the awareness of actors in Poso of developments 
elsewhere in the country, incidences of outside intervention in the Poso violence that 
result from national dynamics, and how the local context influences the manifestation of 
specific national trends in Poso. 
These categories overlap, and in one way or another each helps us to understand the 
sixth element, namely the motivations of various actors for perpetrating violence, 
Through attention to these multiple themes, I have endeavoured to present a nuanced 
picture of motivations that change over time as different individuals appear as leaders, 
combatants accumulate experiences of violence, perceptions of friend and foe change, 
and the prevailing context enables or inhibits violence. 
Terminology 
There is not yet a consensus on terminology in the study of ethnic and religious 
violence, as is clear from the space devoted in many texts to definitions. Increasingly, 
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authors call for greater disaggregation of violence into distinct manifestations, such as 
riots, pogroms, terrorism, state violence and genocide, to name but a few possible sub-
divisions. 39 Selection of terminology is thus difficult for a case study of the Poso 
violence, particularly as the closer one looks at an individual case, the less it is likely to 
fit a set of common features of a class of event developed out of a study of many cases. 
In particular, the long duration of the Poso conflict marks it as different from the violent 
events discussed in some of the texts from other countries that have most influenced the 
study of violence in Indonesia. For instance, each riot in northern India that Brass 
studies lasts only days or at most weeks, as is equally true of the riots in Varshney's 
pairs of Indian cities.40 In his study of deadly ethnic riots, Horowitz comments on the 
difficulty of determining the bounds of an ethnic riot, but nonetheless devotes the 
majority of his book to short duration single or "two-wave" riots.41 Similarly, Tambiah 
identifies short duration as a general feature of the South Asian "ethnic riot": 
If the ethnic riots and incidents perpetrated by civilian crowds and factions are repetitive, 
they are also mercifully short-lived, not only because after an initial period of chaos and 
paralysis, the police and the army can assert their dominance, but also because as human 
outbursts these riots have a short life cycle of orgasmic violence and spent energies.42 
In this study, noting this interpretive baggage associated with the term "riot", I refer 
only to the first and second periods of violence in Poso as "riots", and do not use the 
term for subsequent violence in the district. These two periods of violence were of short 
duration, with threats to individual safety greatly diminishing after several days. As 
with most of the violent incidents described in the texts cited above, violence in these 
two periods took place within city limits. Starting with the third period of violence in 
Poso, however, the district entered a period of protracted conflict and as a result most 
comparisons with short-duration riots break down. 
Admittedly, each of the authors cited above also identifies situations among the cases 
they study where riots occur repeatedly in the one location, often many years apart. 
39 See Brubaker and Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence", pp. 446-447; Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic 
Riot, pp. 17-28. A different view comes from McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, who call for the study of 
common processes which they assert are present in many different forms of violence and contentious 
action. See McAdam eta!, Dynamics of Contention, pp. 32-37. 
4° For instance, in the introduction to his 1997 work, Theft of an Idol, Brass explicitly states that the "not 
sustained" nature of riots (an allusion to social movements terminology) has made them a far more 
difficulty phenomenon to study than social movements. See Paul Brass, Theft of an Idol, p. 10. 
41 Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, p. 57. 
42 Tambiah,Levelling Crowds, p. 215. 
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Brass calls this pattern "persistence", and identifies two key elements that explain why 
riots persist. The first is the presence in these cases of what Brass terms an 
"institutionalised riot system" - a "network of persons who maintain communal, racial 
and other ethnic tensions in a state of tension, of readiness for riots" and "riot 
specialists" to convert these tensions into riots at moments of political opportunity.43 
Brass also adopts a functional explanation of riots' persistence to explain why a 
universally condemned and eminently preventable phenomenon nevertheless recurs. 
"[I]t is not possible to produce a broad enough consensus in society to eliminate violent 
riots from Indian public life," Brass writes, because these riots "serve the interests of 
particular individuals, groups, organisations and even society as a whole."44 To date, 
violence in Poso has been protracted rather than persistent in Brass's sense. There is not 
a clear history of repeated religious violence, and at this point one can still be cautiously 
optimistic that future of Poso need not be one of persistent riots. 
Varshney calls such cases "riot prone cities", reflecting his observation that the sites of 
repeated rioting in India are located exclusively in cities with a population greater than 
100,000 ( cf Poso town, 40,000). Setting criteria of 50 deaths in at least ten riots over 
five five-year periods from 1950-1995 for his category of maximum riot-proneness, 
Varshney identifies eight such cities in India.45 As with Brass, it is clear from 
Varshney's definition that he is seeking cases where riots occur again and again, not 
situations such as Poso where a single conflict becomes protracted. The urban element 
ofVarshney's definition is also inappropriate for Poso. 
Horowitz calls these cases "recurrent riots", and suggests that they contrast markedly in 
their general features from single event and "two-wave" riots.46 It is Horowitz's 
argument that the distinctiveness of the recurrent riot "derives from the cumulative 
deposits of the earlier events in the series.'47 Tambiah makes almost the identical point 
43 Brass, Theft of an Idol, pp. 9, 16. 
44 Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India, pp. 23-24. In a response to a 
review of this monograph, Brass retracted the assertion that riots may benefit the interests of "society as a 
whole." See Paul Brass, "Response to reviews by Thomas Hansen, A. R. Momin, and Roger Petersen", 
Ethnicities 6, 1 (2006): 115. 
45 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, pp. 103-104. 
46 See Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, p. 57 for Horowitz's initial differentiation of these two patterns 
of disturbances. Horowitz notes that recurrent riots are "usually separated by years, sometimes by many 
years". 
47 Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, p. 412. Additionally, Horowitz also identifies what he calls 
"recidivist locations, where violence occurs repeatedly. In these sites, there may be more than "one 
direction" of violence (roughly speaking, the motivations and group identities differ in each riot) or else 
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in his discussion of general features of South Asian riots: "In many cities and towns, 
intermittent ethnic riots form a series, with antecedent riots influencing the unfolding of 
subsequent ones."48 
Of the options above, Horowitz's "recurrent riot" bears most resemblance to the Poso 
conflict. Indeed, it might be guessed that Horowitz would judge the term appropriate for 
Poso, as he explicitly cites two other sites of post-Soeharto violence, Maluku and West 
Kalimantan, as locations of recurrent riots in Indonesia. In a recurrent riot, Horowitz 
asserts, precipitating events for each episode become more trivial or unnecessary; the 
targets of violence broaden significantly; the episodic character of the violence becomes 
less discrete and more incessant; violence becomes more organised and less 
spontaneous; violence tends to become more severe with greater casualties over time, as 
experience overcomes rioters' fear and new weapons are introduced, retaliatory 
violence becomes the norm (Horowitz elsewhere asserts that violence in most riots is 
one-sided) and the violence resembles a transition to warfare.49 There is one difference 
with warfare, however, Horowitz asserts: the forces in a recurrent riot do not fight each 
other directly, but instead attack civilian targets: 
It would almost be apt to describe a tacit agreement whereby the A paramilitary attacks B 
civilians, the B paramilitary attacks A civilians, and the A and B paramilitaries do not 
attack each other. 50 
But Poso differs from these recurrent riots in several important respects. Most will be 
explained in the body of this study; just a few of the key differences are noted here. 
Firstly, casualties in Poso did not escalate after the introduction of modem weapons. 
Instead, the most deadly period of violence (May-June 2000) took place before the use 
of factory standard firearms was widespread. Retaliation to each incident of violence 
actually decreased over time, starting from late 2002. While there were rarely sustained 
direct frontal clashes [after 2002], one of the intentions of much of the violence later in 
conflict appeared to be precisely to provoke renewed direct fighting. Finally, although 
Horowitz notes that the boundaries of discrete riots tend to blur in a recurrent riot, many 
of the cases he describes do in fact appear to involve discrete riots taking place several 
or many years apart. 
one or more group may have developed "habitual aggression". See Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, pp. 
407-411. 
48 Tambiah, Levelling Crowds, p. 214. 
49 Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, pp. 412,419. 
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As such I've chosen to refer to violent events in Poso as a "violent conflict", which I 
will often shorten for convenience to just "conflict" or the "Poso conflict". This is not 
an unusual choice for studies of post-Soeharto violence, but it is also necessary to 
offload some of the term's interpretive baggage. In the broader field of study of ethnic 
and religious violence, a number of recent studies have used "conflict" more broadly to 
refer to competition between individuals and groups, which these studies stress can be 
either violent or non-violent. 51 
Violence has generally been conceptualised - if only tacitly - as a degree of conflict 
rather than as a form of conflict, or indeed as a form of social and political action in its 
. h 52 own ng t. 
But as I am studying the processes by which violence escalated and then declined, and 
one of my key arguments is that the intensity of the violence does not simply follow the 
rise and fall of political competition, I see little risk of such conflation in this 
dissertation. 
The assertion that violence is qualitatively different from conflict then begs the 
question, what is "violence"? Brubaker and Laitin sum up the complexities of the term: 
violence is itself an ambiguous and elastic concept, shading over from the direct use of 
force to cause bodily harm through the compelling or inducing of actions by direct threat 
of such force to partly or fully metaphorical notions of cultural or symbolic violence. 53 
Most authors cited in this study (Brubaker and Laitin included) use the term in a narrow 
sense, however, similar to the primary Oxford English dictionary definition, "The 
exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or cause damage to, persons or 
property. "54 I also adopt this usage. 
A final point of terminology relates to the choice of an adjective to place before 
"violence", "violent conflict" and "conflict". In the opening sentence of this 
dissertation, I used the terms "inter-religious" and "inter-ethnic". Some recent studies 
would argue that both should be described by the adjective "ethnic", which these 
authors use to describe a wide range of ascriptive group identities that would otherwise 
50 Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, p. 420. 
51 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, pp. 24-25. 
52 Brubaker and Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence", p. 425. 
53 Brubaker and Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence", p. 427. 
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be further broken down into categories such as religious, racial, tribal and so forth. 55 I 
do not use "ethnic" in the broader sense, for two reasons. It is most common for 
speakers of Indonesian to clearly distinguish between religious conflict (konjlik agama) 
and ethnic conflict (konjlik suku or konjlik etnis), and I have not encountered use of the 
word "ethnic" to describe both. Additionally, it will at times be useful in this study to 
distinguish between "religious" and "ethnic" identities without resorting to an adjective 
such as "tribal" to describe the latter. 
While the focus of this section on terminology has been narrowly academic, I 
acknowledge the insight of scholars who remind us that choices of terminology can 
have real-world consequences. For instance, McAdam et al. argue, 
the naming and labelling of episodes ... [are] ... consequential political acts in their own 
right... For participants or their successors to decide that an episode qualifies as a 
revolution or as a huge riot makes a difference to the identities activated, allies gained or 
lost, governmental measures the episode triggers, and readiness of other citizens to 
commit themselves in the course of later political action. 56 
Brass has also argued convincingly that the interpretation of a conflict and its causes is 
"far from merely a verbal game".57 The prevailing interpretation of the conflict provides 
the basis for the response with tangible consequences for those involved: the 
government's interpretation in particular determines what problems it will address, who 
will be held accountable or even be prosecuted. That said, there are rarely prosecutions 
in the Indian cases that Brass considers, and he argues that "the wide dispersal of blame 
[through after the fact interpretation] masks responsibility and diverts the public gaze 
from the mechanisms that produce riots. "58 
Considered in this light, a discourse analysis of the Poso conflict or a study of the 
contested interpretations of violence in the district would be valuable and fascinating. In 
the interests of maintaining a sharp focus in this dissertation, it has not been possible to 
treat these issues in depth within this study, and I discuss them only in passing. 
54 Oxford English Dictionary Online (www.oed.com), accessed 22 August 2007. 
55 See Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, p, 1; Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, pp. 4-5. 
56 McAdam et al, Dynamics of Contention, p. 30. 
57 Paul Brass, "Introduction: Discourses of Ethnicity, Communalism and Violence" in Riots and Pogroms 
ed. Paul Brass (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 5. 
58 Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Riots, p. 306. 
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Methodology 
The issue of sources presents particular difficulties in writing about violence, and has 
prompted some spirited exchanges in the academic literature,59 as well as other 
contributions that are not overtly polemical. 60 Interpreting sources can be a long and 
laborious process, and there are more than a few gaps and controversies that can never 
be resolved to satisfaction. During six years of following the Poso conflict, I have 
myself observed how memories fade, versions of events evolve and important potential 
interviewees move out of the area, are not willing to talk, pass away or are even 
sometimes killed. The difficulties of researching violence are reflected in the many 
empirical inconsistencies between different academic studies of the one violent conflict. 
As a significant number of the empirical details of this study also vary from previous 
works on the Poso conflict, I have discussed the methodology I employed in compiling 
this dissertation at some length below. I have also noted in footnotes at a few points in 
each chapter where I am presenting a different account or detail to other works, along 
with a brief explanation of why I believe the account presented in this study to be 
correct. 
My pnmary source of information for this dissertation is more than 70 formal 
interviews I conducted in Palu and Po so during research trips in December 2001-
February 2002, July 2003, March-May 2004 and July 2007. I recorded most of these 
interviews, with prior consent from the interviewees.61 Except for a few short passages 
here and there where an interviewee preferred to speak in English, I conducted all 
interviews in Indonesian. The initial selection of interviewees was challenging, as there 
were few available secondary sources discussing the Poso conflict when I commenced 
my fieldwork. As such, I initially interviewed a broad set of respondents chosen on the 
basis of recommendations from local NGO activists, journalists and snowballing from 
the first people interviewed. Often, an NGO activist, community member or "off-duty" 
59 For instance, see the exchange between Allen Feldman and Richard Jenkins over Feldman's book, 
Formations of Violence in the journal, Current Anthropology. Richard Jenkins, "Doing Violence to the 
Subject", Current Anthropology 33,2 (Aprill992): 233-235; Allen Feldman and Richard Jenkins, "On 
Formations of Violence", Current Anthropology 33,5 (December 1992): 595-597. 
60 See, for example, Cribb, "Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia", particularly pp 
3-14. 
61 In a few instances the interviewee asked that no recording be made or I chose not to do so. The earliest 
recordings were made using a tape cassette; since 2003 I have recorded interviews on minidisc, which has 
the distinct advantages of better sound quality and a five hour capacity for each disc. It has proven 
invaluable to have clear recordings of interviews available years after I conducted them. In most 
interviews that I did not record, I took notes and then typed a more complete transcript at the first 
opportunity. 
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local journalist familiar to the interviewee would attend these initial interviews. In 
addition to my own initial interviews, a local journalist also kindly allowed me to listen 
to some interview recordings he had made while reporting on the May-June 2000 
violence. 
As my research progressed and my interest became more focused on combatants' 
contribution to the escalation and decline of violence, I began to interview 
predominantly people who had been directly involved in violence. Increasingly, I 
conducted these interviews without the presence of third parties, although interviewees 
often brought along a friend or, when interviewed in their home, were accompanied by 
family members. On my second and third research trips, some of the interviewees were 
serving sentences in prisons in Palu. 
Over all, around three quarters of the people I interviewed during these four research 
trips were based in Poso, and the number of Christian and Muslim interviewees was 
roughly even. Among various different categories of interviewees, it was hardest to 
arrange interviews with "outside mujahidin" (i.e. mujahidin who entered Poso from 
other parts of the country or even occasionally from abroad), and ideally I would have 
liked to have interviewed more individuals from this group.62 For the most part, I have 
not identified interviewees by name in this dissertation; indeed, many interviewees 
asked specifically that they not be named. Instead, I have chosen several different 
methods of attribution depending on my perception of the sensitivity of the cited 
information. Where possible I provide location, date of interview and some 
characterisation of the interviewee, but I have omitted any or all of these details 
whenever I judge it necessary. 
Between late-2004 and mid-2006, I also made four research trips to Palu and Poso in 
the course of my work for the International Crisis Group. During these trips I conducted 
additional formal interviews with senior police, local government officials, judges, 
prosecutors, community and religious figures, as well as combatants. I recorded very 
few of these interviews. I also took the opportunity on these trips to meet informally 
62 Once contacted, most potential interviewees were willing to be interviewed (during the research only 
three people- two Muslims and a Christian- refused). The more serious limitation to interviewing a 
large group of respondents was the reticence of interviewees to suggest other possible sources. 
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with some of the people I had interviewed during my dissertation-specific research 
trips. 
The individuals interviewed gave generously of their time, with some individuals 
consenting to be interviewed several times and interviews sometimes lasting several 
hours. The many interviews I conducted were an essential part of this research project, 
and I believe these interviews have yielded rich material, as I hope the reader will agree 
upon reading the excerpts provided in the text. But I am also aware of the limitations of 
the interview as a critical tool in a situation of ongoing violent conflict. It is the 
privilege and at once the challenge of writing a contemporary history to be able to 
interview those who participated in the events under study. The limitations of 
interviews have been widely remarked upon by researchers of violent conflict, and I 
mention only a few of the most salient difficulties here. Interviews are not readily suited 
to use in isolation as "event histories", as they self-evidently reflect the interviewee's 
point of view, which in highly polarised conflicts can produce partisan accounts.63 One 
particular narrative of an event may quickly gained precedence as the community's 
"accepted" account, or a frequently told narrative may crystallise into its most 
compelling form. 64 The emotional weight of interview material or the fear of breaking 
rapport with the interviewee may sometimes lead the interviewer not to ask critical 
questions. 65 Information conveyed as a confidence may appear to hold extra credence, 
but simultaneously becomes more difficult to verify.66 Similarly, one sometimes faces 
limitations in how one can phrase a question, when it is based on information or 
documents that the interviewer may not wish the interviewee to be aware are in the 
interviewer's possession. To disclose this information would beg the difficult questions: 
Who is your source? Who gave you that document? The researcher does not have a free 
hand to ask just any question, and to enquire about particular topics may be counter-
productive. 67 
63 For a discussion of this point in the context of Northern Ireland, see Jenkins, "Doing Violence to the 
Subject", p. 234; Feldman and Jenkins, "On Formations of Violence", p. 595. 
64 Gyanendra Pandey, "In Defense of the Fragment: Writing About Hindu-Muslim Riots in India Today", 
Representations, 0,37 (1992): 36; Antonius C. G. M. Robben, "The Politics of Truth and Emotion" in 
Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival ed. Carolyn Nordstrom and 
Antonius C. G. M. Robben (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 93-94. 
65 Robben, "The Politics of Truth and Emotion", pp. 83, 93. 
66 Robben, "The Politics of Truth and Emotion", p. 94. 
67 Compare with Sluka and Feldman (as cited in Lee), who each emphasised the importance to successful 
research of not enquiring about certain "things, places and people" such as "arms an explosives or the 
identity of [IRA] members" during fieldwork in Northern Ireland. See Raymond M. Lee, Dangerous 
Fieldwork, (California: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 18. 
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As such, throughout my research I also sought to collect other video and written 
material to cross-check, contextualise, supplement and enrich the interview information. 
These materials were also an important aid to guide selection of interviewees and 
interview questions. Video has emerged during the second half of my research as an 
increasingly important research resource. For developments after 2004 in particular, 
local NGOs kindly shared parts of their increasingly extensive Poso-related video-
footage archives. Most private television networks now have contributing cameramen in 
Poso, and websites of Indonesian channels such as SCTV and MetroTV often post 
excellent video footage online of events in Poso and interviews with local figures. 
Written materials included media clippings, police reports, interrogation dossiers and 
court documents, reports by government agencies on the violence, reports or documents 
written by other observers or partisans and a small number of leaflets circulated during 
the conflict. 
I was able to collect an extensive set of media articles on Poso from various sources. 
NGOs and private individuals in Central Sulawesi often had extensive clipping archives 
of provincial press publications including the daily newspapers Mercusuar, Radar 
Sulteng and Nuansa Pos as well as weekly or monthly publications such as Mingguan 
Al-Khairaat and Formasi. The newspaper archive of the National Library of Australia 
had complete collections of most national media and the South Sulawesi-based daily 
newspaper, Pedoman Rakyat. Many back issues of Indonesian media can also be 
accessed online in one way or another. Media affiliated to religious groups concerned 
with Poso have at times been posted online, available from the groups themselves or 
else private individuals have generously provided copies. Local NGOs have also 
periodically produced newsletters detailing the results of their field investigations or 
else aimed at peace building. Admittedly, I have found much of this media reportage of 
the Poso conflict to be inaccurate, with large parts of it also overtly partisan. Reportage 
remains a useful source of comparative material, however, particularly when several 
different accounts of a single event are available, or when reportage can be compared 
with other sources of information. The media is also a useful source of interviews with 
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some combatants, witnesses and state officials, although the transcripts of these 
interviews in newspapers are rarely verbatim accounts. 68 
Police interrogation dossiers (called "Berita Acara Pemeriksaan" and typically referred 
to by their acronym, B.A.P.) can be a valuable source ofbiographical information and 
can also help in formulating interview questions. In Indonesia, interrogation dossiers 
contain the pre-trial statements to interrogators of all potential prosecution witnesses, as 
well as records of the questioning of the suspect( s ), and details of other evidence. In the 
years I have been collecting them, these documents have been getting progressively 
longer, and often now run to more than 500 pages. The information in these dossiers 
must be treated with particular caution, however. The depositions are typically not 
verbatim records of the answers of witnesses and suspects. Answers are usually neatly 
formulated and one can often find cut-and-paste passages in the depositions of different 
witnesses in the one dossier. It is also generally not possible to know the circumstances 
under which the depositions were made. In some conflict-related trials, witnesses have 
withdrawn their depositions when called before the court, on occasion with good 
reason. Wherever possible, I have used information from interrogation dossiers only in 
comparison with other sources. 
I have also collected copies of dozens of court decisions from Poso cases as well as 
some prosecution sentencing requests, defence pleas and appeal documents. District 
court judgments, sentencing requests and defence pleas each typically contain 
summaries of witness testimony from the trial. Although not verbatim transcripts, I have 
found these summaries of testimony to be a useful source to cross-check information 
from interviews, media reportage and interrogation dossiers. 69 
68 Where I was able to compare the recordings of media interviews with the transcripts that appeared in 
local media, some media had actually added several (falsified) sentences to interview answers, and not 
just paraphrased answers for brevity or clarity. 
69 To provide one example, the Palu District court decision in the case of Herman Parimo, a Protestant 
man who died in 2000, confirmed a cash payment to him by a Christian bureaucrat during the first period 
of violence in Poso (see Chapter 2). I first came across a report of this payment in a report from a by then 
defunct newspaper. By the time I read the report, Herman Parimo had passed away. The bureaucrat 
refused an interview when first contacted, and I did not clarify the matter to my satisfaction when I was 
able to interview the bureaucrat in 2004. In the records of testimony in the court decision, however, both 
Parimo and the bureaucrat acknowledge the payment, confirming the reportage. The Supreme Court 
decision in Parimo's case also proved to be the only source I could find which provided the date of his 
death. 
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I have also made more limited use of copies of police reports and government reports. I 
have only cited these documents where I am confident of their authenticity, or else 
where doubts persist, they are noted in the associated footnote. The level of mundane 
detail each of these reports contain, apparent correspondence with other sources and 
lack of obvious advantage to any imagined forger's interests contribute to my 
impression that they are authentic. 
Finally, living in Jakarta has itself presented opportunities to collect extra materials. 
NGO activists often pass through the city or come to hold protests, sometimes 
accompanied by Poso community members. I also attended several trials of suspects 
from Poso which were held in Jakarta in 2006-2007, and engaged two research 
assistants to follow further trials in Jakarta and Palu in mid to late 2007. Testimony in 
these trials yielded additional material on the motivations of combatants who carried on 
with violence after 2002, and also provided the opportunity to observe several victims 
of violence in May 2000 and July 2001 testify about their experiences. Attending these 
trials and comparing what I witnessed with what appeared in the written documents 
from those trials also helped me to better interpret documents from earlier trials that I 
did not attend. 
In broad terms then, my method has been to practise triangulation, as all researchers do 
to varying extent. Beyond this broad characterisation, however, I would like to provide 
a few specific examples of techniques that I have found more or less useful as an aid to 
researching and writing about Poso. 
The first is the question of dates. There is often confusion between different texts on 
when particular incidents happened, for instance whether the third period of violence 
started on 23 May 2000 or 24 May. This problem is compounded by a feature of 
Indonesian language that appears curious to a native speaker of English, namely that 
"malam 23 May" may actually refer to "night-time on 22 May". The best method I have 
found to deal with such confusion is to search the newspaper archives for the earliest 
report of a particular incident, and thereby attempt to "disprove" all but one of the 
possibilities. For the example of the third period, the earliest reports appeared m 
newspapers dated 24 May, which leaves 23 May as the only possible option. 
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Not all inconsistencies are as simple as the dates of reported incidents, however. Often 
it is a matter of choosing between different details in partisan or incomplete accounts of 
events. Natalie Zemon Davis suggests one interpretive approach in her work on 
sixteenth century violence in France: 
I have taken especially seriously descriptions of Catholic violence coming from Catholic 
writers (as in the Memoires of the priest Clause Raton) and descriptions of Protestant 
violence coming from the Histoire ecclestiastique. These sources are not necessarily 
telling the whole truth about their party's violence, but at least we can assume that what 
they positively describe did occur. 70 
Davis's observation can be a useful rule of thumb, but there are exceptions. For 
instance, exaggerated or fictitious accounts of violence perpetrated by one's own side 
may be useful as propaganda or else serve the interests of the perpetrators in other 
ways. 71 A clear example from Po so is the story of Abdullah/ Ahmad, which I have found 
in two different jihadist publications published six months apart as "The Story of 
Abdullah Single-Handedly Fighting 3 Enemies" and "Ahmad: A Poso Mujahid Who 
Escaped the Toyado Abductions".72 The common passage from each story is an account 
of Abdullah/ Ahmad killing a Christian adversary with a machete in Malei Lage village. 
This is the earlier version of their fight, told in the third person: 
Abdullah (not his real name), who took part in the battle at Malei Lage, left his house 
carrying a home-made gun and a machete slung at his waist. When the two forces were 
face-to-face and bullets began to fly, looking for their prey, Abdullah started to move 
forward with his weapon through a burned-out house. Unsuspected by Abdullah, three 
Christians appeared at a window that had not been burned, each carrying a machete and 
one of them with a home-made gun. The Christian pointed his gun at Abdullah from a 
distance of only seven metres, but the weapon just made the sound "click". Abdullah 
immediately fired his weapon at the Christians, but it also jammed. One of the Christians 
took this opportunity to draw his machete to attack Abdullah. Like a wild boar he lunged 
at Abdullah and swung his machete towards Abdullah's head, but Abdullah avoided this 
attack and was able to wound the Christian in the forehead. An intense one-on-one duel 
followed, with each man armed with a machete. Initially Abdullah was forced back and 
fell flat on his back in a ditch after tripping on a tree root. The Christian took advantage 
and again swung his machete at Abdullah's head. Abdullah could not evade the blow and 
70 Natalie Zemon Davis, "The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth Century France", Past and 
Present 59 (May 1973), p. 55. 
71 For instance, Schulte Nordholt broaches the possibility that the casualty figures produced by an official 
investigation of the 1965-66 anti-communist purge may actually be exaggerated, as the result of a 
"bureaucratic attitude to please one's superiors by reporting that the project to annihilate the PKI (Partai 
Komunis Indonesia- Indonesian Communist Party) was completed successfully." See Henk Schulte 
Nordholt, "A Genealogy of Violence" in Roots of violence in Indonesia, ed. Freek Colombijn and 
Thomas Lindblad, (Leiden: KITL V Press, 2002), p. 44. 
72 See "Karamah Mujahidin: Kisah Seorang Abdullah Melawan 3 Orang Musuhnya", 
\VWw.mubarizin.netiBahasan UtamaiPosoiPoso Eds 13/poso eds 13.html (accessed via Wayback 
machine); "Ahmad: Mujahid Poso Yang Lolos dari Penculikan Toyado", BUNYAN, January 2002, pp. 23-
24. Fittingly each account states explicitly that Abdullah/Ahmad is not the man's real name. 
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was forced to block it with his elbow, and fresh blood flowed forth. Seeing this, the 
Christian was more eager still to repeat his attack. Even though flat on his back, Abdullah 
was able to avoid this second attack and moreover was able to swing his machete into the 
Christian's neck and the man fell next to Abdullah, with fresh blood gushing from his 
arteries. Afterwards, it turned out that villagers in Malei Lage knew the fallen man as a 
key figure in the Christian forces who had often spread terror among local Muslims. One 
by one he people of Malei Lage hugged and congratulated Abdullah and gave praise to 
Allah, who had helped them via Abdullah's hands. 
A slightly different account appears in the later publication, this time narrated in the 
first person by "Ahmad".73 This time the battle is just part of Ahmad's experiences in 
Poso, as he has by then also escaped the Toyado abductions, in which six Muslims were 
killed. Neither account gives a date for the Malei Lage clash, but they clearly refer 
either to an attack on 30 June or 1 July. Press coverage of these attacks does provide a 
kernel of truth on which the story could centre, as a Christian man in his sixties was 
reportedly killed by machete on 30 June. The Muslim men I interviewed who took part 
in these attacks, however, said matter-of-factly that one Christian died in each attack, 
but told no story resembling Ahmad/Abdullah's deeds.74 Although I cannot be 
absolutely certain, I thus believe we can conclude that the Ahmad/ Abdullah heroic duel 
is either a figment of the author's imagination (albeit one set within the context of real 
occurrences such as the Malei Lage attack and Toyado abductions) or else a greatly 
embellished version of events. The lessons for interpretation are to always be alert to 
how a narrative could serve the interests of the narrator, and to combine useful rules of 
thumb such as Davis's observation with efforts to gather as many different sources as 
possible for each event. 
A third set of interpretive techniques concerns my estimate of a total of 600-1000 
people killed during the Poso conflict. This estimate is not at the upper end of estimates 
of the death toll in Po so, with some media and academic accounts proposing a death toll 
of 2000 people killed. The challenge in establishing a death toll for events in the Poso 
conflict is perhaps less severe than for cases of violent events of much greater 
magnitude, but the variance between the lower and upper limits of my estimate should 
signal that significant difficulties remain. 75 Arriving at an estimate of the number killed 
73 Ahmad is seemingly the better fighter, as unlike Abdullah he is not wounded after tripping on the tree 
root. He also has an appreciative audience of both Muslims and Christians watching his duel. When 
Ahmad kills the man his Muslim spectators shout "Allahu Akbar" and the Christians flee. 
74 Interviews with Poso men, July 2003, April2004. 
75 For a wide-ranging discussion of the difficulties in establishing the number of fatalities in cases of mass 
killings, as well as overview of some techniques to arrive at an estimate, see Robert Cribb, "How Many 
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is a very sensitive endeavour, as a particular figure runs the risk of being misinterpreted 
as an attempt to underplay or overstate the violence, 76 and I would like to briefly 
explain the rationale behind my estimate. The main source of uncertainty over the death 
toll in the Poso conflict is the third period of violence in May-June 2000, and to a lesser 
extent the remainder of2000 and 2001.77 For the years 2002 to 2007 good records exist, 
and the degree of uncertainty for these years amounts only to the possibility that just a 
few more or fewer people were killed, depending on the precise number of people killed 
in specific incidents of violence. During the May-June 2000 period of violence, 
however, there was an almost total breakdown of law and order in Poso for two weeks. 
The bodies of many of those killed during this period were dumped in the Po so river or 
else buried in mass graves around the district, some of which may not yet have been 
discovered.78 In writing about this period and its component incidents, I have attempted 
to identify local estimates of the death toll that can establish lower and upper limits for 
the possible number of people killed, and then compare these estimates against the 
available evidence. In the main text of this dissertation I give a figure of "at least 246" 
people killed during the May-June 2000 violence, a figure sourced from a report on the 
violence presented by the governor of Central Sulawesi. 79 This figure may well be 
conservative, given the government's presumed interest in downplaying the extent of 
the violence, and by quoting the governor's figure I assume that at least that many 
people, and most probably quite a few more, must have been killed. The challenge then 
is to seek an estimate of how many more may have died. To this end, I have established 
a rough upper limit by considering the estimates of fatalities made by survivors of the 
Walisongo massacre, the single worst incident during the May-June 2000 violence. 
These survivors made their estimates in the context of a legal investigation and court 
trial of some of the accused perpetrators of the massacre, and as such I feel it is unlikely 
that they would have had an interest in understating the number of people who were 
murdered. The head of the village where the massacre took place testified that 191 of 
his village's residents had been killed, a figure he obtained by subtracting the number of 
Deaths? Problems in the statistics of massacre in Indonesia (1965-1966) and East Timor (1975-1980)" in 
Violence in Indonesia, ed. Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhoefer, (Hamburg: Abera, 2001), pp. 82-98. 
76 On the political significance often attached to particulat death toll figures, see Cribb, "How Many 
Deaths?", p. 83. 
77 Apart from the third period of violence, difficulties arise for the remainder of2000 and 2001 because of 
incomplete reporting and conflicting death tolls for particular incidents of violence. 
78 For instance, in May 2006 in Tambaro village police exhumed seven bodies from a previously 
undiscovered mass grave dating to the May-June 2000 violence, based on information provided by a 
Christian man imprisoned in Palu. See "Polisi Bongkar Kuburan Massal di Poso", Kompas, 11 May 2006. 
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people registered as internally displaced persons from his village's pre-conflict 
population.80 To me, such an estimated upper limit for the death toll in the Walisongo 
massacre suggests that although it is likely that more than 246 people were killed during 
the May-June 2000 violence, it is unlikely that the number killed during this period was 
as high as three or more times greater than the governor's estimate. Although the 
information is incomplete and uncertainty remains, if the figure for the third period was 
several times greater, it might be expected that we would know of more massacres 
similar to that which took place at Walisongo, or given that Christian forces at the time 
did not appear to have a well-thought out plan to conceal the extent of the killings, we 
would expect more bodies to have been found. (A Muslim team that searched for bodies 
of the victims of the third period violence found 147 bodies between July and 
September 2000.81 ) An estimate of 600-1000 people killed for the entire conflict thus 
allows for the possibility of a significantly higher death toll than the governor's estimate 
during the May-June 2000 violence and its aftermath, while establishing some limit on 
the probable number of fatalities. 
Structure Of Dissertation 
The chapters of this dissertation are arranged in chronological order. Some chapters 
cover a single period of violence in Po so, while others cover two periods. I have divided 
the chapters so that each deals with a distinct aspect of the escalation and decline of the 
Poso conflict. 
Chapter Two examines the first two periods of violence in Poso in December 1998 and 
April 2000 respectively, which each took place before Poso became a site of protracted 
conflict. Among all the periods of violence in Poso, these two episodes are the most 
suited to analysis in terms of the moment of opportunity and uncertainty after 
Soeharto's resignation, when for a time it was unclear how individuals and groups 
would secure local-level access to the state. For one thing, in the violence of each 
period, there were clear and visible links to district-level politics. Yet Chapter Two will 
79 Bandjela Paliudju, Laporan Gubernur Propinsi Sulawesi Tengah tentang Pananggulangan dan 
Langkah yang Dilakukan Sebagai Akibat Kerusuhan Paso, Powerpoint presentation, no date. 
80 Record of testimony ofNgabidun Djaelani in Palu District Court Decision no. 459/Pid.B/2000/PN.PL 
in case ofFabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva and Marinus Riwu, 5 April200l, p. 31. For survivor 
estimates of specific incidents within the Walisongo massacre, see Chapter Three. 
81 See deposition ofJabar A. Salam in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, l3 October 2000, pp. l-3; record of 
testimony of Jabar A. Salam in Palu District Court decision in case of Fabian us Tibo, Dominggus da 
Silva and Marinus Riwu, 5 April200l, p. 32. 
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also highlight the shortcomings of a model of politically-motivated actors as an 
explanation for the violence. An important example that demonstrates some of these 
shortcomings will be the case of a prominent leader acting to perpetrate and encourage 
violence against his own political interests. 
Chapter Three examines the sudden, rapid escalation of the conflict. During two weeks 
in May-June 2000, the sites of violence spread beyond the district's capital, hundreds 
were murdered and religious identity mostly sufficed as a reason for an individual to be 
killed. By this period, the violence lacked discemable links to district-level politics. 
Both Christians and Muslims initiated some clashes, but the violence was 
overwhelmingly the result of a campaign of attacks on Muslims perpetrated by 
segments of Poso's Christian community. Christians formed a new combatant entity-
the kelompok merah (lit. red group) - to provide core combatants for this violence, and 
this chapter will examine the interaction between kelompok merah members and rank-
and-file combatants, as well as the motivations behind the violence. 
The May-June 2000 violence marked the point at which the conflict in Poso became 
protracted and threats to individual security on the basis of religious identity became an 
everyday concern. This period of violence also precipitated the entry into Poso of 
mujahidin from other parts of Indonesia and beyond; the entry of these new actors self-
evidently meant it no longer made sense to try to understand the violence simply in 
terms of the local political context. These men came to Po so to help the district's 
Muslims to defend themselves and indeed to strike back against Christians. But for the 
more established among the jihadist organisations to which these outside mujahidin 
were affiliated, Poso was also part of a broader struggle with goals not specific to the 
district. Chapter Four will examine the development of an alliance between local 
Muslims in Poso and outside mujahidin, and the implications of this alliance for two 
major periods of violence in 2001. One aspect of the analysis in this chapter will be to 
examine the motivations of the local men who fought with outside mujahidin and the 
extent to which these locals adopted the outsiders' agenda. 
Chapter Five examines the decline of violence in Poso, which can be observed from a 
decrease in the number of deaths since 2002 to 40 or less per year, and from the end of 
attacks perpetrated by large crowds after August 2002. This chapter will examine three 
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aspects of the decline of violence. First, the chapter will explore the pattern of central 
government interventions in the Poso conflict and the contribution of these 
interventions to the decline in fighting. The second part will be to explain why many 
combatants stopped fighting in 2002. Finally, this chapter will also examine the 
activities of a core group of local Muslim men and outside mujahidin who continued to 
perpetrate sporadic attacks even after most combatants had ceased to participate in 
attacks. In particular, I will examine what motivated these men to perpetrate violence 
and the extent of the space that remained for them to perpetrate attacks 
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CHAPTER TWO- RIOTS IN POSO 
Before violence started in December 1998, Poso had a reputation as a peaceful region. 
Besides the district's slogan of Sintuwu Maroso - "Strong When United" - Poso's 
reputation at the time is evident in the small number of police deployed in the area.1 
Different police sources put the number of personnel assigned to Poso in December 
1998 at between 169 and approximately 400 personnel, with one of these sources saying 
Poso was renowned as a safe area (daerah aman).2 To put these numbers in context, in 
1998 these police were guarding a population of approximately 420,000 people spread 
across almost 30,000 square kilometres or 44 per cent of the land-mass of Central 
Sulawesi province. 3 The district's peaceful reputation had in fact led to its main 
Christian town, Tentena, being chosen to host the 24th anniversary convention of the 
Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) in January 1997 when 
other locations in Sulawesi had been considered too unsafe.4 The choice now appears 
ironic to say the least. 
The district had not been free from violence in the earlier decades of the twentieth 
century. Schrauwers notes that battles against the Dutch, the hardships of Japanese 
occupation, incursions of Darul Islam and Permesta rebels and the murder of alleged 
communists all live on in the memories of either the district's middle-aged or elderly 
residents.5 The most recent of these horrors, however, took place in the 1960s, a time 
before the memory of the younger half of the population in 1998. Those authors seeking 
more recent and direct portents of the violence that has taken place from December 
1998 onwards have turned up only ephemeral disturbances and controversies on a much 
more limited scale. 6 How then can we account for the violence in Po so from 1998 
1 Translation from Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi", who attributes this slogan 
only to Pamona Utara sub-district. Schrauwers translates the term as "a strong sense of communal aid". 
See Albert Schrauwers, 'Through a Glass Darkly: Charity, Conspiracy and Power in New Order 
Indonesia" in Transparency and Conspiracy: Power Revealed and Concealed in (the) Global Village(s), 
ed. Harry G. West and Todd Sanders (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 136. 
2 Benjamin Mangkoedilaga, B.N. Marbun, Laporan Penugasan Ke Sulawesi Tengah (Palu dan Paso) 
tanggal 6 sampai dengan 9 January 1999, (Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 1999), p. 11, interview with a police 
source who was stationed in Poso in 1998, Jakarta, February 2004. 
3 BPS Poso, Kabupaten Paso Dalam Angka1998 (Poso: BPS, 1999), pp. 4, 61. 
4 Albert Schrauwers, Colonial "Reformation" in the Highlands of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia 1892-
1995, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), p. 226. Albert Schrauwers, "Through a Glass 
Darkly", p. 129. 
5 Schrauwers, Colonial "reformation", p. 227. See also Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso, Central 
Sulawesi", pp. 51-53. 
6 The two events that are commonly cited in accounts of the Poso conflict as prior religious disturbances 
are a controversy surrounding a 1992 essay written by a convert to Christianity regarding Islam, and a 
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onwards? This chapter takes up this question for the first two periods of violence in 
Poso. Respectively, these were four days of rioting in December 1998, culminating in 
widespread arson attacks (the first period), and five days of rioting sixteen months later 
in April2000, during which six people were killed (the second period). 
In Chapter One, I explained that existing accounts have identified a structural context 
for the Po so violence, a context which Po so shared with much of Indonesia immediately 
following Soeharto's resignation. Impending electoral reforms and decentralisation of 
government functions left local actors uncertain over how they could continue to seek 
and secure access to state employment and contracts, which were disproportionately 
important to Poso's economy. With the collapse of the Soeharto regime, local aspirants 
to political office would in many cases need to develop local power bases. Ethnicity and 
particularly religion stood out as possible local sources of power in Poso, where 
competition for bureaucratic positions had in any case taken place along religious lines 
during the last years of Soeharto' s rule. The consensus amongst most observers of the 
Poso conflict is that within this structural context, local actors seized upon two moments 
of political opportunity to seek gains through violence. 7 The first period of violence 
took place in the midst of the search for a new district head (the senior elected official 
in Po so), whereas the second period coincided the appointment of a new district 
secretary (the district's senior career bureaucrat). 
The coincidence of the first two periods of violence in Poso with moments of political 
contestation and opportunity parallels one of the general patterns of inter-religious and 
inter-ethnic riots observed in South Asia. 8 The literature on South Asia is worth 
fight between youths in which a mosque was pelted with rocks in 1995. A fight between migrants from 
Flores and Bali in which four people were killed also took place in 1990 in a different part of what was 
then Po so district, but this is never mentioned as an antecedent to the Poso conflict. Indeed, it is unlikely 
that this fight would even be remembered, but for the fact that one of the men imprisoned after this fight 
was Fabianus Tibo, who was executed in 2006 for his involvement in fighting in Poso in 2000. For 
references to the 1992 and 1995 incidents as antecedents of the 1998 violence, see Sulaiman Mamar et al, 
Respon Meliter Terhadap Konflik Sosial di Poso, Unpublished Research Report, Yayasan Bina Warga, 
November 2000, pp. 42-43; Front Solidaritas Islam Revolusioner (FSIR) Palu, Derita Muslim Poso: 
Derita Kita Semua, unpublished manuscript, (Palu: FSIR, 2000), p. 1; Lasahido et al, Suara dari Poso: 
Kerusuhan, Konflik dan Resolusi (Jakarta: Yappika, 2003), pp. 39-40. 
7 See Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi", p.77; Aragon, "Mass Media 
Fragmentation", p. 5; Lasahido et al, Suara dari Poso, p. 55; Gerry van Klinken, "New Actors, New 
Identities: Post-Suharto ethnic violence in Indonesia" in Violent Internal Conflicts in Asia-Pacific: 
Histories, Political Economies and Policies, ed. Dewi Fortuna Anwar et al (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor 
Indonesia, LIPI, LASEMA-CNRS and KITL V -Jakarta, 2005), pp. 83-84; Lembaga Lintas Sara, 
Kerusuhan Poso II: Dalam sebuah investigasi, Y ogyakarta, 30 June 2000, p. 5. 
8 On this point, see Brass, Theft of an Idol, pp. 17-18; Tambiah, Levelling Crowds, pp. 224-230 
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discussing briefly because most foreign observers writing on the post-Soeharto violence 
have consulted it. Among this literature. Brass's observations on Hindu-Muslim riots in 
India have been particularly influential. Brass argues that local politicians and 
associated "riot specialists" routinely produce Hindu-Muslim riots when opportunities 
arise for them to make political gains through violence. These politicians instigate riots 
because they are the most effective strategy to "produce communal solidarity to gain 
electoral advantage".9 Brass thus shares van Klinken's conviction that elite actors in 
riots are essentially motivated by political interests; in Brass's words, 
political rationality on the part of the principal riot producers is critical: the ends in view 
are clear, the prospects of success reasonable enough to make the effort worthwhile, and 
the results often enough precisely what are desired. 10 
Among observers of Poso, Aragon has articulated a version of this political argument 
most fully and clearly. Aragon characterises the conflict as a fight about the "political 
economy of being Protestant (or Catholic) and Muslim" .11 The chief villains in 
Aragon's account are urban factional leaders - "Pamona-affiliated Protestants and 
Bugis-affiliated Muslims"- who mobilised rural supporters to fight through religious 
solidarity and economic patron-client ties. 12 Aragon succinctly outlines the motivations 
of these leaders: 
In hindsight, analysts can see that the Poso conflict escalated because entrenched district 
executives, who faced newly competitive elections, tried to protect their candidates and 
business profiteering through slanderous fliers and the mobilisation of voters by 
religion. 13 
As with Brass's analysis, most agency appears to rest with these elites, as the "actions 
of a few political leaders or "big fish" led to severe losses for tens of thousands of 
people" or in a later formulation, "Playing the cards of religious identity politics among 
sensitive ethnic constituencies brought predictable votes, but also uncontrollable 
violence."14 
9 Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India, p. 367. 
10 Paul Brass, "Response to Thomas Hansen", Ethnicities 6,1 (2006): 115. 
11 Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi", p. 47. 
12 Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi", p. 77 
13 Aragon, "Mass Media Fragmentation", p. 5. 
14 First quote: Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi", p. 79; second quote: Aragon, 
"Elite Competition in Central Sulawesi", p. 50. 
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This chapter acknowledges many of the links between both periods of violence and 
local politics as set out in existing accounts, and I will present my own version of the 
political machinations surrounding the first two periods of violence. But in doing so, I 
would like to suggest two necessary modifications to the idea of the December 1998 
and April 2000 violence as politically motivated. Principally, I will argue that neither 
leaders nor rank-and-file were so detached as to perpetrate violence simply to win 
political contests. Instead, we need to consider how pre-existing tensions, and each 
incident of violence as it occurred, affected decision-making. 
Second, I would like to challenge the "big fish" metaphor, where hapless rank-and-file 
fight for elite interests. I agree that leaders have more agency than rank-and-file to 
influence the course of the violence, but I believe we need to shift our analysis from 
"manipulation" towards a coincidence of interests. 
Political Context- The First Period- December 1998 
The accusations of political manipulation in the first period of violence in Po so - which 
ran from 24-28 December 1998 - centre on the election of a new district head. This 
election was due to be held in 1999; under the system at the time, the district head was 
chosen by the district legislature. This 1999 district head election was of course to be 
the first since the collapse of Soeharto's regime in May 1998. The incumbent, local 
Muslim man Arief Patanga, could not seek re-election as he had served two five-year 
terms. Patanga tendered his "letter of resignation" in mid-December 1998, but this was 
merely a formal administrative requirement, and one that did not take immediate effect. 
His term in office did not end until June 1999, meaning the search for a successor was 
only in its very early stages when the violence took place.15 
Indonesia's electoral and local government laws were swiftly reformed after Soeharto's 
resignation but the effect on the process to choose a district head was not as profound as 
sometimes claimed. Patanga, for example, had won the district head position in 1989 
and 1994 through a process where the district legislature sent a list of candidates for the 
post via the provincial governor to the Minister of Home Affairs who chose the 
winner.16 Even though the legislature placed the candidates in order of preference, the 
15 Lasahido et al, Suara dari Poso, p. 40; "Suhu Politik Poso Panas Lagi", Formasi, 18-25 February 1999. 
16 This process is set out in Article 16 of Law no 5/1974 on the Key Points of Local Government (Pokok-
Pokok Pemerintahan di Daerah). 
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minister was not bound to accept this ranking and indeed often overturned it. In theory, 
this system enabled the central government to exercise tight control over who became 
district head. Even in the 1990s, however, there were just under 300 districts in 
Indonesia, and it seems plausible to suggest that Poso district was not always at the 
centre of Jakarta's thoughts. 17 Certainly the records of the 1994 district head election 
and the local political machinations that accompanied the compilation of a list of 
candidates to send to the provincial governor suggests that local political parties felt the 
outcome of this local process was significant. Patanga had dominated this 1994 election 
as the incumbent, securing top spot on the list of candidates put forward by three of the 
four Poso legislature "fractions". 18 Even so, there was a long-running dispute between 
political parties on which other names should be on the list the legislature would send to 
the governor, which in fact caused a delay in the finalisation of the list.19 Allegations 
were also raised around the time of the election that Patanga had bribed his way to 
victory for his first term in office from 1989-1994.20 Another attempt to discredit 
several of the candidates saw allegations surface that the candidates or their families had 
past associations with Communist-linked organisations. 
Considered in the light of these previous local contests between candidates, the new 
process to elect a district head under the regional autonomy legislation passed in May 
1999 does not appear so different. Instead of several candidates being chosen by the 
legislature, one of whom would be appointed by the minister, the 1999 law granted the 
district level legislature power to make the final decision on who would be their next 
district head. 21 In fact, the bigger change potentially lay in how the legislature that 
chose the district head would be constituted. New electoral laws (and associated laws on 
17 Fitrani et al provide figures of292 districts (including municipalities) in 1998, rising to 434 by the end 
of 2004. According to media reportage, 166 new districts had been formed between 1999 and late 2007. 
See Fitria Fitrani, Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser, "Unity in Diversity? The Creation of New Local 
Governments in a Decentralising Indonesia", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 41,1 (2005): 58-
59; "Lobi-Lobi Politik Warnai Penilaian Daerah Otonom", Kompas, 27 October 2007. 
18 DPRD Poso, Berita Acara Basil Kesepakatan bersama antara Pimpinan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Daerah Kabupaten daerah Tingkat II Paso dengan Pimpinan Fraksi-Fraksi DPRD Kabupaten Daerah 
Tingkat II Paso Tentang Bakal Calon Bupati Kepala Daerah Tingkat II Paso Masa Bhakti 1994-1999,24 
March 1994, pp. 1-2. 
19 See "Gubernur Suteng Coret Nama Pelima dan Malik", Surya, 15 April 1994, DPRD Poso, Berita 
Acara Hasil Kesepakatan Bersama. 
20 "Skenario Rusuh Merebut Kursi Bupati", MAL, Second Week, January 1999, p. 6. 
21 This process is set out in Articles 34-40 of Law no 2211999 on Local Government. Even before the law 
came into force, the government had stopped exercising its authority to determine the winner of district 
head contests. The system introduced by the 1999 law was replaced by direct election of district heads 
under a new Law on Local Government passed in 2004. The first direct elections for district heads were 
held in mid-2005. 
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political parties and the composition of legislatures) reduced the share of seats granted 
to military appointees from 20 per cent to 10 per cent and opened the election up to 
contestants other than the regime's Golkar party, the Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI) 
and the United Development Party (PPP).22 Under these new laws, 48 parties took part 
in the June 1999 legislative election. 
Again the continuities with the late New Order are at least as important as the changes. 
Golkar' s share of the vote declined significantly, but the party still won nineteen of the 
36 seats up for election.23 Golkar's victory in Poso was typical of its performance in 
Sulawesi more generally, which remained a Golkar stronghold in the 1999 elections.24 
The other two New Order parties, PDI-P and PPP, each won five seats.25 The remaining 
seven seats were spread between six different new parties. 
The district legislature's official preselection of candidates for district head had 
seemingly not started in December 1998. Of those rumoured to be interested in the post, 
district secretary Yahya Patiro, provincial-level Golkar politician Muin Pusadan and 
vice-district head Malik Syahadat had all made it on to the list of candidates sent to the 
governor five years earlier.26 As the district's senior bureaucrat, local Protestant Patiro 
was regarded as the early front-runner, with both his supporters and opponents 
acknowledging that Patiro' s support base extended beyond just Christians, with some 
Muslims east of the city also reported to favour him.27 Such support of course would not 
necessarily translate into votes from members of the district legislature. Patiro would 
need support from both religious communities to win. Until 1999, when the Morowali 
22 Under Soeharto, only these three parties had been allowed to contest each of the elections held since 
1977. For a summary of changes in the electoral laws and their implications, see National Democratic 
Institute, The New Legal Framework for Elections in Indonesia, 23 February 1999. 
23 The remaining four seats went to police and military appointees. In 1997, Golkar had won 27 seats of 
31 up for election, with 8 seats reserved for appointees. See Sumono, Perbandingan perolehan Suara 
Pemilihan Umum Anggota DPR Pada Pemilu 87, 92 dan Hasil Sementara Pemilu 97 Propinsi Daerah 
Tingkat I Sulawesi Tengah, nd. 
24 In the election for the national legislature, Golkar secured at least 43 per cent of the vote in all five 
provinces in Sulawesi, and more than 50 per cent of the vote in every province in Sulawesi apart from 
North Sulawesi. The party's national vote was 22.3 per cent. See Aris Ananta et al, Indonesian Electoral 
Behaviour: A Statistical Perspective, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), pp. 259, 
265. 
25 PDI-P (the extra P stands for "Perjuangan" (Struggle)) was one faction of the New Order PDI, led by 
Megawati Soekamoputri, one of the daughters oflndonesia's first president. Megawati's faction had been 
unable to participate in the 1997 election, after Soeharto illegally arranged her removal as party 
chairperson in 1996. 
26 "Gubemur Sulteng Coret Nama Pelima dan Malik", Surya, 15 April 1994; "Perang Dingin Patiro dan 
Malik", Formasi, 18-25 February 1999. 
39 
area was excised from Poso to become a separate district, Christians comprised only 35 
per cent of the population of the district compared with 63 per cent Muslims; after the 
excision, Christians accounted for 41 per cent (versus 56 per cent Muslims),28 and there 
were also fewer Christian legislature members than Muslims. 29 Patiro could not win if 
the poll became starkly polarised along religious lines. As it turned out, among the 
potential candidates for district head, it was Patiro's reputation that would suffer the 
most damage from the December 1998 violence. In the end, he did not make it onto the 
shortlist for the election. 
The riot 
The violence started with a brawl between two youths - a Christian and a Muslim - in 
the vicinity of the Darussalam mosque in the city ward of Sayo (See Map 1 ). It is clear 
that the Muslim, Ahmad Ridwan, suffered a knife wound to his arm at the hands of his 
assailant, Roy Runtu Bisalemba. 30 Beyond that basic fact, there are various versions of 
this initial scuffle: that Ridwan was attacked in the mosque itself, or on the verandah of 
the mosque, or that the fight took place near the mosque after which the wounded 
Ridwan ran inside, and that Ridwan had been unarmed and taken by surprise or that he 
had hidden a knife under the carpet of the mosque in expectation of a fight.31 
In explaining the escalation of violence, of course, the precise details of the initial brawl 
are not significant. Any fight between a Christian and a Muslim so close to a mosque 
(let alone inside one) would always be open to interpretation as a religiously motivated 
attack and could thus inflame inter-religious tensions. The specifics of the brawl 
mattered little to the rumours that spread throughout the district over the next few days, 
which in their most exaggerated form informed their audience that the imam of the Sa yo 
27 Interview with a prominent Muslim resident of Poso, July 2003, Interview with former residents of 
Poso living in Tentena, July 2003. 
28 Catholics, included in the Christian figures above, made up only 0.5 per cent of the population before 
Morowali was excised. BPS Poso, Kabupaten Paso dalam Angka 1998, p. 141 
29 A table in suggests there were more Christians than Muslims in the Poso district legislature for the 
1971-1977 period, but more Muslims than Christians in every legislature in the district since (table 
provides data up until the 1997-1999 legislature). Haliadi, Syakir Mahid, Jamaluddin, DPRD Paso, 1952-
1999: Studi Sejarah Parlemen Lokal (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Timur, 2004), p. 117. 
30 A photograph of the injured Ridwan appears at http://www.fica.org/hr/poso/picturesl.html, accessed 14 
April 2007. Roy was the son of the head of the Poso branch of PDI, but I have found no suggestion that 
this was relevant to his involvement in this fight. 
31 See, for example, FSIR, Derita Muslim Paso, p. 2; "Poso Mencekam, Bupati Diungsikan", Jawa Pos, 
29 December 1998; Mangkoedilaga and Marbun, Laporan Penugasan Ke Sulawesi Tengah, p. 2; 
interview with a Tentena resident, February 2002. 
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mosque had been hacked to death inside the building.32 The timing of the brawl also 
compounded its sensitivity - it took place late in the night on Christmas eve, which by 
coincidence fell during the Islamic fasting month in 1998. Yet despite the potential 
inherent in the religious "baggage" of the fight to inflame wider animosities, the 
immediate retaliation was in fact targeted at the specific perpetrator of the initial fight. 
This retaliation took the form of a small crowd of Muslims gathering to ransack several 
houses in Sayo before dawn on Christmas day, including that of the Christian youth 
Roy.33 
There was one more coincidence in the timing of the brawl - Christmas day was a 
Friday in 1998, meaning many of Poso' s residents would, depending on religion, either 
attend a church service or perform the Islamic Friday prayer within hours of the brawl 
and the first retaliatory attacks. Even before these worship services took place, the 
district's bureaucratic and security-sector leaders met and sought to head off any 
religious interpretation of the night's event. They duly declared the causes of the brawl 
to have been "purely criminal" (kriminal murni), which would have been readily 
recognisable to the local audience as the antithesis of religious tension in New Order 
parlance. Local religious leaders were then asked to convey the criminal nature of the 
brawl during their worship services; meanwhile Roy (and several others who had been 
involved in the brawl) were swiftly arrested.34 
Despite these efforts to contain the fall-out from the brawl, violence resumed in the 
afternoon following the Friday prayer?5 In public discussion of the brawl during these 
hours, the salient detail of the incident was that the Christian youth Roy had been 
drinking at the Chinese-owned Toko Lima store before fighting with Ridwan. Crowds 
returned in the afternoon to ransack Roy's house again as well as several homes owned 
32 This and other rumours are detailed in a chronology of the riot written from a Muslim point of view. 
See Kronologis Kejadian Kerusuhan Massa Di Kota Paso Pada Tanggal 25 Desember 1998. 
http://tragcdiposo.blogspot.com/2006/06/kronologis.html, accessed 14 April 2007. 
33 Interview with a Poso lawyer, February 2002, Kronologis Kejadian Kerusuhan Massa Di Kota Paso 
Pada Tangga/25 Desember 1998. 
34 Interview with a Poso lawyer, February 2002. Interviews with former Poso residents living in Tentena, 
February 2002, Record of testimony of Leo Mandayo in Palu District Court Decision no. 
412/Pid.B/1999/PN.PL in case of Herman Parimo (hereafter Parimo Decision), p. 11. 
35 Several Christians who at the time lived in the city said that after the message of criminality was 
conveyed in the Christmas services, Christmas day essentially passed without serious incident. Two 
chronologies written from the Muslim point of view describe the incidents detailed above, however, 
leading me to believe the Christians are mistaken in their recollection. For details of the Friday afternoon 
violence, see FSIR, Derita Muslim Paso, pp. 2-3 Kronologis Kejadian Kerusuhan Massa Di Kota Paso 
Pada Tanggal 25 Desember 1998 
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by his relatives, but they appear to have concentrated more on raiding each of the hotels 
and stores around town known to sell liquor. Toko Lima was one of the stores targeted, 
and one chronology lists thirteen different stores and hotels in several different city 
wards that were each damaged or even burned down on Christmas day. Many of these 
stores were in the city wards of Gebangrejo, Kayamanya and Moengko, which lay 
across the river from the part of Poso where the initial brawl had taken place and where 
Roy and his relatives lived. The stores in these three wards may have been targeted by 
Muslim youths who were unable to cross Poso' s main river bridge, which was being 
guarded by the security forces (See Map 1 ).36 
Map 1: Poso Town (Main Streets Only)37 
In response to these disturbances, the police then sent more personnel to Poso overnight 
to reinforce their relatively small permanent presence in the district. The provincial 
police chief, Colonel Soeroso, also himself made the four-hour journey to Poso from the 
36 Kronologis Kejadian Kerusuhan Massa Di Kota Paso Pada Tangga/25 Desember 1998. 
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provincial capital, Palu, to arrive just before noon on 26 December. 38 Soeroso convened 
a public meeting at the district head's residence, where it was decreed that the sale of 
alcohol would be banned in Poso with immediate effect. 39 A round-up of alcohol 
quickly commenced, and thousands of bottles were destroyed using heavy machinery in 
a ceremony in front of the district legislature building that aftemoon.40 Soeroso returned 
to Palu later that night. 
Poso's problems though were of course far from over. The initial brawl, the subsequent 
clashes and the round-up of alcohol had all heightened tensions between local 
Christians and Muslims. Not all Christians had objected to a round-up of liquor per se, 
but they were angered by the manner of its conduct: "We also supported the eradication 
of alcohol, but it was anarchic. Breaking things, and even starting to set things alight."41 
The result was that crowds of Muslims and Christians began to gather in and around the 
city, drawn in part by exaggerated rumours of what had taken place in Poso to that 
point. Many of the Muslims who carne into the city from surrounding villages gathered 
around the market in Gebangrejo ward, while the largest gathering point for Christians 
would eventually be several kilometres south of the city in Tagolu village:42 
We were sitting around at night in our village, when someone came in a car and said that 
a youth had been attacked in the Sayo mosque. They said attackers had used a machete 
and the youth was badly injured, and it had happened in a mosque. In our village we felt 
why did it have to be a Muslim, why would you attack them in a mosque, if there was a 
problem, it shouldn't have been [approached] like that. That's what made 300 people 
leave from my village for the city that night.43 
The rumour was that churches would be burned, that there was a group, they told us the 
Islamic community wanted to bum churches. So automatically this [provoked] a desire to 
defend, so the Christian communities around here, from other villages [as well], went 
down to the city. [The way to describe it] was that we wanted to help our friends in 
Lombogia who they said were going to defend [the churches].44 
37 All maps in this dissertation are aligned so that the top of the map is north. In Chapter Three, this 
means that in Map 4, north points to the right of the page. 
38 The extra police were two platoons of mobile brigade (Brimob) from the provincial capital, Palu. See 
Mangkoedilaga and Marbun, Laporan Penugasan Ke Sulawesi Tengah, p. 10. 
39 Mangkoedila and Marbun, Laporan Penugasan ke Sulawesi Tengah, p. 10. 
4° Kronologis Kejadian Kerusuhan Massa Di Kota Paso Pada Tanggal 25 Desember 1998, FSIR, Derita 
Muslim Paso, p. 3. 
41 Interview with a former Poso resident living in Tentena, February 2002. By 2007, the common 
objection raised by Christians to this liquor round-up was that it should have been police who confiscated 
the alcohol. 
42 One Christian city resident also suggested it was the influence of Roy's family and the affront his 
relatives felt at the damage to his house that motivated many Christians from other parts of Poso district 
to come to the city. Interview with a Po so resident living in Tentena, February 2002. 
43 Interview with a Muslim resident of village in Poso district, July 2003. 
44 Interview with a Christian resident of village in Poso district, July 2003. 
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Before charting the further escalation of violence, it is necessary to take stock of the 
developments thus far. The brawling, liquor round-up and arson had not been directed 
at overtly political targets. One could argue that the owners of the shops and hotels that 
had been raided may have been likely financiers for Christian candidates in the coming 
elections, although no-one I interviewed volunteered or confirmed this interpretation. 
Nor had anyone hoping to provoke larger clashes along religious lines attacked a place 
of worship, despite the potency of even the rumours of such an attack in mobilising 
crowds. We are left to question then whether the liquor round-up was itself deliberate 
and pre-conceived provocation. Certainly, rounding up alcohol had raised tensions 
between Christians and Muslims in Poso, and this may have been the intention. On the 
other hand, the round-up may not have been pre-planned: it is hardly surprising that 
local youths would be interested in rounding up liquor once given a pretext, and that the 
seizures were not orderly. Many of Poso's youths were given to drinking, and those 
involved in the round-up openly admit that there was ample opportunity to spirit away a 
proportion of the seized goods for personal consumption. 
If the significance of the liquor round-up and associated clashes are ambiguous, later on 
26 December events did begin to take on a political edge, as the role of some leaders in 
encouraging violence started to come into view. Firstly, in the late afternoon, local 
Protestant figure Herman Parimo and three other senior local Protestants went to see the 
district head Patanga at his residence.45 Parimo reportedly was a former member of the 
district legislature, and had joined the Central Sulawesi Youth Movement (GPST -
Gerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah) in the late 1950s and 1960s, a movement formed to 
resist rebellions to Poso's north and south.46 Parimo and his companions offered to help 
keep peace in the city by bringing in crowds (of Protestants) under the banner of the 
long defunct GPST. Needless to say, such a move could only have caused mayhem and 
Patanga declined the men's offer.47 Nevertheless, three village chiefs testified at 
45 Record of testimony of Leo Mandayo, Tangkuka Sambaeto, AriefPatanga, Herman Parimo in Parimo 
Decision, pp. 11-13,28-29,54. 
46 Various accounts of the Poso conflict list Parimo as a member of the district legislature (i.e. for the 
period, 1997 -1999) but his name does not appear in a list of the 40 members in a recently-published 
history of the Poso legislature. A relative also asserted that Parimo was not a member in 1998, but said he 
may have been in the 1970s. This, too, is puzzling, as Parimo's name does not appear in lists of members 
for the 1971-77, 1977-82, 1982-87 or 1987-1992 legislatures in either the district legislature history or a 
general history of Poso. See Haliadi, Mahid, Jamaluddin, DPRD Paso, 1952-1999 : Studi Sejarah 
Parlemen Lokal pp. 99, 105, 106-107; Hasan et al Sejarah Paso, (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana Yogya, 
2004), pp. 263, 267-268. 
47 One Parimo supporter asserted that Patanga had in fact asked Parimo to conduct a Christmas parade in 
the city during this meeting, and in so doing had trapped the unwitting Parimo for political reasons. This 
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Parimo' s subsequent trial that he came to their village to encourage them to send 
Christian crowds to the southern fringe of the city, testimony that Parimo did not 
dispute.48 There has been particular suspicion that Parimo was trying to start a political 
riot to somehow help district secretary Yahya Patiro's electoral prospects, because it 
later emerged that the Patiro had given Parimo Rp 5 million (approximately $700) in 
cash around this time.49 The timing of the payment does inevitably make it suspicious, 
but if the money was a fee to start a riot it seems a bargain price. 
Second, the same night, a rumour spread that Patanga's residence would be attacked. In 
response, some of the Muslim youths who had come to the city from surrounding 
villages chose to guard the house overnight. 50 This rum our was the antecedent of the 
campaign that would begin immediately after the first period to depict the violence as a 
campaign of insurrection by local Christian officials, including the front-runner for the 
district head post Yahya Patiro. 
Several hours after the provincial police chief returned to Palu on the night of 26 
December, the violence continued. Crowds burned tyres, a (Christian-owned) house and 
several motorbikes. Rival crowds from different neighbourhoods also threw rocks at 
each other the next morning, and several people were injured. As a result, a further 
peace meeting was held at Poso's government offices on the morning of27 December.51 
Delegates from the meeting- which again brought together local government, security, 
religious and community leaders - then visited one of the main points of confrontation 
between rival crowds: the 'Tentena' intersection in the Poso city ward Kasintuwu.52 At 
the intersection, they encouraged the rival crowds to disperse. That night, district head 
Patanga, district secretary Patiro, local military commander F. X. Suprapto and Po so 
police chief Deddy Woerjantono also went to Tagolu village- just south of the city-
seems a most unlikely course of events, and it is not corroborated by the court testimony of any of the 
participants in the meeting. Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
48 Another village chief said that Parimo sent his son as an intermediary for the same purpose, which 
Parimo did dispute. Parimo decision, pp. 14, 16, 32, 35. 
49 
"$" refers to Australian dollars unless otherwise specified. "GPST dan Tragedi 28 Desember", Palu 
Pos, Edition XXXI, pp. 1, 7. In court testimony, Patiro said the payment was a routine gift that he made 
to Parimo each Christmas; Parimo testified that Patiro had given him the money both because Parimo had 
just recovered from an illness and as a Christmas present. See Parimo Decision, pp. 23, 56. 
50 I have determined the timing of these events based on an interview with one of the youths who guarded 
the house, considered in comparison with chronologies of the first period. Nevertheless, there is still some 
uncertainty regarding the timing of the guarding of the house. Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
51 "Kronologis Kerusuhan Poso", Mercusuar, no date. 
52 Called the "Tentena" intersection because it is the point at which the road to Tentena begins. 
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and encouraged the sizeable crowd of Christians that had gathered there to disperse. 53 
By some accounts, the Protestant figure Parimo, who had met the district head the 
previous evening, was also asked to make a speech urging the crowd to leave, but 
dodged the request and instead left for the city. In his court testimony Parimo said that 
he did address the crowd, but agreed with other testimony that he left the meeting 
before its conclusion to enter the city.54 
The Tagolu peace meeting did not have the desired effect. Later that evening, two or 
more trucks full of Christians did in fact drive from Tagolu down into the city. 
Christians who were in Tagolu at the time typically say that the trucks "lolos" (lit. 
escaped), implying that those who entered the city on the night of 27 December were 
not under the control of recognised community leaders. 55 These statements are intended 
most specifically as a rebuttal of reports that Herman Parimo led the crowd, even 
though Parimo had offered precisely this form of "security assistance" to the district 
head the previous day. (These rebuttals notwithstanding, Parimo most likely did in fact 
lead the crowd.) The trucks displayed banners bearing the name GPST- the defunct 
youth movement Parimo had joined in the 1950s - and the passengers sang hymns while 
circling the city.56 The premise for this move into the city was that it was a "Christmas 
parade". It is true that one frequent celebration of certain religious holidays in Indonesia 
is for truckloads of youths to circle towns late at night making a commotion, but the 
plausibility of this particular convoy being a parade is well summed up by a Muslim 
youth who saw the trucks: "They said they were holding a Christmas parade but the 
funny thing was they were carrying all manner of things like machetes."57 One of the 
trucks reportedly headed for the port in Bonesompe, while the other headed for the 
market in the centre of the city.58 
53 Mangkoedilaga and Marbun, Laporan Penugasan Ke Sulawesi Tengah (Palu dan Poso) tanggal 6 
sampai dengan 9 January 1999, pp. 3-4. 
54 Parimo decision, pp. 54-55. 
55 Another interviewee phrased this as a specific denial of Herman Parimo's culpability: "If he was a 
leader why did some of the crowd get through when he was trying to stop them. That means some of the 
crowd weren't listening to him any more." Interviews with former Poso residents living in Tentena, July 
2003, interview with a former Poso resident living in Tentena, February 2002. 
56 In explanation of the appeal to Poso's younger generation of the symbol from the defunct 1950s 
movement, a youth who lived in the city in 1998 remarked, "[The symbol reminded us that] our parents 
had proven able [to fight back, so what about us]". Interviews with former Poso residents living in 
Tentena, July 2003, July 2007. 
57 Interview with a Poso resident, Poso, July 2003. 
58 Interview with former Poso residents living in Tentena, July 2003. 
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By this point, a crowd had gathered around Poso's central market with the idea of 
protecting it. As the truck approached the market along Poso's main street, this crowd 
clashed with those on the truck, and along with the police forced the truck back to the 
end of the road and then out of the city.59 (I have not found any account that provides 
details of the journey of the other truck to the port.) If there had been any plans for the 
crowds of either Muslims or Christians in and around the city to disperse, the entry of 
these trucks into the city made certain this would not happen. 
As day dawned on 28 December, the rioting of the first period reached its peak. Another 
group of Christians entered the city from Tagolu. Some accusatory narratives claim this 
crowd numbered as many as 2000 people, other eyewitnesses recall only a few more 
than one hundred people. 60 This crowd apparently came upon graffiti denigrating Jesus 
as they passed through one of Poso's main intersections. Some accounts attribute the 
Christian crowd's apparent attempt to attack Poso's marketplace to their anger upon 
seeing this graffiti, but it seems likely that violence would have resulted anyway once 
so many Christians had come into the city. 61 The main point of confrontation with a 
rival Muslim crowd came to be the bridge separating the two halves of the city. As 
those in the Muslim crowd gained ascendency and pushed Christians back from the 
bridge, they were then able to bum parts of the city wards of Lombogia, Kasintuwu and 
Sayo.62 More than 100 houses and other buildings were destroyed, and around 80 
people were injured in the clashes, including one Protestant man who was doused with 
petrol and set alight.63 Places of worship were not targeted in Poso, but a church was 
later burned in the provincial capital Palu on 30 December.64 The district head's 
residence also came under attack during the morning; both Patanga and district 
59 Interview with a former Poso resident living in Tentena, February 2002; Kronologis Kejadian 
Kerusuhan Massa Di Kota Paso Pada Tanggal25 Desember 1998. 
60 Interview with a Poso resident, July 2003. The number of trucks used to transport this crowd was a 
point of contention during the trial of Herman Parimo. A Muslim witnesses recalled seeing twenty trucks, 
Parimo and most Christian witnesses asserted that there were five. See Parimo Decision, pp. 39, 48. 
61 Mangkoedilaga and Marbun, Laporan Penugasan Ke Sulawesi Tengah, p. 2. 
62 Not everybody understood why particular houses were being selected. A participant remembered the 
pattern of burning as follows: If a person was influential, an influential person, then maybe their house 
would be sought, then that house would be burnt, but we didn't burn them all .... [What sort of figures 
were people after?] Oh, I didn't know what their names were at the time. Someone would say, this is so-
and-so's house, just burn it. This is his house here, burn it, ah, they were chosen one by one. Interview 
with a Poso man, July 2003. 
63 See "Mereka Diperalat Herman Parimo", MAL, First week, January 1999, p. 8. 
64 Mangkoedilaga and Marbun, Laporan Penugasan Ke Sulawesi Tengah, p. 6. 
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secretary Patiro were evacuated from the city for their own safety until late in the 
afternoon. 65 
During this peak of violence on 28 December, it seems clear that there were people 
among the crowds providing direction on who or what the crowd should target. Even 
after the crowd of Christians had been driven back, not all Christian owned houses were 
burned. Instead one Muslim man present in the crowd on 28 December recalled houses 
were being burned on the basis of the owner's social status. 
If a [Christian] person was influential, an influential person, then maybe their house 
would be sought, then that house would be burned, but we didn't bum them all [i.e. all 
houses in each ward] ... I didn't know what their names were at the time, someone would 
say, this is so-and-so's house, just bum it ... they were chosen one by one.66 
Beyond the targeting of the property of particular individuals, the breakdown of law and 
order during the peak of the riot also presented an opportunity to loot. There does not 
appear to have been a sharp religious divide among looters: 
In the first riot, when I came to the city, there were several of my friends there who were 
Christians, and we looted together in the terminal. At the time, Muslims' opponents were 
the [Christian] people who came down from Tentena, and Christians from Lombogia, 
who had their own group (blok). But Christians in Bonesompe, Gebangrejo, they came 
with us and looted.67 
Most people ... came empty handed, they didn't come from their villages looking for a 
war, they came to loot. There were no leaders, but people were in groups from each ward, 
68 Bonesompe, Lawanga, maybe 50 people. 
One interviewee also suggested the defence of Poso' s market from looting was a 
cooperative effort: 
Around the central market in Poso, the Christian and Muslim communities had 
intermingled. When the rumour spread that the community from around here [a Christian 
village outside the city] would bum the market and the area surrounding it [during the 
first period], Christians and Muslims banded together to defend the area.69 
65 A witness at the trial of Herman Parimo testified that she heard Parimo telling the crowd, "Take the 
[district head's] residence, abduct the district head, burn it." Several other witnesses gave similar 
testimony. See "Suara Aneh di Telinga Nurjanah", MAL, Fourth Week, September 1999, p. 7; Record of 
testimony ofNurjannah in Parimo decision, p. 35. 
66 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. A former Poso resident living in Tentena corroborated this 
selective pattern of arson, saying two of his family's houses had been burned while the neighbouring 
houses were left untouched. Interview with former Poso resident living in Tentena, July 2003. 
67 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
68 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
69 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
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Whatever the veracity of these specific claims, it seems clear that the identity of an 
individual as a Muslim or a Christian had not become a sole and sufficient basis to 
attack that individual during the first period of violence. There is no doubt that many 
people took part in the violence because they felt their religion, their places of worship 
or their religious community had been wronged. The above quote on the cooperative 
defence of the market notwithstanding, it is also clear that when crowds fought each 
other, Christians were on one side and Muslims were on the other. But a range of those 
present, both Christian and Muslim, indicated that away from the main sites of 
confrontation, people were not targeted just because they held one religion or another. 
One youth recalled the pattern of violence as follows: 
There were a lot of [unfamiliar] people, possibly from Ampana, from Poso Pesisir, from 
Parigi. 70 But it was easy to work out which side was which, as Christians were gathered 
in majority Christian areas, and vice versa. Also, most people from the villages were 
wearing white headbands to show they were Muslims, while Christians wore white cloth 
on their wrists. But at the time, there were still a lot of cases where Christians might be at 
the market when it happened [the fighting] and Muslims saved them, there wasn't mutual 
aggression, unless you happened to be part of the crowds throwing rocks at each other. 
Other people were left alone. 71 
Some of the Muslim youths who took part in the fighting also recalled the first period 
more as a fight between neighbourhoods than a community-wide confrontation across 
the religious divide: 
Some people did wear them [headbands], but only a few, because at the time, it was more 
an ethnic (suku) thing, rather than being religious, because we never discussed religion. 
We just said, our targets are Lombogia people and Toko Lima. 72 
We were looking for Lombogia youths, there was no problem with [youths] from Sayo, 
except for the ones who had caused trouble (mengganggu). It was just Lombogia 
residents, because they were the problem. 73 
The importance of identity markers other than religion accords with the common 
observation from other conflicts that the process referred to as "totalisation" - whereby 
an individual's status as friend or foe comes to be wholly defined by one identity 
marker alone- takes place only over time.74 It is also possible, however, that some of 
70 Ampana is a coastal town east of Po so, Po so Pesisir is a coastal sub-district west of the city (now sub-
divided into several sub-districts), while Parigi is the capital city of the neighbouring district to the west 
ofPoso. 
71 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
72 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
73 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
74 See for example, Valli Kanapathipillai, "July 1983: The Survivor's Experience" in Mirrors of Violence: 
Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia, ed. Veena Das, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
p. 341; Veena Das, "Specificities: Official Narratives, Rumour, and the Social Production of Hate", 
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the statements that downplayed the extent of the religious divide may have reflected the 
speaker's anxiety that fighting against a group because of their religious identity may 
not be legitimate, or may not be perceived as legitimate by the broader community.75 
Such an anxiety may account for one of the banners that appeared after the December 
fighting: "We have no quarrel with Christians, we are only fighting Herman Parimo and 
his followers"76 This message would be reproduced almost verbatim on another banner 
in a later period of conflict in Poso except with the religion of the target and the implied 
aggressor reversed. 77 
No-one was killed in the fighting in Poso in December 1998, despite the widespread 
arson and other property damage. Part of the reason lies in the weaponry used: crowds 
mostly just threw rocks at each other, and carried weapons no more sophisticated than 
machetes or at most peluncur (literally "launcher", a weapon used to fire arrows).78 The 
crudeness of the weaponry does not suffice to explain the lack of fatalities, though: it 
would become readily apparent approximately eighteen months after the December 
1998 violence that such weapons were quite adequate for widespread killing if wielded 
by men and women intent on murder. Another possible explanation was that the youths 
who fought in this first period were largely acting out the repertoire of violence with 
which they were familiar from previous brawls in and around Poso, in which there was 
seldom anyone killed. It would take a simple accident for the violence to escalate to 
murder, or the same sort of leadership that directed the crowd to target specific houses. 
The peak of the December violence lasted only one day, with the arson attacks after 
Christians had fled from the city marking the end of the fighting. The next day - 29 
December - the governor and provincial security leaders came to Poso and convened a 
peace meeting. 79 By this time efforts were well and truly underway to establish the 
identity of the culprits of the violence. Banners were put up around the city blaming the 
violence on Parimo, district secretary Patiro and other Christian officials. The following 
is typical of the genre, "Arrest and Hang Y ahya Patiro, Herman Parimo, CH Rongko 
Social Identities, 4, 1 (1998), pp. 109-130, Patricia Spyer, "Fire Without Smoke and Other Phantoms of 
Ambon's Violence: Media Effects, Agency and the Work of Imagination", Indonesia 74 (October 2002): 
28. 
75 For further discussion of this issue, see Chapter Three. 
76 Banner appears in picture in Palu Pas, Edition XVII, nd, p. 5. (Kami tidak bermusuhan dengan Umat 
Kristiani, tapi kami hanya berperang dengan Herman Parimo dan pengikutnya) 
77 See Chapter 3. 
78 Interviews with Poso men, January-February 2002, July 2003, April-May 2004. 
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and DA Lempadeli and their Cronies as Criminals, Insurrectionists, GPK. .. "80 A leaflet 
accusing Christian officials of insurrection also circulated around this time, allegedly 
authored (and certainly at least distributed) by Agfar Patanga, the younger brother of the 
incumbent district head.81 Agfar Patanga would much later serve a six-month sentence 
in prison over the leaflet. 82 Of those named in the accusatory banners and leaflets, only 
Parimo would be put on trial over the December violence. Facing a primary charge of 
leading a rebellion against the district government (Article 108 (2), Criminal Code), he 
was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment in November 1999, later reduced to 
fourteen years in his first appeal. 83 The precise length of the sentence proved to be 
immaterial, as Parimo fell ill in prison and died while being treated in Makassar in May 
the following year.84 The youth Roy and another Christian participant in the initial 
brawl on Christmas Eve also served prison terms. 
The second period 15 - 20 April 2000 
When a second period of violence took place in Poso in April 2000, the indications that 
some local elites deliberately provoked the violence were much clearer. For instance, a 
politician from Poso representing the Islamic party PPP in the provincial legislature 
issued a public warning two days before the violence began that rioting would be the 
result if a particular candidate for Poso district secretary was not appointed; the same 
warning had allegedly also been conveyed to the governor, H.B. Paliudju in private a 
week earlier. The violence in Poso again began with a brawl between Christian and 
Muslim youths, which this time appeared contrived even from its first moments: as one 
of the Muslims involved in the brawl fled, bandaged his healthy arm and began telling 
79 "Kasus Poso", Pedoman Rakyat, 30 December 1998, p. 11. 
80Banner appears in picture in Palu Pos, Edition XVII, nd, p. 5. On the term "GPK" (Gerombolan 
Pengacau Keamanan - Security Disturbing Gang), see Dave McRae, "A Discourse on Separatists", 
Indonesia 74 (October 2002): 41-43. 
81 It is less clear who Christians identified as Muslim villains immediately after the violence. One 
anonymous, unreferenced document contains a long list of almost exclusively Muslim provocateurs; 
prominent Christian church minister Rinaldy Damanik pointed the finger at local Muslim civil servant 
Damsyik Ladjalani in his prison memoir published around five years after the violence. See Rinaldy 
Damanik, Tragedi Kemanusiaan Paso: Menggapai Surya Pagi Melalui Kegelapan Malam, (Jakarta: 
PBHI; Palu: LPS-HAM Sulteng, 2003), pp. 17-18. 
82 "Vonis Bersayap buat Agfar", MAL, Third Week November 2000, p. 8. 
83 Decision of Central Sulawesi High Court (Pengadilan Tinggi) no. 36/PID/1999/PT.PALU in case of 
Herman Parimo, 15 November 1999. Article 108 (2): The leaders of a rebellion face penalties of life 
imprisonment or a fixed prison term not exceeding twenty years. 
84 It is common for Christians to assert that the Supreme Court acquitted Parimo. In fact, the court simply 
ruled that the prosecutor could no longer continue its case against Parimo as he had died. According to 
the court decision, Parimo died on 7 May. Aragon and van Klinken each assert Parimo died in April, and 
while I have adopted the date from the Supreme Court decision, it may be incorrect. See See Decision of 
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people he had been knifed. The police themselves clearly believed the violence had 
been deliberately instigated. They eventually arrested the youth who had bandaged his 
hand and also conducted a long-running investigation into one local Muslim contractor 
on the suspicion that he had organised crowds to engage in arson. 
This violence took place on a much larger scale than the December 1998 rioting: this 
time six people were killed, and almost the entire city ward of Lombogia, which had an 
89 per cent Christian population, was set alight. Four churches were also burned and 
another was heavily damaged. 85 Does politically motivated manipulation account for 
the violence reaching this new scale? And if provocation was so obvious - with the 
politician's comments being reported in the provincial press before a stone was thrown 
in anger - what motivated those who took part in the violence to do so? Also, with 
foreknowledge that plans were afoot to foment violence, why could the police and local 
government not stop the riot? 
Before addressing these questions directly, we return to the aftermath of this first period 
of violence to set out the political context for the April fighting. 
Political Context 
In the months after the December 1998 violence, as vanous investigations were 
conducted and the local media carried stories about the connections between the riot and 
the need to elect a new district head in Poso, the district legislature nevertheless set 
about preparing for its election of a new district head. This initiative was puzzling 
because the outgoing Patanga's term in office did not end until June 1999, about the 
time of the scheduled general elections for the district legislature. Under normal 
circumstances, the new legislature would have the responsibility for electing the new 
district head, and it was not clear that a new legislature would want to, or be obliged to, 
accept the work of the previous legislature. Not surprisingly though, not least of all 
given the potential financial rewards for its members, the existing legislature remained 
intent on itself nominating which candidates would comprise the final shortlist. 86 The 
Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung RI) no. 211/TU/55K/Pid/2000 in case of Herman Parimo, 28 
December 2004, pp. 11-12. 
85 Lembaga Lintas SARA, Kerusuhan Paso II: Dalam Sebuah lnvestigasi, Yogyakarta, 30 June 2000, p. 
11. 
86 For details, see "Suhu Politik Poso Panas Lagi", Formasi, 18-25 February 1999. A member of the 
legislature elected in 1997 explained that while he himself was above taking bribes, potential candidates 
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final five were Muin Pusadan (nominated by Golkar), Edy Bungkundapu and Marten 
Luther Manganti (PDI), Mashud Kasim (TNI-Polri) and Ismail Kasim (PPP).87 By the 
time the election was held on 30 October 1999, the field had been pared back further to 
just three candidates: Pusadan (a Muslim politician and academic based in Palu), 
Bungkundapu (secretary to the provincial legislature) and Mashud Kasim.88 
Before the nominations were finalised, however, there was still time for district 
secretary Yahya Patiro to attempt a political recovery. Like Patanga, Patiro had fled 
Poso at the peak of the December violence. With his name appearing on accusatory 
banners all around the city after the riot, he chose to remain in Palu. To secure a 
nomination for district head, he would obviously need to return to Poso and attempt to 
clear his name, which he did in late March 1999. Staying at the government-owned 
Hotel Wisata in the majority-Muslim beachside ward of Lawanga, Patiro took the 
opportunity to meet a group of local Muslim youth activists shortly after his arrival. 
However, upon learning that Patiro was in Poso another crowd of Muslims gathered in 
front of the Hotel Wisata later the same night and began throwing rocks at the 
building. 89 Patiro escaped over the back fence before the crowd could enter the hotel, 
which it later ransacked. With the help of a nearby resident he was taken to the local 
district military base (Kodim), after which he quietly returned to Palu with a police 
escort.90 He was subsequently transferred to the provincial civil service in Palu as an 
aide to the governor, with his political ambitions in tatters. 
By this stage, political aspirants in Poso must have thought violence to be a most useful 
tool. Moreover, there must have appeared to be few risks in perpetrating violence: in 
this Hotel Wisata case, for example, I found no record of any arrests. The police 
themselves inadvertently may have encouraged the idea that a willingness to deploy 
violence could bring influence. An example is the police's decision to consult widely 
with local Muslim, Christian and community figures on where to hold Parimo's trial 
for district head would treat him and other members of the legislature to trips to Palu and fine dining 
while there to lobby for each party's nomination. Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
87 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
88 I was unable to establish Kasim's background. In 2002, a Mashud Kasim was head of the provincial 
Housing and Regional Infrastructure Office (Kimpraswil), but I cannot be certain that it was this Kasim 
who ran for district head in Poso. 
89 'Yahya Patiro Dihadang di Kampung Sendiri', Formasi no 8, 2 Aprill999, p. 12. 
90 Interview with Yahya Patiro, December 2004. 
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and whether to take Agfar Patanga into pre-trial custody.91 In both cases, the police 
concern was that the wrong decision could cause violence. Yet by consulting with the 
public about whether violence was likely rather than just making the decision 
themselves, the police must have underlined to those they spoke to that violence could 
influence law-enforcement decisions. 
Nevertheless, neither the June 1999 legislative election nor the election for a new 
district head were marked by severe disturbances. The Muslim Golkar candidate 
Pusadan won the district head poll, collecting sixteen votes (three fewer than the 
number of Golkar members in the legislature), while Kasim received thirteen votes and 
Protestant civil servant Bungkundapu eleven.92 
One of the first tasks for Pusadan was to appoint a new district secretary (the senior 
career bureaucrat in Poso ). The post was keenly sought after, with the contest reminding 
us that different factions may compete even within the one religious group. Pusadan's 
favoured candidate was the third assistant to the district secretary, Awad Al-Amri, who 
was a Muslim of Arab descent, and whom Pusadan indeed eventually installed to the 
post. A vocal faction centred on PPP preferred the head of the district Development 
Planning Board (Bappeda), Damsyik Ladjalani, a Muslim from the coastal area east of 
Poso town.93 Christians suggested Ladjalani was implicated in the violence of the first 
period, and one observer suggested he was behind the March 1999 attack on Patiro.94 
However, provincial legislature member Haelani Umar campaigned actively for 
Ladjalani, sending letters of support to both the governor and Poso district head and 
repeatedly speaking approvingly of Ladjalani in the press.95 Ladjalani was also 
supported by some Muslims who resented what they saw as the domination of key posts 
91 M Situmorang, Laporan Atensia No. Pol. R/LA/03/VII/1999/Dit-Ipp, (Palu: Direktorat Intelijen dan 
Pengamanan, Polda Sulteng, 1999). 
92 Lasahido et al., Suara dari Paso, p. 44. Pusadan's victory has generally been referred to as a win for an 
"outsider", but by winning the district head post from a position in the provincial legislature he in fact 
emulated Patanga's path to the job when first elected in 1989. From 1987-1989, Patanga was deputy 
chairperson of the provincial legislature. See Hasan et al, Sejarah Paso, p. 281. 
93 Other short-listed candidates were the head of the Civil Registrar's Office, Nus Pasoreh, a Protestant; 
and Parks and Sanitation head Hengki Taroreh, also a Protestant. See "Berharap Damsyik Setelah Yahya 
Patiro", MAL, Fourth Week, February 2000. 
94 Sangaji, citing a media report, notes that Damsyik Ladjalani, now head of new district Tojo Una-Una, 
was suspected of organising this attack on the hotel. In Sangaji's account,the incriminating detail was 
Ladjalani's failure to follow an instruction from Arief Patanga, the outgoing district head, to inform the 
Poso police of Patiro's presence. Anto Sangaji, "Pertarungan Paska Soeharto" in Rumput Kering di Balik 
Anyir Darah, unpublished manuscript, March 2004, p. 3. 
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in Poso by Muslims from Bungku (a sub-district of the then newly excised Morowali 
district).96 Pusadan, the vice district head and head of the Poso legislature indeed all 
hailed from Bungku. To have raised the issue of Bungku domination in the context of 
the district secretary position appears disingenuous, however, as none of the short-listed 
candidates for district secretary were Bungku Muslims. 
Before the decision on a district secretary was made, however, Ladjalani was 
transferred to the provincial civil service to become assistant head of the provincial 
Development Planning Board in Palu.97 As Ladjalani's chances were thus perceived to 
have diminished, support for him seemingly escalated into threats. One chronology, 
which overall adopted a Christian point of view, alleged a delegation from the Poso 
branch of the Indonesian National Youth Committee (KNPI- Komite Nasional Pemuda 
Indonesia) met the governor on 9 April and threatened that if Al-Amri and not Ladjalani 
was appointed there would be further riots in Poso.98 Whether or not this meeting took 
place as described, five days later Halaeni Umar repeated the same threat in implicit 
form to a journalist from the provincial paper Mercusuar. In what has become an 
infamous quote, Umar stated, "I predict there will be another riot in Poso. And it might 
be bigger than what has gone before." The riot would take place, Umar stated, because 
the government had blocked community aspirations by not appointing Ladjalani as Poso 
district secretary.99 The night after Umar's comment was published, fighting in Poso 
resumed and, as Umar predicted, escalated to a greater scale than the December 1998 
period of violence. 
The Riot 
Trouble this time started at around !O:OOpm on 15 April 2000, a Saturday night. A 
Muslim youth, Firman Said alias Dedi approached two Christian youths buying 
cigarettes near the Tentena intersection, which it is worth repeating is in Poso, not 
95 See "Haelani: Damsyik Layak Jabat Sekwilda Poso", Mercusuar, 28 February 2000; "Berharap 
Damsyik Setelah Yahya Patiro, MAL, Fourth Week, February 2000. 
96 For an example of a statement of ethnic support for Ladjalani, see "Berharap Damsyik Setelah Yahya 
Patiro", MAL, Fourth Week, February 2000. 
97 "Poso Bakal Rusuh Kembali", Mercusuar, 15 April2000. 
98 In theory though, if the selection of the district secretary took place under the new regional autonomy 
law, the governor should not have played a role in the selection process. Cheq and Recheq Forum, 
Tragedi Kemanusiaan di Paso, p. 5. 
99 "Poso Bakal Rusuh Kembali", Mercusuar, 15 April 2000. 
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Tentena. An altercation ensued and Dedi punched one of the youths. 100 Around an hour 
later, Dedi returned to the intersection on a motorbike with two companions and 
dragged a samurai sword along the asphalt. The Christian youths, some of whom were 
waiting with knives, took exception to this and chased Dedi, who fell off the motorbike. 
Dedi then ran away on foot, leaving the motorbike behind, although not before he, his 
two companions and the Christian youths had paused to throw rocks at each other. Dedi 
most likely then ran to the nearby Muslim majority ward Lawanga. Returning to the 
scene, the Christian youths apparently handed the motorbike to police at this point. 
A few minutes later, a small crowd of around 30 Muslims from Lawanga and 
Kayamanya themselves came to the scene, carrying machetes, peluncur and blocks of 
wood. Dedi was among them, having bandaged his arm to give the impression he had 
been knifed in the earlier encounter. The police managed to avert more serious trouble 
for the moment, however, by keeping the two crowds apart and convincing people to go 
home. 
At around 10:30 the next morning, Sunday 16 April, a group of youths from Lawanga 
began to engage in the same sort of anti-liquor drive that had marked the early moments 
of the first period, but this time on a smaller scale. After seizing liquor from several 
locations, including a Muslim-owned store in Lawanga, they poured some of the liquor 
out onto the road and destroyed some of the bottles in the car park of the district 
legislature (DPRD) building. 101 Not long afterwards, a group of around 25 Muslims 
returned to Lombogia, seemingly looking for Angki Tungkanan, one of the Christian 
youths who it was rumoured had attacked Dedi the previous night. 102 The arrival of 
these youths in Lombogia at an hour when Christian worshippers were still at the Pniel 
100 Substantially the same chronology of these events is reproduced in Lembaga Lintas SARA, Kerusuhan 
Paso II: Dalam Sebuah Investigasi, pp. 7-11; FSIR, Derita Muslim Paso, pp. 8-13; Lasahido et al, Suara 
dari Paso, pp. 47-51, Ecip and Waru, Kerusuhan Paso yang Sebenarnya, pp. 30-36. All of these reports 
in fact appear to have adopted the Crisis Center GKST chronology of the second period without 
attribution and with only minor modification. For the original GKST document, see Rinaldy Damanik et 
al, Kronologis Peristiwa Kerusuhan Paso (II) April2000, (Tentena: Crisis Center GKST, 1 May 2000). 
101 Basic details of the liquor roundup appear in the oft-repeated GKST chronology. The details regarding 
the shop in Lawanga and the DPRD building are drawn from what appears to be an earlier draft of the 
police report cited in footnote 106. The draft is not signed or dated, however, and these details do no 
appear in the final version. The draft may be inauthentic. See Suratmo S, Laporan Khusus ttg Keurushan 
dan Bentrokan Kelompok Massa di Kota Paso tanggal 15 April sld 19 April 2000, (Palu: Direktorat 
lntelijen dan Pengamanan Polda Sulteng, 2000), p. 3. 
102 Lembaga Lintas SARA, Kerusuhan Paso 11: Dalam Sebuah Investigasi, p. 8, Suratmo S, Laporan 
Khusus, p. 4. 
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church appears to have caused a panic, with those in the church quickly returning to 
their homes. 103 Nothing further ensued at this point, however. 
Later that night around 8:00pm, another crowd of several dozen Muslims returned to 
Lombogia carrying machetes and other crude weapons. The lurah (ward chief) went out 
to meet the crowd, along with Paulus Tungkanan, who was the father of the youth 
Angki whom the crowd had been seeking earlier in the day. 104 The police brokered 
negotiations between the two sides, but even as they talked some members of the crowd 
set several Christian-owned houses alight, before a Muslim youth attacked Paulus 
Tungkanan with a machete, causing a large gash wound to his back. 105 This attack drew 
an immediate response from the Christians at the scene, and the two rival crowds began 
to pelt each other with rocks and to fire arrows at each other. As a result, at least seven 
more people and three police were wounded. 106 The police sent two platoons of riot 
police to the scene and by around 3:00am the clashes had tailed off for the night. 
Fearing further trouble, the Poso police chief also called for reinforcements from Palu at 
this point, and as a result a paramilitary police or "Mobile Brigade" (Brimob - Brigade 
Mobil) unit from Palu arrived in Poso early the next day. 107 
I simply do not have the data to ascertain exactly who was fighting at this point. Given 
the threats that preceded the violence, it is likely some members of the crowd of 
Muslims in particular were acting out a pre-conceived plan. But even if there was a 
plan, Dedi's subterfuge in falsely bandaging his hand suggests that those attempting to 
organise violence still needed to gamer support beyond their immediate group. Indeed, 
one Muslim youth from a village outside the city explained that it was inaccurate 
rumours of Dedi's death that brought him to Poso: 
103 The panic may have arisen after an attempt to knife a youth who could not tell them where Angki was. 
Lembaga Lintas SARA Kerusuhan Poso II: Dalam Sebuah Investigasi, p. 8. 
104 Tungkanan, a retired military officer, was also the head of one ofRT (Rukun Tetangga- Neighbours' 
Association) in Lombogia. RT is an administrative unit two levels below ward. 
105 Lembaga Lintas SARA, Kerusuhan Poso II: Dalam Sebuah Investigasi, p. 8, interview with Paulus 
Tungkanan, February 2002. Tungkanan, a retired military officer, allegedly became a key commander of 
Christian forces in the third period of violence. He said that the night he was wounded, he was forced to 
flee over the fence of the hospital. 
106 Casualty figures from Soeroso, Laporan Peristiwa Kerusuhan Massa di Kecamatan Kota Poso 
Kabupaten Poso Sulteng Dari Tanggal 16 s/d 19 April 2000, (Palu: Polda Sulteng, 2000), pp. 10-11. As 
each of the seven wounded persons listed in this report are Muslims, it seems a reasonable assumption 
that the number of wounded was actually higher. 
107 The police also requested back-up from the army at this point. Soeroso, Laporan Peristiwa Kerusuhan 
Massa, pp. 10-11. 
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The second period resulted from a Muslim dying in Kasintuwu, he was hacked to death. 
In my village we heard, and the funny thing is that at this point the police didn't know 
who had done it, but the news in our village was that Lombogia residents were the 
culprits, so the crowd took action again for four or five days.108 
In any event, the violence continued to escalate the following morning, 17 April. The 
district authorities were by now well aware that the situation was getting out of hand. 
The recently elected district head Pusadan and the district's law enforcement chiefs also 
came out to speak to each of the crowds in an attempt to calm the situation. 109 The 
Brimob unit sent to Poso as reinforcements were also deployed to the Tentena 
intersection, where they established a blockade in an attempt to keep the Muslim and 
Christian crowds apart. As they were unable to reach Lombogia for the time being 
because of the Brimob barricade, the Muslim crowd instead turned its attention to 
neighbouring Kasintuwu, another majority Christian-populated ward. Here they set 
about burning houses. Within approximately two hours of Pusadan's peace efforts, the 
crowd of Muslims also broke through the police barricade of the Tentena intersection, 
and started to fight with the Christian youths gathered in Lombogia. The Christian 
youths, who had seemingly concentrated their defences in the area around the Pniel 
church, were forced back further into Lombogia, allowing the Muslim youths to bum 
the church, associated buildings and nearby shops. This was the first place of worship to 
be burned in Poso during the conflict; local Muslim leaders would justify the church's 
destruction in a peace meeting the next day on the grounds that Christians had been 
using the building as a fort. 11 0 
After the church was burned, the police increased their efforts to halt the violence. 
Reportedly after first firing warning shots into the air, the Brimob unit from Palu 
instead fired directly into the crowd of Muslims at around noon, killing three youths and 
wounding several others. Two of those killed - Y an to and Muhammad Rosal Mahmud -
were still teenagers. (Mahmud moreover was still in school.)111 
108 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. It is possible that this youth had confused the rumours of 
Dedi's injuries and the subsequent death of Muslim youth, Ulan, on 19 April2000. 
109 FSIR, Derita Muslim Paso, p. 11, Lembaga Lintas SARA, Kerusuhan Paso 11: Dalam Sebuah 
lnvestigasi, p. 9. 
110 Soeroso, Laporan Peristiwa Kerusuhan Massa, p. 8. 
111 A police report states that two of those killed were each seventeen years old; a chronology written 
from the Muslim point of view states that one of the boys, Yanto, was only thirteen. Soeroso, Laporan 
Peristiwa Kerusuhan Massa, p. 5, FSIR, Derita Muslim Paso, p. 11. 
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Given the effect these shootings had on the escalation of violence and the prominent 
place they occupied in discussion of the riot after the fact, it is worth pausing briefly to 
consider what led the police to fire into the crowd. Local police in fact denied that they 
could have been responsible for the shootings, saying none of the police deployed that 
day had been issued the type of bullets used to kill the three men. The police instead 
asserted that the military had conspired to discredit them, presumably either by 
substituting live rounds for blanks, or by firing from a concealed location (each 
somewhat far-fetched alternatives to the straightforward explanation that the police 
were the shooters). 112 These objections notwithstanding, there appear to be two possible 
reasons for the police action. One is a genuine concern to try to stop the rioting - the 
police chief was no friend of those seeking to gain from the violence and this would be 
only the first of several occasions during the Poso conflict on which police adopted a 
"shoot on sight" approach. But these killings may in fact have foreshadowed a second 
pattern that recurred during subsequent periods of conflict, where the security forces 
retaliated with lethal force when one of their own was wounded or killed. One 
chronology of the April violence in fact explains the shootings in these terms, saying 
the police opened fire after one of their number was hit by an arrow.113 
Regardless of police motives, the killings further enraged the crowd of Muslims, and by 
3:OOpm the violence had resumed. Christian interviewees claimed that the police had by 
now withdrawn all personnel to their district headquarters on Poso's main street in 
Gebangrejo, although I have not been able to verify whether this was the case. 114 There 
was one difference in the afternoon's violence as compared with that in the morning: 
there were now two targets, Lombogia and the police. Earlier in the afternoon, a 
procession taking the body of one of the dead youths back to Kayamanya had paused to 
throw rocks and Molotov cocktails at the police station in Gebangrejo before being 
moved on by warning shots. After the funerals, several police-owned buildings in 
Bonesompe ward as well as the residences of a handful of officers were set alight. 115 At 
the same time, the crowd now set about trying to destroy Lombogia ward. Most of the 
ward's residents had by then fled, although several dozen reportedly continued to fight 
112 Interview with a police source stationed in Po so in 2000, Jakarta, February 2004, see also '" Aparat di 
Poso Disudutkan': 95 Persen rumah di Lombogia Dibakar", Surya, 30 April2000. 
113 Lembaga Lintas SARA, Kerusuhan Paso II: Dalam Sebuah Investigasi, p. 9. 
114 Interviews with former Poso residents living in Tentena, February 2002. 
115 Soeroso, Laporan Peristiwa Kerusuhan Massa, pp. 6-7. 
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until the next day. 116 The arson attacks only halted in the late afternoon as heavy rain set 
in. 117 By afternoon's end, an estimated 130 houses, two churches and three schools had 
been burned, and thousands of people had fled to the outskirts of the city.118 
At this point, provincial authorities sought to intervene. The governor, provincial police 
chief and provincial military commander all flew to Poso early the next morning, 18 
April, and convened a meeting in the function hall at the district head's residence. 119 
The Muslim community leaders invited to the meeting issued several demands: that the 
Brimob unit from Palu be withdrawn and the shootings investigated, that the governor 
clarify which local officials had been involved in the first period of violence in 1998, 
and that Poso police chief Dedy Woerjantono, who had been spearheading an 
investigation into local corruption, be replaced.120 They also apologised for the burning 
of the Pniel church, with the proviso that they believed the building had been used as a 
fort. Underlining the political context of the violence, they also asked for Agfar Patanga 
to be released and Damsyik Ladjalani to be installed as district secretary. 121 The 
provincial police chief agreed to the demand regarding Brimob on the spot and the unit 
was withdrawn to Palu several hours after a replacement unit arrived that night. 122 The 
provincial officials also took the opportunity to tour some of the sites of violence across 
the river in Kasintuwu. Indicative of the extremely poor security situation, hundreds of 
youths initially blocked the governor from reaching Kasintuwu and thronged around the 
governor during his inspection. Several buildings were also set alight even as the 
provincial delegation was out on the streets inspecting the previous day's damage. 123 
116 Interview with a Tentena resident, Tentena, February 2002. 
117 "Ditemukan Lagi 3 Korban Jiwa di Poso", Tinombala, 20 April2000. 
118Given the eventual figure for the April violence of 406 houses burned, it is quite possible that even 
more houses had already been burned. For figure of 406, see'" Aparat di Poso Disudutkan"', Surya, date 
not recorded. 
119 One media report suggests the governor in fact left for Poso the previous night. See "Gubernur Sulteng 
Secara Mendadak Kunjungi Poso", Tinombala, 18 April 2000. 
120 Woeryantono was investigating the suspected misuse of Farmer Enterprise Credit (Kredit Usaha Tani 
- KUT) funds. For one account of the misuse of these funds, see George Junus Aditjondro, "Renungan 
Buat Papa Nanda, Anak Domba Paskah dari Tentena" in Rinaldy Damanik, Tragedi Kemanusiaan Paso: 
Menggapai Surya Pagi Melalui Kegelapan Malam, (Jakarta: PBHI; Palu: LPS-HAM Sulteng, 2003), pp. 
xxx-xxxn. 
121 Situmorang, Laporan Atensia, p. 8; Interview with a Poso man, February 2002; Interview with a 
delegate to meeting, July 2003. 
122 "Brimob Ditarik, Diganti 100 Perintis", Tinombala, 19 April 2000; Soeroso, Laporan Peristiwa 
Kerusuhan Massa, p. 12. 
123 See for example, "Brimob Ditarik, Diganto 100 Perintis", Tinombala, 19 April2000. 
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Before returning to Palu, the governor also visited Christian IDPs in Tagolu later in the 
afternoon, urging them not to seek revenge.124 
At this point, the political interests of those seeking to produce a riot had arguably been 
served. They had made their point during the meeting to the governor regarding 
Damsyik Ladjalani, the violence had delayed the trial of Agfar Patanga, and the position 
of police chief Deddy Woerjantono was now shaky. Yet any chance that the violence 
would cease with the gubernatorial visit and the withdrawal of the Brimob unit had 
evaporated by the next morning, 19 April. Lombogia was by now abandoned, but a 
Muslim youth was found murdered near a Christian family's home. The young man, 
Ulan Lanusu, had been knifed in the neck and arm, earning him the unfortunate 
distinction ofbeing the first person murdered during the conflict.125 Angered by news of 
this murder, another crowd of Muslims gathered and proceeded to bum two more 
churches and more Christian-owned houses. 126 The crowd also engaged in a "sweeping" 
to look for Christians, who could be readily identified by means of their identity card. 
They duly found two Christians and murdered each of them, by one report setting the 
bodies alight after the men were dead. 127 Another Christian man reportedly drowned 
later that night as he fled from Gebangrejo and attempted to swim across the river to the 
safety of Kawua, a majority Christian-populated ward. 
Why were people murdered? I have found no record to suggest that police ever 
identified, let alone prosecuted a suspect for the Ulan murder, leaving us in the dark as 
to the context of the killing. It is probable that revenge for the attacks on Lombogia was 
part of the motive of Ulan's killer(s), but we have no way to judge whether Ulan's 
killers knew him or simply happened upon him. Although we do lack details, Ulan's 
death and the two subsequent murders show that identities were becoming more 
thoroughly totalised, as different religious identity now became a basis for killing. Even 
so, for much of the second period violence was more narrowly targeted at Lombogia 
and its residents (where the Christian youths falsely rumoured to have wounded Dedi 
124 "Ribuan Warga Poso Mengungsi", Surya, nd (probably 19 April 2000). Aragon suggests the 
governor's precise comment, "Saya mahan saudara-saudara tidak balas dendam, biarlah Tuhan yang 
membalas," ("I would ask you not to seek revenge, let it be God who strikes back.") caused great offence, 
as it could be interpreted to mean the government planned to take no action against the perpetrators of 
violence during the second period. See Aragon, "Mass Media Fragmentation", p. 22. 
125 Details of injuries from Suratmo S, Laporan Khusus, p. 10. 
126 Damanik et al, Kronologis Peristiwa Kerusuhan Paso (II) April 2000, p. 4. 
127 Suratmo S, Laporan Khusus, p. 10. 
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hailed from). The shift to wider targeting of individuals based on their religious identity 
during the course of the riot is embodied in the two quotes below. 
When I went to the city [during the second period] I was blocked by a white crowd [ie 
Muslims] holding machetes and spears. "Where do you want to go?" [they asked me.] 
"I'm looking for my children". "Where are they?" I said "In Lombogia, they go to school 
here." "Where are you from?" "From the kampung [ie outside city]." "Ok, you may go." 
They accompanied me [to Lombogia] but if I'd been from Lombogia they would have 
killed me, they thought I was from Lombogia but I told them I was from the kampung. So 
they accompanied me there [and they said] "Don't do anything to him." 128 
When I reached Kasiguncu, I called my boss [who was a Muslim]. 129 "Could you pick me 
up, I'm in Kasiguncu." My boss said, "I can't guarantee your safety," because at the time 
they were asking for identity cards in Kayamanya, looking at people's identity, Muslim 
or Christian. 130 
The murders of 19 April did not immediately lead to further killings, and in fact 
provincial police reinforcements sent to Poso that night largely restored order in the city 
on 20 April. 131 A series of peace meetings and visits by high-ranking officials were then 
convened. The latter included a visit to Poso on 22 April by Major General Kirbiantoro, 
commander of the Sulawesi-wide Wirabuana Military Region. The records of 
Kirbiantoro's meetings though suggest he was at least as intent on criticising the police 
and emphasising that police were responsible for security in Poso as he was on ensuring 
there was no further violence. 132 
For their part, the police commenced a number of investigations, after establishing a 
provincial-level team of detectives to handle the violence the day after rioting ceased. 
One focus of enquiries was the Muslim youth Dedi, who had falsely claimed to have 
been knifed in the early moments of the fighting. Along with his twin brother Fatman 
Said alias Didi, he would eventually be arrested and sentenced to a prison term.133 
Haelani Umar's comments in the press immediately prior to the second period also 
came under scrutiny, with police questioning both Umar himself and the journalist who 
128 Interview with a Poso man, Palu, May 2004. 
129 Kasiguncu lies just west ofPoso town; the interviewee was returning from Palu. 
130 Interview with a former Poso resident living in Tentena, July 2003. 
131 "Ditemukan Lagi Tiga Jenazah di Poso", Media Indonesia, 20 April2000. 
132 See "Pangdam Minta Kapolda Usut Penembak Massa", Mercusuar, 24 April 2000; "Pangdam Jenguk 
'Aprilia' Yang Lahir Saat Kerusuhan", Mercusuar, date not recorded. Rivalry between the military and 
the police had intensified after the police were established as a separate force in April 1999. 
133 Ecip and Waru list Dedi and Didi's sentence as three years, but I have been unable to locate a 
corroborating reference for the length of prison term. The prosecutor's sentencing request was for four 
years. See "Tanggapi Tuntutan JPU Atas Dua Provokator Kerusuhan Poso Jilid II: 'Tuduhan 
Menyebarkan Berita Bohong Tidak Tepat'", Mercusuar, date not recorded; Ecip and Waru, Kerusuhan 
Paso yang Sebenarnya, p. 121. 
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conducted the interview. 134 A third target was local Muslim businessman and political 
aspirant Maro Tornpo, who was an attendee at both the 18 April meeting with the 
governor and the later meeting with Kirbiantoro.135 Police suspected Tornpo was 
responsible for gathering crowds and for instigating some of the arson attacks on 
Christian areas. They interviewed more than twenty witnesses in their investigation of 
him, but in the end he never faced trial. 136 
Tornpo certainly also featured on the list of villains whom Christians held responsible 
for the April violence. Indeed most of the attendees at the 18 April meeting with the 
governor were among those Christians considered provocateurs. They included local 
fish trader Nani Larnusu, local Bugis businessman Daeng Raja, construction contractor 
Mandor Pahe and local religious leader Adnan Arsal. 137 
Muslims did not appear to make much of a show of blaming Po so's Christians for the 
April 2000 violence, such was the mostly one-sided nature of the damage. 138 Instead 
local observers again blamed the consumption of alcohol as one of the causes, while 
Haelani Urnar also carne in for criticism for his pre-riot cornrnents. 139 The greater focus 
though appears to have been the shooting of the three Muslims on 17 April. 140 To 
defuse criticism of their actions on 17 April, the police asked the military police to 
investigate the incident. 141 Poso police chief Deddy Woerjantono was also removed 
from his position shortly after the riot. 
134 Amri Kamil, Laporan Tim Backup Polres Paso Dalam Rangka Penyidikan Kasus Kerusuhan Paso, 
Direktorat Reserse Polda Sulawesi Tengah, 28 June 2000, p. 11; "Keteranganan Andono di BAP 
Dibatalkan", Mercusuar, 2 May 2000. 
135 Tompo ran unsuccessfully in 1999 as a candidate for the district legislature on the now defunct 
People's Sovereignty Party (Partai Daulat Rakyat - PDR) ticket. The list of PDR candidates tells us 
something about Tompo's associates. The second-ranked candidate for PDR was Ahmad Laparigi, who 
has twice been imprisoned for embezzlement of conflict relief funds and was arrested in connection with 
the beheading of a village chief in Poso in 2004, but not charged. The third-ranked candidate, Yusuf 
Dumo, has also been investigated for corruption. Details. See "Bocah masuk hutan tanpa pakaian", Surya, 
23 April 2000. 
136 Kamil, Laporan Tim Backup Polres Poso, p. 11. 
137 List of attendees from Soeroso, Laporan Peristiwa Kerusuhan Massa, pp. 7-8. 
138 Some more recent Muslim-authored accounts have started to depict the April violence as an instance 
of Christians attacking Muslims. The assertions in such accounts stand at odds even with earlier Muslim-
authored chronologies. For an example of such accounts, see Fauzan Al-Anshari and Ahmad Suhardi 
(ed.), Tragedi Paso, pp. 16-17. 
139 See "Hailani Umar Pemicu Kerusuhan Poso", Tinombala, 19 April2000 
140 See, for example, "Pangdam Minta Kapolda Usut Penembak Massa", Mercusuar, 24 April2000. 
141 "Polda Serahkan Pengusutan Aparat Pelaku Penembakan kepada Denpom", Tinombala, 28 April 
2000. 
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None of these investigations were to be resolved, however, before attention was 
diverted by a further period of violence in Poso the following month. This third period 
of violence, lasting two weeks from late May-June 2000, dwarfed the December 1998 
and April 2000 violence, and marked the escalation of the Poso violence into murderous 
and protracted conflict. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the first two periods of violence in Poso. I have analysed 
these two periods as a pair because they took place before Poso became a site of 
protracted inter-religious conflict. The violence perpetrated during these two incidents, 
although serious, did not spread beyond the city limits, and each period of fighting 
lasted no longer than a few days. In the introduction to this chapter, I mentioned that I 
would focus my analysis on two points - whether political motivations adequately 
account for these riots, and whether "big fish" led hapless crowds to serve the big fish's 
ends. 
First, let us consider an example from each of the first two periods to evaluate the 
political motivations model. For the first period, let us consider the example of Herman 
Parimo, the Protestant man who received the heaviest prison sentence after the 
December violence, and who has been widely identified as a political supporter of the 
district secretary, Yahya Patiro. To recap quickly Parimo's involvement in the 
December 1998 violence, he offered "security assistance" to the district head on 26 
December, sought anyway to marshal a crowd of Christians after the district head 
refused his offer of help, led this crowd into the city after district authorities had ordered 
Christians gathered in Tagolu to disperse on the night of 27 December, and was again 
prominent among Christian crowds during the main day of rioting on 28 December. 
If we are to adopt a model of political motivations, we might (indeed, it could be 
argued, must) then conclude that Parimo led the crowds in expectation of improving 
Patiro's electoral chances in the race to become the next district head. The problem is 
that Parimo's actions in leading crowds into the city on 27 and 28 December, if 
anything, greatly harmed Patiro's chances of winning the top job. Indeed, it is not 
readily apparent how any other political outcome could have been expected from 
Parimo's actions. As discussed in the body of this chapter, it was not in Patiro's 
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interests for the legislative election or the district head election to become starkly 
polarised along religious lines - Christians simply did not have the numbers. Patiro' s 
accusers themselves attribute a second political motive to Parimo - to murder the 
incumbent district head Arief Patanga in the hope that Patiro would become district 
head without an election. But there was no guarantee that Patiro' s interests would be 
advanced by the murder of the district head either. As district secretary, Patiro was not 
next in line to take over the role of district head if Patanga died. It was more likely that 
Malik Syahadat, the Muslim vice-district head, would take over, or else that the 
governor would appoint a provincial official as an interim district head. The governor 
actually took the latter step when Patanga' s term expired in June 1999, before the 
election for a replacement had taken place. Indeed, far from helping Patiro, Parimo' s 
actions during the riot provided the kernel of truth required by Patiro' s opponents to 
blame Poso' s Christians for the first period of violence, and indeed to depict the riot as 
an insurrection by local Christian officials. 
Van Klinken provides a final alternative for a political model of Parimo's motivations: 
"Physical force was also a necessity [as a resource to compete politically], if only as a 
defensive measure."142 But "defensive measures" hardly appear to account for the range 
of Parimo' s actions during the riot - he did not after all set up barricades or 
fortifications at the boundaries of Christian settlements. Instead, the crowds he led 
attempted to enter majority Muslim populated areas. 
How then are we to explain Parimo's well-documented actions of late December 1998? 
What might his motivations have been? While we cannot discount a simple political 
miscalculation on his part, I would suggest that we can better explain Parimo's actions 
as motivated by a sense of indignant anger at a perceived affront rather than by any 
expectation of political gain. Such a conclusion is not definite, given that we do not 
have a record of Parimo's commentary on the violence, but several incidents early in 
the first period present themselves of possible sources of this indignation. Parimo may 
have perceived an affront in the timing of the liquor round-up on Christmas day, or in 
the attacks on Roy's house and other Christian-owned shops and residences. 
Conceivably, Parimo's reaction to these events may have been magnified by local 
anxieties over the place of indigenous Christians in Poso. 
142 Van Klinken, Small Town Wars, p. 80. 
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The importance of Parimo' s actions to the escalation of the December violence means 
that an explanation of the first period as politically-motivated manipulation by the 
supporters of Muslim aspirants to the post of district head is also incomplete. That is not 
to say that some local Muslims did not actively seek political gain from the first period. 
In fact, some clearly did, either by directing crowds to bum particular houses, or by 
seeking to frame the interpretation of the riot during and particularly after the fact by 
installing banners, distributing leaflets and making comments to the local press. But the 
strategy of these Muslim political hopefuls could not succeed without Parimo' s actions, 
which were essentially unpredictable and beyond their control. Had the violence 
stopped with the peace meetings on 27 December, for example, it would have been 
much more difficult for these political hopefuls to make the case that Christians had 
produced the riot for political ends. 
A further obstacle to explanation of the December violence through a pnsm of 
politically-motivated manipulation is that the first two and a half days of disturbances 
do not appear to have been overtly political. (The shift to an overtly political context 
then took place when Parimo visited Patanga's residence on 26 December.) Of course, 
it remains possible that Muslim political aspirants orchestrated the disorderly liquor 
round-ups on 25 and 26 December as an initial provocation; indeed some accounts 
suggest Muslims had plotted a conspiracy even before this round-up took place 
(although some of these accounts display a Christian bias and so must be treated 
sceptically). 143 There may well have been such a conspiracy, but if the round-up was 
deliberate provocation, it was a roundabout route for the assumed conspirators to take to 
their eventual goal, a route that only made sense after what appears to have been a 
spontaneous initial brawl. 
In summary, the Parimo example highlights the limits of depicting violence as a means 
dispassionately deployed to an end. Van Klinken provides the clearest example of the 
"dispassionate" model in the Indonesian context, specifically in his analysis of Dayak-
Madura violence in Kalimantan: 
143 See, for example George Junus Aditjondro, Kerusuhan Poso dan Morowali, Akar Permasalahan dan 
Jalan Keluarnya, (paper presented at seminar on "Application of Emergency Status in Aceh, Papua and 
Poso?" Hotel Santika, Jakarta, 7 January 2004) not paginated. 
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I am arguing, in other words, that the anti-Madurese campaign was for these 
ethnic associations only their secondary objective. The primary objective was to 
dominate provincial politics, informally if not formally. To achieve that, the 
Madurese could almost have been selected at random from among the other 
perhaps equally abundant settlers - Javanese, Banjar, Bugis - as a common 
enemy. 144 
Rather than being dispassionate, I would suggest that the first two periods of violence 
built on pre-existing community prejudices, contempt and resentment. 145 These feelings 
do not in themselves cause violence, but nor are they irrelevant as motivations once 
violence occurs. Once the liquor round-up took place and Christian houses had been 
targeted, pre-existing feelings of resentment may have contributed to Parimo 
interpreting these actions as a (personal) affront, and made correcting the affront more 
urgent than his coolly considered political interests. 
If Parimo's example forces us to consider an individual acting against his political 
interests, a second example, this time from the April 2000 period of violence, suggests 
that political interests may not be the whole story even when actors are clearly pursuing 
political gain. For this example, we will focus on the local Muslim businessmen who 
appear to have encouraged or even instigated the violence, among whom was the 
police's chief suspect- Maro Tompo. We can be sure of some of these men's political 
interests in the second period, because they stated them publicly, whether in the form of 
the pre-riot warning of further violence, or in the demands made at the 18 April peace 
meeting. To recap, these interests included pressuring for district secretary aspirant 
Ladjalani to be appointed against the wishes of the district head, or at least to show that 
they were still a force to be reckoned with despite bureaucratic defeat; stopping the trial 
of Agfar Patanga; and forcing the removal of local police chief Woerjantono. By the 
time of the peace meeting with the governor, provincial police chief and other senior 
officials on 18 April, these men had achieved some of these goals and were not likely to 
make more progress towards the others through further violence. Yet violence 
continued almost directly after this meeting and moreover continued for another two 
days. How are we to explain this continuation? Admittedly, contingency may be part of 
the answer - maybe the violence would have stopped sooner if the Muslim youth Ulan 
had not been murdered on the morning of 19 April. Another alternative is to attribute 
144 Van Klinken, "Indonesia's New Ethnic Elites", not paginated. 
145 Aragon presents one version of the development of these resentments and tensions in Poso. See 
Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi", pp. 76-77. 
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violence after the meeting to rank-and-file individuals, who we would then assume to be 
less interested in the outcome of the peace meeting and instead motivated primarily by 
enmity for their opponents. I believe there is some truth to each of these explanations. 
But I would also say that if we can accept that feelings of enmity would motivate rank-
and-file individuals to perpetrate violence, then the same argument should also be valid 
for politically-interested leaders. Might not these leaders also have taken the 
opportunity to kick their disliked opponents while they were down, and while the police 
were not in a strong position to stop them. 
So far we have focussed on the motivations of elites and leaders, without properly 
considering the question of how the violence was organised and why the rank and file 
may have chosen to fight. How much agency do we rightly grant to the "big fish" -
were they able to control the course of the violence? 
Certainly, we have abundant evidence that in the first two periods in Poso leaders were 
often able to direct and manipulate the rank-and-file. A rumour was spread that the 
district head's house would be attacked, and so Muslim youths came to guard the 
residence; Herman Parimo and his associates offered "security assistance" under the 
banner of the GPST, and were duly able to drive several trucks bearing the defunct 
organisation's logo into the city the following evening; in the second period, a riot was 
threatened and duly produced, complete with wilfully false claims of injury after what 
appears a contrived initial brawl. 
But other aspects of the violence were less certainly the product of manipulation, or at 
least seemed to suit the interests of the rank-and-file. The liquor round-up of the first 
period may have been a good opportunity for youths to drink for free, for example. In 
the second period, it seems reasonable to assume that local youths knew plotting for a 
riot was afoot, and yet they still chose to fight. 
Patronage ties may be part of the answer, and we will need to look to future studies to 
clearly and comprehensively map the nature of any ties rank-and-file individuals may 
have had with local elites. But I think we should also take heed of Van Klinken's 
observation regarding the early moments of the Maluku violence: 
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Rather than being organised from above, it seems more likely that the groups were at this 
stage ad hoc and based on existing neighbourhood solidarity. 146 
If we give more credence to some degree of bottom-up mobilisation for violence - and 
the crowds in the first period clearly did mobilise in neighbourhood blocks - then we 
can think of relations between leaders and rank-and-file in terms of a coincidence of 
interests. If rank-and-file were themselves interested in a fight which in the first two 
periods still retained some resemblance to commonplace youth gang brawls, then we 
can think of many of the ends to which they were being "manipulated" largely as more 
specific manifestations of crowd members' broader prior intentions. It would not then 
have taken a strong commitment to a particular agenda to follow directions to burn or 
loot this house or to fight in this ward. Even if one did follow such a direction, one 
would still retain great autonomy to bum a different house, loot elsewhere, stop 
fighting, leave the crowd, or otherwise act beyond the control of leaders. 
Finally, I would like to take up the question of the influence of the national context on 
the first and second periods of violence. I have repeatedly acknowledged the enabling 
role of the structural context that Poso shared with other sites in immediate post-
Soeharto Indonesia, but I feel this chapter has also demonstrated the important 
contribution of chance events and circumstances to the actual occurrence and escalation 
of violence. Three chance circumstances contributed to the first period of violence. The 
arrival of the new local police chief Woerjantono in Poso just a week before the first 
period began - too short a time to familiarise himself and assert his authority locally -
further weakened the local police at a time when popular deference to the security 
forces had in any case lessened greatly throughout Indonesia. The family background of 
at least one of the men involved in the initial brawl - Roy was from a family of 
relatively high local status - arguably made the brawl immediately relevant to a wider 
group of people than might otherwise have been the case. The third coincidence was the 
timing of Christmas in 1998, not only during Ramadan as has often been noted, but also 
on a Friday, meaning that both Muslim and Christian communities would gather for 
worship services on the day following the night-time brawl. Chance occurrence also 
contributed significantly to the second period of violence in April 2000. The decision of 
a Brimob unit to fire into a crowd of Muslims on 17 April, in what may have been a 
reprisal killing, became crucial to the escalation and political outcomes of the violence. 
146 Van Klinken, Small Town Wars, p. 98. 
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The shooting doubtless generated additional popular anger and left the police in a poor 
position to intervene in the escalating violence. The murder of the Muslim youth Ulan 
also contributed to the continued escalation of the violence even after initial peace 
efforts had been made. 
A second element of the national context is the possible effect of violence elsewhere in 
Indonesia on effects in Poso. Bertrand is the leading proponent of the idea that violence 
in Poso in some sense snowballed from elsewhere in Indonesia, although van Klinken 
also argues in general for the borrowing of tactics across different sites of violence. 147 
In the context of the first period, the snowballing argument means considering the 
possible effect of the burning of21 churches in a riot in the Ketapang area of Jakarta on 
22 November 1998, and the retaliatory burning often mosques almost 2,000 kilometres 
away in Kupang in East Nusa Tenggara province on 30 November. 148 Poso was by no 
means a world unto itself, and it is a plausible argument that local events in the district 
took on greater significance because imaginings of what could happen had been 
heightened by reports of violence elsewhere in Indonesia. Nevertheless, I have not 
found evidence of specific influences from Ketapang or Kupang on Poso to parallel the 
detail Bertrand presents of an IDP flow from Kupang leading to a church being burned 
in the South Sulawesi capital ofMakassar, for example.149 
How might the argument of snowballing apply to the April 2000 violence in Poso? By 
the time of this second period of violence in Poso, both Christians and Muslims had 
perpetrated terrible violence in Maluku and North Maluku provinces. At least three 
major periods of fighting took place in Maluku before April 2000, with various 
estimates suggesting more than 1,000 people had been killed. 150 In North Maluku, 
hundreds of Muslims were killed in a matter of days in late December 1999, drawing 
national attention to the remote islands. 151 Overall, the North Maluku conflict had also 
resulted in more than a thousand deaths - both Muslim and Christian - before the April 
violence in Poso. 152 It is almost certain that the community in Poso would have been 
147 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, pp. 104, 132-33; van Klinken, Small Town 
Wars, p. 62. 
148 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. I 04 
149 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, p. I 04 
150 Van Kiinken, "The Maluku Wars", pp. 2-5. 
151 Van Klinken, "The Maluku Wars", p. 7. 
152 For a comprehensive discussion of the North Maluku conflict see Chris Wilson, Ethno-Religious 
Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God (London: Routledge, 2008 (forthcoming)). 
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aware of at least some of the violence in these two provinces. But considered in the 
light of the violence in Maluku and North Maluku, the April 2000 violence in Poso 
actually shows the limits of arguments for snowballing and the borrowing of tactics. In 
comparative terms, what stands out about the April 2000 violence in Poso is how little 
killing took place - six people dead, half of them shot by police. Violence was 
worsening and religious identity was becoming a sufficient basis to kill a person in 
Poso, but in April 2000 this escalation was taking place largely independently of 
violence taking place elsewhere in the country. It was still to be another month before 
community members in Poso themselves engaged in large-scale killings. 
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CHAPTER THREE- THE THIRD PERIOD, MAY-JUNE 2000 
In the middle of the second period of violence in Poso in April 2000, the governor of 
Central Sulawesi visited Christians who had fled the city and made the following 
request to them, "I would ask you not to seek revenge. Let it be God who strikes back."1 
When the violence of the second period ended several days later, few people in Poso 
shared the governor's optimism that God would be the next to strike. Instead, many of 
the district's residents appear to have expected a more immediate and worldly 
resumption of the violence. Villages began to make local preparations to face possible 
further clashes; a sub-section of Poso' s Christian community went one step further, and 
began to prepare to perpetrate large-scale reprisals. 
The outcome of these various preparations was a sudden and drastic escalation of 
violence beginning almost exactly a month after the April 2000 riot. In two weeks 
starting on 23 May 2000, at least 246 people, mostly Muslims, were killed in Poso, 
while tens of thousands of people fled from the district by land and sea.2 By contrast, in 
the two riots spread across sixteen months prior to the third period just six people had 
been killed, half of them shot dead by the police. The duration of the third period of 
violence also contrasted with the two riots that preceded it: two weeks as opposed to 
four days (December 1998) and five days (April 2000). The physical destruction during 
this May-June violence was also immense, as crowds burned thousands of houses and 
other buildings in villages in at least six different sub-districts. The aggressors in most 
clashes were crowds of Christians. They described their violence either as revenge or as 
a spontaneous response to "defend our territory", even though the violence was on a far 
greater scale than that which had gone before. Assertions of spontaneity 
notwithstanding, a more organised core of Christian combatants fought amongst these 
crowds and at least loosely coordinated much of the fighting. 
1 "Ribuan Warga Poso Mengungsi", Surya, nd (probably 19 April2000). 
2 The figure of 246 is sourced from the Central Sulawesi governor's report on the violence. Given the 
breakdown of law and order and the political uses to which a lower or higher figure for casualties could 
be turned, no accurate figure is ever likely to emerge for how many people were killed in May-June 2000. 
Official estimates of casualties in large-scale Indonesian riots have generally been held to be 
conservative. The same governor's report provides a figure of just under 70,000 IDPs. This may also be 
conservative, but is likely to be closer to the truth than the figure of 425,000 cited by van Klinken, which 
is higher than the entire population ofPoso. SeeLaporan Gubernur Propinsi Sulawesi Tengah tentang 
Pananggulangan dan Langkah yang Dilakukan Sebagai Akibat Kerusuhan Poso, Powerpoint 
presentation, pp.7, 9, 10; van Klinken, Small Town Wars, p. 83. 
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How are we to explain such a rapid escalation from the two initial riots in Poso to the 
mass killings of the third period? This will be the central question addressed in this 
chapter. The escalation was not just a jump in intensity of violence, but also involved an 
expansion of the geographic scale from two riots within the city limits to a period of 
violence that directly affected most of the district. 
Existing studies of the Po so conflict, including those that provide detailed description of 
the third period, have tended to explain the May-June violence as a continuation of the 
processes that underpinned the first two periods. Aragon, for example, who terms the 
May-June 2000 violence "a vendetta likely organised by urban [indigenous, 
predominantly Protestant] Pamona [ethnics]", explains the escalation in terms of a logic 
of "multiplied revenge" that all three periods shared: 
As conditions worsened, segments of Poso's Muslim and Protestant communities began 
to respond to any perceived assault with a pattern of multiplied revenge; not tit for tat, not 
just explosive anger, but the idea that an extra wallop or calculated punishment was 
required in the vindictive act. "Our cousin was knifed, so we bum your town. You burned 
our houses, so we ambush hundreds from your community, kill them, and cut them into 
pieces."3 
Sidel and van Klinken for the most part follow suit in explaining the May-June 2000 
violence in the same terms as they had used for the two preceding periods. Sidel, 
although briefly describing the organisation of Christian forces for the third period 
separately, nevertheless includes this period within the logic of inter-community 
fighting produced by uncertainty over religious boundaries. The violence escalated, 
Sidel asserts, because each period of fighting sharpened religious boundaries and 
heightened mutual suspicion, while at the same time sharpening "the organisation and 
instruments of violence on each side".4 For his part, van Klinken explains the May-June 
2000 violence in terms of a similar political logic to that which he sees underpinning the 
December 1998 and April 2000 violence. In his view, leaders encouraged violence at a 
moment of political transition for their own political gain. Van Klinken is forced, 
however, to introduce some changes to his model for the May-June 2000 violence. No 
moment of political transition coincided with this period, and so van Klinken describes 
the violence as in part a "struggle for dominance over the entire district", but also in 
part driven by "impotent rage, revenge and fear". 5 
3 Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso", pp. 47, 77. 
4 Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad, pp. 162-164. 
5 Van Klinken, Small Town Wars, p. 83. 
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I share these authors' views that there were significant continuities in the processes 
underpinning the violence from December 1998 to April 2000 to May-June 2000. It 
could hardly be otherwise, when many of the combatants in the third period had also 
been involved in one or both of the earlier periods of violence. There are, however, 
crucial differences to explain. The first is the formation of a new and more organised 
combatant entity on the Christian side, which I will term the "kelompok merah" (lit. red 
group). Where the previous fighting had required individual commitment of hours or 
days, many of the individuals in the core group of the kelompok merah devoted more 
than a month to preparing for and perpetrating the violence of the third period. 
Throughout this chapter I will trace the activities of this core combatant group and 
present a close examination of how their activities affected the organisation, forms and 
escalation of violence. 
Van Klinken's model notwithstanding, the second difference is the lack of a discemable 
direct link to district politics. The lack of this link requires us to take a renewed look at 
what motivated leaders and combatants to fight during this period. 
Preparations for Violence 
The April 2000 violence was confined within the city, but its aftermath affected the 
atmosphere in many other parts of Poso district. An important mechanism in raising 
local-level tensions was the displacement of large parts of the city's Christian 
population during the second period. The arrival of these people seeking refuge in many 
villages around the district, as well as in the main Christian town Tentena, spurred 
religious solidarity and added to the anticipation of further violence.6 For instance, one 
Christian villager asserted that the IDP flows of the second period made every Christian 
villager in Poso a kelompok merah member, as "Whatever way you look at it, us 
Christians were concerned for our friends."7 The following interrogation dossier excerpt 
depicts the effect of the arrival of Christians fleeing from the second period of violence 
on Sepe village, a predominantly Christian settlement south of the city in Lage sub-
district: 
Q5. Give a brief account of when you fled your village and when you returned? 
6 On the importance ofiDP flows to the North Maluku conflict, see Chris Duncan, "The Other Maluku: 
Chronologies of Conflict in North Maluku", Indonesia 80 (October 2005): 80. 
7 Interview with a Poso resident, January 2002. 
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A: Initially in May 2000 at around 10:30pm,8 IDPs from Lombogia came to Sepe, Lage 
subdistrict, Poso district- I didn't know how many of them came, because there were 
very many, and the IDPs walked to our village from the mountain, and upon arrival in 
Sepe they were all received by the [Christian congregation], then the IDPs from 
Lombogia were accommodated in the Mawar Sarung Sepe church, and at the same time 
another portion of the IDPs were moved to Tentena. After the arrival of those IDPs from 
Lombogia, the atmosphere in Sepe became increasingly heated: a "zigzag" (chicane 
barrier) was placed on the main road and at night the community established guard posts, 
and a roster was established for people to take turns guarding. Each night ten people 
would man each post, and there were two posts in Sepe, one at each end of the village. I 
also manned the guard posts twice a week. ... [answer to question 5 continues]9 
Mutual suspicions motivated people in villages around Poso to begin to make 
preparations for more fighting. A villager in a majority Muslim village described the 
atmosphere around the same time as follows: 
Nothing was certain, we didn't know when they would attack, but the community 
predicted there would be a large-scale attack .... So they [Christians] were making 
preparations, we also made preparations, but on a village by village basis, we didn't 
prepare to enter the city, we just prepared in our own village ... so we made as many dum-
JO dum [home-made "bazooka" ] as we could, as many peluncur as we could, arrows, and 
we used the bombs that were [normally] used to bomb fish for our preparations. 11 
The expectation that violence would take place outside the city was new, and it not clear 
why this shift took place. In one sense, this shift in perception was clearly part of the 
expansion of the geographic scale of the conflict. On the other hand, many youths from 
various villages around the district had in fact gone to the city during one or both of the 
December 1998 and April 2000 riots. Although their villages had not to that point been 
affected, these youths already had direct experience of the fighting. 
It is likely that these mutual suspicions and ad hoc preparations would have eventually 
led to at least localised clashes between villages. But, as it eventuated, it was not these 
local processes, however, that most directly led to the commencement of the May-June 
2000 violence. Rather, we can trace the initiation of the third period to organised 
preparations for violence undertaken by a relatively small section of the Christian 
community. These men and women began preparing to strike back at Poso's Muslims 
almost immediately after the second period, probably at the beginning of May. In all 
likelihood, these preparations centred on Kelei village, southeast of Tentena. The 
8 These events most probably occurred in April2000. It is not uncommon for depositions to contain 
jumbled dates, or for Poso residents to confuse dates when recounting events in the district 
9 Deposition of Junior Bobi Tingginehe in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 4 November 2000, pp. 2-3. 
10 A dum-dum is a metal pipe, stuffed with shrapnel such as nails, metal and glass shards and an 
explosive (sometimes match heads) to propel the shrapnel. 
11 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
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preparations in the village may have included rudimentary military-style training for a 
limited number of combatants and manufacture of home-made weapons. It is difficult to 
provide a detailed account of these preparations, however, because most Christians 
deny any training took place, whereas Muslim accounts are dominated by the 
exaggerated and probably false court testimony of a Muslim youth, Anton. Claiming to 
have infiltrated the preparations in Kelei, Anton described military-style training taking 
place there for 42 days, with 700 participants and the delivery of 727 factory-standard 
firearms. 12 The following paragraphs set out the most likely course of events in Kelei 
based on comparison of these conflicting accounts, with interpretive difficulties 
discussed in the footnotes. 
Kelei was the home village of the Protestant civil servant A. L. Lateka, who by some 
accounts was the most senior kelompok merah leader during the May-June 2000 
violence. Immediately before the third period of violence, Lateka was living in Palu, 
where he worked at the Central Sulawesi Regional Investment Coordination Board 
(BKPMD). Lateka's most immediate, visible link to the earlier violence in Poso 
involved his brother-in-law, Herman Parimo, who was sentenced to fourteen years in 
prison in 1999 for his role in leading Christian crowds into the city during the first 
period.13 Lateka had reportedly attended Parimo's trial and, even before the trial began, 
wrote a letter to the Supreme Court asking that the proceedings be expedited. 14 In the 
event, Parimo fell ill and died while receiving treatment in Makassar on 7 May 2000. 15 
A. L. Lateka appears not to have been the only member of his family who became 
12 Anton claimed to have infiltrated the kelompok merah and testified in the trial of three Catholic men 
who were sentenced to death for their role in the third period. His testimony did not explain how he 
managed to infiltrate the kelompok merah, despite being detailed on many other points; his claim 
regarding 727 factory standard weapons was implausible and never corroborated by other information; he 
also came forward as a witness much later than most people who appeared in the trial, long after 
extensive press coverage of the case. Given these and other problems with his account, I do not regard 
Anton's testimony to be credible, and it is not discussed at any length here. For a detailed account 
including further discussion of the inconsistencies in Anton's testimony, see Dave McRae, "Criminal 
Justice and Communal Conflict: A Case Study of the Trial of Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva and 
Marinus Riwu", Indonesia, 83 (April2007): 99-100, 105-106. 
13 See Chapter Two. Parimo was married to Lateka's eldest sister. 
14 According to a description of the letter in what appears to be a police intelligence report, Lateka also 
demanded that Agfar Patanga and Damsyik Ladjalani be taken into custody as they had caused the 
December 1998 riot, and that certain Christian figures withdraw their support for a letter condemning 
Parimo's actions. SeeM. Situmorang, Laporan Atensia No. Pol. R/LA/03/Vll/1999/Dit-lpp, Direktorat 
Intelijen dan Pengamanan, Polda Sulawesi Tengah, 28 July 1999, p. 2. Around the same time, Lateka also 
reportedly wrote to the Central Sulawesi governor concerning Parimo. See Aragon, "Communal Violence 
in Poso, Central Sulawesi", p. 63. 
15 Mahkamah Agung RI, Putusan Nomor 211/TU/55K!Pid/2000 in case of Herman Parimo, 28 December 
2004, pp. 11-12. 
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involved in the third period violence: other Christians also named two of Lateka's 
brothers, Bakte and Kade, as key combatants in May-June 2000. 16 
We cannot ascertain with any certainty how many people may have taken part in the 
training activities described above. I would guess, however, that the number was closer 
to 100 than the 700 Anton asserted took part.17 We know of at least two different groups 
of Christians who appear to have come together to train in Kelei. The first group was 
comprised of youths displaced from the city during the second period of violence, of 
whom most came from Lombogia ward. Indeed, one of the Christian IDPs described the 
people who fled Lombogia in particular as the "spearhead" of Christian forces. 18 The 
Christian man who mentioned these youths' presence in Lateka's home village 
described Lateka's appeal to these youths as follows: 
He [Lateka] didn't ask for help, but because the youths had been victims [in the first and 
second periods], youths from Lombogia, from Sayo, they were waiting for someone who 
would lead them ... they went to the church to ask the church to speak out, but the church 
didn't have the courage to say anything. The church all became cowards after a hundred 
ofthem came [to the church offices in Tentena] ... 19 So with the reluctance of the church 
to go along with what these youths wanted, Lateka was easily able to get followers. 
Because they didn't have a leader, but for their aims they needed someone who was ready 
to lead, and they felt they had [in Lateka] got a man who was a brave leader. 
The people who had fled from Lombogia were not just a source of trainees. Some of 
them became senior Christian leaders during the May-June 2000 violence. The most 
prominent example is Paulus Tungkanan, the retired police officer who was wounded 
while negotiating with a crowd of Muslims in Lombogia on 16 April (as described in 
Chapter Two). Tungkanan left the city the morning after he was wounded and made his 
way to Tentena, where he has lived since. After arriving in Tentena, Tungkanan acted as 
a, or, in some accounts, the key Christian leader in the May-June 2000 violence, 
16 Lateka's niece Bea is also mentioned in the interrogation deposition ofYenny Tadengga, a woman 
arrested after the first incident of the third period of violence. Interviews with a Tambaro resident, April 
2004, May 2004; interview with Fabianus Tibo, 28 July 2003; deposition of Y enny Tadengga in dossier 
ofFabianus Tibo, 31 October 2000, p. 2. 
17 One of the main reasons for this guess is that if there had been 700 trainees in Kelei, the kelompok 
merah would have had less need for ad hoc recruitment oflocal villagers for each clash in the May-June 
2000 violence. As discussed below, however, this ad hoc recruitment was in fact a recurring feature of the 
third period. 
18 Interview with a Poso man, April2004. 
19 A Christian man who helped IDPs leave the city during the second phase told a similar story of 
Lombogia residents and their desire to involve the church: "They [Lombogia youths] were in a rage by 
then [after retreating from the city after a day and a half of fighting]. They said, "Find a car! We want to 
go to Tentena, to see (hadap) the GKST!" Interview with a Poso man, February 2002. 
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according to several Christian detainees in Palu prison.20 At least two of Tungkanan's 
adult sons, Angky and Berny (the latter killed in 2005) were also rumoured to have 
played important roles in the May-June 2000 violence.21 
A second group who also appear to have trained in Kelei between the April 2000 and 
May-June 2000 violence came to the village under the leadership of Fabianus Tibo, a 
Catholic long-term migrant from Flores who lived in neighbouring Morowali district. 
Tibo had previously served a six-year prison term in Poso in the early 1990s for his 
involvement in a dispute between transmigrants from Bali and Flores, in Lawangke 
village, in which four Balinese were killed. This conviction is the source of a 
widespread belief that Tibo was a preman (thug), although no specific details are 
known. During the May-June 2000 violence Tibo appears to have acted as an important 
field commander for the kelompok merah, although he was by no means the highest 
leader.Z2 He himself denied taking part in training in Kelei or even being present in the 
village during the period when training most likely occurred, but his account is 
contradicted by the depositions of two of his travelling companions. Assuming that 
Tibo did indeed train in Kelei, he appears to have brought a relatively small group of 
perhaps one or two dozen men, who were themselves migrants from Flores or the other 
islands in Nusa Tenggara Timur province.Z3 The involvement of this group from Flores 
still puzzles observers, and at this point we can make only an educated guess as to 
whether the men were hired help, came to Poso because of prior personal association 
with other kelompok merah members or were motivated primarily by feelings of 
religious solidarity. 
20 Interviews with Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva, Palu, July 2003; interview with a Poso man 
detained in Palu, date withheld. 
21 Paulus Tungkanan himself has repeatedly denied allegations that he was involved in the May-June 
2000 violence. In my first interview with him in 2002, however, Tungkanan complained that he had lost 
influence among Poso's Christians once their security situation improved, at which point the community 
paid more heed to indigenous inhabitants. (Tungkanan is originally from Tana Toraja in South Sulawesi.) 
Although he declined to discuss what role he might have played in the third period, his complaint 
suggests his authority rose and fell with the community's perceived need to perpetrate violence. In my 
view, his complaint thus partially corroborates the many statements by other interviewees that Tungkanan 
was one of the leaders of Christian forces. Interviews with Paulus Tungkanan, February 2002, February 
2006, July 2007. 
22 For details, see McRae, "Criminal Justice and Communal Conflict", pp. 87-93. 
23 In a prison interview, Tibo told me he had travelled to Kelei as part of a group of fourteen men. The 
deposition of one of his travelling companions provides no details on how large Tibo' s group was when 
they arrived in Kelei, but says that the group numbered 27 men by the time they left the village. Interview 
with Fabianus Tibo, July 2003; deposition of Rafael Sina in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 29 May 2000, p. 2. 
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The only direct accounts of the training in Kelei (available to me) come from four 
interrogation depositions in the dossier of Fabianus Tibo. Two of the depositions are 
provided by his travelling companions, another came from a resident of the majority-
Christian village Sepe, and the fourth was provided by the Muslim man, Anton?4 As I 
do not consider Anton's account credible, the following paragraphs are exclusively 
drawn from the depositions of the three Christian men.25 
Judging from comparison of the men's accounts, it is likely that the training in Kelei 
had started by the second week of May 2000.26 One of these men said that the training 
took place away from the village itself, with two sessions each day: the first taking 
place from 4:00am until the middle of the day, and the second from 3:00pm until 
6:00pm.27 There are few details of the identity of trainers in the depositions, but all 
three Christian men said that one of Tibo's companions, Marinus Riwu, provided them 
with instruction in the use of arrows. Tibo himself is described in two of the depositions 
giving directions to trainees on what they would do in Poso. "Anyone not wearing a 
black shirt and a kongkoli (forest grass) bracelet is an enemy and must be attacked." "If 
[you meet] kelompok putih forces they must be killed. "28 None of the accounts mention 
A. L. Lateka appearing at the training, or in any capacity at all. The Christian men all 
stated that the participants manufactured weapons while in Kelei, including bows, 
24 Tibo's travelling companions, Leonardus Lewa and Rafael Sina (each, like Tibo, originally from Nusa 
Tenggara Timur province), say Tibo picked up them and others from several villages in Morowali district 
between 11-13 May 2000 and then took the group to Kelei on 14 May. The Sepe resident, Tingginehe, 
says he took part in training in Kelei after a Christian man came to his village and selected him and IDPs 
from Lombogia who were staying in his village to take part. He says he went to Kelei on 12 May. 
Unfortunately, none of these three men were called as witnesses in Tibo's trial, so the validity of their 
depositions was not tested in court. As such, the information in them should be treated only as 
preliminary. The fourth deposition was that of Anton. The details of the training in his deposition 
contradict the accounts of the other three men, but are not consistent with the time-line of the conflict, as 
he describes training taking place for six weeks, when only 35 days separated the second and third 
periods. 
25 On Anton's testimony, see footnote 12. 
26 Tinnginehe said that he arrived at the training on 12 May, Sina and Lewa each said they arrived on 14 
May. It is possible, of course, that training had already commenced prior to their arrival. 
27 Deposition of Junior Bobi Tingginehe in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 4 November 2000, p. 4. 
Tingginehe's account of training is the most detailed among the three Christian men. Sina and Lewa's 
depositions each provide only a few lines of description of the training. 
28 First quote: deposition ofLeonardus Lewa in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 30 May 2000, p. 2. Second 
quote: deposition of Junior Bobi Tinggginehe in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 4 November 2000, p. 5. If this 
second comment can be taken at face value, it is a strong indication that the decision to kill had already 
been taken during the Kelei training. In evaluating each of these comments, however, we must remember 
that the depositions were typed by investigators who were attempting to compile a case that Tibo had 
ordered others to murder during the May-June violence. There is no guarantee that the depositions are 
verbatim accounts, particular as the validity of these two depositions was not tested by calling the men as 
witnesses in court. 
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arrows, peluncur, home-made "bazookas" (dum-dum) and according to one of their 
depositions, home-made firearms.29 
During the period that Christians were training in Kelei, it appears that some of the 
participants took part in an attack on a nearby Muslim settlement in the vicinity of 
Didiri village (probably Korongjongi).30 This attack was part of a series of disturbances 
in the southeast part of Poso district between 16-19 May 2000 around two villages: 
Didiri itself and Taripa.31 The violence around these two villages did not escape the 
attention of residents of Poso town and may have raised tensions there, but because they 
did not immediately precipitate retaliatory violence in the city or generate widespread 
hostilities along religious lines, they are more accurately understood as the immediate 
precursors to the third period violence, rather than part of the third period itself. 
Training in Kelei appears to have ceased on 21 May, or at least paused, as two groups 
of Christians went to the city on 22 May. One, under the leadership of Fabianus Tibo, 
went to Santa Theresia boarding school in the Poso city ward of Moengko Baru, 
ostensibly to remove the children there from a rumoured attack. The other group was 
seemingly led by Lateka. We do not know where this second group went immediately 
after leaving Kelei, but given that they entered the city from the southwest early the 
next day, it is possible that they went to a Christian-populated village on the fringes of 
the city, such as Lembomawo.32 Each group's subsequent activities in the city are 
described in detail in the next section. 
29 See deposition of Rafael Sina, 29 May 2000, p. 2. deposition ofLeonardus Lewa, 30 May 2000, p. 2, 
deposition of Junior Bobi Tingginehe, 4 November 2000, p. 4, all in the dossier ofFabianus Tibo. 
Christians also appear to have manufactured contrived body armour for some of their combatants, either 
in the form of rubber vests or even seemingly solid metal vests. Pictures of these two items appear in Al-
Anshari and Suhardi (ed.), Tragedi Paso, pp. 75, 80. 
30 A Tentena resident interviewed in 2002 attributed the Didiri attack to the Christian youths who at the 
time had been preparing to attack Poso in Kelei village. Interview with a Tentena resident, February 
2002. 
31 Different sources that mention these disturbances provide conflicting details, but apart from the attack 
on the Muslim settlement, the violence in the area appears to have included a rice mill and a Muslim-
owned house being burned, road-blocks being established to control traffic and seek Muslim drivers (with 
one driver possibly murdered). For various versions of these disturbances, see "Sandi Pembantaian di 
Frekuensi 425-225", MAL, Fourth Week, June 2000, p. 11; FSIR, Derita Muslim Paso, p. 14; Lasahido et 
al, Suara dari Paso, p. 51; Ecip and Waru, Kerusuhan Paso yang Sebenarnya, p. 70; interview with a 
Tentena resident, February 2002. 
32 A woman who was part ofLateka's group stated in an interrogation deposition that she was picked up 
on 22 May and taken to Barati village (where a female village elder administered an adat rite. The group 
then went to Poso she said, arriving at about 6:00pm on 22 May. She did not disclose the precise location, 
saying only "we crossed a long bridge and then went down a laneway". Depending on which bridge she 
was referring to, this suggests the group either went to Lembomawo or Gebangrejo. Deposition of Yenny 
Tadengga in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 31 October 2000. 
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If a group of Christians engaged in training in Kelei after the second period, an obvious 
question is what exactly the trainees were preparing for. We can gamer only a 
rudimentary answer from the depositions of trainees, but other documents and my 
interviews provide a more comprehensive picture of the aims of kelompok merah 
leaders and key combatants during the May-June 2000 violence. 
The clearest single statement by a kelompok merah leader of the rationale for the third 
period violence is provided by "Lateka's mandate" (amanat Lateka), a one page 
typewritten letter addressed to the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas 
HAM). The letter has been attributed to A. L. Lateka, but first came to attention only 
when read out publicly several days after his death. The letter is reproduced here in 
full:33 
Demands of our Struggle 
Aim 
To: National Commission for Human Rights 
Jl Latuharhari 4b 
Central Jakarta 
1. Struggle to restore the human rights of the Poso community, which have been 
systematically laid waste. 
2. Free the Po so community of the oppression of rioters (perusuh ). 
Target 
1. Eliminate/arrest the rioters/provocateurs (provokator) who have thus far been 
protected by the government 
Demands 
1. Free Poso of rioters/provocateurs whom the authorities have already identified 
2. The patience of Paso's people is at an end and the time has come to assert that 
Paso's people are the indigenous inhabitants who must live in freedom in their own 
birthplace. 
3. Because Lombogia, Kasintuwu and churches have been razed/burned by the 
Muslim rioters/provocateurs it will be our struggle to raze all of the villages of the 
rioters/provocateurs (Moengko, Kayamanya, Bonesompe and Lawanga) 
4. The security forces should stop taking sides as thus far in reality the security forces 
have always obstructed us, meaning crowds following the instructions of 
provocateurs have been free to bum Christian residents' houses and buildings. 
5. Give us the opportunity and freedom to help the government to pursue the 
provocateurs/rioters and to take action against them as a guarantee of restoration of 
security as a component of national security. 
6. It is a matter of deep regret that the security forces have not overcome the rioters' 
brutality, but instead have let them loot, bum people's houses and churches. 
33 I have translated what purports to be a photocopy of the original letter. Substantially similar versions of 
the letter are reproduced in the prison memoir of the Christian minister who first read out the letter 
publicly, and a contemporary news item. See Damanik, Tragedi Kemanusiaan Poso, pp. 31-32; 
"Memperjuangkan Amanat Lateka" Formasi, no. 48, July 2000, p. 7. 
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7. The support of the central government will be inseparable from the achievement of 
the aims and target of our struggle. 
On behalf of the Pejuang Pemulihan Keamanan Poso (Champions of the 
Restoration of Security in Poso) 
Ir. Adven L. Lateka34 
By analysing each of the points of the letter, we can draw out some of the underlying 
grievances that fed into the violence, as well as some of the more immediate 
motivations. 
A good starting point in analysing the letter is Lateka's formulation of the boundaries of 
kelompok merah group identity. There are two key phrases in this respect: "Poso's 
people are the indigenous inhabitants" and "Christian residents".35 These two identity 
markers - ethnic and religious - do not correspond exactly in Poso, but it is not accurate 
to think of the groups as separate. For instance, a non-indigenous Christian man who 
fought during the third period started his narrative of the conflict by remarking, "We 
feel that we are the indigenous residents here."36 The relevance of both identity markers 
to the May-June violence are also neatly captured in three pieces of graffiti dating from 
the third period that were photographed by a Muslim chronicler: "Pamona Poso my 
birth land, indigenous people ofPoso unite", "Christians are free", "Muslims must leave 
the land ofPoso".37 
This dual identification has led some authors to argue that the conflict is best 
understood primarily in ethnic terms, with an emphasis on competition for land between 
indigenous people and migrants. Aditjondro in particular argues that the description of 
Poso as a "religious conflict" should be exchanged for "a paradigm of the displacement 
of Poso's indigenous communities", with the third period violence understood as a 
primarily ethnic enterprise to "reclaim their customary land from migrants who have 
defiled their land."38 Lateka's letter does touch upon the issue of land and territory, 
34 Ir.- Insinyur (an engineering degree) 
35 Respectively, "warga Paso adalah penduduk asli" and "Rakyat Kristiani" 
36 Interview with a Tentena resident, February 2002. 
37 Respectively "Pamona Paso Tanah Kelahiranku, Paso Asli Bersatu", "Merdeka Kristen" and "Muslim 
Harus Tinggalkan Tanah Paso". Substantially the same collection of photographs appears in two 
Muslim-authored accounts of the third period. See Al-Anshari and Suhardi (ed.), Tragedi Paso, pp. 61, 
65; Tim Pencari Bukti, Fajar Merah Saga, Photo 16, Photo 25, Photo 26. 
38 George Junus Adi1jondro, Kerusuhan Paso dan Morowali, Akar Permasalahan dan Jalan Keluarnya, 
(paper presented at seminar on "Application of Emergency Status in Aceh, Papua and Po so?" Hotel 
Santika, Jakarta, 7 January 2004) not paginated. Aragon also identifies "insider-outsider friction over 
economic use of land as the basal line of fracture", but it is clear she is arguing for the inclusion of an 
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saying "Poso's people are the indigenous inhabitants who must live in freedom in their 
own birthplace." Nevertheless, while we should remain sensitive to the fact that ethnic 
identity and competition over land were among the motivations for some combatants to 
take part in the violence, religion still stands out as the primary cleavage in the third 
period. Two features of the violence make the primacy of religion clear. Ethnic ties did 
not lead certain individuals to fight against their co-religionists in Poso, for instance, in 
the way that Muslim and Christian Kao-ethnic people fought together against Muslim 
Makian-ethnic migrants in North Maluku, to give one example.39 Nor do kelompok 
merah members appear to have confined the target of their attacks to only particular 
ethnic groups among Poso's Muslims. 
In fact, the primary adversaries whom Lateka identified in his letter are "perusuh" 
(rioters) and ''provokator" (provocateurs), with one or both of these groups mentioned 
eight times in the letter's ten points. The kelompok merah will eliminate/arrest 
(menumpas/menangkap), pursue/take actions against (memburu/menindak) and raze the 
villages (meratakan) of these groups. Lateka himself did not name names, but the 
identity of the men Christians considered to be provocateurs was well known. Tibo, for 
example, named the Muslim men Adnan Arsal, Daeng Raja, Maro Tompo, Agfar 
Patanga, N ani Lamusu and Mandor Pahe when interviewed by the press at the 
conclusion of the third period.40 Other Christian combatants recounted similar lists of 
names during my interviews with them. 
ethnic idiom along with religion rather than the replacement of religion with ethnicity. Acciaioli, touching 
on Poso based on secondary sources in a paper primarily about indigenous-settler land tensions in the 
Lindu plain of Central Sulawesi, makes a similar argument to Aragon, calling ethnic and religious 
tensions "mutually reinforcing". See Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso", p. 57; Acciaioli, "Grounds 
of Conflict, Idioms of Harmony: Custom, Religion and Nationalism in Violence Avoidance at the Lindu 
Plain, Central Sulawesi",Indonesia 72 (October 2001), p. 85. 
39 Chris Wilson, "Ethnic Origins of Religious Conflict in North Maluku Province, Indonesia, 1999-2000", 
Indonesia 79 (April2005), pp. 87-89. I have found only one reference to Muslims fighting for the 
kelompok merah, in a contemporary press interview with a kelompok merah combatant: "And you should 
remember that our group are not all Christians, there are several Muslims." Considering its uniqueness, it 
is possible the reference is spurious. See "Hanya Dendam Pada Penindas", Formasi, June 2000, p. 6. 
40 Similar transcripts of the interview, which most likely took place on 8 June, appear in Palu-based 
tabloids MAL and Formasi. In the Formasi version, two additional names appear in Tibo's list: Andi 
Ridwan and Mat Laparigi. See "Kami Hanya Mencari Provokator", Formasi, July 2000, p. 10; "Saya 
Ajak Masyarakat Muslim Berdamai", MAL, Fourth Week, June 2000, p. 9. Arsal was a Department of 
Religion employee, Agfar Patanga was the younger brother of Arief Patanga (district head in Poso from 
1989-1999), Nani Lamusu was a fish trader, whereas the rest of the men were businessmen or contractors. 
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It is clear that Lateka's rioters/provocateurs are Muslims, but Lateka himself makes 
only one mention of the word "Muslim" in his letter. This is typical of other rhetoric 
surrounding the May-June 2000 violence. 
We were looking for rioters, we were not fighting against Muslims. At the time we had a 
banner, on which we wrote in big letters "We are not fighting against Muslims nor are we 
their enemies. It is rioters that we are looking for." 41 
Even cursory examination of the May-June 2000 violence makes it clear that the 
kelompok merah were in fact fighting against Muslims, even if in such rhetoric 
combatants asserted that they were not fighting their adversaries because they were 
Muslims. 42 But the rhetoric still had its effects, most notably the disproportionate care 
kelompok merah members usually took to not bum mosques in the villages that they 
attacked. A chronology of the Poso conflict compiled by a Muslim organisation in Palu 
lists six mosques and one prayer house (mushollah) burned during the third period. By 
the same report's count, 3,492 houses were bumed.43 Of course, the decision not to bum 
mosques may have been a tactical move to try to limit the conflict to district scale and 
to avoid involving Muslim populations elsewhere, a tactic observers have also identified 
in the West Kalimantan and North Maluku conflicts.44 But it is also possible that the 
reluctance to bum mosques reflected an anxiety on the part of the perpetrators that 
attacking a group because of their religion may not have been legitimate, or may not 
have been perceived as legitimate by the broader community. After all, Muslims had 
installed a banner almost identical to the one described above after the first period, 
41 Interview with a Tentena resident, February 2002. This interviewee clarified the term "rioter" later in 
the interview, saying "Whoever [stood and] faced us, we would consider to be a rioter." 
42 This same reluctance to mention religion was also evident in a discussion I had with several Tentena 
residents regarding their perceptions of the causes of the violence. They were happy to discuss political 
subterfuge to control the district head position, but made a show of being reluctant to explicitly state that 
the people they were referring to were Muslims and that they perceived the political competition had 
taken place along religious lines. Discussion with Tentena residents, July 2003. 
43 See FSIR, Derita Muslim Poso, p. 40. This matches the figure in the governor's report. See Laporan 
Gubernur Sulawesi Tengah, p. 7. 
44 In the initial confrontations of the North Maluku conflict, which took place between (mostly Muslim) 
Makian and (mixed Muslim and Christian) Kao ethnics, Wilson notes that Kao also took care not to bum 
mosques. Peluso notes the same behaviour on the part ofDayaks in the 1997 conflict. Wilson observes 
that one motivation for the Kao "restraint" may have had been their own side's mixed religious 
composition. However, both authors observe that not burning mosques was also intended to make a 
statement that the violence was not "about religion", intended as a tactical move to minimise the risk of 
attracting new opponents to each conflict. See Chris Wilson, "The Ethnic Origins of Religious Conflict in 
North Maluku Province, Indonesia", Indonesia 79 (April2005): 88. Nancy Lee Peluso, "Passing the Red 
Bowl: Creating Community identity through violence in West Kalimantan, 1967-1997" in Violent 
Conflicts in Indonesia: Analysis, Representation, Resolution, ed. Charles A. Coppel (London: Routledge, 
2006), p. 111. 
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when as the demographic majority in the province and the country they had little reason 
to fear widening the conflict to involve other Christian populations (See Chapter Two). 
The December 1998 and April 2000 riots also stand out as a central part of the rationale 
for violence that Lateka expressed in his letter. This follows directly from Lateka's 
focus on ''perusuh" and ''provokator". At one level, the letter displayed a feeling of 
indignant anger at the effrontery of the perpetrators of the first two periods of violence -
"the patience of Po so's people is at an end" - leading to a justification of the May-June 
violence as revenge or retaliation, expressed explicitly in Demand 3. Whether by chance 
omission or because it was indicative of Lateka's own preoccupations, the letter does 
not mention the murders at the end of the second period, and instead mentions explicitly 
injury to property alone (looting, burning of houses, burning of churches). Nor did 
Lateka mention the death in custody of his brother-in-law, although it is hard to imagine 
that this did not loom large in his thoughts. Indeed, other Christian sources do not 
reproduce Lateka' s exclusive focus on property damage. Another Christian figure, who 
preferred an ethnic interpretation of the conflict, focussed on the murders, describing 
the killings of the two Christians during the April 2000 violence as a violation by 
migrants ofPoso's adat (customary law). 
We have not fenced off this land, we have not fenced off the forests, nor have we 
dammed the sea. We have allowed you to come here, but if you spill blood here then you 
45 
must face the consequences. 
The feelings that they had been intolerably affronted as well as a desire for revenge 
were encapsulated in two common phrases that Christians use in description of the 
May-June violence: "[Period] three happened because of one and two," and "Having 
turned both cheeks we had no cheek left to tum." This second statement is particularly 
rich in its potential interpretations. At one level it explains away the defeats of the first 
and second periods as the results of Christian stoicism, thus nullifying these previous 
riots as an accurate test of the relative strength of local Christian and Muslim 
populations. On another level, the saying also justifies the third period violence as 
reasonable by suggesting that Christians had entered a period that went far beyond the 
normal limits of stoicism. 
45 Interview with a Christian figure, January 2002. Although this figure discussed the conflict in ethnic 
terms, he perceived Christianity to be part of Poso 's indigenous ethnic identity. 
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The conviction of local Christians that they had been subjected to repeated affronts is 
important as an illustration that the decisions individuals were making to fight in the 
third period were not taken dispassionately. This sense of having been affronted was not 
simply based in discursive identification as the result of clever framing by manipulative 
leaders, even if that may sometimes be perfectly sufficient basis to generate indignation 
and anger. For a group that was much broader than just the leaders who expressed these 
sentiments, feelings of indignant anger at a perceived affront would have fed off lived 
experience, be it forced displacement, loss of property, or, for a few people, injury or 
even the death of a relative. 
But a greater preoccupation than previous affronts that comes through in Lateka's letter 
is the failure of the government and security forces to take action in response to the first 
two periods of violence. His preoccupation is evident in the fact that four of the letter's 
ten points touch upon the government's or security forces' past performance in Poso.46 
Under the rationale the letter typifies, this failure of the state to provide protection 
renders the rioters/provocateurs as an ongoing and immediate threat. Epitomising this 
feeling of threat, several Christian combatants recalled that they were convinced that 
after the April 2000 violence, Tentena would have been the next location to be attacked 
if they had not themselves taken action. This idea of an impending threat led many 
Christians to describe the third period violence as defensive, "mempertahankan kita 
punya wilayah" (defending our territory), or at best as a war (implying the fighting was 
two-sided), even though the violence wrought on Muslims and their villages far 
exceeded anything that had previously occurred in the area.47 The perceived failure of 
the security forces to act also provided a justification for Poso's Christians to take 
matters into their own hands, reflected in the two points ofLateka's letter that invite the 
government to join with Lateka's Pejuang Pemulihan Keamanan Poso (Champions of 
46 Target 1, Demands 1, 4, 6. The reference in Demand 4 to the security forces' obstructing "us" makes it 
possible this letter also refers to the portion of the May-June 2000 violence that preceded Lateka's death 
on 2 June. The security forces had intervened on several occasions to break up clashes and drive Christian 
assailants away from the city's fringes. As a comparison, another Christian leader, Fabianus Tibo, 
complained to the press just after the third period (prior to his arrest) that the kelompok merah had been 
unable to capture provocateurs because the security forces had "obstructed us and shot at us". See "Saya 
Ajak Masyarakat Muslim Berdamai", MAL, Fourth Week, June 2000, p. 9. 
47 The idea of defence most often explicitly referred to territory, ie the assertion that Christians were not 
aggressively attacking Muslims' villages but instead were defending their own villages. One combatant 
though expressed the idea of defence in family terms, "By chance I was given the task of leading sector 
"X" [detail deleted by author from interview transcript], because my father had been wounded, so the 
time had come for his son to defend (him)." Interview with a Christian combatant, date and location 
withheld. 
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the Restoration of Security in Poso) to take action against those responsible for past 
violence.48 
The following two quotes are long, but bring together many of the themes identified 
above. The first quote is from a combatant, the second from a Christian community 
member. 
First quote: 
[During the first period] we thought, "Let's just surrender (mengalah) and make peace." 
It was peaceful, but all the while they were consolidating. Another small blow-up 
developed into another large blow-up [ie, the second period], but we were able to subdue 
things, because we, Christians, told people in church, "Let's not be like this, let's not 
listen to them." So we tried to just take it (mengalah) again, obediently, but in the end the 
third [period] was triggered. Ah the third one, you could say there was no mercy in the 
third one. Because we had [endured it] twice, we weren't able to hold back. We struck 
back (balas). We struck back right to the very last drop .... If we hadn't countered them, 
Tentena would have been razed. You could say [our attacks] were just defensive, 
defending our territory, because our religion had been trodden upon and insulted, our 
church had been burned, and they even said, 'The Lord Jesus is a Pig' and 'The Lord 
Jesus has Flea-Ridden Long Hair', various types of insults, but we took it all on the chin. 
But because we saw their plans were getting increasingly out of hand, we countered 
them.49 
Second quote: 
The most sensitive thing for the community here was that their churches had been burned 
- the Pentecostal church, the Pniel church, the Advent church - as long as it was a 
church, even a Catholic church, it had been burned. If their houses had been burned, their 
possessions looted, well ... they could still be stoic (sabar), but as soon as the churches 
were burned, and then there had been someone killed, and they saw at the time that the 
person killed, a Torajan, was killed in front of the security forces, who did nothing, they 
just held their weapons [interviewee motions as if holding a weapon by his side]. When 
the looting was happening, I saw it - the security forces were there but they just stood 
like this, with their weapon [at their side], so the community didn't believe in the security 
forces anymore, not all of the security forces, but the oknum [rogues] who had been on 
duty. So without this belief, where else could they seek protection. That was the cause, 
back then there was also information that they were planning a third [riot], and in this 
third one it would be Christian religious figures and community figures who would be 
murdered. So as I see it, the third [period] was revenge, before they attack us better to 
attack them . .. If they had attacked, it was certain they would have attacked in this 
direction [towards Tentena], but instead we attacked in that direction [towards the city]. 
A final theme that is strongly evident in these two quotes is the feeling that the Christian 
religion had been insulted. While some combatants were extremely reluctant to state 
that they were fighting against Muslims on account of religion, others in fact explicitly 
depicted the third period violence as a religious enterprise. Indeed, even a single 
individual could be inconsistent within the one interview: the same man who described 
48 Demands 5, 7. 
49 Interview with a former Christian combatant, July 2003. 
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the kelompok merah banner's declaration that their enemies were not Muslims also 
referred to the kelompok merah's rules of engagement as the hukum sepuluh (literally, 
ten laws), apparently an allusion to the Ten Commandments.50 Another non-combatant 
who sympathised with the violence described these rules of engagement in even more 
explicitly religious terms: 
In Biblical terms not a single item could be looted, not even a single needle could be 
taken. There was a rape, so it was compulsory for the person who perpetrated the rape to 
be killed, and so it was done. 51 There could not be any wrongdoing in this episode. A 
grand retaliation, with prayers, and greetings "In the name of the Father, the Son and the 
Holy Spirit.52 
Some combatants also described God as an agent on their side: 
When we deployed that night, we sang songs like "Onward Christian Soldiers" (Laskar 
Kristen Maju) all the way to the battlefield. We went until twelve at night, so we still had 
a chance to rest. When we arrived in the field, as light approached I prayed, I said "God, 
with the rays of the sun, I hope you give your love to us. Now we are facing the enemy. 
Help us Lord, break their bones, you own their souls, but we are taking the devils that 
have possessed their lives. If you are on our side, who can resist us." When there were 
only ten metres left between us and the enemy, they shot at us but not one of us was hit, 
not even one. Their bullets just went overhead, sometimes only air would come out of 
their weapons. I was surprised at the terrific power that was with us, we faced them 
numbering around 150 people, whereas there were a thousand of them, but imagine, 
although no other part of them was wounded, their necks broke, that's what surprised us. 
When we were able to kill them with machetes or bows, when we cut them, a pig ate 
them. Yes, a pig, a group of pigs, hundreds ate them, which made us think, maybe this is 
what they meant when they said 'The Lord Jesus is a pig'. 53 
The man's reference to Jesus manifesting himself on the battlefield as a pig was only 
half joking, if it was at all. 
The importance of religious imagery to the violence inevitably raises the question of the 
extent of the involvement of the Central Sulawesi Christian Church (GKST). Certainly, 
the GKST was accused in the provincial press and Muslim niche media of instigating, 
coordinating and even commanding the May-June 2000 violence. 54 Among academic 
observers, van Klinken makes the strongest statement that the church was involved, 
albeit without supporting details: "It now seems beyond doubt that Tibo was taking 
orders from top people within the GKST church, well-connected individuals who 
50 Interview with a Tentena resident, February 2002. 
51 This refers to the murder of Christian man Wens Tinegari, cited by several combatants in support of 
assertions that Christians would not tolerate rape or atrocities within their ranks. 
52 Interview with a Christian man, January 2002. 
53 Interview with a Tentena resident, February 2002. 
54 "Konflik Poso (Belum) Akan Segera Berakhir", Bunyan, January 2002, p. 18. 
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managed to erase their involvement by the time Tibo was arrested and later sentenced to 
death."55 
There is some evidence of contact between GKST leaders and Christian combatants 
during or immediately after the third period. For instance, a military intelligence officer 
produced a letter to the secretary of the GKST Synod signed by Tibo during the trial of 
Tibo, Dominggus and Marinus that requested petrol, rice and instant noodles for Sepe 
and Silanca villages. According to a note on the letter, the Synod had apparently 
fulfilled the request.56 Senior members of the church were also able to contact Christian 
fugitives immediately after the third period, most notably when two ministers brokered 
the arrests of Dominggus and Marinus.57 It was also a minister of the church, Rinaldy 
Damanik, who publicly read out Lateka's letter justifying the third period violence after 
the kelompok merah leader's death.58 
Indeed, Damanik and the GKST Crisis Centre, of which he was coordinator at the time 
of the third period, have often been the primary targets of suspicion. The Crisis Center 
was formed after the April 2000 riot, ostensibly to help evacuate threatened Christian 
populations and distribute humanitarian aid. The Center issued a number of statements 
and reports on the May-June 2000 violence which at best tacitly condoned the violence. 
It also accepted a number of Christian combatants as members, a step that Damanik 
explained as an attempt to convince them gradually to withdraw from violence. At a 
personal level, it is clear that Damanik grew into a figure of great influence within the 
church and broader Christian community during the conflict - he was chosen as 
secretary-general of the church synod in December 2000 and then head of the synod in 
2004.59 It is not clear, however, that he exercised direct authority over combatants in the 
55 Van Klinken, Small Town Wars, p. 84. Van Klinken's assertion is weakly referenced. One reference is 
an expanded internet version of a leaflet handed to me by a protester at a rally shortly before the 
execution of Tibo and co which was demanding that the men be freed. Such a document would obviously 
downplay Tibo's involvement and responsibility. His second reference is a 2006 article from a national 
news magazine. 
56 Record of testimony ofNasirun in Palu District Court Decision no. 459/PID.B/2000/PN.PL. in case of 
Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva and Marinus Riwwu (hereafter Tibo Decision), p. 46; "Menyoal 
Surat Sinode", GAMMA, 21-27 February 2001. 
57 Interview with Dominggus da Silva, July 2003. 
58 Damanik was imprisoned in 2002 on a weapons possession charge after home-made firearms were 
found in a vehicle in which he was a passenger. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment, but was 
released in November 2004. 
59 Damanik, Tragedi Kemanusiaan di Paso, p. 170; "Walau Masih Mendekam di Penjara Pdt Damanik 
Terpilih Ketum Sinode GKST", hariankomentar.com, 25 October 2004. 
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May-June 2000 violence, and I have not come across any specific evidence to support 
accusations that he played such a role. 
The available evidence thus falls well short of proving that the church exercised 
authority over the third period violence - certainly accounts of key sites of kelompok 
merah activity do not typically mention ministers of the church. There is also evidence 
that suggests that the church did not make use of its great local authority in Poso in 
2000 - even recognised by men who were at best nominal Christians - to lead the 
violence. The authority of the church is clear from the fact that local youths twice went 
to the GKST seeking leadership in 2000: an initial group went to the church 
immediately after they fled Lombogia during the April 2000 riot, and a second group 
went at the outset of the third period violence. Both times, however, these crowds 
appear to have left disappointed; on the second occasion a senior church leader 
reportedly told the crowds, "Anyone who fights is a [member of a] 'GPK' (Gerakan 
Pengacau Keamanan - Security Disturbing Movement)."60 Indeed, a local youth 
highlighted the church's unwillingness to get involved as one of the factors that helped 
Lateka gain influence with the people who had fled from Lombogia. As such, I believe 
it is likely that neither the church as an institution nor its most senior officers 
commanded or coordinated the third period violence. 
This is not to say that there were not ministers of the church who were themselves 
frustrated with the GKST's formal stance. Several ministers whom I interviewed clearly 
strongly approved of the May-June 2000 violence. 
Who would be willing for his brothers to be massacred or murdered, of course one would come 
and defend them, that would be the usual thing I would think, that how a person's instincts should 
be. I myself often criticised Christians who did not want to defend their brothers, but [it's a 
question of] the [appropriate] way of defending them. 61 
Some combatants also told anecdotes of local ministers blessing combatants before they 
departed for clashes. Such blessings - and the statements condoning the violence 
released by the Crisis Centre - may in fact have been the most important role played by 
ministers of the church who approved of the May-June 2000 violence. Such blessings 
and statements would have bestowed social respectability on the decision to fight, a 
respectability that may have been strengthened because some important combatants 
60 Damanik, Tragedi Kemanusiaan di Paso, p. 35. On the term "GPK", see Dave McRae, "A Discourse 
on Separatists", Indonesia 74 (October 2002): 41-43. 
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were also members of their village's local church committee.62 Wilson highlights the 
importance of social respectability bestowed by religious figures in the context of the 
North Maluku violence, writing "religious sanction for violence alienated any remorse 
that Christian men may have felt, increasing both their sense of purpose and their ability 
to carry out further atrocities without guilt."63 Horowitz makes the same point but in a 
more general context: "If it [ie, ethnic violence] did not have legitimacy and social 
support, otherwise respectable people would not participate, and perhaps more 
important, could not resume ordinary life, free of social sanction, after the fact. "64 Thus 
irrespective of whether the Crisis Centre or any ministers of the church actually played 
any role in physically supporting combat, through their public condoning of violence 
they may have encouraged ordinary Christians to take part. 
* * * 
The preparations for violence and indeed the disturbances in the southeast of Poso 
district in mid-May did not escape the attention of the community in Poso town. 
Rumours of a planned Christian attack on the city began to circulate, leading some 
Christians and Muslims to leave the city during what turned out to be the final week 
before the third period of violence began. 
Both Christians and Muslims have built accusatory narratives around these departures 
from the city, which preceded the actual violence. Several Muslim residents of the city 
later cited the departure of their Christian neighbours as alleged evidence of these 
neighbours' foreknowledge of the May-June attacks. Conversely, a Christian figure 
from Poso depicted the decision of any Muslim who chose not to flee the city as a sign 
of aggressive intent: "Muslims indigenous to Poso who chose not to get involved [in the 
violence] fled from Poso. The only ones left in the city were Bugis or from 
Gorontalo. "65 
Even at this late stage, decisive action to send more troops to Poso, to take visible steps 
to investigate the previous violence or even to engage in dialogue with community 
61 Interview with a minister ofGKST, date and location withheld. 
62 On the intertwined nature of church and societal authority in Poso, see Schrauwers, "Through a Glass 
Darkly", p. 138. 
63 Wilson, Ethno-religious Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God. 
64 Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, p. 266. 
65 Interviews, Poso, Palu, January-February 2002. 
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leaders might have prevented violence or lessened its scope. But despite the decision of 
many of the city's residents to flee, the district government and security forces did not 
appear to appreciate the seriousness of the situation. Poso was left under the command 
of the interim police chief placed in the district after the previous commander had been 
removed in the wake of the April violence. Neither have I found records of additional 
police or military being moved to the district prior to the commencement of the fighting 
on 23 May. Moreover, the district head was absent in South Sulawesi on the day the 
fighting began. Government and security force efforts on the final night before violence 
began, 22 May, epitomise their response to the developing crisis. With rumours rampant 
of an imminent attack on the city by Poso's Christians, the district administration 
contacted sub-district authorities in the majority-Christian town Tentena to seek 
clarification.66 The Tentena-based officials assured their counterparts in the city that no 
preparations for an attack were evident in the town. The district government in tum 
chose to relay this message to the city's residents on the night of22 May by sending out 
a truck and loud hailer to circle the city's streets, assuring the community that there 
would be no attack and appealing for calm. The first Christian sortie into the city, in 
which three Muslim men were killed, began just a few hours after this announcement. 
The start of violence 
The attack on the city that marked the start of the third period took the form of a pre-
dawn foray on 23 May into the city wards of Kayamanya and Moengko by a small 
group of around fifteen Christians, all clad in black and armed with machetes. The 
group, under the leadership of Protestant civil servant A. L. Lateka, appear, at least 
initially, to have been pursuing the plan set out it Lateka's letter to take action against 
"provokator". For instance, one of the targets of the morning's attack was the Muslim 
fish-trader Nani Lamusu. By one account, the group entered Nani Lamusu's house, 
another said that one of the men killed had been guarding Lamusu's residence. Palu 
newspaper Mercusuar reported the group also threw rocks at a car owned by Mandor 
Pahe, another of the men whom Christians considered to be a ''provokator".67 Instead of 
apprehending these provocateurs, however, the group's members killed three Muslim 
66 Community members in Poso recall that around this time there were also what in hindsight turned out 
to be signs of the coming violence; for instance, a Muslim villager remembered a neighbour promising to 
show him a homemade gun, only to renege when he realized the man was not a Christian. Interview with 
a Poso man, July 2003. 
92 
men whom they happened to encounter on the streets, including a policeman, whose 
pistol they seized. 68 The group then fled to the nearby Santa Theresia Catholic School 
complex in Moengko, pursued by local Muslim residents. News of the murders then 
quickly drew a large crowd of Muslims to the school. 
Map 2: 23 May 2000 attack on Moengko and Kayamanya (approximate route) 
Although it appears to have been A. L. Lateka who led this initial sortie, this was also 
the point at which the Catholic migrant Tibo first came to public attention in Poso. 
When the Muslims pursuing Lateka's black-clad group arrived at the school, they found 
Tibo standing outside, also clad in black and armed with a machete, just as the members 
ofLateka's group had been. Understandably, the crowd and police who arrived shortly 
67 Interview with a former Poso resident living in Tentena, February 2002; "Poso Rusuh Lagi", 
Mercusuar, 24 May 2000, p. 11. On the movements of the group, see also the deposition of Reko Indro 
Sasongko in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 7 June 2000, pp. 1-2. 
68 Post-mortem reports for two of the men killed- Kamaruddin Ali and Abdul Syukur- appear in the 
court indictment ofTibo, Dominggus and Marinus, which is also reproduced in the district court decision 
in their case. Each man suffered extensive wounds to their head and arms, caused by a sharp object; Ali 
had also been stabbed in the chest and back. See Tibo Decision, pp. 10-14. 
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afterwards concluded that Tibo was one of the assailants responsible for the morning's 
murders. Tibo's own account was that he had arrived at the school the previous day as 
part of another group of around fifteen men. His intention, he said, had been to remove 
the school's children before a rumoured attack on their school, and he had been asleep 
when the murders took place; he had then gone out the front when the school's children 
woke him to tell him that there was trouble in the city and that some men had fled into 
the school. 69 
The police who came to the scene entered into negotiations with Tibo, and he handed 
his machete to them. (Lateka was presumably out of sight within the school complex by 
the time the police arrived.) Despite the presence of the increasingly large crowd of 
Muslims and a request from the police that Tibo accompany them to Poso's police 
station, he somehow managed to flee into the forested hills behind the complex.70 Most 
of Tibo's men, Lateka's black-clad group and the school's students and teachers also 
made their escape. 71 All the various escapees headed south towards the majority 
Christian areas of Poso, first to Tambaro village just south of the city and then further 
south back to Tentena. Behind them in the city, the crowd torched the school complex, 
including its church, and several nearby houses. Several houses were also burned on 
each of the next few days in Moengko and Kayamanya.72 Most probably, these arson 
attacks were retaliation for the violence of 23 May, with Muslims who had chosen to 
stay in the city burning the houses of Christian residents who had already fled. 
69 Interview with Fabianus Tibo, 28 July 2003. Tibo's version of events does not ring true, and is unlikely 
to be the whole truth. It is possible he and his men were not directly involved in Lateka's attack, but their 
very presence at the school, let alone their black clothing and weapons, seem too much of a coincidence 
to be entirely unrelated. 
70 Tibo skipped over his method of escape during my interviews with him; other accounts suggest he went 
into the school on the pretence of summoning his men to surrender, but then ran away. Rohde provides a 
different account, saying Tibo and his companions had agreed to surrender but fled when the Muslim 
crowd broke police lines. See Rohde, "Indonesia Unraveling?", p. 119. 
71 Two members ofTibo's group, Leonardus Lewa and Rafael Sina, were arrested at the scene after being 
beaten by the crowd. "Pimpinan Perusuh Eks Napi Beteleme", Mercusuar, 25 May 2000. 
72 "Pimpinan Perusuh Eks Napi Beteleme", Mercusuar, 25 May 2000; Tengko, Sekilas Tentang 
Kerusuhan Paso III, p. 1. 
Map 3: Escape from Moengko Baru to Tentena 
( - - - = by forest path; _ = by road) 
94 
After the murders on the morning of 23 May, tensions immediately rose even further 
within the city as crowds of Muslims gathered at several locations, including the 
market, in anticipation of further attacks.73 Each of the Christians I interviewed who 
were still in the city at this point said that they then left by day's end: 
I was in the city, but the attack was at dawn, by the afternoon I had left Poso, because I 
saw that many families had already left. Besides, I had several different fields up to 
sixteen kilometres from Poso, one seven kilometres away [south], one ten kilometres 
away [south], and I had seen that a lot of people from [south of the city] were beginning 
to gather. You could see that starting to happen in Poso as well, but not to the same 
extent. And I had spent several nights tending my fields, and I saw that villagers who 
would normally be tending their fields, were now preparing arrows, so I thought these are 
not people preparing to farm, to be honest they were preparing for war. 74 
There were reportedly two further clashes in the south of the city later in the day on 23 
May. In the more serious of the two incidents, around a dozen houses were burned and 
several people were wounded when rival crowds clashed in Sayo ward.75 It is not clear 
whether the Sayo clash was part of the same plan as the foray into Moengko and 
Kayamanya or alternatively was an unplanned side-effect. In another clash near the 
73 "Massa Konsentrasi di Tiga Lokasi", Mercusuar, 24 May 2000. 
74 Interview with a former Poso resident living in Tentena, July 2003. 
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town's drinking water plant in Gebangrejo, police apprehended a female member of the 
group Lateka had led through Kayamanya and Moengko earlier in the day?6 
The 23 May attack on Kayamanya and Moengko was clearly born out of the 
preparations for violence Christians had been undertaking since at least early-May. 
Nevertheless, this attack had not gone particularly well from a Christian point of view. 
Lateka's group had not apprehended or killed any provocateurs, Lateka himself had 
been wounded in the attack, and one ofLateka's group and two ofTibo's men had been 
arrested. 77 The kelompok merah leaders' next move was to convene a meeting on the 
following day in Kelei village. Attendees at this meeting reportedly included Lateka, 
Tibo, the retired police officer Paulus Tungkanan and Protestant civil servant D. A. 
Lempadeli.78 By Tibo's account of the meeting, Lateka gave the order to the gathering 
that Poso be razed.79 Following this meeting, many of the participants travelled to 
Tagolu village (just south of the city), where they established a command post (posko ). 
This posko was located in the house of A. L. Lateka' s younger brother, Bakte. 80 
Tagolu village was a strategic location for a command post and as a staging point for 
attacks, because it lay at the fork of the road south from Poso to Tentena and the road 
east to the Muslim coastal town of Ampana. Controlling Tagolu thus allowed Christians 
to launch attacks along either road, while also simultaneously blocking road access 
from Poso to Tentena and leaving open a secure route of retreat to the south should it be 
required. The establishment of the posko also meant the path to safety for Muslim 
communities south of Tagolu was blocked. 
75 "Massa Konsentrasi di Tiga Lokasi", Mercusuar, 24 May 2000; "Poso Rusuh Lagi", Mercusuar, 24 
May 2000, Tengko, Sekilas tentang Kerusuhan Paso III, p. 1. 
76 The location of the drinking water plant relative to the Santa Theresia church in Moengko suggests that 
the woman who was apprehended, Y enny Tadenga, may have been attempting to flee south back to 
majority-Christian areas. Tadenga herself told police she had stopped near the plant on the way to the 
attack on Kayamanya and Moengko that morning, and so had not taken part in the violence. Tengko, 
Sekilas ten tang Kerusuhan Paso III, p. 1; deposition of Y enny Tadenga in dossier of Fabianus Tibo, 31 
October 2000, p. 2. 
77 Interview with Fabianus Tibo, 10 May 2004; "Poso Kembali Rusuh, 3 Orang Tewas", Surya, 24 May 
2000. 
78 Interview with Fabianus Tibo, July 2003.; deposition ofFabianus Tibo in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 26 
July 2000, p. 5. 
79 Interview with Fabianus Tibo, July 2003; deposition ofFabianus Tibo in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 26 
July 2000, p. 5. 
80 The house was actually the "official residence" (rumah dinas) ofBakte's wife, who worked at the 
nearby Tagolu community health centre. He described the house as approximately 9 x 7 metres, with 
three rooms. It was first established as a posko, Bakte asserted, while he was absent from the house; 
Bakte also said that most houses in Tagolu lodged kelompok merah members during the time the posko 
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The posko appears to have served as a location for Christians to question prisoners, 
make phone calls to district and provincial authorities, and as a lodging place for some 
kelompok merah leaders, particularly Tibo. We do not have a precise picture of the 
leadership structure within the posko. In a deposition, Tibo himself named Erik Rombot 
and Tungkanan as the highest leaders, with himself, Y anis Simangunsong, Ladue and 
Unang as subordinates, but did not describe the role of each man in detail. 81 Others held 
captive at the posko during the third period added the names Dominggus da Silva and 
Marinus Riwu (both Tibo associates), Romi Parimo, Mama Wanti and Marthin to the 
list of alleged leaders there. 82 A. L. Lateka, although a senior kelompok merah leader, 
appears to have spent most of his time in other parts of Poso. The posko was not the 
only centre of kelompok merah activities in Tagolu. The Tagolu village hall appears to 
have been used to execute prisoners, as a wire noose was later found hanging from the 
building's rafters.83 The Tagolu Forestry office may have been used to plan some 
attacks, as a chalk line map of Poso was reportedly found on a table there.84 Nineteen 
bodies were also found in several shallow mass graves around the village. 85 
Hundreds, maybe even thousands, of Christians gathered in Tagolu during the time the 
posko was operating. 86 Christian combatants who were in Tagolu at the time stressed 
that the crowd gathered "spontaneously", a characterisation intended to justify the 
violence that they committed as a defensive response: 
was operating. During the time the house was used as a posko, Bakte also recalled, the telephone was 
treated as "toll-free" by the many visitors to the house. Interview with Bakte Lateka, July 2007. 
81 As these names are sourced from a deposition, they should be treated as preliminary information only. 
In a prison interview, referring to the "bos-bos" (bosses) at the posko, Tibo mentioned three names: Erik 
Rombot, Bakte [Lateka] and Fentje (presumably Fentje Angkouw). Deposition ofFabianus Tibo in 
dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 28 July 2000, p. 7. Interview with Fabianus Tibo, July 2003. 
82 Dominggus and Marinus were mentioned in the collective sense (i.e. the three defendants) by Mahfud 
Rosid Kusni in his testimony in the murder trial ofTibo, Dominggus and Marinus. Ros Kristina, a 
Christian woman held against her will at the posko, mentioned both Dominggus and Marinus, as well as 
the other three individuals, in her interrogation deposition in Tibo's dossier. Kristina would potentially 
have been a key witness as the murder trial, but the prosecution only read out her deposition rather than 
calling her in person, so there are reduced grounds to judge the validity of her information, and therefore 
these names should be treated only as preliminary. 
83 Rohde, "Indonesia Unraveling?", p. 110. 
84 A picture of the chalk outlines appears in a collection of photos published in two different reports. See 
Tim Pencari Bukti, Fajar Merah Saga, Palu, n. d., Al-Anshari and Suhardi (ed.), Tragedi Paso, p. 79. 
85 "The Killing Field ala Poso", Nuansa Pas, date not recorded, p. 6. 
86 The interrogation deposition of the sectoral police chief stationed in Tagolu at the time, Fence Yo han 
Londa, states that a crowd had gathered in Tagolu as early as noon on 23. Londa though says they were 
able to transport many of these people back to Tentena by truck on 24 May, only for the crowd to 
reassemble later the same night. See deposition ofFence Yohan Londa in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 16 
October 2000, pp. 1-2. 
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Because we had already lost all hope [after the second phase violence], we stood our 
ground in Tagolu, to [fight] all out there. It turned out the villages to the south (di atas) 
came down out of spontaneous sympathy, [their presence] is what raises accusations of 
coordination, that there was a [central] command. 87 
The crowds were not summoned nor were cars sent to pick them up, no, they came down 
[to Tagolu] as one to defend. No vehicles were provided, the crowds just commandeered 
vehicles. In the situation at the time, no driver could refuse. They had to take them. 88 
To the extent that these claims of spontaneity mean that the kelompok merah was not an 
army in any formal sense, they contain a kernel of truth. The sheer number of people 
who gathered in Tagolu makes it very unlikely that more than a small proportion were 
affiliated with the kelompok merah by means of anything resembling organisational 
ties; indeed it may be that only a fraction of these people had even taken part in the 
training in Kelei. Long-standing prior organisation would not have been an absolute 
pre-requisite to gather a large crowd in Tagolu. After all, large numbers of Christians 
had gathered in the village in a matter of days during the first period of violence. 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that there was an organised core of people in the village, 
who had been preparing for several weeks to perpetrate violence. Without the presence 
of so many Christians in Tagolu, making the village superficially inaccessible to 
security forces, the posko could not have operated. But it would have been the organised 
core and not any spontaneous arrivals who determined which villages the crowds which 
had gathered in Tagolu were to attack. 
The first day the posko most probably operated - 25 May - was also the day that the 
violence of the third period spread beyond the city limits. As the events of the third 
period unfolded, violent incidents in fact took place at many disparate locations around 
the district. Many of these incidents, though, were concentrated around three primary 
"fronts". Two of the fronts were in the vicinity of the Tagolu posko. The first of these 
fronts lay to the posko' s east, located in a series of villages lying along the road from 
Tagolu to the majority-Muslim town of Ampana (which I call the Lage-Tojo front, after 
the subdistricts where this violence took place). The second front was located in the 
villages around the southern fringes of the city, primarily north but also south ofTagolu 
(which I call the southern front). The third front was in Poso Pesisir sub-district, west of 
87 Interview with a Tentena resident, July 2003. 
88 Interview with a former Tagolu resident, Tentena, July 2003. 
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the city. Owing to this front's distance from Tagolu, the attacks in Poso Pesisir were 
most likely not coordinated directly from the posko. 
Map 4: Three Fronts of Violence 
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The first large-scale fighting outside the city took place on the Lage-Tojo front, starting 
with a clash in Bategencu village on 25 May. Over the course of the first four days on 
which violence took place in the area, part or all of at least six villages were burned 
down. 89 Definite casualty figures are not available, but a comparison of different 
accounts suggests at least five people were killed during these initial clashes.90 The 
posko did not initiate the first of the clashes in the area, but some of its members came 
to the aid of local Christians, assumed leadership positions among the crowds and 
helped secure "victory" in the fighting. It is not clear that these clashes were linked to 
the first and second periods in any direct sense, save that this was a "border" area 
between predominantly Christian and predominantly Muslim villages, at a time when 
tensions were high because of the previous violence and the circulation of rumours of 
impending attacks. These clashes are typical of one of the major patterns of violence 
during the third period, in which rival crowds clashed before one side was forced to 
retreat and their village was burned. In each of these clashes, which represented the 
most direct continuity in the form of violence from the first and second period, only a 
few people appear to have been killed. 
Map 5: Key Locations, Lage-Tojo front 
89 In addition to the attacks on four villages described in the text, Lee and Buyung Katedo sub-villages 
were reportedly also attacked on 29 May. See Tengko, Sekilas Tentang Kerusuhan Paso III, p. 2. 
90 One account lists eight dead by 28 May, without specifying which specific attack on this front resulted 
in each fatality. See "Polda Mulai Ambil Tindakan Tegas", Mercusuar, 29 May 2000. 
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The first day of clashes in Bategencu took place after several truckloads of Muslims left 
from the majority Muslim coastal town of Ampana to head west towards the city, much 
as had happened in the first period of violence around eighteen months earlier.91 By one 
account, these Muslims were drawn to the city by the news of Lateka's attack on 
Moengko and Kayamanya two days earlier; another version is that they came to Poso in 
response to news of a disappearance in the vicinity of the villages they attacked. 92 
When the convoy from Ampana reached the Muslim-populated villages near 
Bategencu, they banded together with local Muslims to attack Bategencu in the late 
afternoon: 
When we received word that Muslims from Ampana, from the coastal areas, were going 
to try to enter Poso, the ten or so police stationed in our village fled and left their post 
abandoned. So the police were deliberately letting [the two sides] trade blows. The crowd 
stopped at Toyado, because there it's majority Christian, then on Thursday afternoon [25 
May] the crowd started to attack Bategencu. There was no resistance, so we burned 
[houses]. This was Muslims attacking, attacking Bategencu, when we met no resistance, 
we returned home.93 
Finding themselves unable to repel this attack, Bategencu's residents retreated and 
sought refuge in the next majority-Christian village along the road, Sepe. This was the 
second IDP flow into Sepe in a month, as the village had also received Christian 
residents of the city fleeing the April 2000 violence, as described earlier in this 
chapter.94 The attack on Bategencu appears to have confirmed the Sepe villagers' 
anxiety that they would be attacked, and they prepared to fight. Another villager who 
took part in the resultant clash, who lived in an adjacent Christian settlement, said he 
did so "because each of us felt that we wanted to hold out so that they [Muslims] could 
not get past, that was spontaneity on the part of Christians, we're not hiding that, almost 
everyone who felt able-bodied [took part]."95 At this point, the Christians who had 
91 One journalistic account estimated the size of the convoy that departed from Ampana to have been 
seven truckloads. See Ecip and Waru, Kerusuhan Paso yang Sebenarnya, p. 74. 
92 The two versions are of course not mutually exclusive. The rumoured disappearance related to vehicles 
being stopped at a road-block established in Sepe village. This version would explain why Muslims 
advanced along the inland road towards the city, which ran through numerous Christian villages including 
Sepe, rather than taking the coastal road, which would have been a safer route. One account in fact stated 
that the convoy from Ampana initially went directly into the city (presumably via the coastal road) before 
doubling back to attack Bategencu. If true, this would make it more likely that the rumoured activities of 
those blocking the road in Sepe were the specific context of the atttack. Interview with Poso man, July 
2003; Rinaldy Damanik and Masdianto Posende, Catatan Peristiwa Pasca-Kerusuhan Paso 11 
(Sementara), (Tentena: CC GKST, 6 June 2000), p. l;.Tengko, Sekilas Tentang Kerusuhan Paso Ill, p. 1. 
93 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. In contrast to this man's recollection that there was no 
resistance, other accounts describe a clash taking place. See, for example, Damanik and Posende, Catalan 
Peristiwa Pasca-Kerusuhan Poso II, p. l. 
94Deposition of Junior Bobi Tingginehe in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 4 November 2000, p. 2. 
95 Interview with a Christian villager, Lage sub-district, July 2003. 
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gathered around the kelompok merah posko in Tagolu also came to their aid. Some of 
these posko members were not from the immediate area, such as Tibo and Dominggus 
and reportedly also Berny Tungkanan.96 Others do appear to have been locals: for 
instance, the Silanca resident, Ladue.97 Rumours of their prowess may have been one 
reason why these non-local posko members could assert their authority as leaders. For 
example, a Christian villager from the area said that although Tibo and Dominggus 
were not known personally to the area's villagers, they could quickly assert authority 
because of their rumoured "ilmu" (magical powers, typically invulnerability).98 
The day after the Bategencu clash, 26 May, two crowds thus stood ready to attack each 
other. On the Christian side were villagers from several local Christian settlements 
along with members of the Tagolu posko. The crowd of Muslims was again the loose 
mix of Ampana residents and Muslims living closer to Bategencu. One of the men on 
the Muslim side described the day's aims: "We wanted to go there [Bategencu] again, 
because the aim was to raze Christian villages all the way into the city, some people 
even said all the way to Tentena."99 In the event, the crowd of Christians drove the 
Muslim crowd back from Bategencu and thereafter themselves advanced to bum down 
much of Toyado village. This marked the end of the day's hostilities, and the Christian 
crowd withdrew back along the road towards Tagolu. 
A local Muslim villager attributed the kelompok merah' s success that day to better 
weaponry and better tactics. There had been more Muslims than Christians at the clash 
he said, but with the Muslims arranged as a column filing along the road, by his 
estimate stretching as far as two or three kilometres, 
Even if a blind person had taken a shot, someone would have been hit. The 
Christians had only a few people on the road, behind corrugated iron sheeting and 
metal drums. Then other people would shoot, not the ones on the road. The ones on 
the road were bait. 100 
96 Deposition ofFabianus Tibo in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 26 July 2000, p. 6; Interview with a Poso 
man, January 2002; interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
97 Ladue is named by Tibo in his interrogation deposition as one of the leaders in these clashes, and I have 
corroborated this detail in other interviews. Depositions ofFabianus Tibo in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 28 
July 2000, p. 7 and 3 I July 2000, p. 4. Interviews with Poso men, July 2007. 
98 Interview with a Silanca resident, July 2003. 
99 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
100 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
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A document focussing exclusively on Christian casualties in this clash lists one dead 
and seven wounded (including one injured by his own dum-dum. The Toyado village 
chief, a Christian, said in an interrogation deposition that one of the village's residents, 
a Muslim, was killed. 101 The Toyado village chief also estimated 200 houses had been 
burned in his village. As was the case in most villages attacked throughout the third 
period, the mosque was left untouched. There is some confusion over whether the men 
from Ampana stayed to fight on subsequent days: one report states that five truckloads 
of the crowd returned to Ampana immediately following this clash, while another 
Muslim-authored chronology still lists "mujahid-mujahid Ampana" fighting in the 
vicinity on 27 May. 102 
From this point onwards, Christians were the aggressors on the Lage-Tojo front. There 
were two more days of clashes immediately after the 26 May fighting. On the second 
day of these clashes, the kelompok merah burned Tongko and Labuan villages. There 
were then no further large-scale clashes on this front for around a week. Part of the 
reason may have been a peace deal struck between Malei-Lage village and Sepe. The 
essence of the deal was that Christians would not attack Malei-Lage if the Muslims 
living there vacated the village temporarily during the May-June disturbances. 103 
Despite the deal, Malei-Lage was eventually burned on 5 June. 
I do not have sufficient information to reach a firm conclusion about whether the 
clashes on this Lage-Tojo front were part of a pre-meditated plan. On the one hand, the 
location of the kelompok merah posko in Tagolu suggests that Christians were at the 
very least aware that there was likely to be fighting along the road from Tagolu to 
Tongko. On the other hand, it was Muslims from Ampana (and not the Christians at the 
posko) who initiated the first clash on the front. Key kelompok merah combatants from 
outside the immediate vicinity of the villages described themselves assuming leadership 
roles within the crowds on this front, but detailed local-scale research would be required 
to gain a clearer picture of how local and non-local combatants interacted and who took 
tactical decisions such as on which day to attack a village. 
101 Deposition ofElia Djalaki in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 25 August 2000, p. 2. Damanik, Catatan 
Peristiwa Pasca-Kerusuhan Paso II (Sementara), p. 1. Other reports and media coverage list two to three 
killed on the day. See, for example, Tengko, Sekilas Tentang Kerusuhan Paso III, p. 2, "Poso Makin 
Mencekam", Mercusuar, 30 May 2000 .. 
102 For the report that Ampana crowd left, see Tengko, Sekilas Tentang Kerusuhan Paso III, p. 2. For the 
report that they stayed, see Tim Pencari Bukti, Fajar Merah Saga, p. 8. 
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The Christians who had gathered in Tagolu played an important role in the clashes on 
the Lage-Tojo front, acting as leaders and providing extra personnel, but it was not their 
sole focus at the time. On 27 and 28 May, for instance, significant clashes between 
Christian and Muslim crowds also took place elsewhere in Poso. Closest to the Tagolu 
posko, there were renewed clashes in Sayo ward on each of these days.104 Violence also 
began in Poso Pesisir on 28 May, initially comprising attacks on some of the villages 
close to the western fringe of the city. 105 A Tibo deposition suggests that A. L. Lateka 
and another man Tibo named as a kelompok merah leader, D. A. Lempadely, travelled 
to Poso Pesisir to take part in the fighting there. 106 
Indeed, considered purely in terms of the geographic spread of violence, 28 and 29 May 
2000 may have seen the highest intensity of fighting during the third period. On each of 
these days, clashes took place on all three fronts almost simultaneously. It was also 
during this two day period that the worst massacre of the entire Poso conflict began. 
The massacre - commonly dubbed the "Walisongo massacre" after the Islamic boarding 
school (pesantren) where the first killings took place - started with a clash between 
Christians and Muslims in the vicinity of the school on 28 May. When Christians 
overpowered their adversaries, they killed an estimated 38 people in the school's 
mosque and reportedly took others hostage. 107 Over the next four days, kelompok merah 
members then set about capturing many of the people who had escaped from the school 
or nearby Sintuwulemba village - killing the men and reportedly sexually assaulting 
some of the women before releasing them. In all, around 100 Muslims were killed. 108 
103 Interviews with Malei-Lage residents, July 2003. 
104 Dominggus may have led attack on 27 May, both he and Tibo claimed to have been at Sayo on 28 
May. 
105 See footnote 149 regarding uncertainties over the dates on which attacks in Poso Pesisir took place. 
106 Deposition ofFabianus Tibo in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 26 July 2000, p. 7. Interviewed in 2007, 
Lempadely denied travelling to Poso Pesisir prior to Lateka's death on 2 June, but admitted he was in 
Poso Pesisir after Lateka was killed. Interview with Lempadely, July 2007. 
107 The casualty figure for the 28 May killings in the mosque comes from the account of Sutarmin, who 
survived the attack. Sutarmin was also one of the three survivors in another killing that formed part of the 
Walisongo massacre on 1 June, in which 25 people were killed. I lend particular credence to these 
numbers as upper limits for the casualties in each incident, because they were provided by Muslim 
survivors. 
108 A reasonable upper limit for the death toll may be provided by the testimony of the Sintuwulemba 
village chief, Ngabidun Djaelani, in the murder trial ofTibo, Dominggus and Marinus., who testified that 
191 residents of his village had been murdered. He obtained the figure by subtracting the number of 
registered IDPs from his village's pre-conflict population. Djaelani himself was in Palu at the time of the 
massacre. See record of testimony ofNgabidun Djaelani in Tibo decision, p. 31 and deposition of 
Ngabidun Djaelani in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 3 July 2000, p. 2. 
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Although there are other reports of captives being killed during the third period, none 
are of the same scale as these incidents. 109 
According to profiles of the school published subsequent to the massacre, the 
Walisongo boarding school was established in 1987, and received a further allocation of 
land from the district government in 1996.110 At the time of the massacre, around 150 
students were studying at the school, both boarders and day students. The school was 
located adjacent to the majority-Muslim Sintuwulemba village (population 
approximately 1000111), which itself was established in the 1970s to resettle 
transmigrants from Poso Pesisir sub-district whose land west of the city was frequently 
inundated by floods. Taking place nine kilometres south of the city, the events of late 
May left the school and Sintuwulemba village isolated: to the village's immediate north 
the Tagolu posko and the Christians gathered there lay between Sintuwulemba's 
residents and the city, while the road south passed through numerous Christian-
populated villages and the district's main Christian town, Tentena. 
The chain of events that led most immediately to the massacre started at least as early as 
25 May, when Christians in the area raised objections to the school's two-way radio 
antenna and asked that it be removed. 112 After brief negotiations, those at the school 
agreed to take down the antenna in return for an assurance that the Christians would not 
attack them. 113 According to one of the Muslim men who survived the subsequent 
109 For other accounts of the murder of prisoners, see "Jalan Keluar Masuk 'Kristen"', Formasi, August 
2000, p. 14; "Saya Bersama Tubuh Manusia Dicurahkan ke Jurang", MAL, Second Week, September 
2000, p. 9; deposition ofRos Kristina in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 6 July 2000, p. 2. 
110 The details of this paragraph, the final sentence excepted, are drawn from "Pesantren Walisongo, 
Riwayatrnu Dulu", Formasi, 54, October 2000, p. 7, "Lembah Persatuan yang Porak-Poranda", no details 
recorded, "'Mereka Biadab, Mereka Lebih Rendah dari Binatang"', MAL, First week, July 2000, p. 13. 
111 In his deposition, Djaelani says 1,703; Sangaji gives a 1997 population of 1,047, but with no 
indication of source. Deposition ofNgabidun Djaelani in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 3 July 2000, p.2; 
Arianto Sangaji "Pembakaran Rumput Kering", p. 11. 
112 It is not difficult to see how the antenna could become a point of contention. On the one hand, 
Christians were convinced that villagers in Sintuwulemba were using the two-way radio to communicate 
with Muslims in the city to plan a coordinated attack on Tagolu. Understandably, the Christians at Tagolu 
wanted the antenna removed. On the other, as the May disturbances had left Sintuwulemba residents 
unable to physically travel to the city, the antenna was the main remaining link the Muslims living there 
possessed with co-religionists elsewhere in the district. It would be understandable if they were reluctant 
to take the antenna down. Interview with a Poso man, July 2003 
113 Recording ofDarwis Waru interview with "11" made available to author. Waru requested that only the 
man's initials be mentioned in this text. 
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violence, however, Christians started harassing the school only two hours after the 
antenna had been removed.114 
Negotiations continued the next day, 26 May, this time regarding the evacuation of 
some of the residents of Walisongo and Sintuwulemba. When these negotiations broke 
down, a police platoon commander, Mohamad Najib, and twelve of his men who had 
been ordered the previous night to go to the school attempted to evacuate around 100 
people anyway. 115 Their convoy of vehicles made it only as far as neighbouring Tagolu 
village, however, where the (sectoral) police chief, a Christian, warned Najib not to 
attempt to pass through the village. Many Christians had gathered in the village, and 
Najib would need to seek reinforcements.116 When no additional personnel could be 
summoned, Najib took the convoy back to Walisongo. After the convoy returned to 
Sintuwulemba, Najib recalled, a kelompok merah member demanded use of the 
policemen's truck to transport Christian villagers seeking refuge. Under threat of force, 
Najib acceded. 117 The truck was returned to him later that night with the windscreen 
smashed. The police driver Najib had provided also came back with a dart wound to his 
arm. liS 
Far from making renewed efforts to help the people at Sintuwulemba, Najib and his 
men left the next morning at 11 :00am.119 The Tagolu police station chief and the Lage 
114 Recording ofDarwis Waru interview with "11" made available to author. "11" says that Sahuddin, one 
of the teachers at the school who was subsequently killed, asked one of the Christians what his name was, 
to which one man replied "Dominikus D". This may be a reference to Dominggus da Silva. A Muslim-
authored chronology presents a different version saying [Christian] "ninja" cut the antenna and broke it. 
See Tim Pencari Bukti, Fajar Merah Saga, p. 11. 
115 Deposition ofMohamad Najib in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 2 October 2000, p. 2. A Christian source 
said negotiations broke down because the people at Walisongo only wanted to evacuate women, children 
and elderly people, whereas the Christians at Tagolu wanted everybody to leave. "Il" acknowledges that 
the request was for "adik-adik yang ada di tempat itu" to leave, but says the negotiations failed because 
Sintuwulemba residents refused a Christian demand that they surrender all of their weapons to the Lage 
police chief. Interview with a Poso man, July 2003, Recording ofDarwis Waru interview with "11" made 
available to the author. 
116 Deposition ofFence Yohan Londa (Lage police chief), in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 16 October 2000, 
p. 2. Londa claimed in his deposition that the kelompok merah had effectively taken over the Tagolu 
police station from 24 May until Londa's departure from Tagolu on 28 May. 
17 The truck was taken by an associate ofFabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva, who was executed with 
Tibo in September 2006. Dominggus acknowledged appropriating the truck, but said the policeman 
would relinquish the vehicle only after Dominggus had given him Rp50,000 for diesel. Interview with 
Dominggus da Silva, July 2003. 
118 Deposition ofMohamad Najib in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 2 October 2000, p. 2. 
119 Each of the two policemen claimed that the Tagolu police station chief phoned Tibo at the Tagolu 
posko to request safe passage for Najib before he attempted to reach Poso, although Tibo denied this. See 
record of testimony ofMohamad Najib in Tibo decision, pp. 36-37, deposition ofMohamad Najib, in 
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sub-district head, also based in Tagolu, then left at around noon the next day, 28 May, 
which may have in fact been after the first of the killings had already taken place.120 
These two stated in interrogation depositions that they were unaware of the massacre 
when they left, but that they saw large numbers of kelompok merah members in 
Sintuwulemba, and that the village was already ablaze. 121 
Finally, on 28 May, the school was attacked. The day's violence developed in several 
stages. Firstly, at around 9:00am, the kelompok merah appear to have sent a small group 
of men from the Tagolu posko to the boarding school.122 This first group of Christians 
clashed with Muslims gathered at the school, and before long the kelompok merah 
members retreated to Tagolu. 123 Some of those at the school or in Sintuwulemba fled 
into the forest after this first clash, whereas others stayed at the school.124 
A larger group of Christians soon returned to the school. Those present estimated this 
second group to number anywhere between 40 and 300 people. This group's arrival 
sparked a second clash with Muslims who were at Walisongo, in which the Muslims 
were swiftly overwhelmed. Those Muslims still at the boarding school then fled into 
nearby rice paddies, before around seventy men fled into the Al-Hijrah mosque.125 
Having run out of peluncur darts, those inside the mosque decided to surrender, 
according to a Muslim survivor's account. When Christian assailants entered the 
dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 2 October 2000, pp. 2-3, deposition ofFence Yohan Londa, in dossier of 
Fabianus Tibo, 16 October 2000, p. 2. 
120 Despite these police withdrawals, it appears at least one vehicle carrying nine people was able to leave 
Sintuwulemba before the kelompok merah attack. Recording ofDarwis Waru interview with female 
resident of Sintuwulemba made available to the author. 
121 Deposition of Minto Ida in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 23 August 2000, p. 3; deposition ofFence Yohan 
Londa in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 16 October 2000, p. 2. 
122 Several Christians said this first group went to Sintuwulemba with the intention of evacuating the 
village's Christian residents. Tibo offered a different version, saying the first group of Christians went to 
the school at the request of a police captain, Mandagi, to help evacuate Muslims from the area. Interview 
with Tentena resident, July 2003. Interview with Fabianus Tibo, July 2003; Deposition ofFabianus Tibo 
in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 28 July 2000, p. 4; Rinaldy Damanik, Masdianto Posende, Catatan Peristiwa 
Konjlik di Desa Sintuwulemba: Pesantren Walisongo, Tentena: CC GKST, 14 June 2000. 
123 Different Christians provided different interpretations of the initial clash at Walisongo. One man, who 
blamed the clash on the negligence of police, said he felt Muslims would have been alarmed by the 
arrival of kelompok merah members, and would have thought, "Rather than have our heads cut off, better 
to attack them first." Another man cited this clash as evidence of the alleged duplicity of the Muslims at 
Walisongo, "People who said they were afraid were now ready to stand in our way." Notice that both 
versions assert that Muslims were the first to attack. It is of course equally possible that Christians were 
the first to attack the Muslims gathered at the school. Interview with Tentena residents, July 2003; 
interview with former Christian combatant, July 2003. 
124 One of those who said he fled after the initial clash was Ilham, a survivor of the later 1 June killing 
who went on to describe his experience to the local media and testify in the Tibo murder trial. 
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mosque, the man recalled, they slashed the necks of many of those inside, and took 
others hostage. 126 In contrast, Christian combatants denied the claim that they had killed 
people who had already surrendered. Rejecting the label "massacre", these combatants 
asserted that anyone killed on 28 May perished in a battle, and that the battle lasted less 
than an hour. 127 A chronology released by the Central Sulawesi church's Crisis Centre 
two weeks after the massacre endorsed these claims, saying the men in the mosque were 
killed when they continued to fire on Christians despite having displayed a white cloth 
to indicate their surrender. 128 Interviewed three years after the chronology was released, 
however, one of the document's authors admitted that he was doubtful of its 
accuracy. 129 
In the course of these clashes, Christians razed the boarding school complex, apart from 
the mosque where the killing took place, and also burned around 200 houses in 
Sintuwulemba village. (The mosque was reportedly also subsequently burned. 130) As 
the Tagolu police station chief indicated, many houses in Sintuwulemba were also 
burned. There then appears to have been a lull in the violence, before more Christians 
returned at around 3:00pm to collect Muslim bodies and search for survivors (These 
bodies appear to have been dumped in a gorge near Pandiri village, or buried in other 
mass graves in the vicinity of Sintuwulemba). 131 One man who was still alive in the 
mosque when the kelompok merah members returned, said that they killed anyone 
showing signs of life and then loaded the bodies into their truck. The man himself 
played dead and was able to escape because there were too many bodies for the truck to 
transport in one trip, he recalled. 132 
125 'Kami Dibantai Seperti Menebas Batang Pisang', Suara Hidayatullah, July 2000. The figure of70 
people is sourced from the deposition of Sutarmin in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, I 0 June 2000, p. 2. 
126 Record of testimony of Sutarmin in Tibo decision, p. 29, deposition of Sutarmin in dossier of Fabianus 
Tibo, I 0 June 2000, p. 2. 
127 Interview with Poso men, July 2003. A variation on this assertion is that most of those killed died 
while trying to cross the Poso river to flee. This is unlikely to be true (there were no similar large-scale 
casualties when other groups of people crossed the river), but the assertion is interesting because it is 
effectively an admission from Christians that a lot of people were killed. 
128 Damanik and Posende, Catalan Peristiwa Konflik di Desa Sintuwulemba: Pesantren Walisongo. 
129 Interview with a former GKST Crisis Center member, July 2003. 
130 A Muslim survivor account and the CC statement say the mosque was not set alight, but a picture of 
the mosque published in July 2000 shows the building burned by that point. See "'Mereka Biadab, 
Mereka Lebih Rendah dari Binatang"', MAL, First week, July 2000, p. 13. Also record ofNgabidun 
Djaelani testimony in Tibo decision, p. 31. Damanik and Posende, Catalan Peristiwa Konflik di Desa 
Sintuwulemba: Pesantren Walisongo. 
131 Deposition ofSutarmin in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 10 June 2000, pp. 2-3. 
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This initial massacre was not the end of the chain of events. Over the course of the next 
four days, some of the survivors of the first two clashes at the school were rounded up 
by the kelompok merah, along with other Sintuwulemba residents. Some of those 
captured had been sheltered by local families during the intervening days, who 
reportedly defied a threat that those caught harbouring escapees would themselves be 
abducted and killed. 133 A large group were found sheltering in fields near Tambaro 
village, not far from Sintuwulemba, and were taken captive by the kelompok merah on 
31 May. One of these captives estimated there were approximately 28 males and 
eighteen women and children.134 
The treatment of the men, women and children differed. The men were tied up and led 
by foot to the Ranononcu village hall, where they were tortured. The men were also 
questioned, with the deposition of one survivor indicating the captives were asked who 
among them had taken part in the attacks on Lombogia ward in April 2000. 135 This 
version is consistent with some material in a Tibo deposition, but another survivor's 
account makes no mention of this line of questioning.136 After this ill-treatment, the 
men were loaded onto a truck and taken back to Tagolu, stopping at a spot used to 
quarry gravel from the Poso River. Here the men were unloaded from the truck and 
most were killed. (A survivor suggests 28 men suffered this fate (although three 
escaped).) 13 7 
132 'Kami Dibantai Seperti Menebas Batang Pisang', Suara Hidayatullah, July 2000; record of Sutarmin 
testimony in Tibo Decision, pp. 28-29 .. 
133 'Kami Dibantai Seperti Menebas Batang Pisang', Suara Hidayatullah, July 2000. 
134 Deposition ofUntung Djumadi in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 10 June 2000, p. 2; record of testimony of 
Untung Djumadi in Palu District Court Decision no. 51/Pid.B/2001/PN.PALU. in case ofHeri Mangkawa 
and Ferry N andus Kuhe, p. 7. The highest estimate of male captives, made by a witness in the trial of two 
Tambaro men, was 48 people, another witness in the same trial estimated that there were around 40 
captives, without specifying gender. See record of testimony of Hajriah alias Popi and of Sutarmin in 
Palu District Court Decision no. 51/PID.B./2001/PN.PALU. in case ofHerry Mangkawa and Ferry 
Nandus Kuhe, pp. 7-8. 
135 See deposition ofSutarmin in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 10 June 2000, p. 4. 
136 Recording ofDarwis Waru interview with II made available to the author. A comment attributed to 
Fabianus Tibo in his dossier reads: "I said to the red crowds (Christians) around that location (Tagolu) 
that prisoners should be asked if they were involved in the burning of Christians' houses in Lombogia, 
and if not they should be taken to the Poso (military) company headquarters (in Kawua)." To the question 
of what he told people to do if someone admitted involvement in the Lombogia violence, the dossier 
records the somewhat implausible answer that Tibo instructed that such captives be handed over to the 
security forces; Tibo's deposition goes on to elaborate that four Javanese men admitted that they had 
burned houses, and so were taken to Kilo 4 and then left to make their own way into the city, presumably 
in the hope they would turn themselves in. See deposition ofFabianus Tibo in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 
28 July 2000, pp. 5-6. 
137 Recording ofDarwis Waru interview with "II" made available to the author. 
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The women and children were held for several days in the Tambaro village hall. On the 
night of 1 June 2000, according to the subsequent testimony of several of the women in 
court trials, they were sexually assaulted, as kelompok merah members searched the 
women's genitals to check for concealed magic amulets. 138 The women were then 
allowed to march to the military company headquarters in Kawua in the southern part of 
the city. 
We are never likely to be able to fully recover the reasons why the men in the mosque 
were killed. 139 If there was in fact a premeditated plan to do so, it is unlikely anyone 
would admit as much given the virtual certainty that they would face severe legal 
sanctions. It is possible that the first killings occurred out of the chance opportunity 
presented by Sintuwulemba's position as an enclave. This left the Muslim men little 
chance to flee, whereas on the Lage-Tojo front there was more opportunity to flee both 
by land and sea. Even in this second scenario, I suspect the killings would have required 
one or several leaders to order others or themselves to start perpetrating murder on such 
a large scale. Whereas the first murders on 28 May could have been a product of the 
circumstances immediately after a clash, the subsequent murder of captives could only 
have been planned. We are left to wonder though whether these later killings were 
intended to conceal the 28 May murders, or simply reflected the fact that some 
combatants had now crossed the threshold of mass killing. 
Police never properly investigated this massacre, meaning that we do not have as clear a 
picture of the identity of the perpetrators as in some other incidents later in the 
conflict.140 A firmer idea of exactly who was involved would likely aid interpretation of 
what factors led to the massacre. In the absence of more detailed information, the 
testimony of these women and the few men who survived provide a preliminary 
indication of the composition of the forces responsible for the Walisongo massacre, as 
do the statements made in their own defence by the people these survivors accused. 
138 Record of testimony ofSiti Munawarah and Sufiah Siswandi, Tibo Decision, pp. 42-45. 
139 Indeed, the literature on Poso does not provide a detailed treatment of why so many may have been 
killed at Walisongo. The most common explanation has simply noted that Sintuwulemba was a minority 
(ethnic and religious) enclave. See Sangaji, "Pembakaran Rumput Kering", p.8, Ecip and Waru, 
Kerusuhan Paso yang Sebenarnya, p. 86. 
140 In 2006, police quietly re-interviewed many of the Christian men whose names had been associated 
with the Walisongo massacre as well as others who were rumoured to be key kelompok merah leaders or 
combatants. More publicly, police also disinterred the remains of seven people believed to be victims of 
the Walisongo violence from a mass grave in Tambaro village in May 2006. I have not been able to 
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Some of the men named as perpetrators were from the Tagolu posko, while others were 
residents of Christian-populated villages near Sintuwulemba. From the posko, Tibo, 
Dominggus and Marinus were each indicted for involvement in the murders, although 
each denied taking part. 141 In a prison interview, Tibo instead suggested it was Erik 
Rombot, Bakte Lateka and Fentje Angkouw who had gone to the school from the 
posko. 142 Regarding the later capture of escapees in the vicinity of Tambaro village, two 
Tambaro residents, Heri Mangkawa and Feri Nandus Kuhe were convicted of abduction 
occasioning death. A witness at their trial also testified regarding the involvement of 
two other men, Roy Yara and Agus Paelamara.143 Another male captive, "Il", said in an 
interview with the media that four of the men at the Ranononcu hall had spoken using 
Poso and Mori language. 144 This is not sufficient information to identify who these four 
men may have been, but does suggest they were not Tibo, Dominggus and Marinus. 
As details of the violence at Walisongo came to light, the massacre became a short-hand 
for violence by Christians against Muslims in Poso during the third period, and a 
rallying point for Muslims around Indonesia to come to Poso in the subsequent months 
and years. 145 At the time the massacre occurred, however, news of the killings was slow 
to emerge, with media reports published as late as 31 May listing only twelve people 
killed in all the clashes to that point in the third period. Several times that number had in 
fact been killed by that time in Walisongo alone. 146 There is little doubt that this delayed 
reporting of the full extent of the violence in Poso slowed any sense of urgency in 
making an effective response to the violence. 
access the records of these interviews, but police do not appear to have believed they had gathered 
sufficient evidence to charge anyone. 
141 For details of the evidence against these men and their own versions of the events at Walisongo, see 
McRae, "Criminal Justice and Communal Conflict", pp. 91, 94-95, 97. 
142 Interview with Fabianus Tibo, July 2003. In a subsequent interview, Bakte Lateka denied the 
allegation that he was involved. 
143 Record of testimony ofUntung Djumadi in Defence Plea ofHery Mangkawa and Ferry Nandus Kuhe, 
7 June 2001, p. 5; record of testimony ofUntung Djumadi in Hery Mangkawa and Ferry Nandus Kuhe 
decision, pp. 7-8. 
144 Recording ofDarwis Waru interview with "11" made available to the author. 
145 The massacre also dominated the law enforcement response- dozens of arrests were made for other 
incidents, but at least five of the six heaviest sentences handed down in the aftermath of the third period-
three death sentences, a twelve year sentence and an eight year sentence, all arose from the alleged 
involvement of the defendants in the massacre or its aftermath. See Decision in case ofFabianus Tibo, 
Dominggus DaSilva and Marinus Riwu (co-defendants), Decision in case ofHery Mangkawa and Ferry 
Nandus Kuhe (co-defendants). 
146 See, for example, "Poso Diserang dari Empat Penjuru", Mercusuar, 31 May 2000. 
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Even with the inadequate reportage by the provincial press of the extent of the violence 
in Poso, some Muslims in Palu did attempt to come to their co-religionists' aid in late 
May. The main example was a group of several dozen men calling themselves Laskar 
Jihad Al-Khairaat, who left Palu for Poso on the evening of 27 May.147 The group's 
name referred to Palu-based Islamic organisation Al-Khairaat. Although an Al-Khairaat 
cleric saw the men off, the group does not appear to have enjoyed the organisation's 
unequivocal endorsement, as a more senior member of the organisation, Saggaf 
Aldjufri, publicly expressed his disagreement with their departure.148 
In order to reach Poso town by road, the Laskar Jihad Al-Khairaat convoy first needed 
to pass through the coastal sub-district, Poso Pesisir. This proved to be impossible. Even 
before the men left Palu, the kelompok merah leader A. L. Lateka had arrived in Poso 
Pesisir to organise Christians to attack Muslim villages there. 149 In the early morning on 
28 May, clashes took place in Kasiguncu, Bega and Mapane, a cluster of villages close 
to the western fringe of Poso town.150 Even before these clashes, villagers in Poso 
Pesisir had set up obstructions on the road and established guard posts, but both Muslim 
and Christian residents of the area attributed the start of large-scale fighting to crowds 
brought from elsewhere in Poso Pesisir (allegedly by Lateka). A Muslim resident of 
Mapane said his village was warned by local authorities hours before it was attacked 
that an armed crowd of Christians wanted to pass through the village to enter the city, 
and that his village should remove obstructions from the road.151 The village complied, 
hoping to thereby secure its own safety. When the crowd did start to move towards the 
city, it split into two groups at aT-junction in the road. Half headed for the city and 
attacked Mapane and Bega villages, whereas the other half headed in the opposite 
147 The convoy may have swelled as it passed through Muslim areas in Parigi. A villager in Poso 
described the convoy as numbering in the hundreds, and another villager described the men as "help from 
Parigi". Interview with Tokorondo resident, January 2002; interview with a Poso man, July 2003; "Laskar 
Jihad Alkhairaat Kirim Pasukan ke Poso", Surya, 29 May 2000. 
148 See "Laskar Jihad Alkhairaat Kirim Pasukan ke Poso", Surya, 29 May 2000. 
149 See Deposition ofFabianus Tibo in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 26 July 2000, p. 7; Interview with a 
former resident of Po so Pesisir, July 2007. References to the dates of attacks in Poso Pesisir are 
inconsistent, sometimes even within the one account. There is not always sufficient basis to eliminate all 
but one possibility, and it cannot be stated with certainty on which date many of the events described in 
the text took place. I have endeavoured to establish the correct date for each incident through comparison 
of multiple sources, but I have indicated alternative possible dates for many of the clashes in Poso Pesisir 
in the footnotes. 
150 Interview with a former resident ofPoso Pesisir, July 2007; Tengko, Sekilas tentang Kerusuhan Paso 
III, p. 2. One Muslim-authored chronology lists these clashes taking place on 27 May. See FSIR, Derita 
Muslim Paso, p. 18. 
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direction towards Palu to attack other Muslim settlements. A Christian villager from 
Po so Pesisir who was part of the crowd that headed for Palu recalled Lateka and around 
five associates coming to his village in late May to recruit a crowd to fight, with Lateka 
himself brandishing a pistol. 
We here [in this village], we really didn't want to take part. But there was a leader who 
forced us ... he's dead now, Lateka, yes, Lateka came here. He said "If you don't take part 
then you're not a Christian, and if there's anyone who can't be used [for the fighting], 
then we'd be better off just killing them so that they're good for something." So we took 
part.152 
After joining Lateka, the man recalled, they reached Saatu on the first day of attacking 
Muslim settlements (most probably 28 May) and Tokorondo the next, although this 
sequence of attacks is not consistent with some other accounts. Indeed, although the 
details of each individual clash in Saatu and Tokorondo are relatively clear, it has been 
impossible to establish the precise sequence of events, with different accounts providing 
conflicting dates. 153 Regardless of the timing, when Lateka and his recruits attacked 
Tokorondo (either on 28 or 29 May), they crossed paths with the Laskar Jihad 
Alkhairaat convoy, which was still on its way to Poso, and the two groups clashed. 154 
Even with the support of the men from Palu, Muslims in Tokorondo were 
overwhelmed. 
We held on, even though we knew that we could not resist them, as we could see how 
many of them there were, and we knew they had weapons, 155 so we fell back bit by bit, 
resisting for a while, then falling back a bit, all the way back to the edge of our village. At 
the border of our village, we forced ourselves to hold on, because there were still a lot of 
women and children in the village. Not all the houses in our village were burned at that 
point, but several days later, nineteen of the younger people in our village went back to 
151 Interview with a Mapane resident, July 2007. On this point, see also Tim Pencari Bukti, Fajar Merah 
Saga, p. 9, which criticises Muslims in Poso for their perceived naivety in complying with the request to 
clear the road, and Ecip and Warn, Kerusuhan Paso yang Sebenarnya, pp. 75-76. 
152 Interview with a villager in Poso Pesisir, February 2002. 
153 The fact that the village's men participated in multiple days of attacks raises doubts over just how 
important coercion was to their recruitment as combatants. Another Christian man who was wounded in 
the Tokorondo clash made no mention of coercion, reportedly telling the press that everyone in his village 
had participated in the attack because they feared their village was under threat, but that he had simply 
piled into a truck without knowing where he would be fighting. The overall model of violence that the 
interviewee suggests, however - a few core combatants joining with larger numbers of local villagers - IS 
consistent with other descriptions of the Poso Pesisir violence. See "Hanya Dendam Pada Penindas", 
Formasi, 47, June 2000, p. 6. Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
154 The Palu-based Formasi tabloid suggested the clash with the men from Palu in fact took place in 
Masamba village, several kilometres from Tokorondo. See "Mempertahankan Desa Takurondo", 
Formasi, 47, June 2000, p. 7; "Kronologis Kerusuhan Jilid III", Formasi, 47, June 2000, p. 5; FSIR, 
Derita Muslim Paso, p. 20. 
155 Regarding weapons, the interviewee elaborated, "[When they attacked], we didn't see what weapons 
they were using, but we have evidence that our villagers suffered gun-shot wounds from real bullets, and 
that we heard continuous streams of gunfire, meaning they had genuine weapons (i.e. factory standard)." 
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see if there were any of our villagers lying dead there, but we met with the kelompok 
merah and had to run to the sea and flee by boat, after which the rest of our village was 
burned. 
In the course of this clash, one of the men from Palu, Abdul Jihad, was shot in the head 
and died. 156 Several Tokorondo residents may also have been killed. Local villagers 
recalled that after Jihad was shot, the men from Palu turned back. 
Hundreds of people arrived from Palu, and the situation became more heated. But they 
came empty-handed, what did they expect to do. [Our foe] had long-range weapons [ie 
firearms]. One of them fell on the road [Abdul Jihad, shot in the head] and they [ie, the 
men from Palu] said, "We're pulling out." 157 
Like the men from Ampana who had approached Poso from the opposite direction four 
days earlier, the Laskar Jihad Al-Khairaat group do not appear to have accurately 
anticipated the extent of the escalation of the violence at this time, compared with the 
level of violence during the first and second periods. The preparedness of Christians 
took Muslims by surprise, especially those outside Poso. This weakens the argument 
that the Poso violence was the result of snowballing in any direct sense from Ambon. 
Clearly Muslims had not anticipated that the violence would escalate as far as it did, and 
did not fully appreciate how the violence had changed until experiencing this change 
directly. Weight of numbers had been sufficient to prevail in confrontations between 
crowds in December 1998 and April 2000, and an individual could participate in the 
clashes during those riots without significant risk of death. By the May 2000 violence, 
some combatants were using crude home-made firearms (senjata rakitan) that could fire 
factory-standard ammunition, and it is possible that the few military and police who 
joined the ranks of the fighters may have also used their guns. Although many of the 
men fighting on the Christian side were ad hoc recruits like their Muslim opponents, the 
core of organised combatants on the kelompok merah side helped to give them the 
advantage. 
It would still be several more days after the clash in Tokorondo described above before 
the intensity of violence throughout Poso began to decline significantly. The marker for 
this decline was the death of A. L. Lateka in Kayamanya ward on 2 June 2000. 158 
156 In some sources, the man's name is written Abu Djihad. See Ecip and Waru, Kerusuhan Paso yang 
Sebenarnya, p. 80; "Mempertahankan Desa Takurondo", Formasi, June 2000, p. 7. 
157 Interview with a Tokorondo resident, January 2002. Corroborated by interview with a Poso man, July 
2003. 
158 Some accounts of the third period list Lateka's death as occurring on 26 Mayor 5 June. The correct 
date is 2 June. See "Kerusuhan Poso Pecah Lagi Jumat Pagi, Dua Tewas", Suara Pembaruan, 2 June 
114 
Lateka was killed when a convoy of Christians he was leading into the city from Poso 
Pesisir was blocked by Muslim youths near the Kayamanya mosque. As with most 
incidents during the third period, the different accounts of this event contradict each 
other. Many Christian accounts suggest Lateka was tricked into coming to the city by 
the newly installed Poso police chief, Djasman Baso Opu, on the pretext of holding a 
parade. 159 Supporting this interpretation, one of the men who claimed to have taken part 
in Lateka's convoy that day said that Lateka had told his recruits not to worry about 
bringing along all of their gear.160 In contrast, a Muslim man who was in Kayamanya at 
the time interpreted Lateka's convoy as an attack, and one that the ward's residents had 
been awaiting for several days. 161 Lateka had been beaten to death when attempting to 
come to the assistance of an aide, Christian women Paulina Da'i, who was also killed in 
the clash, the man recalled. Christians disputed this version, claiming Brimob personnel 
had shot Lateka in the head.162 
There are several possible explanations for the decline in violence after Lateka's death, 
none of which are mutually exclusive. One option is to focus on the agency of the 
individual, namely the loss of impetus inherent in the death of one of the kelompok 
merah's key leaders. The shoot-on-sight order for rioters in Poso instituted by police the 
day before Lateka's death could be a second explanation. Police had made immediate 
use of this order, shooting dead two men and wounding two others in Toini village in 
Poso Pesisir sub-district on 1 June, and possibly also felling Lateka the next day.163 The 
increased risk of death for Christian combatants that this order created may have 
temporarily dissuaded all but the most committed from taking part in attacks. It is also 
possible that Christians may already have attacked most of the areas that they were able 
to reach by the time Lateka was killed. Vast numbers of people had by then fled the 
district and most Muslim-populated villages had been burned, while the police and 
military were defending some of the untouched areas in the city. Key Christian 
2000. News ofLateka's death could appear in Suara Pembaruan on the day he was killed because Suara 
Pembaruan is an evening newspaper. 
159 Note the parallel with the version of Herman Parimo 's involvement in the December 1998 violence, 
where a Christian man maintained Parimo had been deceived into leading a crowd of Christians into the 
city at the request of then district head AriefPatanga. 
160 Interview with a Poso man, January 2002. 
161 Interview with a Kayamanya resident, January 2002. 
162 Interview with a Kayamanya resident, January 2002. A Brimob shooting would be consistent with the 
shoot-on-sight directive issued to police in Poso the day before Lateka was killed. See "Kerusuhan Poso 
Pecah Lagi Jumat Pagi, Dua Tewas", Suara Pembaruan, 2 June 2000. 
163 "Kerusuhan Poso Pecah Lagi Jumat Pagi, Dua Tewas", Suara Pembaruan, 2 June 2000. 
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combatants may also have started to experience "battle" fatigue after more than a week 
of fighting. 
The day after Lateka died, there appear to have been no major clashes on any of the 
three main fronts of violence. There was then a further sequence of attacks in Poso 
Pesisir on 4-5 June, and two more attacks on the Lage-Tojo front on 5-6 June. 164 
Security Forces Intervene 
Finally, at the end of the first week of June 2000, the security forces began to make a 
concerted push into Poso to try to put a stop to the violence. The police sent around 280 
Brimob personnel from Jakarta to Poso in the early hours of 7 June. The military also 
dispatched a task force from Makassar under the leadership of infantry colonel M. 
Slamet, comprising six company-equivalent units (Satuan Setingkat Kompi- SSK).165 
Admittedly, these were not the first reinforcements police and military had sent to Poso 
during the third period. By 28 May, police had sent three SSK (approximately 300 
personnel to Poso) as well as a Brimob platoon and were planning to send another SSK 
of Brimob.166 It is clear that these deployments were inadequate. By the time the 
Brimob personnel from Jakarta went to Poso on 7 June, the provincial police chief 
Soeroso said there were already six SSK of police and military in Poso.167 Yet the 
security forces' response to the May-June 2000 violence was far too slow, and in some 
of the specific cases outlined above, negligent in the extreme. 
Inevitably, such tardiness and negligence has fuelled conspiracy theories centring on the 
security forces' perceived desire to profit economically from unrest in Poso, establish a 
second regional military command in Sulawesi, or even to discredit the national-level 
civilian government.168 Although it is clear that some security forces personnel did 
profit from the conflict and claims of other conspiracies must be investigated, there is 
no clear evidence that senior officers harboured sinister intentions. A degree of the 
164 Aditjondro suggest burning ofkampung started in earnest only after Lateka's death. The information I 
have from press reports and interviews does not bear out this assertion. 
165 "Enam SSK dan Kendaraan Tempur Kodam VII Siap ke Poso", Pedoman Rakyat, pp.l, 16. Two 
companies of paramilitary police (Brimob) from Pare-Pare in South Sulawesi may also have travelled to 
Poso as part of this task force, although I was not able to confirm this detail. 
166 "Polda Mulai Ambil Tindakan Tegas", Mercusuar, 29 May 2000. 
167 "Danrem: Kelompok Merah AktifMenyerang", Mercusuar, 7 June 2000, p. 11. 
168 See, for example, George Yunus Aditjondro, Pemekaran Kodam di Sulawesi, (Jakarta: NDI, 2002), p. 
10. 
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tardiness may be attributable to the same failure to appreciate the full seriousness of the 
situation that was evident in the provincial press's slow realisation of the full extent of 
the murder that had taken place in Poso. The urgency of the security forces' response to 
the third period violence also would not have been helped by the rivalry between the 
military and the police in the wake of the separation of the two forces in April 1999. In 
the context of the May-June 2000 violence, the two forces quarrelled over the procedure 
for the police to request military assistance, as well as over the chain of command when 
police and military personnel were operating simultaneously in Poso.169 Such behaviour 
is less surprising when we recall the visit to Poso by the military commander 
responsible for all of Sulawesi immediately after the April 2000 violence, described in 
Chapter Two. During this trip the commander appears to have taken some pleasure in 
emphasising that it was the police who were responsible for (the lack of) security in the 
district. 
On the day after the Brimob personnel from Jakarta arrived in Poso, 8 June, the police 
finally disbanded the Tagolu posko, seizing weapons including 27 dum-dum, a senjata 
rakitan (home-made firearm), fifteen slingshots and 550 arrows. 170 On the same day, 
the police also sponsored a peace meeting between kelompok merah representatives 
(including Tibo) and several Muslim men in Malei Lage village. Both the Deputy Head 
of Central Sulawesi Police and the newly appointed Poso Police Chief, Superintendent 
Djasman Baso Opu, attended the meeting. The next day, another peace meeting was 
held in Tentena, again attended by the two senior police and Tibo, as well as Tibo's 
associate Dominggus and a Christian minister from the GKST Crisis Centre, Rinaldy 
Damanik. At the meeting, Damanik read out "Lateka's mandate", the letter reproduced 
earlier in this chapter. After the Tentena meeting, the community in Poso were given 
one week to hand in any weapons they possessed. 171 
There is little information about how the kelompok merah demobilised from the Tagolu 
posko. Two important combatants said that they went into hiding for several months 
after the posko was disbanded to avoid encountering the security forces. One hid in 
Toraja district in South Sulawesi; the other moved around different villages in the south 
169 See, for example, "Soal Operasi Cinta Damai, Tanyakan ke Danrem", MAL, Fourth Week July 2000, 
p. 8. 
170 "Kelompok Merah akan Turun Poso", Mercusuar, 10 June 2000. 
171 "Keamanan Poso Berangsur Pulih", Mercusuar, 16 June 2000, "Pasukan Cinta Damai Taati 
Deadline", Nuansa Pas, date not recorded. 
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of the district. 172 Other combatants interviewed said simply that after the early June 
peace meetings, those at the posko returned to their respective villages. 173 Another 
account comes from two interrogation depositions provided by a Christian woman, Ros 
Kristina. Her account is described here briefly, but it is problematic. Because the 
depositions were made in the course of an investigation into Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus 
da Silva and Marinus Riwu, her comments focus on these three men, particularly Tibo 
and Dominggus. More seriously, Kristina did not appear as witness in the men's trial, 
meaning the depositions were not subjected to scrutiny in court, and I do not have other 
information to assist in evaluation of the depositions' credibility. Nonetheless, the 
depositions state that on the day the posko was disbanded, Tibo ordered those at the 
posko to leave, but reassured them that the posko' s dissolution was not the end of their 
struggle, and they would again attack Muslims once the security forces had left. 
Kristina continued that Dominggus picked her up that night and took her to Kelei, 
stopping at each village along the road to tell each community to remain on guard.174 
She then describes Dominggus and Tibo returning to their home village, Beteleme, and 
says she also met A. L. Lateka' s brother, Bakte, when she travelled to Beteleme.175 
By the time of the Tentena meeting on 9 June, both the police and military had 
established separate security operations in Poso. The police operation was code-named 
"Sadar Maleo". 176 The military, although professing to be under the operational 
coordination of the police, established their own "Cinta Damai" (Love Peace) Task 
Force using personnel from Makassar in South Sulawesi. Both police and military 
personnel engaged in sweeping operations to seize weapons from the community. 
Within the first week after the Tentena meeting each operation had seized hundreds 
(perhaps thousands) of weapons. Most weapons were crude and home-made, but the 
security forces also seized factory-standard ammunition.177 
172 Interviews with Po so men, July 2007. 
173 Interviews with Tentena residents, July 2003. 
174 Deposition ofRos Kristina in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 6 July 2000, p. 6. 
175 Deposition ofRos Kristina in dossier ofFabianus Tibo, 7 July 2000, p. 2. 
176 The maleo is an endangered bird, which was at one point found in plentiful numbers in Poso. "Sadar 
Maleo" means "Aware of the Maleo". Thankyou to Syamsul Alam Agus for explaining the connection of 
the maleo bird to Poso. 
177 For details of weapons seized, see "Ratusan Senjata Tajam Disita di Poso", Kompas, 12 June 2000; 
"TNI Sita Amunisi Buatan Luar N egeri", Pedoman Rakyat, 13 June 2000, pp. 1, 3; "Tim Operasi Cinta 
Damai Sita 750 Butir Amunisi", Pedoman Rakyat, 17 June 2000, pp. 1, 11. 
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By late June 2000, the security forces were also finding mass graves. At least 74 bodies 
were found in at least four different villages. 178 Nineteen bodies were found in three 
separate graves in Tagolu; 34 bodies were found in two separate locations in Pandiri, 
eleven bodies were found dumped in marshland near Sintuwulemba, while eighteen 
bodies were found in Padang Marari village near the western shore of Lake Poso in 
Pamona Selatan sub-district. 179 Some reports said the Tagolu graves were very shallow, 
with three bodies lying only five centimetres below the surface. In the Pandiri sites, the 
bodies had been burned before being dumped into a gorge. Many other bodies had 
simply been dumped in the Poso river and left to float out to sea. Whatever preparations 
Christians had made for this third period of violence, a plan to properly conceal the 
extent of the killing does not appear to have been part of them. 
After the initial conciliatory approach of the peace meetings in Malei and Tagolu, both 
the police and military began to make arrests. In all, more than 150 people were taken 
into custody over a period of several months following the third period. As Christians 
were at this point responsible for the majority of the worst of the violence in the 
conflict, many more Christians than Muslims were arrested. The arrests, however, were 
not completely one-sided. Muslims arrested included the twin brothers suspected of 
deliberately instigating violence in the earlier April 2000 riot, suspects for the murder of 
PDI-P politician Gerald Polii, who was abducted and then beaten and stabbed to death 
in Poso town on 29 May, as well as six men arrested in early August in Lawanga when 
found in possession of senjata rakitan, other weapons and several dozen bullets. 180 
There is at present no complete data-set of who was arrested or of the result of those 
cases that were brought to trial. The arrests do not appear to have been based on any 
systematic attempt to understand the kelompok merah command structure, however, or 
to prioritise particular incidents of violence. The highest profile arrests were those of 
Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva and Marinus Riwu, with Tibo and Dominggus in 
particular having been repeatedly named in press coverage as key fugitives prior to 
being taken into custody. Each of the three men were sentenced to death in April 2001, 
178 Overall, according to the governor's report on the violence, 111 bodies were recovered from mass 
graves. Unfortunately the report does not list the locations of the graves. See Laporan Gubernur Propinsi 
Sulawesi Tengah, p. 7. 
179 See "Kuburan Massal Batal Digali", Mercusuar, 1 July 2000, p. 1; "Ditemukan Kuburan Massal di 
Tagolu", Mercusuar, date not recorded, p. 1; "Lagi, Ditemukan 19 May at Kasus Po so", Mercusuar, date 
not recorded; "The Killing Field ala Poso", Nuansa Pos, date not recorded, p. 6. 
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and executed just over s1x years later. 181 The two Tambaro residents arrested in 
connection with the Walisongo massacre were sentenced to twelve and eight years 
respectively, while another Christian man, Sarlis, received a ten year sentence. 182 Most 
of the men who appear to have been key kelompok merah members were either not 
arrested, arrested on only a minor charge, or in a few cases arrested and subsequently 
released without trial. This undermined the contribution criminal justice could have 
made to stemming the violence, both because key perpetrators remained at large and 
because the public were aware that these perpetrators enjoyed impunity, further fuelling 
a sense of injustice. 
Efforts to make arrests may also have been undermined by the religious solidarities of 
law enforcement personnel. For example, the combatant mentioned above who hid in 
Toraja district after the kelompok merah posko was disbanded said he in fact 
encountered security forces intelligence officers there, but the men knew him personally 
and did not report him. Although left unstated, the implication was that these Christian 
intelligence officers would not turn in a fellow Christian. Another kelompok merah 
leader said he had been apprehended by security forces personnel at one point during 
the third period when returning from an attack but the men were Christians and let him 
go.I83 
A few police and military also came under susp1c10n of direct involvement in the 
violence or of providing support to one side or the other. Twenty nine members of the 
Poso district military command were investigated in connection with the May-June 
violence, although media reports suggest as few as two of these men may have been 
formally established as suspects. 184 Senior provincial police also indicated to the media 
that around fifteen members of the Poso Resort police were under suspicion, 
characterising the extent of these men's involvement as failing to be neutral because of 
feelings of (ethno-religious) solidarity. 185 One of those reportedly under investigation 
180 See Laporan Tim Back-up, "Misteri Gerald, di "Arena" Kerusuhan", MAL, First Week August 2000; 
Decision ofPalu District Court No. 41/Pid.B/2001/PN.PL in case ofMoh. Risal Soleman and Alamsyah, 
13 June 2001; "Cinta Damai Bekuk Kelompok Putih", Nuansa Pas, date not recorded. 
181 For a detailed discussion of the three men's trial and their execution in the context of the criminal 
justice approach to Poso, see McRae, "Criminal Justice and Communal Conflict". 
182 Ecip and Waru, Kerusuhan Paso yang Sebenarnya, pp. 120-121. 
183 Interviews with Poso men, July 2007. 
184 See "Dua Anggota TNI akan Dimahmilkan", Mercusuar, date not recorded (but seemingly late June 
2000), "28 Oknum Kodim Diperiksa", Kompas, 21 June 2000. 
185 See "Ditemukan bekas-bekas Pembunuhan", Formasi, 48, July 2000, p. 5. 
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was the Lage sectoral police chief, the man who left his post in Tagolu on the day that 
Walisongo massacre started nearby. 
The provincial government also formed a reconciliation team for Poso after the May-
June 2000 violence, under the leadership of vice-governor Kiesman Abdullah. 186 The 
team made its first trip to Poso in mid-July, and thereafter set about organising several 
elite-level peace initiatives. 187 The most prominent among these initiatives was a peace 
meeting attended by President Abdurrahman Wahid, several ministers, the national 
police and military chiefs and Governor Paliudju on 22 August. 188 Dubbed the Rujuk 
Sintuwu Maroso (Sintuwu Maroso Reconciliation), the ceremony took the form of a 
Pamona-ethnic adat rite, with fourteen adat representatives signing a broadly-worded 
statement agreeing to commit to peace and support law enforcement measures against 
those responsible for violence. 189 After so many people had been killed, seen their 
houses destroyed or otherwise been displaced, this meeting never had much chance of 
success as a stand-alone initiative. The ceremony's chances of success were further 
reduced because most of the adat figures appear to have had little direct connection 
with any of the preceding periods of violence.190 Onlookers jeered the ceremony even as 
it was taking place, and none of my interviewees attributed a significant influence to 
this ceremony in affecting the dynamics of the violence. 191 
Despite the flurry of police and military activity following the disbandment of the 
Tagolu posko, sporadic violence continued after the third period. A small group of 
armed men stopped a bus on the southern outskirts of the city on 19 June and dragged a 
Muslim passenger from Kayamanya ward off the vehicle to beat him.192 On 24 June, a 
group of around 30 people attacked Kawua village, killing a local resident and a TNI 
186 FSIR, Derita Muslim Poso, p. 44. 
187 "Di Sini Rekonsiliasi, di Sana Tibo Beroperasi", MAL, Second week, July 2000, p. 6. 
188 "Adat Pakasi Wia Sambut Gus Dur", Nuansa Pos, date not recorded. The 22 August meeting was 
preceded by another peace meeting on 13 August in Tentena, and an adat conference on 21 August 
organised by the reconciliation team to set the agenda for the Rujuk itself. 
189 "Rujuk, Huuuu .... !", MAL, Third Week, August 2000. For a discussion of the adat implications of the 
ceremony, see Ruagadi et al, "Bersatu Kita Teguh di Tana Poso" in Revitalisasi Kearifan Lokal, ed. 
Alpha Amirrachman (Jakarta: ICIP, 2007), pp. 236-238. 
190 A possible exception is D. A. Lempadeli who appeared at the ceremony as a Lage adat representative. 
191 For a description of the ceremony and the reaction of the crowd of onlookers, see "Rujuk, Huuuu .... !", 
MAL, Third Week, August 2000. 
192 Curiously, the men did not kill the passenger, but signalled the bus as it was driving off to return the 
passenger, who was then treated at Poso hospital. See "Poso Kembali Mencekam", Mercusuar, date not 
recorded, "Lewat Poso, Penumpang Bus Trauma", Mercusuar, date not recorded 
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member.193 Three days later, the police shot dead three men in the vicinity of Pinedapa-
Saatu in response to a disturbance in which 30 houses were bumed. 194 Another vehicle 
was stopped in Pinedapa village, and two Muslim passengers were shot, but survived to 
receive treatment. 195 Muslim-owned houses located in majority-Christian areas, and 
vice-versa, were also burned sporadically. Around the same time, Muslims began 
preparations in several locations in and around Poso to take revenge for the May-June 
2000 violence. By late 2000 and particularly early 2001, these preparations would lead 
to a resumption of more concerted violence. 
Conclusion 
An understanding of the May-June 2000 violence is crucial to overall analysis of the 
Poso conflict, as it was during this period that the intensity of the violence escalated to 
mass killing and Poso became a site of protracted inter-religious conflict. At the outset 
of this chapter, I highlighted two key differences between the May-June 2000 violence 
and the two riots that preceded it: first, the emergence of the kelompok merah as a new 
combatant entity, and second, the lack of a direct link to district politics, thereby 
necessitating a renewed look at the motivations of combatants. I will now return to 
these points. 
In the body of this chapter, I have traced the formation of an organised core of Christian 
leaders and combatants, as well as the movements of the individual members of this 
core around the district during the third period of violence. The members of this 
organised core were not recognised local politicians, although some were civil servants, 
nor did they occupy positions of formal authority in the Central Sulawesi Christian 
Church. Instead the leaders were typically figures of some previous social standing, but 
who rose to particular prominence in the third period because they were motivated to 
fight on account of direct losses for themselves or their families during the December 
1998 or April 2000 violence. These individuals made a significant commitment to the 
cause: some of them would have been intensively involved for over a month by the time 
they trained in Kelei and then fought for the two weeks of violence from late May to 
early June. This level of commitment was new - combatants in the first and second 
periods fought only for hours or at most a few days. This core of combatants established 
193 "Danrem: Mereka Geromblan Biadab", Mercusuar, date not recorded. 
194 "TNI Kirim 1 SSK ke Poso", Mercusuar, 29 June 2000. 
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as their prime enemies the ''provokator" and "perusuh" from the December 1998 and 
April 2000 violence, but it is clear that their targets went further. The training they 
conducted and the weapons they manufactured were clearly intended for a larger scale 
of violence than just the targeting of just a few men, for instance. In the end, as 
described above, at least 246 people were killed, with not a single person from the 
initial list of key provo kat or among them. 
The influence of these core kelompok merah combatants on the violence was immense. 
They determined the timing of the start of the third period of violence by attacking 
Kayamanya and Moengko wards on 23 May. They put in place a structure to support a 
prolonged period of violence by establishing the posko as a staging point in Tagolu. 
They appear to have strongly influenced the geographic spread of the violence through 
their personal presence at clashes. 
The influence of core combatants on the geographic expansiOn of violence has 
interesting implications for the puzzling phenomenon of neighbour attacking neighbour, 
which has attracted great analytical attention in the literature on inter-religious and 
inter-ethnic violence.196 A common explanation is that totalisation of identity 
overcomes previous familiarity - in the context of the May-June violence this would 
mean that neighbours were no longer seen as individuals but instead as Muslim 
adversaries. Indeed, it is clear that neighbours in Poso did begin to perceive each other 
as a threat during the third period - hence the two cases in which neighbouring villages 
entered into negotiations to try to secure a local peace. (In the event, neither of these 
agreements held.) But in Po so, these neighbours appeared to actually have attacked each 
other - as opposed to fearing each other - only after co-religionists from elsewhere 
arrived. Hence local villagers clashed in Bategencu after . Muslims from Amp ana 
arrived, and continued the next day when kelompok merah members from the posko 
came to reinforce Christian crowds. Clashes started in Poso Pesisir after Lateka and/or 
other kelompok merah leaders came and mobilised Christian villagers to fight as 
crowds. 
195 "Poso Kembali Bergolak", Mercusuar, date not recorded. I was not able to establish on what date this 
particular incident took place. 
196 For instance, see Cribb, "Introduction: Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia", p. 
14; Spyer, "Fire Without Smoke and Other Phantoms of Ambon's Violence", p. 28. 
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The core group of the kelompok merah also established from the very first attack, when 
they murdered three men whom they encountered on the road, that the third period 
would involve killings. In fact, core combatants appear to have been central to the 
escalation to mass killings. As much is evident from the significant proportion of 
prisoners or over-powered combatants among fatalities for the third period. As many as 
half or more of those killed in the third period may have been murdered prisoners of the 
kelompok merah. I draw this conclusion for two reasons. First, the high number of 
people found in mass graves, suggesting these people were killed in groups. Second, 
although people were killed in clashes between crowds, where we have records of these 
clashes the fatalities are invariably only in single digits. I would argue that it was most 
likely core combatants, and not random rank-and-file individuals, who were killing 
most of the prisoners. 
The paradox of the influence of these leaders, however, is that when acting by 
themselves, the group at the core of the kelompok merah were weak. When they 
attacked the city on 23 May as a small group of combatants, they were forced to beat a 
hasty and haphazard retreat. Indeed, this 23 May attack showed that the core group were 
not even particularly well armed, as they used machetes and considered a policeman's 
pistol a valuable enough trophy for them to seize it. In short, the core group of the 
kelompok merah needed crowds to be able to operate. Without the participation of 
crowds - either drawn from the hundreds who came to Tagolu or recruited ad hoc at 
each site of violence - the core group may not have had the manpower even for one 
large-scale attack, let alone simultaneous attacks on multiple fronts. Beyond providing 
foot-soldiers for attacks, crowds were also essential to the kelompok merah enterprise 
because they precipitated a general breakdown of law and order in Poso. With security 
forces unable or insufficiently determined to move around the district, the posko in 
Tagolu was able to operate largely unimpeded. 
Thus it is clear that the violence of the third period was mass violence, to which the ad 
hoc participation of thousands of Christian residents of Poso was crucial. Given that 
confrontations between crowds involving hundreds of people may often have resulted in 
only a few deaths, it is quite possible that most ad hoc combatants among these crowds 
did not personally perpetrate violence that was any more serious than was the norm in 
the first and second period riots. As I have already stated, it is more likely that it was the 
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core combatants who were responsible for many of the murders at the heart of the third 
period. But even if they did not personally perpetrate murders, the participation of these 
rank-and-file - en masse - was a part of the conditions that enabled these crimes to 
happen. 
The example of the Walisongo massacre illustrates the importance of crowds in 
producing a situation that enabled mass killings, even when the crowds may not have 
been involved directly in the violence. This massacre was a set of related incidents that 
took place over at least four days. If news of the initial killings on 28 May had surfaced 
more quickly, or it had been easier for security forces to reach the areas where the 
massacre was taking place, it is plausible to imagine that the later killings could have 
been prevented. 
On a more mundane level, local Christians would also have played an important role as 
guides to kelompok merah combatants from other parts of Poso, who otherwise would 
not have been as familiar with the local lay of the land as the Muslim villagers they 
were attacking. 197 Indeed, Muslim villagers in different parts of Poso were convinced 
the violence against their village could not have succeeded without their Christian 
neighbours pointing crowds towards the weak -points of their village's defences. 
Yet as crucial as crowds and local Christian populations were to the core group of the 
kelompok merah, this core group lacked organisational ties to these people. The core 
group still needed to recruit individuals ad hoc at each site of violence. More research 
will be required into exactly how this recruitment was achieved, including the relative 
importance of local leaders, coincidence of interests and coercion. 
Before moving on, it is necessary to qualify these statements regarding the importance 
of leaders and core combatants to the escalation of violence. The importance of the core 
group notwithstanding, I consider it unlikely that all of the violence during the third 
period was part of a single, coordinated campaign. Much as the breakdown of law and 
order allowed the core group to pursue their agenda, it would also have provided the 
opportunity for other local actors to settle scores or otherwise pursue their own interests. 
One case we know about, because the victim was high profile, was the murder in the 
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city of Protestant PDI-P legislator Gerald Polii, seemingly at the behest of Muslim 
political opponents. But it is also likely that other murders and violence during the third 
period entailed local communities acting independently of the kelompok merah's core 
leadership group. 198 Determining now whether or not any single incident is linked to a 
broader campaign is exremely difficult and often impossible, because of the ubiquitous 
claims that the violence was "spontaneous" and widespread denial of personal 
involvement by attributing local violence to forces beyond each village. 
If there was scope for individuals to pursue their own interests, there was also space for 
individuals to resist or ignore the call to violence.199 Every large-scale conflict or riot 
has examples of individuals who in one way or another help or refuse to kill members 
of the rival group. Just one example from the third period is provided by the account of 
a Muslim man, Taiyeb Lamello, who was taken captive by Christians and held at the 
Tagolu posko. Lamello testified that kelompok merah members from his home village 
came to the posko to ask that he be allowed to return home to tend to his ailing wife200 
If this account is factual, village allegiances appear to have trumped the broader 
Muslim-Christian divide in this instance. 
If better organisation was crucial to the escalation of violence, what about the question 
of motivations? In particular, what motivated people - many of whom had also 
participated in the riots that preceded the third period- to also take part in larger-scale 
clashes. 
One of the more common explanations in the literature for the motivations underpinning 
an escalation to larger-scale clashes focuses on the role of fear produced by real and 
anticipated violence. Communities in Poso in May 2000 had every reason to fear that 
their villages might be attacked: from their experience of the first and second periods, 
they had seen evidence of the destruction that could be wrought on villages; the 
movements of people fleeing past or anticipated violence had heightened mutual 
197 Within the city, these roles may have been reversed, as a member of the core force described their role 
as guiding villagers who would otherwise not know their way around the city streets. 
198 This might particularly apply to some of the attacks in the south of the district in areas well away from 
the posko and other centres of kelompok merah activity 
199 This may have varied by geographic location. It is likely there would be greater scope for non-
involvement away from border areas between majority-Christian and majority-Muslim areas, for 
example. 
200 Record of testimony of Taiyeb Lamello in Tibo Decision, p. 44. 
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suspicions and sharpened resentment; and, once the third period was underway, 
villagers in locations the violence had not yet reached were able to see plumes of smoke 
rising from burnt settlements elsewhere in the district. 
The "security dilemma" is one model commonly applied when fear is factored into 
analysis.201 The "security dilemma", introduced to the study of ethnic and religious 
violence from the field of international relations by Posen, occurs when the actions one 
party takes to secure itself from a perceived threat posed by a second party end up 
making the first party less secure. The dilemma arises in particular, Posen explains, 
when parties cannot establish whether a potential rival's military build-up is for 
offensive or defensive reasons, or when offensive action appears superior to defensive 
action to ensure survival.202 The concept appears a poor match for the third period 
violence in Poso. The preparations made for violence by the kelompok merah, for 
instance, were not triggered by any misconstrued defensive preparations made by 
Poso's Muslims, for example. The concept may have limited applicability in the local-
level suspicions that saw villages setting up guard posts and making preparations for 
violence. But even at this local level, a "security dilemma" does not help us explain 
why violence appeared to start in many locations only after co-religionists from 
elsewhere in the district arrived. 
A more appropriate model of fear for Poso is provided by Horowitz's comparative 
study seeking general features of the "deadly ethnic riot". Horowitz proposes that 
rioters are "risk averse", choosing to attack at a location and time where there is only a 
moderate risk to their own personal safety.203 
Angry or aroused people are not necessarily heedless of risk. An impressively wide range 
of variables affects the rioters' calculation of risk. Among these are supernatural beliefs 
in invulnerability, lack of credible opposing force or possible retaliation, societal 
condemnation (confirmed by the action and inaction of the state), inadequate police 
deployment, and a variety of risk-averting tactical decisions taken by the rioters 
themselves. 204 
201 See, for example, Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses and Moscow in 
Moldova's Civil War", International Security 21,2 (1996): 108-138; David A. Lake and Donald 
Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict", International Security 
21,2 (1996): 41-75. For a critical application of the concept to the dispersion of violence in the North 
Maluku conflict, see Wilson, Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia. 
202 Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", Survival35,1 (1993): 28. 
203 Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, p. 384. 
204 Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, pp. 525-526. 
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Horowitz's observation is a generalisation and one drawn from the example of riots at 
that, and so is not a perfect match for Poso. In particular, I am not convinced that 
Christians had thought so far ahead as to what retaliation the third period violence might 
generate, nor that they were as careful in selecting sites for violence as the rioters that 
Horowitz describes. Indeed, the seeming lack of forward planning is another point that 
weakens political interpretations of the Poso violence. Nevertheless, I feel that 
Horowitz's concept of risk aversion leads us to an important insight regarding the 
violence of the third period. It is clear that the fear or apprehension of being attacked 
was an important motivation to perpetrate violence. The role of fear is evident both in 
the local preparations of villages after April 2000 to face possible further clashes, as 
well as in the stated motivations of kelompok merah leaders, core combatants and a 
range of other Christian interviewees. But what Horowitz helps to remind us is that for 
people to stay and fight, or engage in lengthy preparations to fight, they must generally 
perceive that their fears are surmountable. That is to say, if they fight, they will have a 
reasonable chance of winning. When the threat of violence - real or anticipated -
appeared insurmountable, most people in Poso fled. Hence, in the third period Poso' s 
Muslims - who had every reason to fear they would be attacked - mostly fled if they 
could when it became evident that they could not counter the violence that Christians 
were perpetrating. The same pattern was evident, but with the sides reversed, later in the 
conflict: most Christians also fled during clashes in 2001 and 2002 when it was clear 
that they could not effectively resist Muslim attacks, as I will explain in the next 
chapter. Indeed, I believe the decision of most combatants on the weaker side in each 
clash to flee (if a route of escape was available) rather than fight to the last is part of the 
reason why clashes between crowds in Poso often produced only a few fatalities. 
The particular advantage of thinking about fear in this way is that it allows us to factor 
fear into our analysis without labelling the thoughts and motivations of local actors as 
irrational. Horowitz's idea of risk aversion leads us to consider fear as a part of an 
individual's calculation of their interests, rather than putting interests on one side and 
fear on the other side of a rational/irrational dichotomy.205 We can then do the same for 
205 On the questionable dichotomy commonly drawn between emotions and rationality, see Ron 
Aminzade and Doug McAdam, "Emotions and Contentious Politics" in Ron Aminzade et al, Silence and 
Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 ), pp. 20-23; 
Deborah B. Gould, "Passionate Political Processes: Bringing Emotions Back into the Study of Social 
Movements" in Rethinking social movements: structure, meaning, and emotion, ed. Jeff Goodwin and 
James M. Jasper, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 161-162. 
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some of the other important "emotive" motivations I have identified for the violence in 
Poso: indignant anger, resentment, contempt and by the third period, a strong desire for 
revenge. We can then consider how such motivations are part of an individual's 
decisions to reformulate their interests and priorities, rather than consigning them to 
irrationality. 
As with the previous chapter, I would like to conclude by considering the influence of 
the national context on the third period of violence in Po so. The main point of relevance 
is the accusations raised locally that the third period violence was orchestrated by 
national level actors. Aragon well sums up a number of these allegations: 
Suspects implicated through news media included the entire Poso security "apparatus," 
the wife of a Jakarta conglomerate leader (isteri konglomerat di Jakarta) who purportedly 
had assisted the now-slain Lateka to obtain weapons, Indonesian Army personnel (TNI) 
who had smuggled weapons, and even a German tourist traveling in South Sulawesi.206 
To Aragon's list might be added speculation that Soeharto's family had planned the 
conflict, or that often unspecified foreign parties had a hand in the violence.207 Such 
allegations notwithstanding, the actors in the third period violence were 
overwhelmingly local, as was the scope of the rhetoric justifying the violence, as I have 
mapped out at some length in this chapter. Of the alleged outside links, I find the 
allegations that money was sent to Poso from elsewhere in Indonesia to support 
violence in the district most credible. Significant sums of money were being sent to 
communities in Poso for humanitarian aid around the time of the third period, and it 
would be a case of anomalously meticulous and scrupulous financial management if 
none of this money ended up being used to support the fighting. I should stress, 
however, that there is a significant gap between people from outside the district 
donating money and considering those same people to be controlling the violence. In 
any case, much of the kelompok merah's activities during the third period would not 
have needed much in the way of funds. 
This impetus to find actors from beyond the district who were secretly responsible for 
the violence may have in part been a hangover from the experience of Soeharto's New 
Order regime. Farid observes that many of the killings that took place during the 
206 Aragon, "Communal Violeence in Poso", p. 69. 
207 See, for example, "Keluarga Cendana Dalang Kerusuhan Poso", MAL First Week August 2000, p. 6; 
"Saya Menduga Ada Campurtangan Pihak Asing", MAL Third Week August 2000, p. 10. 
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Soeharto era could be attributed directly or indirectly to "a dictator and omnipresent 
military". With analysts caught "flat-footed" by the inter-religious and inter-ethnic 
violence after Soeharto's resignation, Farid suggests, one of the dominant streams of 
analysis was to continue to view these conflicts through the prism of Soeharto-era state 
violence: "trying to determine who among the army officers and Suharto's cronies was 
the hidden mastermind, or dalang, and what his political motives were".208 
What of the question of snowballing from other conflicts in Indonesia, or the borrowing 
of repertoires from these conflicts? The provincial press occasionally speculated that 
there may have been direct links between the third period violence in Poso and other 
conflicts, including one article that mused that a prominent Christian militia leader from 
North Maluk:u could be hiding in Poso?09 Such speculation notwithstanding, I have not 
found evidence of snowballing or borrowing of tactics any more direct that the minimal 
influences of these phenomenon during the December 1998 and April 2000 violence. 
Nevertheless, the severity of the violence in Poso during the third period was such that 
parts of the local media soon did begin to dub the conflict a potential "second Maluk:u" 
(Maluk:u Jilid II).210 There was a degree of unintended prescience in such comparisons, 
as news of attacks on Muslim populations in Poso during the third period swiftly 
attracted members of Indonesia's jihadist networks to the district. Many of these men, 
whom I term outside mujahidin, were veterans of the Maluk:u conflict before they came 
to Po so. The influence of these outside actors on the dynamics of the conflict will be the 
subject of the next chapter. 
208 Hilmar Farid, "Political Economy of Violence and Victims in Indonesia" in Violent Conflicts in 
Indonesia: Analysis, Representation, Resolution, ed. Charles A. Coppel (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 
269. 
209 The full extent of this article's evidence was that the militia leader was missing in North Maluku, and 
so could possibly be in Po so. See "An tara Beny Doro dan Comelis Tibo", MAL, Third Week, June 2000, 
p. 8. For speculation on possible links to Maluku, see "Ada Dugaan, Provokator Poso dari Maluku", MAL 
Third Week August 2000, p. 9. 
210 See, for example, "Tragedi Poso, Skenario Ambon II", Formasi, August 2000, p. 8; "Rujuk Gagal, 
Poso Jadi Ambon II", Formasi, September 2000, p. 9; "Sulawesi, Maluku Jilid II?'' Suara Hidayatullah, 
October 2000, pp. 43-45. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - REVENGE, JIHAD AND THE FOURTH AND 
FIFTH PERIODS 
After the two weeks of intense violence from late May to early June 2000, most 
Muslims in Poso harboured a strong desire for revenge. Hundreds of Muslims had lost 
immediate family members in the third period violence, many thousands had lost their 
homes, and almost all had been forced to flee their villages. Recalling their feelings at 
the time, several local Muslim men explained that their only thoughts were of how to 
take revenge (balas dendam) on Poso's Christians.1 
Muslim populations elsewhere in Indonesia and even abroad responded swiftly to news 
of the May-June 2000 attacks. Humanitarian donations for Poso's IDPs flowed to 
Central Sulawesi from around Indonesia, and even from as far as the United Arab 
Emirates. The news also spurred several of Indonesia's jihadist networks to mobilise to 
send their members to Po so. The first members of these networks, whom I will refer to 
as "outside mujahidin" (i.e. mujahidin from outside Poso ), arrived in Poso just a few 
weeks after the third period violence, and quickly set about recruiting local Muslim 
youths to receive rudimentary military training and doctrinal instruction regarding jihad. 
The results were swift, with the first known cooperative attack on a Christian settlement 
in Poso by outside mujahidin and local Muslims taking place in December 2000. The 
alliance between outside mujahidin and local Muslims became crucial to the next two 
major periods of violence in Poso: a series of clashes in June-July 2000 known as the 
fourth period, and several days of large-scale attacks on Christian villages in late 
November- early December 2001, referred to as the fifth period. These two periods of 
violence will be the subject of this chapter, the first of two that focus primarily on the 
alliance between outside mujahidin and local Muslims. The next chapter will focus on 
this alliance in the context of the decline of violence in Poso from mid-2002 onwards. 
The outside mujahidin who came to Poso generally belonged to one of two broad 
groups. The first group were members of jihadist networks derived from the 1950s and 
1960s Darul Islam (DI) rebellion.2 Included in this group were Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), 
1 Interviews with Poso men, July 2003, April2004. 
2 On link between DI and more recent jihadist organisations, see Greg Fealy,"Radical Islam in Indonesia: 
history and prospects", in Greg Fealy and Aldo Borgu, Local Jihad: Radical Islam and terrorism in 
Indonesia, (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 2005), pp. 11-46, International 
Crisis Group, Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darulislam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, Asia 
Report no. 92, 22 February 2005. 
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Mujahidin Kompak, and various other DI splinter groups - which each drew their 
members primarily from Java and Sumatra - as well as two related South Sulawesi-
based organisations: Wahdah Islamiyah and Laskar Jundullah. 3 These networks sent 
relatively few members to Poso, but they were disproportionately significant to the 
violence in the district after their arrival. In making the move into Poso, these 
organisations were able to draw on the expertise of some of the several hundred 
Indonesian Muslims who had undertakenjihadist training in Afghanistan between 1985 
and the mid-1990s, as well as the alumni of similar training in the southern Philippines.4 
The timing of the third period violence in Poso - well after equally serious violence had 
started in Maluku - meant that these networks could also send to Poso men who had 
trained and fought in Maluku province since mid-1999. 
The second broad group were the mujahidin who came to Poso as recruits of Laskar 
Jihad Ahlus Surma Wal Jamaah (hereafter Laskar Jihad), a Java-based militia formed in 
early 2000 in response to violence in Maluku and North Maluku.5 Laskar Jihad came to 
Poso in July 2001, almost a year after the arrival of the first of the mujahidin from the 
DI-derived networks. As an organisation, Laskar Jihad was ideologically opposed to 
mujahidin from the first broad group - for instance, Laskar Jihad recognised the 
legitimacy of Indonesia's government whereas other mujahidin typically did not.6 These 
divisions were sharpened by squabbling in Maluku, and Laskar Jihad's members did not 
cooperate closely with other outside mujahidin in Po so. 7 
Surprisingly few academic works have examined the activities of Indonesia's jihadist 
networks in Poso or other post-Soeharto conflict areas in any detail. Two of the three 
main comparative single-author monographs on the post-Soeharto conflicts devote 
almost no attention to outside mujahidin. Bertrand, with his focus on the historical 
development of the structural background that enabled each conflict, makes only the 
briefest mention of the deployment of Laskar Jihad fighters to Maluku, and does not 
3 For details of the development of each organisation, see International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah 
in Southeast Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous. Asia Report no. 63, 26 August 2003, pp. 14-15; ICG, 
Recycling Militants in Indonesia, p. 22; International Crisis Group, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, Asia 
Report no. 74, 3 February 2004, pp. 5-6. 
4 See Fealy, "Radical Islam in Indonesia", p. 18; ICG, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia, pp. 2-10, 16-
23. 
5 For a comprehensive study ofLaskar Jihad, see Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and 
the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Program 
Publications, 2006). 
6 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 6. 
132 
mention the DI-derived network at al1.8 Van Klinken devotes several paragraphs to 
discussing the arrival in Poso of outside mujahidin from both broad groupings as an 
example of Muslim coalition building; in his chapter on Maluku, two paragraphs note 
the arrival of Laskar Jihad.9 But for the most part, the activities of outside mujahidin do 
not fit well with van Klinken's focus on local politics, and are incidental to his narrative 
of the conflicts. The third monograph, authored by Sidel, treats outside mujahidin at 
greater length, but in the context of the post-Soeharto conflicts focuses almost solely on 
Laskar Jihad. 
More generally, three factors have contributed to the dearth of studies on jihadist 
networks in Indonesia's conflict areas. 10 The inaccessibility of these often clandestine 
movements as research subjects is one factor. It has been difficult, although not 
impossible, for researchers (particularly foreigners) to meet outside mujahidin, and local 
Muslims may often deny these men were present or else may themselves not fully 
understand the background of outside mujahidin.11 Within Indonesia, there has also 
been a deep scepticism of the existence of these jihadist networks as independent 
agents, with many Indonesian observers and NGO activists dismissing outside 
mujahidin as creations or puppets of the military or intelligence agencies, domestic or 
foreign. 12 In a related phenomenon, some Indonesian observers and media reports have 
also misidentified attacks by mujahidin as the clandestine actions of Indonesian military 
or police personnel. 13 This scepticism and misidentification has served to discourage 
studies of these networks in their own right. A third factor is that among foreign 
observers, these networks have been more comprehensively studied in the context of 
7 This ideological opposition is discussed below in a separate section on Laskar Jihad. 
8 See Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, pp. 131-132. 
9 See van Klinken, Small Town Wars, pp. 84, 103. 
10 North Maluku may be something of an exception, as Wilson argues in considerable detail that the 
mobilisation of the Pasukan Jihad (Jihad Force) in the province was an overwhelmingly local concern, the 
intermittent presence of some outside mujahidin notwithstanding. See Wilson, Ethno-Religious Violence 
in Indonesia: From Soil to God. 
11 I have encountered these difficulties in my own research. In particular, I was able to conduct interviews 
with only three outside mujahidin- a member of Jemaah Islamiyah, a member of Mujahidin Kompak and 
a member of Laskar Jihad. I have attempted to address this shortcoming in data by supplementing these 
interviews with interviews with local men who trained with outside mujahidin and with other somces 
familiar with outside mujahidin, interrogation depositions, the publications of jihadist organisations, 
video recordings and other sources. 
12 See, for example, Cahyo Pamungkas, "Membaca Dinamika Konflik Poso: Dari Kekerasan Komunal ke 
Kekerasan Politik", Masyarakat Indonesia 32,2 (2006): 71; George Junus Aditjondro, Tibo dan 
Penyerangan Jilid II Pesantren Walisongo, unpublished manuscript, no date, pp. 19-21. 
13 See, for example, "Jejak-Jejak Tentara Sesat di Poso", Media Sangkompo, October 2002, pp. 4-6; 
"Polisi Berlakukan Siaga I untuk Poso", Sinar Harapan, 18 October 2003; "Ketua Majelis Sinode GKST: 
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terrorism against Western targets than as actors in local conflict areas. Another class of 
studies of these networks focuses more on their lineage and history than on their 
contemporary activities. 14 
The above factors notwithstanding, academics have not completely ignored the 
presence of outside mujahidin in Poso, Maluku and North Maluku. Most studies, 
however, that do address the activities in jihadist networks in these areas focus almost 
exclusively on Laskar Jihad, which sent several thousand fighters to Maluku starting in 
April 2000, and a hundred or more men to Poso starting in July 2001. 15 This focus is 
evident both in studies written before the activities of the DI-derived networks were 
well understood, as well as in some more recent works such as Sidel.16 
The focus on Laskar Jihad has introduced several blind-spots or misperceptions into the 
study of Poso and other post-Soeharto conflict areas. The sheer number of men that 
Laskar Jihad sent to Maluku in particular means that Laskar Jihad as an organisation 
often has been the focus of study, with less attention being given to the militia's 
interaction with local men or to how attacks were cooperatively planned and organised. 
Put differently, locals are too often absent from the picture ofLaskar Jihad activity. The 
attention devoted to Laskar Jihad has also contributed to an exaggerated perception of 
the extent of the links between the Indonesian military and jihadist networks in general. 
Laskar Jihad initially boasted of meetings with high-ranking military officers, and it is 
well known that sections of the military turned a blind eye to and occasionally 
facilitated the departure of Laskar Jihad members to Maluku. 17 But it is not clear that 
we can extrapolate from the example of Laskar Jihad to assert that other jihadist 
Pelaku Mutilasi 3 Siswi di Poso Mungkin dari Luar Sipil", detik.com, 1 November 2005; "Pendeta GKST 
Tewas Ditembak di Palu", Sinar Harapan, 16 October 2006. 
14 See Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies oflslamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia", South East 
Asia Research 10, 2 (2002):117-154, Greg Fealy, "Half a century of violent jihad in Indonesia: a 
historical and ideological comparison ofDarul Islam and Jema'ah Islamiyah" in Islamic Terrorism in 
Indonesia: Myths and Realities ed. Marika Vicziany and David Wright-Neville (Clayton, Monash Asia 
Institute, 2005), pp. 15-31. 
15 Several authors have suggested that excessive focus on Laskar Jihad may derive from the 
organisation's deliberate strategy to main a high public profile, in contrast to the clandestine activities of 
other outside mujahidin. See ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 14; Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 189, 196. 
16 In describing the activities ofjihadist groups, Side! typically mentions Laskar Jihad by name and then 
includes a non-specific reference to "other Islamic groups" or "similar Muslim paramilitary troops". As a 
consequence, he describes Laskar Jihad's activities in Poso and Maluku in more detail than those of the 
DI-derived groups. As Side! cites studies that discuss the significance ofDI-derived movements to 
violence in Poso and Maluku at some length, it is not entirely clear why he adopts such a predominant 
focus on Laskar Jihad. See Side!, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad, pp. 165, 183-5, but also pp. 198,213. 
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networks had the same level of contact with the military. In some cases, the pre-
occupation with Laskar Jihad has also led to a misperception of the identity of the 
perpetrators of violence. Hasan, the author of the most-detailed study of Laskar Jihad 
yet compiled, in fact raises doubts over whether many of the militia's members took 
part in any attacks in Maluku, doubts not always echoed in other studies. 18 Aragon, 
although herself focussing each of her studies on other aspects of the Poso conflict, 
notes the misidentification inherent in naming Laskar Jihad as the primary jihadist 
organisation in Poso. 
This report [by the GKST Crisis Centre], which seeks to list all cases of violence in Poso 
from May to December 2001, repeatedly points to Laskar Jihad as the group responsible 
for the continued violence. In other words, the only organisation publicly representing 
Poso Christians both at home and abroad was inaccurately naming Laskar Jihad militias 
as the perpetrators ofthe violent strikes against them. 19 
One of the main exceptions to the tendency to focus on Laskar Jihad has been the 
reports of the International Crisis Group (ICG).20 Three ICG reports have as their 
primary focus the activities of DI-derived networks in Poso. Jihad in Central Sulawesi 
describes the entry of JI and Mujahidin Kompak into Poso and seeks to explain the 
network behind two attacks in October 2003; Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin 
Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Paso identifies the type of network likely to be 
responsible for a major bombing in 2005, as well as naming three local groups that 
could have collaborated with outside mujahidin in such an attack; Jihadism in 
Indonesia: Paso on the Edge describes the background to a January 2007 police raid 
intended to capture jihadists responsible for violence in Poso from 2004-2007.21 
17 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 190. Connections with senior military figures did not save Laskar Jihad from 
subsequent stem and fatal military action against the militia. See Chapter Five. 
18 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 193. See also the separate section on Laskar Jihad below. 
19 Aragon, "Mass Media Fragmentation", p. 44. 
20 Although see also Arianto Sangaji, "Militer, laskar dan kekerasan regional di Poso", (paper presented 
in 'Renegotiating Boundaries: Local politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia' workshop, Jakarta, 20-22 
December 2004 ). Almost all of Sangaj i' s discussion of jihadist networks in this workshop paper was 
excised from the resulting book chapter, however. See Arianto Sangaji, "The Security Forces and 
Regional Violence in Poso" in Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, ed. 
Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, (Leiden: KITL V, 2007), pp. 255-280. To further 
underline the time lag in understanding of the DI-derived networks, a survey of violence and radical 
Muslims in Indonesia published by ICG in October 2001 did not mention either Jemaah Islamiyah or 
Mujahidin Kompak. The February 2002 ICG report on the Maluku conflict mentions DI-derived 
networks only by their generic name, Laskar Mujahidin, without giving any hint as to this organisation's 
background. See International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, 10 October 2001; 
International Crisis Group, The Search for Peace in Maluku, 8 February 2002, pp. 13, 20. 
21 See ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi; International Crisis Group, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin 
Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Paso, Asia Report no. 103, 13 October 2005; International Crisis 
Group, Jihadism in Indonesia: Paso on the Edge, Asia Report no. 127, 24 January 2007. I was the 
primary author of the 2005 report, and any praise ofiCG materials in this dissertation refers only to the 
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Although the presence of non-Laskar Jihad mujahidin in Poso was known before these 
reports were published, the 2004 report Jihad in Central Sulawesi was path-breaking in 
presenting unrivalled detail on the nature, structure and precise identity of the jihadist 
networks active in the district.22 
Even though these ICG reports have made an important contribution to the 
understanding of jihadist violence, the reports themselves have their own limitations in 
their contribution to the study of Poso. The focus of these reports has been as much or 
more to gain insights into national-level jihadist networks as it has been to examine the 
Poso conflict itself. This is particularly true of the first report, Jihad in Central 
Sulawesi, which reads more as a study of Jemaah Islamiyah and Mujahidin Kompak 
than of Po so. As much is clear from the report's conclusion, in which all but one 
paragraph are devoted to insights gained from the Poso case regarding Jemaah 
Islamiyah and terrorism in Indonesia. The two subsequent ICG reports in the set, which 
have a somewhat greater focus on Poso in its own right, are nevertheless primarily 
oriented to explaining violence in the later years of the conflict, particularly from 2004-
2007. There is still scope to study further the interaction between outside mujahidin and 
local men, paying greater attention to the motivations and interests of local men, and to 
the effect of this interaction on violence in Po so. 
The ICG reports also tend to be structured around explaining one major attack, in what 
Sidel somewhat pejoratively describes as a "whodunnit" approach.23 This structure 
means that the reports have covered only a very limited range of incidents in Poso in 
depth. Neither of the two major periods of violence I will discuss in this chapter, for 
example, have been treated in any detail. 
The involvement of outside mujahidin in violence in Poso also prompts renewed 
scrutiny of the relative importance to the conflict of local and national-level contexts 
and actors. The outside mujahidin were members of jihadist networks that were 
engaged in activities throughout Indonesia: other members were fighting in Maluku, 
first and third reports on Poso. In 2008, ICG released another briefing on Poso, Indonesia: Tackling 
Radicalism in Po so. This report was in the main a short overview of responses to the situation in Po so 
since 2007, as well as a concise update regarding developments in the district during 2007, and it is not 
discussed in any detail in this chapter. 
22 Some details had also been set out in an earlier report. See ICG, Jemaah lslamiyah in Southeast Asia. 
23 Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad, p. 219. 
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proselytising in various parts of the country, and planning terror attacks in Sumatra, 
Java and Bali. The scope of these networks raises the question of whether their arrival 
in Poso can be explained primarily by factors specific to the conflict or by 
developments elsewhere in Indonesia. 
One caveat is necessary at this point: my focus on the development of an alliance 
between outside mujahidin and local Muslims should not be read as an assertion that 
only Muslims perpetrated violence during the time period covered in this chapter. The 
latter half of 2000 and 2001 was a time of open conflict in Poso between two 
communities divided by their respective religious identities, and both Muslims and 
Christians were responsible for different attacks. The single deadliest attack during this 
time period - the 3 July 2001 Buyung Katedo massacre, in which fourteen Muslims 
were killed - was in fact perpetrated by Christians. But Muslims gradually established 
military superiority over Poso's Christians during 2001. To the extent that Christians 
continued to mobilise for violence it was increasingly to defend border areas or to 
ambush buses and other vehicles well within Christian territory. Because of the 
dominance that Muslims established, an understanding of the nature of the alliance 
between local Muslims and outside mujahidin is crucial to explain the escalation and 
the later decline of the violence from the fourth period onwards. 
Outside Mujahidin Come to Poso- Preparations for Reprisals24 
The first jihadist networks to come to Poso after the third period did not bring an entire 
ready-made fighting force. Instead, each organisation sent small teams of men to meet 
local leaders and to begin to recruit local youths. Owing in large part to the reports of 
the International Crisis Group, we have a more complete picture of the arrival of 
Jemaah Islamiyah and Mujahidin Kompak's first representatives in Poso than we do of 
the arrival of other groups. 
Jemaah Islamiyah first sent a senior emissary to meet local Muslim leaders and then, 
soon after, sent a small team of trainers to the district; thereafter the organisation 
centred its presence in Poso in the Tanah Runtuh area of Gebangrejo ward, home to 
local Muslim figure Adnan Arsal.25 Arsal's profile had risen during the earlier periods 
24 As this section refers to a period of time before Laskar Jihad arrived in the district, all references to 
"outside mujahidin" refer to members of the DI-derived networks only. 
25 See ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, pp. 8-9; ICG, Jihadism in Indonesia, p. 3. 
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of conflict, particularly the May-June 2000 violence, when he reputedly remained in the 
city at a time when many community leaders fled.Z6 The organisation's arrival in Poso 
was essentially clandestine, as its members do not seem to have immediately revealed 
their affiliation to Arsal or to the other Muslim figures with whom they met.27 
Mujahidin Kompak was also in touch with Arsal, but chose to establish its base in 
Kayamanya ward, which is adjacent to Gebangrejo.Z8 By August 2000, Mujahidin 
Kompak had sent two small assessment teams to Poso, mostly composed of veterans of 
the Maluku conflict; these teams brought with them a few of the guns the organisation 
had garnered for use in Maluku.Z9 Once established in the district, Mujahidin Kompak 
concealed its military activities by using the Islamic charity Kompak as a cover.30 Apart 
from providing a cover, the humanitarian assistance Kompak sent to Central Sulawesi 
also gave Mujahidin Kompak members an avenue to approach Muslims who had fled 
from Poso to other parts of Central Sulawesi, among whom outside mujahidin found 
some of their first recruits. 31 
The first outside mujahidin to arrive in Central Sulawesi would have found a receptive 
atmosphere in Palu and Poso, where anger over the May-June 2000 violence meant that 
many local Muslims considered violent retaliation to be warranted. Large numbers of 
Muslims from Poso were sheltering in Palu in mid-2000, either in makeshift camps at 
locations such as the Gawalise sports stadium or with relatives. Reflecting the mood at 
the time, the mainstream, if Muslim-biased, Palu-based tabloid Formasi printed an item 
titled "Ethics of War in Islam" in its June 2000 edition, which comprised [rough] 
Indonesian translations of three verses from the Qu'ran. 
Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah 
does not love transgressors [2: 190]. And slay them wherever you catch them, and tum 
them out from wherever they have turned you out,for slander is worse than murder; but 
26 Interview with Adnan Arsal, February 2002; interviews with Poso men, January 2002, July 2003, July 
2007. 
27 See ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, pp. 7-8. As late as 2007, local Muslim men who had trained 
extensively with JI members and cooperatively perpetrated violence claimed that they had only become 
aware that the outside mujahidin were JI members after being taken into police custody. Given the 
exculpatory effect of such statements, they must be treated with scepticism. See, for example, 
"Mohammad Basri: 'Kami Ini Hanya Kerbau'", Tempo, 18 February 2007, p. 32. 
28 Interview with a Mujahidin Kompak member, April2004; deposition of Mohammad Fadli Barasalim 
Bin Zakir alias Opo alias Ustad Aan in his own dossier, 17 March 2006, p. 4. 
29 ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, p. 7. 
30 The South Sulawesi-based Laskar Jundullah also used Kompak as a cover, as its commander, Agus 
Dwikama, was head of the charity's Makassar office. ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 5. 
31 Interview with a Mujahidin Kompak member, April2004. 
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do not fight them at the Sacred Mosque, unless they (first) fight you there; but if they 
fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of people who have no faith [2:191]. [article 
skips over a verse] And fight them on until there is no more slander, and religion is only 
for Allah; but if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who violate 
regulations [2: 193]. [Italics indicate variance in the Indonesian text from a published 
English translation of the Qu'ran] 32 
The article also explained that a jihad may not be waged to satisfy a desire for revenge, 
and that in the time of the prophet Muhammad it was forbidden to target the elderly or 
children, to cut down plants or to destroy property not associated with the enemy, to 
attack first or to try to force Islam on conquered areas. In addition, several local youths 
recalled that Muslim religious figures in Poso were vocal in their support of a jihad: 
"One hundred per cent of religious figures were indoctrinating us to fight a war, giving 
us a religious perspective, that we must strike back. It was a matter of religion [they 
said], a war."33 
With their own desire to fight and the strong social approval for jihad, it is likely that 
local Muslim youths would have eventually perpetrated some form of reprisals for their 
losses during the third period, even without the assistance of outside mujahidin. After 
all, some of the local Muslim men who had fled their villages during the third period -
either leaving the district altogether or moving to areas away from Christian settlements 
- returned of their own accord after several weeks; news of the May-June 2000 violence 
also appears to have spurred some of Po so's Muslim diaspora to return to the district. 34 
These early returnees set up guard posts in their villages or else congregated in 
relatively safe areas such as Kayamanya ward, arming themselves as best they could. 
One youth recalled, 
32 "Akhlaq Perang Dalam Islam", Formasi, June 2000, p. 18. The omitted verse, Q. S. Albaqarah 192, 
reads "But if they cease, Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful." Translation adopted from Abdullah 
Yusuf Ali (translator), The Holy Quran (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 2000), p. 24, except where 
text is italicised. The following is the full Ali translation of the same passage: "Fight in the cause of Allah 
those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah does not love transgressors [2:190]. And slay 
them wherever ye catch them, and tum them out from where they have turned you out, for tumult and 
oppression are worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the Sacred Mosque, unless they (first) fight you 
there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those who suppress faith [2: 191 ]. But if they 
cease, Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. [2: 192] And fight them on until there is no more tumult and 
oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah; but if they cease, let there be no hostility except to 
those who practise oppression. [2: 193)." 
33 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
34 An example of the latter group is Fadli alias Opo, a local youth who trained with Mujahidin Kompak 
and confessed to involvement in a string of attacks from 2001-2003, according to his interrogation 
deposition. (The information on these attacks was not tested as he was brought to trial only for a 2006 
armed robbery.) The biographical section of his deposition says he returned to Poso in 2000 from Toli-
toli after hearing of the Walisongo massacre. See deposition of Mohammad Fadli Barasalim Bin Zakir 
alias Opo alias Ustad Aan in his own dossier, 17 March 2006, p. 3. 
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After less than three months we came back, but even during the time when we were 
taking refuge in a different village we were making preparations, we started to study how 
to make weapons, and also started to look for bullets. I had a friend whose friend could 
get bullets, so we gathered together funds. The first time, we were sent about 150 bullets, 
and around twenty of us with thirteen homemade guns (senjata rakitan) between us 
returned to our village. We repaired our village so that there was at least makeshift 
housing, and also started to stand guard, while at the same time beginning guerrilla 
operations. At night we would walk into the area of neighbouring villages and if we saw 
one or two people we would take a shot and then retreat.35 
Outside mujahidin were able to significantly increase the capacity of local Muslims to 
perpetrate reprisals by providing locals with training, weaponry and, to some extent, a 
more thoroughly elaborated version of jihadist ideology to underpin the violence. 
Before the end of 2000, both Jl and Mujahidin Kompak had conducted their first round 
of training for locals. The courses each organisation provided were longer than 
kelompok merah training before the third period violence (see Chapter Three), but much 
shorter than the three years of instruction some of the outside mujahidin had received in 
Afghanistan. ICG suggests Mujahidin Kompak initially ran programs of three weeks' to 
a month's duration, while each Jl training program ran for three months.36 Each 
organisation's program involved a combination of physical training (tadrib) and 
religious instruction (ta'lim). Local Muslims may not have known exactly who their 
trainers were or what group their trainers were from - the men I interviewed generally 
referred to the outsiders' organisation by the generic term "Mujahidin".37 
Different sources provide different details of the precise timing and location of each 
organisation's various training programs, and there is not yet any definitive list of all 
the training provided by outside mujahidin in Poso district and surrounding areas. The 
first Jemaah Islamiyah-run training appears to have taken place near Ampana in late 
2000 (although another source said the first training took place in 2001 in Uekuli 
village, a coastal settlement east of the city in Tojo sub-district). A later round of 
training appears to have been held near the Tanah Runtuh neighbourhood, perhaps 
starting in February 2001.38 ICG estimated the number of initial local trainees in the Jl-
run program at 35-45 people; local men who said they had taken part in three month 
35 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. The village described in the quote was outside the city in a 
border area between Christian and Muslim villages. 
36 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, pp. 8-9. 
37 Interviews with Poso men, July 2003, April2004. Several authors note that DI-derived movements also 
collectively went by the generic label Laskar Mujahidin in Maluku. ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 6; 
Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 196-197. 
38 ICG, Jihadism in Indonesia, pp. 3-4; interviews with Poso men, July 2003, April2004. 
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training programs which may have been run by JI said there were 50-100 participants.39 
The location of training organised by Mujahidin Kompak and how many times such 
training was held is less clear. A former Mujahidin Kompak member said the 
organisation held its first training of local combatants from Poso in neighbouring Parigi-
Moutung district in late 2000, with around fifteen participants; the deposition of a local 
trainee partly corroborates these details. 40 In addition to the training it held for Muslim 
men in Poso, Mujahidin Kompak also took some local men to train in Maluku in 2001 
and 2004.41 According to ICG, various other jihadist networks held training in parts of 
South Sulawesi close to Poso as well as at a site near Pendolo on the shore of Lake 
Poso, also close to the South Sulawesi provincial border.42 
Even within the one training program, the degree of military instruction each trainee 
received appears to have varied. Much of the early training organised by outside groups 
appears to have been limited. A man who said he took part in training near Tanah 
Runtuh in 2001 claimed that participants used wooden replicas of weapons, and not 
even their own homemade firearms. 43 In his interrogation deposition, a participant in 
Mujahidin Kompak training in 2000 said trainees had only one "senjatajungle" (World 
War II era bolt-action rifle, more commonly written ''jenggel") between them to practise 
shooting.44 A Mujahidin Kompak member described much of the training he provided 
in Poso as essentially "scouts training" (first-aid, navigation, map-reading) mixed with 
"the arts of war" (that is, obstacle courses or, for a more select group, weapons and 
explosives training).45 Along similar lines, a local trainee recalled his experience as 
follows: 
39 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 8; ICG, Jihadism in Indonesia, p. 3. Interviews with Poso men, July 
2003, April 2004. 
40 Interview with Mujahidin Kompak member, April2004, deposition ofYusman Said alias Budi in 
dossier of Mohammad Fadli Barasalim Bin Zakir alias Opo alias Ustad Aan, 24 March 2006 p.3. 
Although we cannot know the circumstances under which this deposition was compiled, this would have 
been a strange detail for interrogators to fabricate, as Budi was being interrogated over his involvement in 
a 2006 armed robbery. The details of any training Budi undertook in 2000 were irrelevant to his 
conviction for the crime. 
41 On the 2001 training, see, for example, deposition of Emil Salim Mardani in dossier of Sofyan Djumpai 
alias Pian, 11 June 2004, p. 3. Many details in this dossier appear to have been fabricated, but the journey 
ofPoso men to Maluku has been corroborated by other sources and is beyond doubt. On the 2004 
training, see ICG, Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin 's Networks, p. 14. 
42 See ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 11. 
43 Interview with a Poso man, April 2004. 
44 Deposition ofYusman Said alias Budi in the dossier of Mohammad Fadli Barasalim Bin Zakir alias 
Opo alias Ustad Aan, 24 March 2006, p.3. 
45 Interview with a Mujahidin Kompak member, April2004. 
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We studied how to take cover, how to enter an area we were attacking. Even that wasn't 
really taught there, because we knew the lie of the land in our own village, and so around 
my village I'd analyse what technique we should use to attack. They didn't teach us how 
to make weapons either, we already knew.46 
Certainly it is possible that in their accounts these men were concealing the full extent 
of the training that took place. Nevertheless, the above descriptions are broadly 
consistent with the portrayal of training camp (reputedly in Southeast Sulawesi) on a 
VCD apparently made for fundraising purposes.47 The VCD shows recruits training in 
physical agility and attacking a mocked-up village all while holding wooden replicas of 
guns, set to a background of chanting exhorting viewers to "wake from their long sleep" 
and step forward bravely to "destroy Satan's forces". An instructor demonstrates the use 
of a pistol and is shown firing the weapon at one point, and one man is seen holding 
what appears to be a genuine long-barrelled firearm while participating in a drill, but 
none of the trainees are shown firing a gun. 
By the same token, however, some participants in jihadist training m Poso clearly 
learned advanced skills such as bomb-making (not difficult for local youths who were 
already skilled in the repair of electrical appliances). In later years of the conflict, two 
youths from Poso were even sent to Java to learn more advanced bomb-making there.48 
Some of the local Muslims who participated in training courses held by outside 
mujahidin later held more rudimentary training sessions in their own villages when they 
returned home. A participant in one village's sessions said the training amounted to half 
a day of running, jumping and rolling held once a week. 
I'm not sure you'd say it was fun, the rolling made you dizzy, sometimes I'd lay low to 
avoid going [to the sessions], but ifyou didn't go, you also felt you'd missed out, because 
you learned an art (ilmu), the art of battle, so you had to go. But then if you did go, you 
ended up with a sore body from all the jumping.49 
By gathering youths from around the district to take part in training, outside mujahidin 
developed an increasingly wide network of contacts in the various villages around Poso. 
46 Interview with a Poso man, April 2004. 
47 In the version of the VCD in my possession, which includes one hour of footage from Maluku, Poso, 
Aceh and probably also Kalimantan, the approximately twelve minutes of footage of the training come at 
the beginning of a section on Poso. The VCD is obviously spliced together from many different sources 
of footage. It is narrated in Arabic, although in some sections the original cameraman provides 
impromptu commentary in Indonesian while filming, and the chants referred to in the main text are in 
Indonesian. 
48 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah 's Current Status, 3 May 2007, p. 3. 
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After three months I went back to the village, and if they [ mujahidin] wanted to go to the 
village, I'd go straight back there. My friends then trusted me as a leader because they 
knew I'd been sent to Poso [town). Even before I went to Tanah Runtuh, I'd often 
brought groups of people to guard our [vacant] village at night [rather than sleep in the 
populated neighbouring village]. After I came back [from Tanah Runtuh], if we wanted to 
attack, we could quickly ask for help from Poso [town], particularly from people we 
already knew. Normally they'd come by boat, because there were a lot of security forces 
along the coastal road. 5° 
The provision of training indeed proved to be an effective first step for outside 
mujahidin to forge long-standing relations with local Muslim youths. Admittedly, not 
every recruit for training joined subsequent activities - an early Mujahidin Kompak 
trainee told interrogators that he had found a return to drinking more palatable than the 
tasks his trainer had expected ofhim.51 But some ofthe earliest local trainees continued 
to perpetrate violence for years. For instance, Safri Ambo Bokori alias Aco G.M., one 
of the first men trained by Mujahidin Kompak in 2000, was still active in an associated 
group when he took part in an October 2003 shooting and arson attack on a village in 
Morowali. 52 Another example is Lilik Pumomo alias Haris, a local man who played a 
key role in plotting the October 2005 beheading of three Christian schoolgirls in Poso 
(See Chapter Five).53 The attack was a cooperative effort with JI: ICG dates Lilik's 
association with the organisation to his participation in its first round of training in Po so 
in late 2000.54 
The Agenda Behind the Violence 
At the broadest level, local Muslims and outside mujahidin shared an interest in 
perpetrating reprisals for the third period violence. This was an initial basis to work 
together. This section attempts to map out the interests and motivations of each group of 
men in more detail to expose some of the differences. I will then discuss how these 
differences affected the interactions between the two groups, and the extent to which the 
interests of either group were reflected in the ensuing violence. 
49 Interview with a Poso man, April2004. 
50 Interview with a Poso man, April2004. 
51 Deposition ofYusman Said alias Budi, in dossier of Mohammad Fadli Barasalim Bin Zakir alias Opo 
alias Ustad Aan, 24 March 2006, p. 3. 
52 Interview with a Mujahidin Kompak member, May 2004. Aco G.M. was sentenced to four years in 
prison for his involvement in the attack. See Palu District Court Decision no. 138/PID.B/2004/PN.PL in 
case ofSafri Ambo Bokori alias Aco G.M., Hamdan alias Komar, Abdul Haer Pantua alias Bakar and 
Andang Bado alias Ridwan, 28 August 2004. 
53 Lilik admitted his involvement to police after his arrest and he was sentenced to fourteen years 
imprisonment. Direct observation by author of trial ofLilik Pumomo and Irwanto Irano. 
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For local Muslims, the priority after May-June 2000 was to take revenge. Muslims in 
Poso considered two particular subsets of the district's Christian community to be most 
responsible for the third period violence. Villagers who lived in border areas between 
predominantly Muslim and predominantly Christian settlements harboured a desire for 
revenge most strongly, although not exclusively, against their Christian neighbours. 
Without the help of these near neighbours, Christians from elsewhere in the district 
would not have possessed the local knowledge to breach their defences, local Muslims 
judged. Attacking villages near border areas could also serve to simplify the "religious 
geography" by removing settlements that lay between two villages inhabited by co-
religionists. Villages reputed to have been Christian strongholds during the May-June 
2000 violence, such as Sepe and Silanca in Lage sub-district, were also a particular 
target of revenge. The focus of local Muslims' desire for revenge was reflected in the 
pattern of reprisals in 2000-2001: each Christian border village was attacked, and two of 
the Christian strongholds - Sepe, and Tangkura in Poso Pesisir sub-district - were also 
over-run. 
In similar fashion to Christians who had formulated an unwritten list of ''provokator" 
and ''perusuh" before the third period violence, Po so's Muslims also circulated several 
lists of Christians of whom it was alleged that they took part in the May-June 2000 
violence. Most of the individuals on these lists were members of the local Christian 
elite. One of the earliest lists to emerge was a five page document titled "List: Names of 
the Intellectual Authors/Masterminds of the Riot and Massacre of Po so's Muslims in 
2000".55 The document names its source as "Pos Komando Jihad Poso"; although the 
list is not dated, it must have been compiled almost immediately after the third period 
violence because an image of its pages appeared in an August 2000 edition of the Palu-
based weekly tabloid MAL. Of the approximately 80 names on the list (including A. L. 
Lateka, who was presumably dead at the time the list was compiled), I have identified 
only one man who was subsequently attacked. 56 A second list of Christian names 
54 ICG, Jihadism in Indonesia, p. 4. 
55 Daftar: Nama-Nama Aktor Intelektual Dalang Kerusuhan dan Pembantain Muslim Paso Tahun 2000 . 
. The copy of the list in my possession bears the stamp of the Forum Silaturrahim dan Perjuangan Ummat 
Islam Kabupaten Po so, a coalition of local Muslim figures and organisations that over time was 
increasingly controlled by Adnan Arsal and his allies. I cannot ascertain whether the stamp indicates that 
the document was copied from FSPUI's archives, or whether FSPUI played a part in compiling or issuing 
the list. 
56 The unfortunate individual is Drs. J. Kogege, who was shot in the head while in his car on 3 September 
2001. (He survived.) Two other men on the list- Fabianus Tibo (who is listed under the name "Comelis" 
Tibo, which at one point was incorrectly believed to be his first name) and Dominggus da Silva- were 
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emerged from a document submitted to the Palu District court by Tibo, Dominggus and 
Marinus, three Catholic men who stood trial in 2000-2001 for their role in the third 
period violence. In the document, the three defendants named sixteen (Protestant) men 
who they alleged were the most responsible for the conflict in Poso, in a move intended 
to deflect responsibility for the violence to others. The document itself was not 
immediately circulated more widely, but the judges presiding over the trial included the 
list in the text of their judgment, effectively making the names public. Since the 
judgment was read out, the "sixteen names" have become firmly ingrained in the public 
psyche and there have been persistent Muslim demands for the men to be arrested. 57 
Curiously, there was almost no correspondence between the lists of names in the Pos 
Komando Jihad and Tibo documents: only retired police officer Paulus Tungkanan 
appeared on both. Despite the greater prominence of this second list compared with the 
Pos Komando Jihad document, none of the sixteen men has been murdered or targeted 
in an attack. 
Outside mujahidin were perfectly happy to assist local youths to seek revenge by 
providing them with physical and military training. Their willingness to provide training 
derived from what outside mujahidin saw as their fundamental obligation to defend 
Muslims under threat; some outside mujahidin doubtless also shared the local youths' 
desire for revenge for the deaths of their co-religionists.58 A Mujahidin Kompak 
member, for example, indicated that news of the Walisongo massacre had been the 
strongest motivation for fighters from Java to come to Poso and that he himself had 
become emotional after visiting the site of the Walisongo massacre and finding bone 
fragments scattered around the area.59 In another mujahid's words, "Because we saw the 
government would not take the side of the Muslim community, we "punished" 
(menghakimi) the orang merah [i.e. Christians] ourselves."60 
arrested around the time the list must have been issued and were sentenced to death and indeed were 
executed in September 2006. Their co-defendant, Marinus Riwu, who was also executed in September 
2006, does not appear on the list. 
57 The men are almost always referred to collectively as "the sixteen names", and I suspect few people in 
Poso could name all sixteen people on the list. Indeed, several different versions of the list circulated in 
the year before Tibo and his associates were executed. 
58 The obligation to defend Muslims notwithstanding, ICG notes that the mobilisation to Maluku was a 
matter of debate within DI-derived networks. Opponents worried that the conflict had political undertones 
and that local Muslims were not devout. The pro-jihad factions won out, and this debate had been settled 
before the May-June 2000 violence in Poso provided a reason for outside mujahidin to travel to the 
district. See ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, pp. 4-5; ICG, Recycling Militants in Indonesia, p. 24. 
59 Interview with a Mujahidin Kompak member, April2004. 
60 Interview with a former Jemaah Islamiyah member, January 2007. 
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But the goals of jihadist networks went beyond simply punishing the kelompok merah. 
At least for the more established of these networks, such as Jemaah Islamiyah, the jihad 
in Poso was only one part of their operations in Indonesia. For instance, Fealy identifies 
as Jl' s long term goal the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. 61 JI' s strategy 
to achieve this goal involved several stages: first, the establishment of small devout 
communities to act as "beach-heads"; next, the development of a true Islamic 
consciousness more broadly in Indonesia. 62 JI had developed a "disciplined and military 
capable organisation" to pursue these goals, as its leaders saw the "tactical use of 
violence" as an essential to eventual success. 63 There were at least two ways that a jihad 
in Poso could contribute to this over-arching goal. 
First, anger at the violence against Muslims in Poso could be exploited as a hook to 
recruit new members in other parts of Indonesia. The importance of recruitment is 
evident from the identity of those whom the DI-derived networks sent to Poso. Many 
Afghanistan and Philippines alumni did go to Poso, but the networks also sent men with 
no prior military experience.64 These new recruits were sent to Poso despite the fact that 
these networks probably could have conducted training and other combat operations in 
Poso solely by relying on the many Afghanistan and Philippines veterans that they had 
at their disposal. 
The narrative of a VCD produced from the Poso conflict, titled "The Call to Jihad in 
Poso" (Panggilan Jihad Poso), provides a glimpse of what the film's producers thought 
would appeal to potential recruits in other parts of Indonesia. The main narrative on the 
VCD is presented during an eight-minute section roughly in the middle of 26 minutes of 
graphic footage of the victims of one of the worst attacks on Muslims in Poso. The two 
off-screen narrators issue an appeal for the viewer to come to Poso. The first narrator, 
who speaks for the longest, appeals to a sense of Muslim solidarity for the viewer to 
come and fight in Poso, and threatens of dire consequences if the call to jihad is not 
heeded. 
61 Fealy observes that the formation of such an Islamic state is itself an intermediate, if concrete, goal on 
the road to JI's ideological commitment to establish an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia. See Fealy, 
"Radical Islam in Indonesia", p. 32. 
62 Fealy, "Radical Islam in Indonesia", p. 32 
63 Fealy, "Radical Islam in Indonesia", p. 26. 
64 For example, see the narrative of the experiences in Maluku and Poso ofMujahidin Kompak combatant 
Asep Jaja in ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, pp. 6-9. 
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Can we claim to be Muslims, can we claim to have faith in Allah if at the same time we 
do not think of our brothers who are suffering, do not heed the disaster they are 
experiencing, if the desire does not rise in our hearts to defend them, to feel together the 
hurt they feel, the suffering, the arduous trials caused by the evil conspiring of infidels?65 
We are contemptible in Allah's presence, we have no value in Allah's presence, if we do 
not care about all ofthis. Don't let it be that Allah says that we betrayed his religion, that 
we betrayed the Muslim community, because we did not want to take heed of them [ie 
Muslims in Po so], did not want to think of them. Think of the elderly here as you would 
think of your own parents, feel the suffering of small children here as our own suffering, 
when they feel hurt, we also feel hurt, when they suffer we also feel the suffering, and 
when they are attacked, we are ready to defend them, whatever the price . .. even if it 
means giving up our lives. Let Allah place us among the ones chosen to defend His faith, 
let us be among the ones chosen by Allah, our lives, our possessions exchanged by Him 
for a place in heaven. 
The second speaker on the VCD phrased his own appeal to the viewers' Muslim 
solidarity by emphasising the challenges recruits would face in Poso: 
Truly jihad fisabilillah66 is a very onerous undertaking and is difficult for a person. No 
one can withstand [the path of jihad] except for a [select] few, Because of its great 
difficulty, Allah will repay it with a true reward. Look at your brothers (ikhwan), this is 
our life in this world of jihad, Allahu Akbar, staving off hunger, staving off the cold, 
traversing hills and mountains, for the sole cause of defending Allah's religion.67 
Precisely at the moment that we are exhausted, when we are risking our lives to defend 
our religion, you are comfortably [sitting there] engaged in debate, saying the greater 
jihad is to resist one's worldly desires. 68 In case you wanted to know, the greatest jihad to 
resist your worldly desires is here [in Paso], your desires will be tested, why should we 
return to our houses, or [would it be better for us] to stay here and defend our religion. 
Allahu Akbar, it never occurred to you to defend your brothers here. Your faith must be 
questioned, it must be questioned, Allahu Akbar, we're waiting for you here. 
The precise mechanism by which jihadist networks recruited new members in other 
parts of Indonesia is not set out comprehensively in existing studies, although two ICG 
reports provide interesting preliminary examples. 69 These mechanisms are of greater 
relevance to the study of jihadist networks in their own right than they are to the 
65 Earlier in his address the narrator explains that this conspiracy is a worldwide collaboration between 
Jews, Christians and communists. See Panggilan Jihad Paso, which depicts the victims of the July 2001 
Buyung Katedo incident, described below. 
66 Fealy and Hooker define this term as "jihad in the path of God with death leading to martyrdom". See 
Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook ed. Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker, 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p. xl. 
67 1t is clear that this narrator's address was originally done on-camera (hence "look at"), but that the 
audio track has been taken and spliced onto different background footage. 
68 "Greatest jihad" is a reference to the distinction drawn by the Prophet Muhammad between the lesser 
jihad of battle and the greater jihad of resisting worldly desires. See Greg Fealy, "Jihad" in Voices of 
Islam in Southeast Asia, ed. Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2006), p. 353. 
69See ICG, Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, p. 22, but 
see also amendment to this passage in footnote 98 ofiCG, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia, p. 21; 
ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, p. 7. 
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violence in Poso, however, and thus they are beyond the scope of this dissertation. More 
detailed information on recruitment mechanisms would nonetheless be of interest to the 
study of Poso in as far as these mechanisms could shed light on the extent to which 
recruits who joined jihadist networks in order to fight in the post-Soeharto conflicts 
were also committed to the longer term goals formulated by each organisation's leaders. 
With a better understanding of the internal dynamics of jihadist networks, we could 
more thoroughly assess how likely it was that outside mujahidin actually pursued their 
organisations' long term goals in Poso. Unfortunately, it was not possible during the 
compilation of this dissertation to interview sufficient numbers of outside mujahidin to 
make such a judgement, and I have instead focused on whether outside mujahidin were 
able to promote these long terms goals among local Muslims. 
Second, fighting in Poso could be viewed as a means to convert the district into a secure 
base, or at least to make the local Muslim population more devout. 70 In pursuit of this 
end, the training programs these jihadist networks provided to local Muslims included 
ta 'lim (religious instruction) as well as the military-style training described above. 
Outside mujahidin described this religious instruction as the more important component 
of training. In addition to ta'lim held in conjunction with physical training, several 
jihadist networks also brought da'i (preachers) to Poso specifically to preach, and sent 
these individuals to stay in various villages throughout the district. These da 'i were 
familiar with the outside mujahidin who had come to fight, but did not themselves take 
part in battles. 71 
I am not aware of any detailed accounts of exactly what material was presented to local 
recruits in early ta 'lim sessions in Poso. ICG, for example, notes only that JI insisted on 
a full month of religious training before starting on physical instruction, without going 
into details of the material presented. 72 Clearly a large proportion of the material dealt 
specifically with the doctrine of jihad, including practical rules to be followed when 
perpetrating violence. 
They taught that we could not kill children, women, or even people who had surrendered. 
They were very strict. You weren't allowed to take the enemy's possessions for 
yourselves, we'd take stuff and put it all together in one spot, then it would be sold by the 
70 ICG,Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 5. 
71 Interview with a Poso man, April2004. 
72 ICG,Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 8. 
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leader, and then we'd use the money to buy ammunition. But you couldn't take the 
money yourself. 73 
Local youths appear to have been receptive to the idea that they were involved in a 
jihad, but may not have picked up the finer points. One trainer lamented that the 
instruction given to new recruits had been too dogmatic, resulting in them taking a hard-
line stance in all situations; a local youth also doubted the degree of nuance that 
Muslims in Poso had taken away from training: 
That's the confusing thing, at the time as well as military training for the community, 
there were also spiritual activities, religious explanations, they [outsiders] said what jihad 
was, what the term meant, so maybe the community -well the younger ones - understood 
it [the violence] as jihad, even though they couldn't distinguish whatjihad was [and what 
it wasn't], the important thing was that it was jihad.74 
Another aspect of ta 'lim essentially consisted of moral instruction and religious 
education that was not directly related to the obligation to perpetrate violence. The 
provision of this moral instruction reflects what Fealy describes as the "inescapable 
obligation" of JI members to persuade Muslims of the need to implement Islamic law.75 
The resolve of outside mujahidin to provide moral instruction may have been further 
strengthened in Poso by the dismay of some of these men at the lifestyle and ignorance 
of Islam of many of the trainees. Most local Muslim combatants interviewed admitted 
to frequently drinking alcohol, and ICG suggests that many of the recruits for early 
rounds of training had a background as local gang members. 76 
Outside mujahidin may have been determined to provide moral instruction, but this did 
not automatically mean that all local combatants were receptive to outsider moralising. 
Many local trainees, even those who remained active among mujahidin ranks, appear to 
have kept on drinking alcohol even after they had taken part in ta 'lim. The predilection 
of local youths to embrace vice was presumably the source of the following interesting 
excerpt from a sermon given at the burial of the fourteen Muslim victims of the July 
2001 Buyung Katedo incident (described in a later part of this chapter). 
Forgive all of our sins ya Allah. Forgive the sins of the [local] mujahidin who have 
perished ya Allah. Some among them did not pray ya Allah, some among them still used 
amulets (azimat) ya Allah, some among them still drank palm wine (arak) ya Allah, then 
they stepped forward to wage war to defend Your religion ya Allah. Please have mercy 
73 Interview with a Poso man, April 2004. 
74 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
75 Fealy, "Radical Islam in Indonesia", p. 27. 
76 lnterviews with Poso men, July 2003, April2004, May 2004. ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 8. 
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on them ya Allah ... Have mercy on those who have fallen and have mercy on the 
mujahidin who are still alive who are stepping forward to continue your struggle. 77 
ICG suggests that locals who were more interested in fighting quickly became impatient 
with religious instruction;78 a Mujahidin Kompak member also recalled that the youths 
he trained had not been particularly interested in moral lessons. 
Our approach was that this disaster was a reprimand from Allah, because they had not 
been close to Allah the Almighty, we steered them in that direction. Young children and 
women accepted this, but the young men clearly did not. Their interest was in taking 
revenge, they were men you know, but they didn't have the strength. I showed them the 
strength that we had, as Muslims we must have strength, we trained, and then they 
wanted to fight. 79 
By chance I have a few skills, including practical skills in self-defence, that was the main 
thing, that was what they needed, so that's what we used to attract them in the beginning. 
Informal education [ie, ta'lim] was secondary, usually they would be interested in what 
they needed, the practical skills.80 
Whereas the Mujahidin Kompak member described local youths as reluctant to embrace 
moral teachings, local Muslim youths put a slightly different spin on their receptiveness 
to religious instruction. Particularly in late 2000 and to some extent in 2001, only men 
had returned to the villages near border areas with Christian settlements, and standing 
guard after dark was a nightly necessity. In such an atmosphere, some locals recalled, 
they needed lectures on jihad to give them courage. This was true both of the men who 
took part in outside mujahidin-run physical training, as well as those who only attended 
lectures by a mujahidin preacher (da 'i) placed in their village. 
Most lectures were about jihad, and under those circumstances, we were a receptive 
audience. If you were to come and say those things now [people's reaction would be] 
"Always wanting to wage jihad, always conflict." There's been a shift. People would 
listen before, but not now.81 
We heard a rumour that mujahidin had come to Poso, and we already knew it would be 
these sort of people who could help us, so we had to accept them, at the time everyone 
accepted them, no-one objected. We needed them, and after they started giving us 
religious lessons, on jihad, it lifted our spirits. Where before we'd lacked courage, after 
listening to their lectures we wouldn't back down, we had no fear .... Before their ta 'lim, 
77 Sermon appears at the end of the VCD, Panggilan Jihad Poso. The reference to fallen mujahidin is 
presumably a reference to those killed in the May-June 2000 violence, as few local Muslims had been 
killed in the course of perpetrating reprisal attacks up until July 2001. Nevertheless, the orator's reference 
to drinking suggests that vice was still perceived as a problem in mid-200 1. 
78 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 8. 
79 Interview with a Mujahidin Kompak member, April2004. The idea of a reprimand or a trial from God 
enjoys some currency in both the Muslim and Christian communities in Poso. 
80 Interview with a Mujahidin Kompak member, April2004. 
81 Interview with a Poso man, April 2004. 
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none of us had the courage to attack, we'd just made weapons to attack, but we didn't 
have the courage to enter [Christian areas] and attack.82 
These local youths indicated that, to their mind, their perceived need for jihadist 
doctrine and physical training had also made them temporarily more receptive to moral 
instruction. Participation in ta 'lim and other religious activities was encouraged by peer 
pressure. One man recalled that he had rarely performed even the Friday prayer before 
the May-June 2000 violence, but when he came back to his village after fleeing for 
several months, he found that a mujahidin preacher was living in his village and all of 
his friends now regularly prayed. 83 Some tenets of jihadist doctrine also helped build 
peer pressure - most local combatants whom I interviewed recalled that they had been 
taught that it was haram (forbidden) to flee a battle. Locals who fled each time the 
security situation worsened were ostracised, branded as cowards and sometimes even 
driven away. 
What then was the relative influence on the pattern of violence in Poso after outside 
mujahidin arrived of local Muslims' desire for revenge, of jihadist doctrine and of the 
longer-term interests of jihadist networks? We can weigh up the influence of each 
factor by examining one of the earliest combined outsider-local attacks: the 24 
December 2000 attack on Sepe village, in which two Christian men were killed. The 
attackers, a small group of mostly local men led by an outside mujahid, Farihin Ibnu 
Ahmad, were armed with two factory-standard weapons from Maluku, homemade guns 
and bombs and attacked the village at night. 84 Farihin described the rationale for the 
attack in the following terms: 
The community needed guidance (pembinaan ), so in mass psychology terms, we 
followed what the community wanted. The atmosphere at the time was thick with the 
desire for revenge, so we tried to leave it up to them. "Which villages had attacked 
[Muslims] in the past?" "Oh, from there [ie, Sepe]."85 
82 Interview with a Po so man, July 2003. 
83 Interview with a Poso man, April2004. In another sign of the effects of increased moral and religious 
instruction, a religious leader associated with Tanah Runtuh expressed his pleasure when I interviewed 
him in early 2002 that Poso's Muslim population had become more visibly devout. Interview with Wahid 
Lamidji, Poso, January 2002. 
84 Interview with Farihin Ibnu Ahmad, date withheld. Farihin said the weapons were a revolver originally 
from the Philippines, which could be fired at the beginning of an attack to stop people coming out of their 
houses, and a semi-automatic SKS rifle obtained from the police. 
85 In another interview, Farihin explained the locals' desire for revenge in more detail, "They said many 
people from Sepe had been involved, Tibo had recruited a lot of the youths there. It was also very close to 
the city .... and [villagers from] Sepe and Silanca were known to have gone on a rampage (membabibuta) 
so their desire for revenge was strong." 
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We provided an example for them, when twenty of us attacked Sepe, they [Christians] 
were in disarray, as were the security forces [stationed there]. People will never be ready, 
if they are sleeping, then suddenly there is gunfire, they panic, and even if they are many, 
our few will appear to outnumber them. That's all we taught them, as simple as that... 
Our mission was just to harass them, to prove that if caught unawares [even in a 
stronghold like Sepe] they would be in disarray, [just as] when [Muslims] were attacked 
in Walisongo, in Poso Pesisir, they had not been ready.86 
The primary aims of the attack, as Farihin describes it, were to continue to forge a link 
with local recruits by helping them to attack a target of their choice, and at the same 
time to increase the recruits' confidence. The local youths' desire for revenge was thus 
the key factor in determining which village would be targeted. By contrast, the limited 
scale of the attack - aimed at "harassing" the village rather than attempting to raze it to 
the ground- is more readily explained by how the attack fit into outside mujahidin's 
plans to train local recruits. 
Other early attacks are more difficult to interpret. Of the incidents from December 2000 
-June 2001, only the February 2001 bombing attack on an Omega bus plying the Palu-
Tentena route stands out as an another obvious example of local-outsider cooperation. 
The local practice of "fish bombing" (fishing by detonating explosives underwater to 
stun or kill marine life) meant that local Muslims knew how to make rudimentary 
explosives even before outside mujahidin arrived, but the details of this attack suggest 
that this particular bomb was detonated by a timer.87 The bomb exploded some time 
after the bus had stopped for lunch along the route, and witnesses indicated that one of 
the passengers did not rejoin the bus after the lunch break.88 By bombing a bus heading 
to Tentena, the attackers could be sure that most or all of the victims would be 
Christians; the bombing of public transport heading for Christian destinations became 
one recurrent pattern of violence for the next five years. Other early incidents -
lynchings, shootings, burning of churches and houses - are not recorded in sufficient 
detail in media reportage and other secondary sources to gauge the motivations, agenda 
and the identity of the perpetrators. The next set of incidents for which I have sufficient 
86 Interview with Farihin Ibnu Ahmad, date withheld. 
87 An explosion in a house in Bonesompe ward in November 2000 may have been an early sign of outside 
mujahidin introducing bomb-making to Poso. The two men killed in the attack were described as "not 
from Poso". The location of the explosion, in a majority Muslim ward not easily reached from Christian 
areas, suggests it could have been an instance of bomb exploding while being assembled, although I do 
not have any corroborating information to confirm this. See "Pihak Ketiga Mulai Bermain di Poso", 
Nuansa Pos, no date recorded. 
88 See "Born Meledak di Sausu", Mercusuar, 7 February 2001; "Pelaku Pemboman Diduga Penumpang", 
Mercusuar, 8 February 2001. 
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information to attempt such an analysis was the first set of larger-scale reprisal attacks 
on Christian villages, which took place in late June-July 2001. 
The Fourth Period- June-July 2001 
By mid-2001, sporadic violent incidents were happening frequently, with at least six 
disturbances per month between April and July, and most often many more than that. 
As a result, although a cluster of attacks in June-July 2001 are customarily referred to as 
the fourth period of violence, there was no sharp transition from peaceful conditions to 
violence to define the start of this period. I have chosen the attack on a Christian 
settlement within Malei-Lage village on 30 June 2001 to mark the starting point of the 
fourth period, because this incident represented a different form of attack from the 
sporadic violence that preceded it. The attack on Malei-Lage was the first in mid-2001 
in which a large part of a village was burned; indeed, one participant proudly asserted 
that this attack was the first large-scale reprisal against a Christian village after the third 
period.89 A second attack on another Christian settlement in the vicinity of Malei-Lage 
followed the next day. Despite the new scale of these attacks when compared with the 
sporadic violence, the fourth period was defined by an attack perpetrated by Christians 
several days later on 3 July. In this incident, a crowd attacked Buyung Katedo village 
(not far from Malei-Lage but closest to the Christian village Sepe) before dawn; when 
Muslims returned to the village they found the bodies of fourteen co-religionists, mostly 
women and children, who had been brutally murdered. The Buyung Katedo massacre, 
as the attack was quickly dubbed, almost immediately triggered further clashes around 
the district. A series of tit-for-tat lynchings and other attacks also ensued, continuing 
until early August 2001. Both Muslims and Christians were responsible for different 
attacks during this period, but Muslims proved more able to burn down large parts of 
villages. Pockets of Christian villages adjoining or fully surrounded by several distinct 
Muslim-populated areas were a particular target. 
Immediately before the first attack of the fourth period on 30 June, hundreds of 
Muslims gathered at the beach in Malei-Lage village, according to a local Muslim 
villager's account. The man said most of the attackers were from the village, but that 
there were also significant numbers of people he did not recognise, including mujahidin 
from Java. The other combatants unknown to the man most likely came from other 
89 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
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Muslim villages along the road east to Ampana. Despite the presence of outside 
mujahidin, this man asserted that this particular attack had been a local initiative. 90 
Local youths strongly desired revenge after their village was burned during the third 
period, the man said; an attack on a Christian settlement would also further simplify the 
local religious geography. 
When the attack started at around 11 :OOam, the crowd of Muslims walked along the 
road to the nearby Christian settlement, where they encountered little resistance. Most 
Muslim combatants had their own senjata rakitan, the man said, but before the attack 
bullets were freely distributed, and some of the people from outside the village also 
brought bombs. One Christian man was killed, and the crowd of Muslims, which was 
growing in number as the attack continued, set about burning the houses in the 
settlement. They stopped soon after a company of paramilitary police (Brimob -
Brigade Mobil) arrived and told them to go home.91 The next day, 1 July, in a 
neighbouring Christian settlement in Tongko village, a second attack proceeded along 
similar lines. The Muslim crowd encountered less resistance, the man recalled, although 
another Christian man was killed.92 
A GKST Crisis Centre report on the Malei clashes complained that Brimob personnel 
were present during the clashes, but did not act to stop the burning.93 As a criticism 
directed at the specific Brimob personnel involved, this is perhaps unfair. One 
combatant noted, the thirty-odd troops would have been endangering themselves if they 
had attempted to contain the much larger crowd of Muslims.94 What such a small 
deployment of Brimob troops does show, however, is how little effort the security 
forces were making to stop the violence. Local Muslims indicated they were convinced 
that the security forces must have known an attack was coming, and could have sent 
more troops if they had wanted to prevent violence. "How could they not [have known]! 
The rumours were hot, there would be an attack, it makes no sense to say that they 
wouldn't have known."95 
90 Interview with a Poso man, April2004. 
91 Interviews with a Poso man, July 2003, April2004. 
92 Interviews with a Poso man, July 2003, April2004. 
93 Crisis Centre GKST, Kronologis Tragedi Kerusuhan Poso Mei-November 2001, no date, p. 3. 
94 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
95 Interview with a Poso man, April 2004. 
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The Malei-Lage attacks were soon overshadowed by much more deadly violence in the 
immediate vicinity, the worst of which was an attack on Buyung Katedo village before 
dawn on 3 July.96 Fourteen Muslims were killed and much of the village was burned. 
All but two of the victims were women and children, and most suffered several deep 
machete wounds to different parts of their bodies. 97 The fourteen victims were buried in 
a mass grave in Lawanga ward on the night of 3 June. The death toll alone makes the 
attack a major incident, as it was the most lethal single incident in Poso from 2001-
2004.98 Over and above the death toll, however, the manner of the killing and the 
identity of the victims made the attack a particular source of Muslim anger. The 
following is an excerpt from a sermon given at the burial: 
Truly Christians, who we call "Obet" ya Allah, have acted cruelly towards us ya Allah.99 
They have murdered and chopped up our children, they have slit open the bellies of our 
women, taken out their foetuses and replaced them with young pigs. Ya Allah our God. 
They are cruel ya Allah, there has never been a group of people as cruel on this earth that 
You created ya Allah. We do not want peace ya Allah. You know what is in the hearts of 
all men ya Allah. You know what is in our hearts. 100 
How can we explain this renewed escalation of violence: the two attacks on Malei-Lage 
and then the Buyung Katedo attack? Clearly the desire for revenge and mutual contempt 
arising from earlier periods of violence was a factor in the motivations of both sides. 
But such feelings do not explain the escalation from the previous sporadic disturbances 
to a period of large-scale attacks. 
The task of explaining this escalation is made far more difficult by a lack of detailed 
information. The fourth period violence is not discussed at length in any existing study 
of Poso; in addition, the various chronologies of the period prepared by religious 
96 Some accounts, including a contemporary VCD depicting the aftermath of the killings place this attack 
on 4 July, or on the night of 3-4 July. I can state with certainty that the correct date is 3 July (or expressed 
differently, the night of 2-3 July), because the first news of the attack appears in the 4 July edition of the 
South Sulawesi daily, Pedoman Rakyat. See "13 Warga Poso Tewas Mengenaskan", Pedoman Rakyat, 4 
July 2001, pp. 1, 12. 
97 A Christian-authored chronology made the implausible claim that the victims had died when bombs 
concealed in the houses that were set alight exploded. The wounds on the victims do not resemble bomb 
wounds, there do not appear to be bum marks on the victims or their clothes, and one would expect 
Christians also to have been killed if this were the case. See Cheq and Recheq Forum, Tragedi 
Kemanusiaan di Paso, p. 26. 
98 In 2005, the bombing ofTentena's central market exceeded the death toll from Buyung Katedo, killing 
23. In 2000, many more people were killed in the Walisongo massacre than died in the Buyung Katedo 
killings. 
99 The term "Obet" derives from the Maluku conflict. A public service advertisement screened in Maluku 
showed a Christian child, Obet, and a Muslim child, Acang, who lives have been disrupted by the 
conflict. Religious communities in the province thereafter adopted the names as epithets for their 
adversaries. See Spyer, "Fire Without Smoke and Other Phantoms of Ambon's Violence", pp. 29-31. 
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organisations, combatant entities and NGOs are incomplete and contradict each other on 
many points of fact. I also do not have a complete archive of local media coverage for 
this particular period, and the national media devoted little interest to these events at the 
time. 
Nevertheless, some studies and some of the available information suggest that local 
politics may have contributed to the escalation. One study attributes the fourth period to 
anger at the district head's decision to appoint Muslim civil servant Awad Al-Amri to 
the long vacant post of district secretary. 101 Media coverage of Al-Amri's appointment 
suggests Christians wanted a Christian appointed to the post as a form of "power-
sharing", so that the district's senior elected official was a Muslim, and the senior 
bureaucrat was a Christian. 102 Another indication of a political element in the escalation 
of violence was the plan of a Christian organisation, Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat 
Tana Poso (Communicaton Forum of the Community of the Land of Poso), to hold a 
protest at the district legislature on 2 July, which would include a demand that the 
district head resign. 103 Such a protest would be a bold and provocative move, given that 
as a result of the geographic segregation of Po so's religious communities at the time, 
Gebangrejo ward (where the legislature was located) was Muslim territory. A 
delegation of 30 Christians departed from Tentena on 2 July, but they were unable to 
enter the city proper, as police and a crowd of armed Muslim men stopped them on the 
southern outskirts of the city in Sayo ward.104 
Different accounts link this failed protest to the fourth period violence in two ways. An 
NGO chronology attributes the 30 June attack on Malei-Lage to a Muslim response to 
rumours that Christians were planning a large-scale protest. A crowd of Muslims tried 
to reach the city to block this protest, the chronology suggests, but encountered 
resistance in Malei-Lage, resulting in a clash. 105 It is possible this version accounts in 
part for the attack, although none of the local men I interviewed regarding the Malei-
100 Speech appears on VCD, Panggilan Jihad Poso. 
101 Lasahido et al, Suara dari Poso, p. 56. Al-Amri was appointed as acting district head in early 2000. 
102 "Rakyat Menangis, Elite Mengais", GAMMA, 11-17 July 2001. A March 2001 article in Palu-based 
newspaper Nuansa Pos also records a local Christian figure, A. Tobondo, requesting that a Christian be 
appointed as district secretary, as there were no Christians in "strategic positions" in Poso. See "Warga 
Pamona Utara Dukung Nus Pasoreh Sekkab Poso", Nuansa Pos, 19 March 2001. 
103 Cheq and Recheq Forum, Tragedi Kemanusiaan di Poso, p. 26. 
104 For somewhat different interpretations of the motives of those blocking the Christians' path, see Crisis 
Center GKST, Kronologis Tragedi Kerusuhan Poso Mei-November 2001, p. 2.; Lasahido et al., Suara 
dari Paso, p. 57. 
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Lage clashes mentioned the protest as part of the context. Other reasons could also 
account for the attack: destroying the settlement as well as another one nearby further 
simplified the local religious geography and so may have made Muslim villagers feel 
safer; outside mujahidin would have encouraged the attack as part of a jihad in Poso; 
and he training that these outsiders had provided made it more likely that Muslims 
would overcome the settlement's defences. 
A second suggested link between the protest and the fourth period violence is that it was 
Christian anger at being blocked in Sayo that prompted the attack on Buyung Katedo 
incident, which took place before dawn the following moming. 106 Muslims in Poso 
made this link at the time, as is clear from footage of the burial appearing on a 
contemporary VCD. On the video, a youth appears holding up a placard calling for the 
arrest ofthe leader ofthe Christian delegation and one of the delegation's members.107 
It is certainly possible that immediate feelings of anger at the blockade of the planned 
demonstration brought pre-existing indignation at perceived affronts and injustices into 
sharp focus, and magnified some Christians' desire for revenge. It is notable that this 
explanation does not rely on political motivations or aims; instead this version of events 
suggests that raised tensions resulting from political developments contributed to the 
Buyung Katedo massacre. An adequate explanation of the violence must take into 
account the multitude of effects of the two-and-a-half years of disturbances that 
preceded the fourth period. These include local desires to perpetrate reprisals and the 
increasing totalisation of identity, where members of the other religious group became 
legitimate targets for violence irrespective of their own personal involvement or non-
involvement. One effect that may have been of particular relevance to the Buyung 
Katedo massacre is that some men in Poso had become accustomed to perpetrating 
horrific violence. Studies of other violent conflicts have often suggested that 
perpetrators become desensitised to the act of killing after repeatedly perpetrating 
violence. 108 Although their identity is not known, it is possible that the perpetrators of 
105 LPS-HAM, Rekapitulasi Karban Konjlik Poso Januari s/d 10 December 2001, unpublished document. 
106 See, for example, Lasahido et al, Suara dari Poso, p. 57. 
107 These two men were J. Santo and P. Tonimba, respectively. Both men were subsequently signatories 
of the Malino peace accord in December 2001. See Chapter Five. 
108 Regarding the correlation of repeatedly perpetrating violence and each violent act becoming more 
severe, see Ron Dudai, "Understanding Perpetrators in Genocides and Mass Atrocities", British Journal 
ofSociology 57,4 (2006): 701. 
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the Buyung Katedo murders had gained prior expenence of killing with machetes 
during the May-June 2000 violence or its aftermath. 
The Buyung Katedo attack was far from being the end of the fourth period violence, 
although no subsequent attack approached the massacre's death toll. On the same day 
that the massacre occurred, there were seemingly two separate attacks in Sayo ward: 
one attack perpetrated by Christians, in which a mosque was reportedly burned, and an 
ambush of four Christians riding two motorbikes by Muslims, in which all four people 
were killed. 109 
On 4 July, according to an NGO chronology, several dozen houses were burned in 
Christian-populated Betania village and an IDP barracks was burned in Masamba, both 
in Poso Pesisir; a church and several houses were burned in the city; and two bodies 
were found in the Poso river. 110 Violence continued the next day, 5 July, when six 
Christians were killed in the vicinity of Toyado village. There are at least two different 
versions of this incident. Contemporary press reports stated that the men, described as 
''perusuh" (rioters), were killed when they fired on police, who then returned fire. In a 
different version of this incident, a local Muslim man said the men died after Muslims 
burned a Christian IDP barracks, and claimed that some of the deaths may have been 
caused by bombs hidden in the barracks. He said the attack on the barracks was a 
reprisal after Christians had burned down a nearby Muslim-inhabited IDP barracks 
shortly beforehand.111 
The next day, 6 July, the site of violence shifted to Poso Pesisir sub-district, where the 
Christian village Saatu (and reportedly also nearby Pinedapa village) were attacked. The 
assailants killed a villager and burned more than one hundred houses. 112 A travelogue 
written by a Muslim man who visited Poso shortly afterwards highlighted the 
contribution of this attack to simplifying the local religious geography by eliminating a 
pocket of Christian settlements that stood between different Muslim areas. The visitor 
recalled his host informing him that they would not have travelled to Poso by land if the 
109 See "Actual News! dari Medan Jihad Poso ", mubarizin.net, 
www.mubarizin.net/Bahasan Utama/Poso/Poso Ed~ 13/poso eds 13.html, accessed via 
www.waybackmachine.org; Cheq and Recheq Forum, Tragedi Kemanusiaan di Poso, p. 27. 
110 LPS-HAM, Rekapitulai Karban Konjlik Poso Januari s/d 10 Des ember 2001. 
111 "Lima Perusuh Poso Tewas Ditembak", Kompas, 6 July 2001. Interview with a Poso man, February 
2006. 
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two villages, which lay along the main road through Poso Pesisir sub-district, still stood 
intact. 113 
Sporadic incidents of violence continued until early August 2001. Some of the more 
deadly attacks included a clash between Muslim and Christian crowds in Pendolo on 18 
July in which two people were killed in Pendolo, the lynching of a Muslim man in 
Tentena on 21 July; and reportedly also the lynching of three Christians who were 
pulled out of a public transport vehicle near Malino Bau village on 29 July. 114 Muslim 
crowds also attacked and destroyed the Christian settlements in the majority Muslim 
Tojo sub-district, which lies between Buyung Katedo and Ampana, during the 
remainder of July. 115 Overall, the fourth period violence caused at least 34 deaths and 
by one estimate crowds burned 22 settlements during this period. 116 
Thereafter, there was a marked reduction in the number of incidents in August, although 
the month was by no means free of violence either. For instance, there were reported 
attacks by Christians on Labuan and Lemoro villages on 13 and 20 August respectively, 
with the latter incident causing two fatalities. 117 The relatively improved security 
situation continued until mid-October 2001. By the time the escalation of violence in 
October started, there was a new actor in the conflict: the Java-based militia Laskar 
Jihad. 
Laskar Jihad Comes to Poso 
In the aftermath of the fourth period and the Buyung Katedo incident, the Java-based 
paramilitary group Laskar Jihad established a presence in Poso. The group was formed 
in April 2000 as the paramilitary wing of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal 
Jamaah (FKASWJ - Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah Communication Forum) - a loose 
112 LPS-HAM, Rekapitulai Karban Konjlik Paso Januari s/d 10 Des ember 2001. 
113 "Laskar Jihad Datang, Kristen Resah", laskarjihad.or. id, 5 August 2001. 
114 LPS-HAM, Rekapitulasi Karban Konflik Paso Januari sld 10 December 2001. Pendo1o, near the 
border with South Sulawesi, was one of several centres of jihadist activity by the time of this clash. In the 
Malino Bau incident, two of the men pulled off the public transport were confirmed as dead, whereas the 
third man was listed as missing in contemporary reports. 
115 LPS-HAM, Rekapitulasi Karban Konflik Paso Januari sld 10 December 2001; Crisis Center GKST, 
Kronologis Tragedi Kerusuhan Paso Mei-November 2001, pp. 3-4 
116 "Muslim Poso: Sudah Dibantai Difitnah Pula", Suara Hidayatullah, September 2001. I do not have 
sufficient details of the fourth period to verify this damage figure. The same source, a local Muslim 
identity, gives what I believe to be a grossly inflated casualty figure, namely 56 Muslims and 600 
Christians killed. 
117 "Perusuh Kristen Serang Muslim Lemoro", Bel@, 24 August 2001. 
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network of salafists aligned with the Yogyakarta-based preacher Ja'far Umar Thalib. 118 
Almost immediately after the militia was formed, Laskar Jihad sent several thousand of 
its members to Maluku, where it commenced operations in May 2000. 119 Both in 
Maluku and later in Poso, Laskar Jihad was the least covert of the various jihadist 
groups. Whereas Mujahidin Kompak, JI and their ilk publicised their activities 
discreetly among their own networks to the ends of fundraising and recruitment, Laskar 
Jihad aggressively pursued a public profile, setting up a website, print media and in 
Ambon a radio station to broadcast news of the group's activities.120 Of the various 
jihadist groups, Laskar Jihad also appears to have enjoyed the closest ties to the 
military. There is a broad consensus among observers that Laskar Jihad had the support 
of some senior military officers, who ignored President Abdurrahman Wahid's order to 
prevent Laskar Jihad from travelling to Maluku. 121 
When the group chose to move into Poso, Laskar Jihad first sent a two man 
investigative team to Central Sulawesi on 14 July consisting of FKASWJ chairperson 
Ayip Syafruddin and Jamaludin Mangun, the head of FKASWJ leadership board in 
South Sulawesi. 122 The pair met the Central Sulawesi governor, Poso district head, local 
Muslim figures and IDPs from Poso housed in Palu. 123 The meeting with the governor 
was well publicised, and served to underline the government's unwillingness to 
intervene effectively to stop violence in Poso, as they would not prevent Laskar Jihad 
from entering the district. 124 Within a week of the team's arrival, two more sets of 
Laskar Jihad members (31 people in all) arrived by passenger ship in Palu, and by the 
end of July, Laskar Jihad had announced on its website that it was now recruiting 
118 Although acknowledging that the precise meaning of the term is contested within Islam, Fealy 
explains that the term "salafi" or "salafist" is generally used to refer to "those who regard themselves as 
the strictest adherents to the model [of proper Islamic thinking and behaviour] set out by the early 
generations of Muslims''. See Fealy, "Radical Islam in Indonesia", pp. 13-14. On Jafar Umar Thalib and 
Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah, see International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: 
Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix, pp. 12-16. 
119 See International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, 19 December 
2000, p. 9; Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 186. 
120 Hasan, who conducted his doctoral research on the group, explains Laskar Jihad's very public jihad as 
a grab for status by the salafists who established the group "to enhance their identity and thereby 
negotiate a place on the map of Indonesian Islam." Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 197. 
121 For one example, see van Bruinessen, "Genealogies oflslamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia", 
p. 118, who identifies sympathy for Laskar Jihad's cause or a desire to destabilise President Wahid's 
government as possible motives for military inaction. 
122 "Pendaftaran Laskar Jihad ke Poso Dibuka", laskarjihad.or.id, 30 July 2001; "Laskar Jihad Datang, 
Kristen Resah", laskarjihad.or.id, 5 August 2001. 
123 "Laskar Jihad Datang, Kristen Resah", laskarjihad.or. id, 5 August 2001. 
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volunteers for Poso. 125 Laskar Jihad then established offices in both Palu and Poso, with 
various estimates of the size of its contingent in Poso ranging from 100 to 700 men. 126 
By the time Laskar Jihad arrived in Poso, there were well-established frictions between 
the group and Mujahidin Kompak/Jemaah Islamiyah. These frictions dated from each 
group's operations in Maluku, but had their ultimate roots in different interpretations of 
Salafist doctrine.127 These frictions may account for the advice given by a board 
member of the Al Amanah pesantren in Poso, Wahid Lamidji, to the Laskar Jihad 
assessment team that neighbouring Morowali district was in greater need of Laskar 
Jihad's help than Poso. 128 (JI members used the Al Amanah pesantren as a cover for 
their operations in Poso.) Despite this lukewarm welcome, Laskar Jihad was able to 
establish posts in several villages and recruit locals, including some men previously 
under the sway of other mujahidin groups. A local man in one of the villages where 
Laskar Jihad established a presence said the group's attraction stemmed from its 
members' willingness to settle in the village, in contrast to other outside mujahidin who 
had visited the village but slept in the city. He said the group's members held religious 
discussions twice a week, and also gave the sermon for the Friday prayer.129 Laskar 
Jihad's sermons focussed on the failings of local Muslims, the man recalled, saying "If 
we thought about their dakwah (proselytising), maybe it was us who were in the wrong 
and not the Christians, because they [Laskar Jihad] said that we had forgotten God, so 
God had given us smoke [ie from burnt houses], visited a disaster upon Muslims 
because many of us had forgotten Him." That said, even a casual glance at Laskar Jihad 
publications in Poso makes it clear that the group also actively promoted violence 
against Christians and anti-Christian sentiment. 
Laskar Jihad distributed an almost daily Paso-specific bulletin in the district, entitled 
Bel@ (Berita Laskar Jihad), and also sold its national level tabloid, Buletin Laskar 
124 The police did arrest a later contingent of 35 Laskar Jihad members as they disembarked from a ship at 
Palu port on 15 August 2001, but let them go after they did not find any weapons in their luggage. See 
"Injak Palu, Laskar Jihad 'Dijemput' Polisi", MAL, date not recorded. 
125 "Laskar Jihad Datang, Kristen Resah", laskarjihad.or.id, 5 August 2001; "Pendaftaran Laskar Jihad ke 
Poso Dibuka", laskarjihad.or.id, 30 July 2001. 
126 ICG estimates 100-150 men, Sangaji estimates 500, whereas Hasan's estimate is 700. See ICG, Jihad 
in Central Sulawesi, p. 14; Sangaji, "Militer, Laskar dan Kekerasan Regional di Poso", p. 26; Noorhadi 
Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 205. 
127 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, pp. 6-7; ICG, Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix, Asia 
Report no. 83, 13 September 2004, pp. 25-28. 
128 See "Laskar Jihad Datang, Kristen Resah", laskarjihad.or.id, 5 August 2001. 
129 Interview with a Poso man, April2004. 
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Jihad. 130 Bel@, typically a one page flyer, promoted a strident anti-reconciliation 
standpoint and encouraged the view that Poso should be segregated geographically 
along religious lines. For instance, in one edition, Laskar Jihad applauded the 3 
September 2001 shooting of Sintuwu Maroso University rector J. Kogege as 
emblematic of the action Muslims should take if Christians entered Muslim territory, 
saying "we must be stem in our action against them [Christians]" because "they would 
never let Muslims pass through their own territory". 131 The bulletins also contained 
tracts on morality, advertised Laskar Jihad health and religious activities, and described 
attacks that had taken place on Christian areas. 
Despite the group's militant rhetoric, it is difficult to quantify Laskar Jihad's exact 
involvement in violence in Poso, not least because this question is the object of 
intensely vitriolic debate. 132 Even local Muslim combatants sympathetic to Laskar Jihad 
described the group as less militant than the mujahidin who arrived in Poso in 2000. 133 
One combatant from Lage sub-district recalled that the group's ten members who were 
stationed in his village "took almost no part in attacks" and provided religious 
instruction only, not military training.134 Some local Muslims not affiliated with Laskar 
Jihad disparaged the group as "Laskar Pilox" (Laskar Spray-paint), saying they showed 
up after the fighting in each attack to spray-paint their organisation's name and claim 
credit for the battle. 135 But by the same token, another local combatant who joined 
Laskar Jihad asserted the group had conducted military training, and in fact had formed 
a fourteen-member special forces (pasukan khusus) unit out of local trainees. 136 Even if 
130 While in Poso, the group freely distributed bound back issues of Bel@, grouped into month-by-month 
sets. 
131 "Penyusup Kristen Tertembak di Poso", Bel@, 7 September 2001. 
132 For one example of this debate, see "Hak Jawab Veteran Lasykar Jihad (1)", post on keluarga-islam 
mailing list, http://Vvww .mail-archive.com/keluarga-islam@yahoogroups.com/msgl3876.html, accessed 8 
February 2008. 
133 A local combatant who joined Laskar Jihad cast this difference pejoratively, saying Mujahidin were 
more "keras" (hard-line), as their teachings encouraged simple hatred of all groups not of the same faith. 
Interview with a Poso man, July 2007. 
134 Interview with a Poso man, April2004. Two editions of Bel@ describe Laskar Jihad-run training 
sessions of a very limited nature. The first session ran for two days from 8-9 October 2001 and involved 
50 youths in Toliba village, while the second session ran for only a day in Tokorondo village on 25 
November. See "Laskar Jihad Gelar Latihan Gabungan Dengan Muslim Toliba", Bel@, 12 October 2001; 
"Latihan Gabungan di Tokorondo", Bel@, 27 November 2001. 
135 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 14. This characterisation ofLaskar Jihad's behaviour may be 
slightly embellished. In its Bel@ tabloid, Laskar Jihad most often referred to the Muslim side in clashes 
in generic terms such as "kaum Muslimin" (Muslims) or "mujahidin Poso". I have not found any explicit 
claim in the bulletin that Laskar Jihad participated directly in an attack. Also, most writing on the walls of 
burned out building that I observed on several trips to Poso in January and February 2002 was etched in 
charcoal, not spray-paint. 
136 Interview with a Po so man, July 2007. 
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Laskar Jihad members from Java did not take part in battles, it seems likely that the 
youths who received instruction from the group did. Certainly, local men who joined 
Laskar Jihad asserted that they continued to fight. Sangaji, based on his interviews with 
local Muslim combatants, also attributes to Laskar Jihad the development of the "bam 
konta/(' (literally, "contact bombs", i.e. bombs propelled by catapult which exploded 
upon impact) used during the fifth period ofviolence. 137 
A less direct role in clashes than other groups would be consistent with Laskar Jihad's 
earlier involvement in Maluku province, where observers increasingly question how 
many of the group's members took part in fighting. For example, while he stresses that 
the group did have a 100-strong pasukan khusus (special forces) in Maluku that took 
part in fighting, Hasan suggests that few of Laskar Jihad's 3,000 strong force in the 
province ever directly participated in attacks, observing that "of the more than one 
hundred members I interviewed, only two fighters claimed to have engaged in real 
battles."138 
Viewed in the light of their members' limited involvement in fighting, the apparent 
paradox of Laskar Jihad's presence in Poso is that the level of violence did intensify 
significantly within a few months of their arrival, a phenomenon also observed by 
Hasan in Maluku. 139 (In Maluku, Hasan attributes this escalation to the increased 
jihadist spirit of local Muslim fighters after Laskar Jihad's arrival). Violent incidents 
became increasingly frequent in Poso in September and October, before a peak of 
violence in late November. It may be that Laskar Jihad's public presence, which was so 
clearly tolerated by the authorities, emboldened other groups to launch larger-scale 
attacks. 140 The more likely explanation, however, is that there was at best a weak causal 
link between Laskar Jihad's arrival and the sharp spike in violence in late November 
2001. Instead, this escalation probably primarily reflects the increased preparedness of 
the groups who arrived before Laskar Jihad in Poso for violence, owing to continuing 
recruitment and training of locals as well as purchase of weapons. The most intense 
137 Arianto Sangaji, Peredaran llegal Senjata Api di Sulawesi Tengah, Position Paper no. 04, (Palu: 
Yayasan Tanah Merdeka, 2005), p. 24. 
138 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 193. 
139 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 195 
140 This interpretation is consistent with contemporary reports of an increased confidence among Poso's 
Muslim community after Laskar Jihad's arrival in the district. See, for example, LPS-HAM Sulteng, 
Laporan Akhir Tahun 2001, p. 32. 
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period of violence after Laskar Jihad's arrival- called the fifth period of violence - is 
described below. 
The Fifth Period- November-December 2001 
The security situation in Poso again became dire in October 2001, and did not improve 
until early December. The violence at this point included numerous attacks on buses, 
the burning of several churches, shooting attacks on villages and clashes between armed 
groups from each community around the outskirts of the city.141 This section, however, 
will focus on just the final five days of violence from 27 November - 1 December, 
which I will term the fifth period. During these five days at least seven Christian-
populated villages were razed in Po so Pesisir and Lage sub-districts. Two of the villages 
destroyed, Tangkura in Poso Pesisir and Sepe in Lage, had previously been considered 
Christian strongholds. During the final attack in the sequence, a military platoon 
commander was shot dead; his comrades took revenge almost immediately, abducting 
eight Muslims from a neighbouring village, only two of whom survived. These five 
days of violence - which took place during the Islamic fasting month, Ramadan - are 
noteworthy over and above the two months of increasing violence that preceded them 
because these attacks spurred central government intervention to bring the parties to the 
conflict to the negotiating table. The scale and intensity of violence during the fifth 
period is also interesting for the insight it provides on the increasing military capacity of 
the alliance of outside mujahidin and local Muslims. 
The fifth period violence can in fact be broken down into two separate, temporally and 
geographically distinct sets of incidents. First, from 27-29 November there were three 
days of attacks to the west of the city in Poso Pesisir sub-district targeting 
predominantly Christian-populated villages located along a road running inland from 
the Muslim-populated settlement, Tabalu. Next, after one day passed without significant 
incident, there was an attack southeast of the city on Bategencu and Sepe villages on the 
night of 1 December, followed almost immediately by a reprisal attack by the military 
on Muslim-populated Toyado village, which neigbours Bategencu. 
141 Different partisan accounts of this violence are provided in "Kronologi Poso Membara", 
laskarjihad.or.id, 5 December 2001; Cheq and Recheq Forum, Tragedi Kemanusiaan di Paso, pp. 34-40, 
Crisis Center GKST, Kronologis Tragedi Kerusuhan Paso Mei-November 2001, pp. 6-11. 
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The first village to be burned in the Poso Pesisir set of attacks was Betalemba village. 
Both Mujahidin Kompak and Laskar Jihad authored chronologies of this sequence of 
attacks, and each organisation claimed that Betalemba was attacked after Christians 
gathered in the village fired the first shot.142 Two Muslims were killed during this 
attack, one of them an important leader among outside mujahidin.143 There is some 
confusion surrounding Christian fatalities, but it appears either two or three Christians 
may also have been killed.144 Again according to media reports, 76 houses, a church and 
a school were burned in Betalemba, while ten houses were also burned in nearby 
P . 145 atlwunga. 
The next villages along the road were Patiwunga and then the reputed Christian 
stronghold, Tangkura. Overnight following the attack on Betalemba, Christians had 
placed oil drums on the road in Patiwunga and the village head of Tangkura had taken a 
group of men to fell coconut trees to block the road. 146 These defences proved little use, 
however, when crowds of Muslims began to advance on the villages early in the 
morning the next day, 28 November. Both villages were razed, two men were killed and 
local Christian residents fled south, either to Sanginora village or further afield to the 
Napu valley or Tentena. 147 Those local Christians who attempted to repel the attacks 
were quickly forced to flee into the hills surrounding the village. 148 The Muslim side in 
142 See "Kronologi Poso Membara", laskarjihad.or.id, dated 5 December 2001, "Kronologi Direbutnya 
Kembali Desa-desa Muslim Poso", BUNYAN, Edisi 09, January 2002, pp.19-20. The BUNYAN 
chronology, a Kompak-authored account, is highly stylised. Its author took pains to stress that Laskar 
Jihad played no role in the violence and depicted the organisation as subordinate to the mujahidin. He 
also stressed that Muslims did not loot any of the villages they attacked. Both claims are questionable. 
143 The mujahidin leader was Abdullah alias Muhamad Sanusi alias Jetli, a Mujahidin Kompak member 
from Riau province in Sumatra. ICG reports list Abdullah as killed in the attack on Tangkura, but he in 
fact died one day earlier. See "Kronologi Poso Membara"; Lembaga Pengembangan Studi Hukum dan 
Advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia (LPS-HAM) Sulteng, "1500 Massa Menyerang ke Desa Tabalu, Patiwunga 
dan Betalemba: Ratusan Rumah Wargahangus Terbakar, 5 Tewas", emailed report, 5 December 2001; 
ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 12; ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, p. 8. 
144 For different estimates, see "Lima Tewas, Kelompok Muslim-Kristen Baku Tembak di Poso", Radar 
Sulteng, 28 November 2001; "Poso Makin Panas, Dua Tewas", Radar Sulteng, date not recorded (but 
probably 29 November 2001); LPS-HAM, "1500 Massa Menyerang". 
145 
"Poso Makin Panas, Dua Tewas", Radar Sulteng, date not recorded (but probably 29 November 2001). 
146 Interviews with Poso Pesisir residents, January 2002. 
147 "LPS-HAM, "1500 Massa Menyerang"; Interviews with Poso Pesisir residents and a resident of 
Sulewana, January 2002. Again, different sources provide different casualty figures, with a chronology 
compiled by the GKST Crisis Centre listing two Betalemba residents and a Tangkura resident killed. See 
Noldy Tacoh, Kronologis Kejadian Penyerangan Laskar Jihad di Kecamatan Poso Pesisir, (Tentena: 
GKST Crisis Centre, no date). 
148 One local Christian man recalled he had fled into the hills after suffering a minor wound caused by a 
piece of shrapnel. "I lost my courage, I may have a large frame but I felt very small once I was hit." The 
man said he tried to return to Tangkura with other local youths that afternoon, but that they were forced to 
flee again after renewed clashes with Muslims. Interview with a resident ofPoso Pesisir, January 2002. 
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this attack was reportedly a crowd estimated to compnse up to 1500 people; 
eyewitnesses claimed that a handful of these combatants used automatic weapons. 149 
The sequence of attacks in Poso Pesisir concluded the next day with an attack on the 
last two Christian villages along the road inland from Tabalu, namely Sanginora and 
Dewua. Both villages were razed, and there may have been two fatalities. 150 This third 
consecutive day of large-scale attacks in the same area was a clear sign of increased 
organisation among Muslim ranks and confidence in their side's military capacity. Such 
a pattern of repeated attacks contrasted with the fourth period of violence in mid-2001 
violence, during which a Poso Pesisir resident recalled that Muslims were reluctant to 
attack neighbouring villages on consecutive days, because the first attack would prompt 
the residents of the next village to be on high alert. 151 A Christian resident of Tangkura 
also claimed that the third day of consecutive attacks had caught him off-guard: 
At the time I thought they would not attack again the next day, so at around 6:00pm on 
the afternoon Tangkura was attacked I went to Napu to seek help from my friends there. 
But before we could come back, the next day they [Muslims] were already in 
S 0 152 angmora. 
Having taken Sanginora and Dewua, the Muslim forces found themselves at the end of 
a twelve kilometre foot-track that led to Sulewana village, located just north of Tentena. 
Christians had used the track to help co-religionists in Poso Pesisir flee during the 
November attacks. 153 If Muslims had wished to continue their advances in Poso Pesisir, 
they in theory could have tried to use the path to reach Tentena without passing through 
the numerous Christian settlements located along the main road south from Poso. They 
chose to go no further, and the focus of the fifth period violence shifted to Lage sub-
district, southeast ofthe city. 154 
The main attack in Lage took place on the night of 1 December, two days after the 
Sanginora and Dewua attacks. 155 In this attack, a crowd of Muslims first attacked 
149 "LPS-HAM, "1500 Massa Menyerang"; interview with a Tangkura resident, January 2002. 
150 LPS-HAM, "1500 Massa Menyerang". 
151 Interview with a Poso Pesisir resident, July 2003. 
152 Interview with a Tangkura resident, January 2002. 
153 Interview with a Sulewana resident, January 2002; Damanik, Tragedi Kemanusiaan Poso, p. 75. 
154 The Dewua-Sulewana footpath is marked on some maps of Poso, and some Christian sources 
speculated that the Muslim forces may have expected to find a more viable way to reach Tentena than the 
footpath provided. Such speculation was not confirmed by any Muslim interviewees. 
155 The Laskar Jihad chronology of the October-December 2001 period states that there was also a clash 
on the southern fringes of the city on 1 December. See "Kronologi Poso Membara", laskarjihad.or.id, 5 
December 2001 
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Bategencu and then proceeded to the neighbouring village, Sepe, reputed as a Christian 
stronghold. This attack started late at night- between I O:OOpm and 12:00am according 
to different accounts - shortly after the power had been cut off in Sepe village. 156 By 
contrast, each of the fifth period attacks in Poso Pesisir sub-district took place during 
the day. Both residents of Sepe and some men who took part in the attack indicated that 
some of the assailants had factory-standard weapons. Nevertheless, it appears the only 
fatality in the attack was a military platoon commander killed when soldiers intervened 
to prevent Muslims crowds from burning the entirety of Sepe. 157 Five Sepe residents 
were wounded, several dozen houses and two churches were also bumed. 158 
The death of the platoon commander had fatal consequences for residents of the nearby 
Muslim village Toyado- a rival stronghold to Sepe- which served as a staging point for 
Muslim attacks in Lage sub-district. On 2 December, just hours after the Sepe attack, 
TNI soldiers went to the village and abducted eight men who were eating the pre-dawn 
fasting month meal (sahur) at a guard post, including the local commander of the 
village's Muslim forces. 159 The soldiers reportedly took the men to Maliwuko village 
(near Tagolu, just south of the city) and handed them over to a crowd of Christians 
there. Two of the men managed to escape, but the other six were murdered. Muslims 
retrieved the body of one of the victims - who had been beheaded - from the Po so river 
and presented his bloated corpse to a National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas 
HAM) team that came to Poso almost immediately after the fifth period.160 The Toyado 
abductions were not the first instance of swift and illegal retaliation by the security 
forces; a month earlier, paramilitary police (Brimob) had shot one Muslim youth dead 
and seriously assaulted around twenty others in Mapane village in Poso Pesisir on 21 
October as retaliation for the death of a Brimob constable during a Muslim attack on 
Betalemba village the day before. Most of those arrested in Mapane eventually won 
156 Unfortunately at the time of the interview I assumed that the power had been deliberately cut and did 
not think to ask whether this was a timetabled blackout (some villages in Poso do not have 24-hour 
electricity). An LPS-HAM chronology implies the power was deliberately cut. Interview with a Sepe 
resident, January 2002; LPS-HAM, "1500 Massa Menyerang". 
157 Interview with a Sepe resident, 30 January 2002. According to the Sepe resident, an elderly member of 
the village was shot in his garden earlier in the evening, and was taken by car to the health centre in 
Tagolu. A contemporary press report indicated that four soldiers were also wounded. I have not found 
any information on possible Muslim casualties during the attack. 
158 LPS-HAM, "1500 Massa Menyerang". 
159 Interview with a Poso man, April2004. It is possible that this attack on Toyado took place one day 
later, on 3 December, but most sources list 2 December as the date. 
160 See "Suaib Ditemukan Tewas Terpenggal", Radar Sulteng, date not recorded; "Komnas HAM 
Dihadiahi Mayat Terpenggal", Radar Sulteng, date not recorded. 
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compensation from the provincial police, after the Palu District Court declared their 
detention to be illegal. 161 
What prompted the fifth period attacks? A chronology appearing in a Kompak-linked 
publication asserted that the advance of Muslim forces from Tabalu village to 
Betalemba was precipitated by a Christian assault on Tabalu, while stating that 
Bategencu and Sepe were attacked because they had frequently harassed nearby T oyado 
village. The Laskar Jihad account cites chronic harassment of Muslims in the vicinity of 
the villages attacked in Poso Pesisir as the reason for the violence. These claims may 
well be true, as it was common for both Muslim and Christian youths to gather around 
border areas and fire shots at neighbouring villages during the night. But given how 
commonplace such "harassment" was, it hardly explains the increase in the level of 
violence. The attacks might also be explained by the logic of simplifying religious 
geography, although Christian populations returned to the villages soon after they were 
attacked. 
The Islamic fasting month appears to have been an important motivating factor. Both 
Laskar Jihad and the DI-derived movements promoted the idea that the fasting month 
was a particularly apt moment for jihad. In its daily bulletin Bel@, for instance, Laskar 
Jihad included several items on the merits of jihad during Ramadan; 162 a treatise on 
jihad during Ramadan published in December 2001 in the Kompak-managed magazine 
BUNYAN noted that each jihad waged by the prophet Muhamad's during the fasting 
month had been a great success, and concluded, 
There is broad scope during Ramadan to do good deeds like waging jihad against 
unbelievers, the highest peak of good deeds in Islam (dzarwatu sanamil Islam). The 
rewards [for jihad during Ramadan] are in fact many times greater than in the other 
months of the year. 163 
161 After stopping a group ofmujahidin in Mapane, Brimob troops arrested 32 of the men. In the course of 
making the arrests, the Brimob troops beat and humiliated the mujahidin, and shot one youth dead at the scene. 
The Palu district court then declared the imprisonment of 27 of the men unlawful and ordered police to pay Rp. 
200,000 ($30) to each. "Tuntutan Pra Peradilan Dikabulkan, Tahanan Tragedi Mapane Dibebaskan", Bel@ , 12 
December 2001. 
162 See "Jihad di Bulan Ramadan", Bel@, 11 November 2001; "Keutamaan Berpuasa dalam Jihad Fi 
Sabilillah", Bel@, 28 November 2001. 
163 See "Napak Tilas Jihad di Bulan Suci", BUNYAN, December 2001, pp. 11-16. 
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A local combatant put the importance of Ramadan slightly differently: Christians in 
2001 thought that Muslims would be weak because they were not eating or drinking, 
and so it was necessary to demonstrate that this was the "best" month for Muslims.164 
This belief in the merit of jihad during the fasting month resulted in a recurring annual 
pattern in Poso of a spike in violence during each Ramadan, particularly during the 
second half of the month. Attacks coincided with the end of the fasting month in 2002 
and 2003, but the pattern was most strongly evident from 2004-2006. In 2004 a 
Christian village chief was beheaded and six Christians were killed in a public transport 
bombing, in 2005 three Christian schoolgirls were beheaded and in 2006 the acting head 
of the Central Sulawesi church was fatally shot in Palu. Only in 2007, after a police raid 
in January and subsequent arrests led to greatly improved security was the pattern of 
violence during Ramadan broken. 
It is also possible that the scale of the fifth period attacks indicates that they were part of 
a larger plan to eventually raze all Christian settlements in Poso including Tentena. 165 
The higher degree of organisation evident in these attacks would be consistent with the 
existence of such a plan. There is some evidence that the fifth period attacks were 
centrally coordinated. Several local combatants said the order for some of the attacks 
came from the city, with one man indicating he was tasked with maintaining 
communication with the maktab (headquarters (in the city)) by two-way radio during 
the attack. 166 Local combatants also said that the December Sepe attack required a far 
greater degree of planning than the July attacks in the same part of the district. The 
extra planning was needed because Sepe was located wholly within Christian territory, 
whereas the July attacks had targeted Christian settlements in mixed Muslim-Christian 
villages. 167 
164 Interview with a Poso man, July 2007. 
165 ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, p. 9. 
166 Interview with a Poso man, April2004. The man also coordinated movements between different parts 
of the crowd. In another instance of radio coordination, an off-camera exchange on a VCD depicting an 
attack on a village in Poso Pesisir in late 2001 involves the following exchange via two way radio: A: 
"We have pulled back, we've pulled back." A: "Where are you? Over." B: "I'm at the bridge." A: "We're 
at the graveyard, we've stopped at the graveyard." B: "Go forward, go forward, go forward!" The 
BUNYAN chronology of the fifth period Poso Pesisir attacks also claims that Muslim combatants 
overheard Christians using two-way radio during the 27 November attack on Betalemba to request ten 
factory-standard firearms from Tentena. See "Kronologi Direbutnya Kembali Desa-desa Muslim Poso", 
BUNYAN, Edisi 09, January 2002, p.l9. 
167 Interview with a Poso man, April2004. 
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If there was a plan to raze Tentena, it was stopped mid-stream by a deployment of more 
troops to Poso in early December, accompanied by efforts on the part of the central 
government to broker peace (described in Chapter Five ).168 The government 
intervention meant that the Sepe attack and the Toyado abductions were almost the last 
serious violence in 2000: two days after Toyado, security forces shot dead a Muslim 
man protesting the abductions in the city, and there may also have been a fight between 
Brimob and Muslim forces in Pandajaya near Pendolo village in the south of the 
district. 169 Overall, according to figures compiled by local NGO LPSHAM, which 
documented the 2001 violence from media reportage and its own investigations, 99 
people were killed in Poso during 2001, with a further 27 people missing. 170 Violence 
has never reached the same intensity since, with fewer than 50 people killed each year 
in Poso during the period 2002-2007. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the development of an alliance between outside mujahidin and 
local Muslims in Poso, an alliance that was initiated after the losses Muslims suffered 
during the third period. The pattern of violence after the third period was initially one of 
tit-for-tat lynchings, harassing attacks and some frontal clashes. The military advantage 
that Muslims gained over time by means of this alliance transformed this pattern to a 
situation where Christians, although still fighting, were overwhelmed. I have charted the 
development of this military capacity by examining two major periods of violence in 
2001: the fourth period (June-July), in which Muslims demonstrated their greater 
capacity to bum villages, but also suffered an horrific reprisal in the form of the Buyung 
Katedo massacre, and the fifth period (November-December), when Muslim crowds 
destroyed all or part of seven Christian villages in four days of attacks spaced over just 
five days. 
168 In addition to the deterrent effect of extra troops, potential attackers may have judged further attacks 
imprudent so soon after the military reprisals against Toyado village. 
169 This clash is described in a Christian-authored chronology, but I have not found other sources that 
corroborate the chronology's account. See Cheq and Recheq Forum, Tragedi Kemanusiaan di Poso, p. 
40. Pandajaya was an important centre of mujahidin activity near the border with South Sulawesi 
province. 
170 LPSHAM, Laporan Akhir Tahun 2001, 14 December 2001. LPSHAM's report actually lists 141 
killed, but this is a tabulation error. The figure of 42 houses burned on 2 November 2001 in Pinedapa was 
mistakenly entered into the deaths column of the summary table. The tally may also include some 
casualties from incidents that happened in 2000. The report's figure for missing people also appears to 
erroneously include the two survivors of the Toyado abductions. 
170 
The organisation of the large-scale attacks on villages during the fourth and fifth period 
bore some similarity to attacks by Christian crowds in the May-June 2000 violence. At 
the centre of each attack there was an organised core of combatants, consisting of 
outside mujahidin and the local men whom they had trained. Outside mujahidin would 
have been only a small numerical minority in most attacks, but they appear to have 
played a prominent role when present. For example, a local man who fought in the 
attack on Sepe village during the fifth period indicated that outside mujahidin tended to 
be in the front line: "Even the security forces were scared of them."171 A local 
combatant from Poso Pesisir put the same point slightly differently, "Even when there 
were security forces, they [i.e. outside mujahidin] stayed standing and kept going 
forward; they wouldn't lie down."172 
Outside mujahidin could occupy leadership positions because of their military prowess 
and readiness to fight as well as their perceived religious authority; the military and 
doctrinal training (ta 'lim) that they provided then reinforced their position of authority. 
The skills and qualities that outside mujahidin offered were valued because they arrived 
at a time when locals wanted revenge and needed to defend themselves against the real 
possibility of further Christian attacks. Outside mujahidin also drew on local authority 
structures, sometimes working through local leaders to gain recruits; they also sought to 
recruit charismatic youths from each village who could themselves exert authority. Not 
every local who trained with outside mujahidin became bound to them by organisational 
ties, but by late 2001, they had probably forged links with local youths that were more 
organised than the ties that bound the core combatants of the kelompok merah together 
during the third period violence. The opportunity to conduct training over a longer time 
period and the regular contact that ta 'lim facilitated both would have aided development 
of a higher degree of organisation. Intentions may also have been important: outside 
mujahidin may have had a conscious aim to develop a fighting force for the longer term, 
however inconsistently such an aim was pursued. 
The control of factory-standard firearms was another resource that outside mujahidin 
had available to them in 2000 and 2001 to exercise authority among local Muslims and 
regulate what violence locals could perpetrate. Factory-standard weapons were 
particularly sought after because the homemade guns that most men owned were 
171 Interview with a Poso man, April2004. 
171 
inaccurate and tended to jam after firing only a handful of bullets. 173 Outside mujahidin 
appear to have largely controlled access to these weapons at this point in the conflict, 
handing out guns immediately before an attack and collecting the weapons again 
afterwards. 174 A pre-attack ceremony from late 2001 depicted on a fund-raising VCD 
provides evidence of this pattern, showing an outside mujahid handing out around a 
dozen firearms to a room of approximately 50 people, before the men pray and set off to 
attack a village.175 It was not until later in the conflict when operational funds ran short, 
a Mujahidin Kompak member claimed, that outsiders sacrificed this means of control 
and began to distribute weapons to local Muslims on a permanent basis. 176 
Although outside mujahidin thus clearly played a role in developing the capacity of 
Muslims in Poso to fight, and by doing so entrenched themselves in leadership 
positions, there were nevertheless limits to these men's agency and authority. One limit 
was their lack of numbers. Particularly during the period before Laskar Jihad arrived, 
there may have been dozens rather than hundreds of outside mujahidin in the district, 
mostly concentrated in wards of the city. With so few people, it is not clear that outside 
mujahidin played a significant role in the day-to-day routine of violence in villages: at 
the time, life for villagers in border areas involved a nightly reality of standing guard, 
harassing their opponents with gunfire and avoiding similar harassment directed at their 
own village. 
Even during major attacks, outside mujahidin did not have control over all combatants. 
The same widespread desire to fight that helped outside mujahidin gain recruits also 
meant that each time a large-scale attack was to take place, Muslim ranks would quickly 
swell. Most local men had their own homemade firearms by 2001, and as a result 
virtually anyone could participate in an attack without close coordination with those 
172 Interview with a Poso man, July 2007. 
173 Despite the use of these weapons in attacks in 2000 and 2001, a somewhat surprising feature of this 
violence is that the average death toll from each clash did not increase in line with the increasing 
organisation and weaponry. The reason is probably that Christians withdrew from the fifth period clashes 
fairly swiftly, realising they could not defend their villages. 
174 Interview with Mujahidin Kompak member, May 2004. 
175 Thee firearms include rifles, at least two pistols and two weapons that appear to be automatic fire. In 
the footage of the attack that followed, only single gunshots are audible, however. In a 2004 report, ICG 
identified the attack shown on this VCD (the same one described in footnote x) as most likely the 
November 2001 attack on Tangkura, because the next clip on the video shows Muslims surveying the 
damage to Tangkura shortly after the village had been razed. The problem with this interpretation is that 
the attack on Tangkura took place during the day, whereas the video depicts a night-time attack. See ICG, 
Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 12. 
176 Interview with a Mujahidin Kompak member, May 2004. 
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nominally in command. For instance, one local combatant recalled that he might set off 
for an attack with what seemed like a few dozen people, only to find himself amongst a 
crowd of hundreds or even a thousand. Hence, as I concluded in the case of Christian 
attacks during the third period, the Muslim side in most fourth and fifth period clashes 
is most aptly described as a "crowd". 
Most of the Muslim men who joined these crowds were probably from villages in the 
vicinity of the Christian settlement that was to be attacked. 177 Many of these ad hoc 
combatants would have had very little contact with outside mujahidin: perhaps they 
may have attended religious activities held in their villages by the preachers these 
organisations brought to Poso, or received training from a local man from their village 
who had himself trained with outside mujahidin. The participation of so many local 
combatants limited the influence of outside mujahidin and the men they had trained on 
precisely what violence took place. One local combatant characterised these loosely 
coordinated participants as happy just to hear the sound of their gun firing, and less 
likely to stick to rules of engagement such as not attacking women or the elderly, nor 
looting for personal gain: 178 
In the field, a lot of people deviated from what they [outside mujahidin] taught, I guess 
because most of the youths hadn't been to their ta'lim; they'd just show up if they heard 
there was a battle. If most people had known what they taught, things wouldn't have been 
brutal. They would have been more disciplined. 179 
The limits of the agency and authority of outside mujahidin were also apparent in the 
extent to which the local men who trained with them adopted their religious agenda. (I 
will explore this limit more thoroughly in Chapter Five, which deals with the decline of 
violence.) To recap their agenda, outside mujahidin encouraged local Muslim youths to 
identify as mujahidin themselves and they encouraged the idea that it was haram to flee 
from a fight. They also promoted the idea that martyrdom was virtuous, taught that 
fighting in a jihad required certain restrictions on targets and forms of violence, and in 
particular they insisted that local Muslims lead a devout life. These tenets were not 
unique to outside mujahidin - violence in Poso had been described as a jihad even 
177 Even the local men who trained with outside mujahidin may have mainly fought in their own sub-
district. 
178 On the satisfaction of hearing the sound of gun-fire, a local Muslim man indicated, "Each time we 
attacked, thousands of bullets would be fired, but only one or two people would be killed, if you counted 
the cost of the bullets it would come to tens of millions of rupiah." Interview with a Poso man, April 
2004. 
179 Interview with a Poso man, April2004. 
173 
before these men arrived. Nevertheless, outside mujahidin made particular efforts to 
establish jihad as the central rationale for violence and to give the term content beyond 
that of an empty mobilising symbol. 
It is difficult to gauge how much of this religious agenda locals accepted in 2000-2001, 
and how the agenda affected their behaviour. There were some indications that religious 
instruction did have an influence: the timing of the fifth period violence in Ramadan, 
believed by outside mujahidin to be an auspicious month for jihad; the observation of a 
local combatant that he returned to his village to find his peers all now regularly prayed 
in the local mosque; the pride local combatants said they felt if they were called 
"mujahidin". ICG perhaps makes the strongest statement regarding the impact of 
religious instruction in its 2004 report, quoting without contradiction an unnamed local 
source saying that many local recruits of Mujahidin Kompak had been convinced that 
"dying as a martyr was glorious" and that "[m]any [local recruits] would have been 
willing suicide bombers". 180 The difficulty we face in evaluating such a statement, and 
the impact of the religious agenda in general in 2000-2001, is that the commitment of 
local Muslim combatants simply was not put to the test by the violence in Poso at the 
time. These were the "good times" in Poso for the perpetrators of jihadist violence. 
Fatalities among Muslim ranks during attacks were rare - the greater danger was 
seemingly posed by being ambushed or when a person's own village was attacked. The 
risk of death from participating in an attack was high only if a member of the security 
forces was killed: take for example the fatality in Mapane, the six men abducted from 
Toyado and killed; a man protesting for the safe return of the abductees was also shot 
dead. When fatalities did occur among the ranks of attackers, a case could be made that 
180 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 21. ICG states that a Muslim youth killed in an accidental 
explosion in Poso in 2003 had been recruited as a suicide bomber. Another man who was born in Poso, 
Ashar Daeng Salam alias Aco, was killed while placing a bomb in a McDonalds restaurant as part of the 
5 December 2002 Makassar bombings. It is not clear whether Aco was a suicide bomber or accidentally 
set off the bomb prematurely: the other explosion in the Makassar bombings was not a suicide attack. 
Outside of these examples, the willingness ofPoso men to become suicide bombers has not been tested to 
date: none of the major bombings in Poso have been suicide attacks, and no local Muslims from Poso 
were recruited into the four terrorist suicide bombings in Java and Bali from 2002-2005. At least two men 
involved in the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta (although not as suicide bombers), 
however, were mujahidin from Java who had travelled to Poso. One of these men, Mujadid alias Brekele, 
was also involved in the 2005 bombing of the market in Tentena which killed 23 people. In 2007, he was 
sentenced to eighteen years in prison for the 2005 attack. The other man, Rois, was sentenced to death for 
his role in the embassy bomb. On Ashar Daeng Salam, see "Tersangka Born Makassar Jadi 16 Orang", 
Sriwijaya Post, 15 December 2002; ICG, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia, p. 16; ICG, Jihad in 
Central Sulawesi, p. 17. On Rois, See ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, p. 1. Direct 
observation by author of trial of Amril Ngiode alias Aat, South Jakarta District Court, 19 September 
2007; "Pelaku Born Poso Divonis 18 Tahun", tempointeraktif.com, 3 December 2007. 
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outside mujahidin were over-represented among those killed - two were killed in late 
2001 -and the risk for locals was consequently lower. 181 Moreover, there were few 
arrests after most attacks, and when people were arrested, crowds could sometimes 
pressure police to release the detainees without charge. 182 There was also strong 
perception among local Muslims of the need to fight, and strong peer approval of 
fighting. Only in late 2002, when these conditions changed, did higher costs begin to be 
associated with a commitment to jihad (See Chapter Five). Once the cost to them 
increased, local youths were forced to consider more directly the difference between 
their own interests and motivations and the agenda of outside mujahidin. 
It is also difficult to distinguish more generally between what was jihad and what was 
revenge. Jihadist doctrine specifically proscribes revenge as a motive, but outside 
mujahidin also promoted the concept of "striking back in equal measure and form". By 
adopting such a doctrine, local Muslims could have attributed their actions to a loftier 
goal than anger over previous violence. Some local combatants doubtless did see 
attacks as jihad, but I found many of the combatants I interviewed were perfectly 
comfortable in explicitly describing their actions as revenge. 
As a final note on the organisation of attacks and the motivation of attackers, I would 
like to note several drawbacks of the approach of this chapter. For the sake of clarity, I 
have focused in this chapter on an alliance of outside mujahidin and local men, and on 
two major periods of violence in 2001. But there are three significant drawbacks 
inherent in this approach. 
By focussing on major periods of violence, I have devoted little attention to explaining 
the frequent sporadic attacks that took place throughout 2001. These attacks would have 
been a more challenging focus of research, as it would have been particularly difficult 
for me to find local men willing to talk about their participation in these attacks. When 
describing a large-scale attack, an interviewee can remain a member of an anonymous 
crowd; if recounting an attack perpetrated by a small group of men the risk that their 
181 The two men were Huzaifah, killed on 9 November in Lembomawo, and Abdullah, killed on 29 
November near Tabalu. Both were shot in the head. 
182 For example, one Muslim-compiled chronology lists an instance in June 2001 when Muslims 
successfully protested in front of the Poso police station for the release of two men held on suspicion of 
stopping a car and attacking its passengers. See "Actual News! dari Medan Jihad Poso ", mubarizin.net, 
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account would be incriminating is much higher. Future research would be required to 
investigate the identity of the perpetrators of the sporadic attacks in late 2000 and 2001, 
who and what determined the timing and frequency of these attacks, whether those 
killed were targets of opportunity or specifically chosen, and how many of these attacks 
were part of a coordinated plan or were random incidents. It may be, however, that the 
passage of time presents too great an obstacle to obtain a reliable and verifiable record 
of this period. 
By focussing on instances where outsiders and locals cooperated, I have also neglected 
study of whether any purely local Muslim militia were responsible for sporadic 
violence. More generally, the limitations of the available data mean that the question of 
exactly who initiated most attacks - sporadic and large-scale - still requires further 
research. 
The third drawback of my chosen focus is that it has meant not thoroughly setting out 
how Christians continued to organise to perpetrate violence during this period, the 
discussion of the Buyung Katedo incident notwithstanding. It would have been difficult 
to incorporate extensive discussion of Christian organisation within the structure of this 
chapter; Christian activity during the period that this chapter covered also proved a 
difficult subject for investigation, with little documentary evidence available. The focus 
of many of my interviews with Christian interviewees also was necessarily on 
elucidating the organisation of violence during the third period. The questions of how 
coordinated a structure Christians retained during this period would also be a valuable 
focus for future research, as well as what continuities there were between the 
organisation of violence in the third period and in late 2000 to 2001. 
In this chapter, I have primarily taken an actor-centred approach to explain the 
mobilisation of outside mujahidin to fight in Poso, depicting their arrival as the product 
of a choice these outside mujahidin themselves made. I also depicted the most important 
factor in the timing of their choice to be events in Poso itself: the DI-derived groups 
arrived almost immediately after the third period, violence, whereas Laskar Jihad 
entered the district within weeks of the Buyung Katedo massacre. Nevertheless, I 
indicated at the outset of this chapter that I would also need to address the question of 
>VWlv.mubarizin.net/Bahasan Utama/Poso/Poso Eds 13/poso eds 13.html, accessed via 
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whether the entry of outside mujahidin into Poso was significantly influenced or 
determined by contexts not specific to the district. 
There are two mam alternatives to my actor-centred, Poso-centred approach to the 
mobilisation of outside mujahidin to go to Poso. The first is to depict the arrival of 
outside mujahidin in Poso as a product of the conspiring of high-ranking military 
officers, intelligence agents or even civilian elites. The interest of these assumed 
conspirators was not in Poso per se, but in using violence in Poso to discredit President 
Wahid's government or as a source of financial profit. Pamungkas' explanation of 
jihadist mobilisation in Poso is is one (of many) examples of this interpretation. 
Suggesting that the military had an interest in encouraging protracted conflict to 
improve its image, gain increased security budgets and facilitate access for military 
businesses to Poso's resources, Pamungkas states: "If one militia [i.e. Christians] were 
to win a battle [i.e. the third period], another militia would be created or brought [to 
Po so] to restore the balance. "183 
There are several weaknesses to conspiratorial interpretations. The first is the simple 
lack of supporting evidence. 184 Conspiratorial interpretations tend to seize upon the few 
well known examples of military or intelligence informers or infiltrators within jihadist 
networks, and then attribute exaggerated authority and influence to these individuals. A 
good example is the work of conspiratorially-minded research institute CedSos, whose 
work enjoys some currency among Central Sulawesi NGOs. The institute's allegations 
of a conspiracy focus on Abdul Haris, a known intelligence agent who played an 
important role in the arrest of an al Qaeda operative in 2002, and Fauzi Hasbi alias Abu 
Jihad, reportedly a long-time informer for Indonesia's National Intelligence Agency 
(BIN) before he was murdered in Maluku in 2003.185 Although few or often no 
references are provided, the CedSos account depicts these two individuals as essentially 
www. waybackmachine.org. 
183 Cahyo Pamungkas, "Membaca Dinamika Konflik Poso: Dari Kekerasan Komunal ke Kekerasan 
Politik", Masyarakat Indonesia 32 (2), 2006, p. 71. Pamungkas frequently cites the work of George 
Aditjondro, another observer who has promoted conspiratorial interpretations of the violence in Poso. 
184 On this point, public figures peripherally associated with these jihadist networks often publicly 
encourage the interpretation that Jemaah Islamiyah is simply an intelligence-created fiction. 
185 See Team CedSoS ( ed.), Dibalik Berita Born Kedubes Australia & Skandal Terorisme, cedsos.com, 
accessed 8 June 2007. For other accounts ofFauzi Hasbi alias Abu Jihad, see ICG, Indonesia 
Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terror Network Operates, pp. 7-9, 11; ICG, Jemaah 
Islamiyah in Southeast Asia, p. 25, Ken Conboy, The Second Front (Equinox: Jakarta, 2006), pp. 85, 93, 
102-3; Kirsten Schulz, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Movement, (Hawaii: 
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controlling the direction of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia. Abdul Haris, for 
instance, is depicted as instrumental to the decision of mujahidin groups in South 
Sulawesi to go to Poso: 
The success of Abdul Haris in relation to KPPSI [Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat 
Islam - Committee for the Preparation of Implementation of Islamic Law] was to plunge 
the Agus Dwikarna-led Laskar Jundullah along with Laskar Santri (which had a close 
relationship with and was backed by the Wirabuana Military Commander) into the Poso 
conflict, with the help of [al Qaeda operative] Al Farouk and Aris Munandar (Abdul 
Haris's representative/assistant in MMI) to provide ammunition, explosives and 
weapons. 186 
No details are provided of how Haris managed such a feat, or why he would even need 
to convince these groups to go to Poso, given that Agus Dwikarna was already involved 
in jihadist activity in Maluku before he travelled to Poso. 
Conspiratorial interpretations are also weakened by the seeming ignorance regarding 
jihadist networks of Indonesia's security forces and intelligence agencies during the 
period immediately after the Soeharto regime collapsed. Their informers and infiltrators 
notwithstanding, Indonesia's security forces and intelligence agencies appear to have 
had a very poor understanding of the precise nature and activities of jihadist networks in 
1999-2000. For instance, in an otherwise sympathetic account of BIN's efforts to 
counter radical Islamic groups, Ken Conboy examines a 24-page assessment of known 
extremists prepared by the agency in September 2001. He suggests that most of the 
information in this document was "inaccurate or woefully outdated", and indicates that 
the assessment made only the briefest mention of Jemaah Islamiyah. 187 
A third weakness of conspiratorial interpretations is the insignificance of Poso on the 
national scale. Violence in Po so in late 2000 and most of 2001 struggled to gain 
national media or political attention; even the Buyung Katedo massacre did not generate 
an exceptional level of coverage in Indonesia's leading daily, Kompas, nor in the 
nation's most influential weekly news magazine, Tempo. Poso was simply too 
peripheral to the consciousness of most Indonesians for violence in the district to 
discredit President Wahid. 
East-West Centre, 2004), pp. 36-37. Abdul Haris may be the infiltrator Conboy refers to as Dadang. See 
Conboy, The Second Front, p. 143 
186 Team CedSoS ( ed.), Dibalik Berita Born Kedubes Australia & Skandal Terorisme, p. 172. 
187 See Ken Conboy, The Second Front, (Jakarta:, Equinox, 2006), p. 146. 
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On the other hand, it has been well-documented that the security forces deployed to 
Poso were able to profit economically from continuing unrest. The security forces could 
request contributions to their budget from the district government; their personnel 
reportedly also engaged in more illicit activities such as extorting payments from trucks 
and buses passing through Poso, renting weapons to combatants and establishing illegal 
businesses. 188 It is unlikely, however, that the sums of money that could be generated 
from the district would have made worthwhile a national-level conspiracy to bring 
outside mujahidin to Poso. 
While the possibility of a national conspiracy merits particular scepticism, there was 
some contact between outside mujahidin and the security forces. Laskar Jihad's 
interactions with the security forces are well documented; other outside mujahidin also 
appear to have obtained at least some of their weapons and ammunition from military 
and police personnel. But to understand such interaction and transactions, we would do 
well to heed the picture van Klinken paints in the context of the Maluku conflict of a 
security forces in disarray, with local units engaging in ad hoc illegal fund-raising and 
"numerous instances of soldiers and police officers taking sides and shooting at each 
other across the front line". 189 There was less direct involvement of soldiers and police 
as combatants in Poso, but a more fractious picture of the security forces leads us to 
think of any interaction with outside mujahidin less as exploitation and more as a two-
sided relationship. Under a two-sided model, we can allow for outside mujahidin to 
actively take advantage of complicit members of the security forces, just as members of 
the security forces could attempt to hinder or facilitate the actions of outside mujahidin 
depending on their own interests. 
A second alternative to an actor-centred, Poso-centred approach is Sidel' s structuralist 
model of jihadist mobilisation, which I sketched in the introduction to this dissertation. 
To recap, Sidel argues that the jihadist mobilisation resulted from a shift in the position 
of Islam in Indonesian public life, namely the defeat of Islamist parties in the June 1999 
legislative election, followed by the election of moderate Muslim leader Abdurrahman 
188 On the financial opportunities presented to the security forces by the Poso conflict, see Arianto 
Sangaji, "The Security Forces and Regional Violence in Poso" in Renegotiating Boundaries: Local 
Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klink en, (Leiden: KITL V, 
2007), pp. 276-279; Sangaji, Peredaran llegal Senjata Api di Sulawesi Tengah, p. 16. For figures on 
contributions from the Poso district budget to the security forces, see "Kekerasan Tak Kunjung Padam", 
Sr,utar Rakyat, December 2003- January 2004, p. 5. 
18 Van Klinken, "The Maluku Wars", p. 8. 
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Wahid to the presidency in October the same year. These political outcomes, in Sidel's 
words, amounted to the "eclipse and evisceration of the Islamist project" and a 
"precipitous reversal of the gains Islam had achieved in the 1990s." In the midst of 
disappointment at these developments, atrocities took place against Muslim populations 
in Maluku and North Maluku in December 1999-January 2000. The result was ajihadist 
mobilisation starting in early to mid-2000 aimed both to "assist vulnerable co-
religionists" and "to reassert and reawaken seemingly lapsed religious sensibilities and 
solidarities". 190 
Side I' s structuralist argument is a good fit for the timing of the mobilisation of Laskar 
Jihad to Maluku: the organisation was formed in early 2000 and sent large numbers of 
men to Maluku in April the same year. But his focus on Laskar Jihad almost to the 
exclusion of other networks' activities may have led him to overlook a significant flaw 
in his argument. Namely, his model does not fit with the timing of the mobilisation of 
the DI-derived networks, members of which had decided to travel to Maluku in June 
1999 and which had set up their first training camp in the province by October 1999 at 
the latest. 191 
Because of his focus on national-level structural shifts, Sidel does not look at outside 
mujahidin as individuals. 192 I do not have comprehensive material on the individual 
motivations of the men who travelled to Poso, but what is known about these men 
suggests that they would have gone to Maluku and later Poso regardless of the context 
Sidel identifies. The DI-derived networks had been building their military capacity 
throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, in part through sending men to train in 
Afghanistan and the Philippines (interrogation depositions even suggest some men used 
their own resources to finance travel to the latter destination).193 The serious violence 
against Muslims in Poso and Maluku - an opportunity or even obligation for jihad right 
190 Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad, p. 212.; Sidel, The Jslamist Threat in Southeast Asia: A Reassessment, p. 
23. 
191 On the entry of outside mujahidin to Maluku, see International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: 
How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorism Network Operates, p. 19, which describes the entry of around 50 
men from Makassar including alumni of trainings in the Philippines as early as February 1999, and 
International Crisis Group, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, pp. 4-5, which focuses on JI and Mujahidin 
Kompak. On the Buru training camp, see ICG, Noordin 's Networks, pp. 13-14. 
192 For a broader critique ofSidel's approach to individuals, see Lianne Kennedy Boudali "Book Review: 
Sidel, J. T. (2006). Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press", Comparative Political Studies 40 (2007): 1265. 
193 Greg Fealy, "Radical Islam in Indonesia", p. 18. 
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on their doorstep - was always likely to motivate these men to travel to these areas to 
fight. 
Where Side I' s analysis may be of greater assistance is in helping to explain why 
Muslim businessmen and politicians supported and were sympathetic to those waging 
jihad. Such support made it easier for these networks to conduct operations in Poso, but 
does not tell us why outside mujahidin travelled to Poso when they did. To answer that 
question, we require close study of the movements involved and the conflict itself. 
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CHAPTER FIVE- THE DECLINE OF VIOLENCE 
The escalation of violence in Poso in November - December 2001, as described in 
Chapter Four), spurred central government intervention to attempt to bring the fighting 
to an end. This intervention, which included a significant additional deployment of 
security forces personnel as well as govemment-brokered peace talks, marked the 
beginning of a decline in violence in Poso. The decline was clearly evident, among 
other indicators, in the diminishing number of fatalities caused by the conflict each 
year. After four major periods of violence - in addition to intermittent shootings, other 
murders and bombings- had resulted in more than 350 fatalities in Poso in 2000-2001 
alone, the number of people killed each year since 2002 has never exceeded 40 
fatalities. 
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Graph 1: Number of Deaths in Poso Conflict, 2000-20071 
1 The numbers used in this graph are approximate. The 2000 figure in particular may be much higher, as 
the almost total breakdown of law and order caused by the May-June violence makes it impossible to 
obtain accurate figures. For the purposes of this graph, I have used the governor's estimate of casualties 
during the third period. The number of mortalities for 2001 adopts local NGO LPS-HAM's count, with 
the caveat regarding mis-tabulation mentioned in Chapter Four. Figures for 2002-2007 may also differ 
slightly, as different sources are inconsistent regarding the number of people killed in certain incidents. 
Any such variance for these later years should only involve an increase or decrease of several deaths, and 
so is not significant to the overall trend. These mortality figures include people killed in other districts of 
Central Sulawesi if the relevant incident was clearly part of the Poso conflict. 
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Another indication of the decline in violence was a "narrowing" of the forms of 
violence in Poso.2 During each of the major periods of violence in Poso from 2000-
2001, attacks perpetrated by crowds were one of the main forms of violence. These 
clashes between crowds reflected the willingness of many villagers to join in fighting in 
an ad hoc fashion, for reasons ranging from a perceived necessity to pre-empt or defend 
against attacks by the other religious community, to pre-existing enmity and indignant 
anger, peer pressure and social approval for violence as well as the desire to take 
revenge for past wrongs. After the two central government interventions in late-2001 
contributed to a decline in violence, however, many combatants and villagers who had 
previously taken part in violence began to stop fighting. The result was a disappearance 
of attacks by crowds; after the two central government interventions there was only one 
more period- in August 2002 - during which attacks by crowds took place. 
Despite the absence of clashes between crowds, other forms of violence such as 
sporadic shootings and bombings continued. Most of the approximately 150 people 
killed in the Po so conflict since 2002 have died in these sporadic attacks (although a 
significant subset of the fatalities, 25 people in all, were killed during police or military 
operations). Some of the people killed in these sporadic attacks since the beginning of 
2002 were murdered by Christians, but overall, Christians had ceased perpetrating 
attacks by 2002 in the face of the clear military advantage that the district's Muslims 
had established. Instead, most of the sporadic attacks were directed at non-Muslims and 
were perpetrated by the same alliance of outside mujahidin and local Muslim 
combatants that I outlined in Chapter Four. 
How can we explain the decline of violence in Po so, and by what pattern and processes 
did the decline occur? These questions will be the central concern of this chapter. My 
answer to these questions will be presented in three parts. 
The first and second parts consider the effect of the two important central government 
interventions in late-2001. Although she does not discuss the decline of violence in 
detail, Aragon has noted that the two interventions - peace talks in the South Sulawesi 
hill town of Malino on 19-20 December 2001, and a large-scale security operation-
2 The term "narrowing is Sidel's, but numerous observers have noted the difference in the forms of 
violence. 
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"virtually ended collective violence among Poso civilians."3 My focus in these sections 
will be to discuss how the interventions restricted violence, and what space remained 
for those intent on perpetrating further attacks. 
It is clear that there was still space for attacks, as violence escalated again in August 
2002 to a level approaching the intensity to the fourth and fifth periods. This escalation 
was only temporary - the August escalation lasted no more than two weeks - and so the 
second part considers why many local combatants decided to stop fighting some time 
after the central government interventions, despite the space that remained for violence. 
The third part explains how those who did continue to perpetrate attacks organised the 
sporadic violence and what their motivations were. It is important to attempt to explain 
this sporadic violence, because despite the clear overall decline in violent conflict in 
Poso, the 150 fatalities in Poso between 2002 and 2007 established the district as the 
site of the most persistent inter-religious fighting in Indonesia. As a comparison, 
fatalities in Poso after 2002 exceeded conflict deaths in Maluku during the same period 
by a factor of two. In one sense, explaining this violence repeats the task of Chapter 
Four, because the perpetrators were a subset of the same group of people considered in 
that chapter. Whereas the focus of Chapter Four was on explaining the organisation and 
motivations for major periods of violence, however, in this chapter I will examine 
sporadic attacks. 
There are far fewer studies of the decline of violence in Poso than of the escalation, a 
point that may be true for the study of violence in Indonesia more generally.4 Even a 
book length study of the post-Soeharto conflicts, such as van Klinken's, devotes only a 
few paragraphs to the decline of violence in all of these conflicts. As a result, compared 
with earlier chapters, there is less scope here to contrast or corroborate the conclusions 
of this chapter with the work of other observers. 
Central Government Intervention - the Malino Accord 
After the November-December 2001 fifth period violence (see Chapter Four), the 
central government began to act with greater urgency to bring the Poso conflict to an 
3 Aragon, "Mass Media Fragmentation", p. 43. 
4 See also van Klinken, Small Town Wars, p. 141, who makes this point for the study of violence in 
general. 
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end. The government dispatched additional security forces personnel, with 2,500 police 
and 1,600 military deployed in Poso by early 2002. The government also sent four 
ministers to visit Poso and meet separately with representatives of the district's Muslim 
and Christian communities on 5 December 2001.5 Among these ministers was Jusuf 
Kalla- Minister for People's Welfare- a businessman originally from South Sulawesi. 
Although the ministerial delegation swiftly returned to Jakarta, Kalla followed up their 
visit by sending a long-time associate to Poso to arrange for ten-member Muslim and 
Christian delegations to come to Makassar in South Sulawesi for further talks.6 
Kalla, his associate and the South Sulawesi governor H. Z. B. Palaguna duly met the 
Muslim and Christian delegations whom Kalla had invited to Makassar on 14 December 
2001. At these meetings, Kalla explained his concept for a round of peace talks to 
resolve the Poso conflict. This concept was set out in a short document entitled "Guide 
for Planned Efforts at Reconciliation in Poso Conflict", which in essence became the 
terms of reference for the subsequent Malino talks.7 In the document, Kalla made it 
clear that he held the leaders of each party to the conflict responsible for the violence in 
Poso, and he asserted to these leaders that "most of the [common] people" were "weary, 
suffering and afraid" after several years of conflict. 
Kalla then gave these leaders three "choices": the government could let the conflict run 
its course, the police and military could take "stem action like in Ambon" or the two 
sides could meet for peace talks, after which the government would assist with 
reconstruction of houses and public facilities in the district. 8 Of course, there was really 
5 Lasahido et al. and the International Crisis Group each assert that this ministerial delegation met 
communities in Poso in November 2001. Their account is contradicted by contemporary media reportage 
of the ministers' visit and a memoir later published by one of the men who helped to organise the Malino 
talks, Farid Husain. See Lasahido et al., Suara dari Paso, (Jakarta: Yappika, 2003), p. 69; ICG, Jihad in 
Central Sulawesi, p. 14; Farid Husain, To See the Unseen: Kisah Di Balik Damai di Aceh, (Jakarta: 
Health and Hospital Indonesia, 2007), pp. 158-160, 178-184; "Muin Tak Tahu Menteri ke Tentena", 
Radar Sulteng, date not recorded; "Warga Tentena Minta Bupati Muin Mundur", Nuansa Pas, date not 
recorded. 
6 Husain, To See the Unseen, p. 183. The man Kalla sent was Farid Husain, a medical doctor whom he 
had recently-appointed as a deputy in his ministry. 
7 "Panduan Rencana Upaya Rekonsiliasi Konflik Poso" (signed by Kalla and dated 13 December 2001) as 
reproduced in Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Tana Poso, Hasil Pertemuan Malina- Sulawesi Selatan 
18-20 December 2001 (Bahan Sosialisasi), nd. The preamble of this document is also reproduced in 
Husain, To See the Unseen, pp. 181-183. 
8 "Panduan Rencana Upaya Rekonsiliasi Konflik Poso". The reference to Ambon probably most 
specifically referred to the deployment of a joint special-forces military battalion known as "Yongab" 
(Yongab - Batalyon Gabungan (Joint Battalion)) to Ambon from August 2000- November 2001. Yongab 
clashed several times with Muslim forces, shooting to kill, and also beat and even executed prisoners. For 
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no choice at all, and each delegation returned to Central Sulawesi to assemble a team to 
take part in the main round of talks five days later. The result was the Malino peace 
talks - named for the hill resort in South Sulawesi where the talks were held on 19 and 
20 December 2001. 
Kalla's terms of reference anticipated that each team in the main round of talks would 
have fourteen members. Four were to be religious figures while the remaining ten 
would be drawn from groups more directly involved in the violence in Poso. The list of 
anticipated delegates from combatant groups made it clear that the government did not 
understand precisely which groups were involved in the fighting, however. On the 
Muslim side, the government sought two representatives each from "Hisbullah, 
Ahlussunah Waljamaah, Jundullah, Majlis Dzikir and Jamaah Tablig",9 whereas the 
Christian side was to be represented by "Kelelawar (Bats), Macan (Tigers), Kupu-Kupu 
(Butterflies), Ansimar and Krisis Centre". 10 Neither list was a good characterisation of 
the key combatant groups: the Muslim list omitted all Java and Sumatra-based jihadist 
groups (with the exception of Laskar Jihad, referred to in the document as Ahlussunah 
Waljamaah) and associated local combatants; the list of Christian invitees used group 
names drawn from press coverage and appeared to include the GKST Crisis Centre as a 
combatant entity. Indeed, the use of animal names so offended some of Poso's 
Christians that they blacked out the names of these groups in copies of the terms of 
reference distributed in Tentena after the talks, replacing them with the generic 
description "community figures" .11 
an account of the battalion's activities in Maluku, see ICG, Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku, 
p. 11. 
9 These might refer to Brigade Hisbullah, the youth wing of the Islamist Crescent Star Party; Laskar Jihad 
Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah, the Java-based militia; Laskar Jundullah, the South Sulawesi based militia; 
Majelis Dzikir, a local group led by Kayamanya resident Habib Saleh al-Idrus; and Jamaah Tablig, a non-
violent salafist group originating from India. 
10 The animal names are drawn from press coverage, although Christian combatant groups may have used 
some of these names during the May-June 2000 violence. Ansimar (Angkatan Muda Sintuwu Maroso) 
was founded in December 2000, but the organisation's precise structure and activities remain little 
understood. The Krisis Center presumably refers to the GKST Crisis Centre. Although this church-
associated body accepted Christian combatants as its members, there is not currently evidence that the 
body itself engaged in activities beyond providing assistance to displaced Christians and publishing 
partisan reports on the violence in Poso (See Chapter Three). 
11 Indicative of the indignation the document spurred, a Tentena resident who was reputedly among the 
leaders of the May-June 2000 violence recalled that he said, "Are we going to be put in pens when we 
arrive [at the talks]? These are groups of animals!" RinaldyDamanik, one of the Christian delegates at 
the Malino talks, suggested in his prison memoir that the government groupings were based on a military 
intelligence assessment from the Wirabuana Military Command. He also noted the offence the document 
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Each delegation to the Malino talks in fact was much larger than the government had 
anticipated: 25 Muslims and 23 Christians took part.12 Moreover, many of these 
delegates were not as directly involved in the conflict as Kalla and the government 
might have hoped. At least a third of Christian delegates and a quarter of Muslim 
representatives had little or no direct authority over combatants. 13 Indeed, one local 
Muslim combatant characterised the Malino signatories as "government people", and 
said few people in his community even recognised the names of all of the delegates. 14 
Another Muslim man said that although Kalla had indicated that he wanted to involve 
parties directly involved in the conflict, combatants themselves were mere spectators 
while "Palu people" took part in the talks. 15 The government's poor understanding of 
combatant groups notwithstanding, most of any fault for the choice of delegates lay 
with each community. Both Muslims and Christians chose their own representatives 
largely independently of the government: Christians chose theirs at a meeting m 
Tentena, whereas Muslims only finalised their delegation after a large group of 
potential signatories all travelled to Makassar. 16 
Because the identity of the delegates to the Malino talks had an important influence on 
the legitimacy of the accord, it is necessary to look more closely at the different 
categories of people in each delegation. A few members of the Muslim delegation did 
have direct links to violence in Poso. For instance, Adnan Arsal became the most 
prominent local Muslim figure during the Poso conflict and was described in a jihadist 
publication as "Commander of the Poso Mujahidin"; 17 the area around Arsal's 
pesantren in Tanah Runtuh sub-ward was also a key centre of outside mujahidin activity 
in the district. Another delegate, Jono Priyandi, who was described in the accord 
document as a "religious figure", was arrested two weeks after the talks in connection 
caused in Tentena. Interview with a Tentena resident, February 2002; Damanik, Tragedi Kemanusiaan 
Paso, pp. 90-91. 
12 Damanik indicated that Christians requested an enlarged delegation during their 14 December 2001 
meeting with Kalla. See Damanik, Tragedi Kemanusiaan Paso, p. 91. 
13 An interesting topic for further research would be whether the legitimacy of those delegates who did 
have more direct relationships with rank-and-file combatants was adversely affected by their participation 
in the talks. Unfortunately I do not have the data to make this judgement. 
14 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
15 Interview with a Poso man, July 2007. 
16 Interview with S. Pelima, January 2002; interview with Paulus Tungkanan, February 2002; Lasahido et 
al., Suara dari Paso, pp. 72-74; Damanik, Tragedi Kemanusiaan Paso, pp. 91-92. 
17 See "Adnan Arsal (Panglima Mujahidin Poso): 'Mereka Mau menang Sendiri'", BUNYAN, January 
2002, p. 22. Local combatants also described Arsal as a "panglima" (commander); Arsal, however, 
denied that his actions merited this title in my interviews with him. 
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with bomb explosions outside four churches in Palu. 18 Agus Dwikama - the leader of 
Makassar-based Laskar Jundullah, who had been involved in the group's jihadist 
activities in both Poso and Maluku- did not take part in the Malino talks proper, but 
reportedly played a prominent role in an internal meeting of Muslim delegates in 
Makassar immediately prior to the talks.19 Other men - for example, Daeng Raja and 
Habib Saleh al-Idrus -had direct links to the violence, but arguably had been more 
important figures before outside mujahidin arrived in Poso. The inclusion of Al-Idrus 
did fit with the terms of reference, however, as he was head of the Majelis Dzikir, one 
of the groups the government had targeted to participate in the talks. 
Several Muslim delegates lived in Palu rather than Poso, but had direct contact with 
mujahidin groups. These men included H. Hasanuddin, treasurer of Dewan Dakwah in 
Central Sulawesi, 20 and Srie Handono Masudi, a civil servant who in 2002 became 
secretary of a committee to establish a new pesantren near Palu to replace the 
Walisongo school. Another delegate, businessman Ahrul Hudaya, had acted as a 
guarantor for an outside mujahid imprisoned in Palu to take part in a work release 
program, and had also provided free accommodation in his hotel in Palu in July 2001 
for the initial Laskar Jihad assessment team in Central Sulawesi.21 
Many of the other Muslim delegates were Palu-based figures who had often made 
comments in the provincial press regarding the Poso conflict, but who had less obvious 
direct links to violence in the district. These men included university lecturers Sulaiman 
Mamar and Sofyan Lemba, the provincial politician Nawawi S. Kilat, lawyer Tajwin 
18 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, pp. 16-17. Priyandi was also interrogated in connection with the 2002 
arrest of an outside mujahid, Farihin lbnu Ahmad, who was found carrying several thousand rounds of 
ammunition at the Palu port. Priyandi told interrogators he had visited Farihin several times in 2001 when 
Farihin was serving a sentence in the Maesa prison in Palu, but asserted that he had no particular 
connection with him. See deposition of Jono Priyandi in dossier of Farihin Ibnu Ahmad, 22 October 
2002, pp. 2-3. 
19 Lasahido et al., Suara dari Paso, p. 74. For a profile ofDwikama, see ICG, Indonesia Backgrounder: 
How the Jemaah Jslamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, p. 31. 
20 The deposition from which this biographical detail is sourced (see next footnote) does not specify 
whether "Dewan Dakwah" refers to Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Islamic Propagation Council of 
Indonesia). 
21 All three of these men are questioned in the 2002 interrogation dossier ofFarihin Ibnu Ahmad, which 
was compiled to support Farihin 's prosecution for possession of several thousand rounds of ammunition. 
See deposition ofSrie Handono Mashudi, 21 October 2002, deposition of Hi. Hasanuddin, 22 October 
2002, deposition of Achrul Udaya, 25 October 2002, all in dossier ofFarihin Ibnu Ahmad. On Achrul 
Hudaya (also seen as Achrul Udaya dan Ahrul Hidayat) and Laskar Jihad, see "Laskar Jihad Datang, 
Kristen Resah", laskarjihad.or.id, 5 August 2001. On Ahrul Hudaya acting as a guarantor for work 
release, see deposition ofFarihin Ibnu Ahmad in dossier of Muhammad Islam alias learn, 5 October 
2002, p. 3. 
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Ibrahim and religious figures Djamaluddin Hadi and Yahya Al-Amri.22 One of these 
men, lecturer Sulaiman Mamar, was chosen as head of the Muslim delegation to the 
Malino talks. 
Among the Christian delegates, Rev. Rinaldy Damanik had emerged during the conflict 
as the most prominent Christian religious figure in Poso, first as coordinator of the 
GKST Crisis Center and later as head of the GKST Synod. Damanik had also publicly 
read out "Lateka' s mandate" in June 2000, a letter that justified and set out the rationale 
for attacks on Muslims during the third period violence (see Chapter Three). Another 
Christian signatory, D. A. Lempadeli was one of the sixteen Protestant men named by 
important kelompok merah leader Fabianus Tibo and his co-defendants towards the 
conclusion of their trial as the most responsible for the conflict. Both Damanik and 
Lempadeli were appropriate choices as delegates. J. Santo and P. Tonimba were each 
members of the Christian group that had attempted to hold a protest at the district 
legislature building the day before the July 2001 Buyung Katedo massacre (see Chapter 
Four); some local Muslims had thus concluded that the two men must have been 
involved in the massacre, and they may have been suitable delegates under the terms of 
reference as a result. The selection of other Christian delegates was more questionable. 
Most notably, more than a third of the delegation were church representatives, including 
at least five GKST members apart from Damanik, two delegates from the South 
Sulawesi church and a Catholic clergyman from Tentena.23 
However indirect the connection between many of the delegates and the violence may 
have been, there was nonetheless significant enmity between the two groups, not least 
because one of the Palu-based Muslim delegates had placed a price on the head of 
Rinaldy Damanik through the Palu press. 24 The timetable for the Malino negotiations 
22 An account ofthe Malino talks compiled by Palu-based academics and journalists suggested that 
Sofyan Lembah set as a condition for his own participation that Hadi, Kilat and Mamar also be invited. 
See Lasahido et al., Suara dari Paso, p. 72. Ibrahim is a Palu-based lawyer who at the time was head of 
the Muslim Paralegal Association (Serikat Paralegal Muslim - SPM), while Al-Amri was a cleric at Al-
Khairaat in Palu. A group of men calling themselves Laskar Jihad Al-Khairaat did travel to Poso during 
the May-June 2000 violence, but the men turned around and returned to Palu before reaching Poso city 
when their leader, Abu Jihad, was shot in the head in Tokorondo village (See Chapter Three). 
23 Of the GKST members, Nelly Tan Alamako, may have been an appropriate choice as a delegate, as her 
church was in Sepe village, a reputed Christian stronghold in Lage sub-district. One of the other church 
delegates, Sawerigading Pelima, was in fact a Palu-based civil servant, although he was later elected 
chairperson of the Poso district legislature for the 2004-2009 period. 
24 Sofyan Lembah offered Rp. 5 million for the capture- alive- ofDamanik, or Rp 10 million for any 
cleric in Central Sulawesi who would issue ajatwa (non-binding religious advice) decreeing the death 
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sought to work around such enmity by keeping the two groups separate from each other 
until a plenary session which would be held on the second day of talks. Each group was 
accommodated in separate hotels in Makassar; when they arrived in Malino on 19 
December, each delegation held separate meetings with government mediators. 25 
Keeping the two groups separate may have been an effective strategy to ensure that the 
talks produced an agreement document, but this strategy came at a cost of severely 
limiting the opportunities for dialogue between the two parties. 
In their meetings with government mediators on 19 December and in other internal 
meetings, each group drew up separate lists of demands. These demands did not centre 
on readily quantifiable issues - for example, control of a particular village, the right to 
form a district or the release of certain prisoners - that could have been subject to 
genuine negotiations. Instead, each list of demands indicated the grievances of each 
group without providing a clear basis for concrete action to address these grievances. 
Christians asked that the security forces prevent lawless actions by outside groups in 
Poso (but stopped short of demanding explicitly that members of these groups be sent 
home), provide better overall security and take action to retrieve factory standard 
weapons. They also called for attention to displaced populations and to economic 
recovery, for "balance" in the selection of senior district officials, a "responsible" 
district head and an end to inflammatory sermons and statements from religious 
figures.26 The Muslim delegation's demands were very similar: an end to (perceived) 
foreign intervention (the equivalent of the Christian demand regarding outsider groups), 
an end to slander on the part of the GKST, better law enforcement, the return of 
Muslims' rights and an assertion that all Indonesians had the right to live in Poso. If 
these demands were not met, the delegation said, Muslims were prepared to wage a 
jihad.27 The lack of quantifiable demands was not the result of insincerity- the form of 
each delegation's demands reflected the fact that there were no simple key issues 
underpinning the fighting. The superficial similarity of the two delegations' positions 
penalty for Damanik See "Kepala Damanik Dihargai Rp 5 Juta", Radar Sulteng, date not recorded (but 
late 2001). 
25 Lasahido et al., Suara dari Poso, pp. 74-77. 
26 "Rangkuman Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Masyarakat Poso Dalam Hal Ini Warga Kristiani Sebagai Saran 
Dalam Upaya Menyusun Format Penyelesaian Konflik Poso Sisampaikan Pada Pertemuan di Malino-
Sulawesi Selatan Tanggall8-20 Desember 2001" (signed by J. Santo and P. Tonimba) reproduced in 
Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Tana Poso, Hasil Pertemuan Malina- Sulawesi Selatan 18-20 December 
2001 (Bahan Sosialisasi), nd. 
27 The nine-point list of Muslim demands is reproduced in Lasahido et al., Suara dari Poso, pp. 75-76 and 
Damanik, Tragedi Kemanusiaan Poso, pp. 82-83. 
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may have facilitated the drafting of an accord that each group could sign, but in fact 
indicated how far apart the two delegations were. Each side sought to position itself 
solely as the victims of violence and unjust treatment, when in fact both had acted as 
aggressors at different times during the conflict. 
The two delegations did little to bridge the gulf between them during the plenary 
session on 20 December 2001. Christians spoke first and asked for forgiveness, but 
undermined this apology by stating that they also forgave Muslims for their 
wrongdoings. 28 (Such "forgiveness" was most likely intended to emphasise that 
Muslims had also perpetrated violence.) The Muslim delegation also started with an 
apology, which they described as their religious obligation. Subsequently, by one 
account, several Muslim delegates described the violence that had taken place against 
their co-religionists, as well as the principles of jihad. By this same account, Kalla 
hardly acted with the requisite sensitivity to foster dialogue between the two 
delegations. After the Muslim presentations, he remarked, "I agree, if Christians start it 
[i.e. violence after the talks], Muslims should feel free to declare a jihad fisabilillah. 29 
How about the Christians, if Muslims start it will you wage a crusade (perang salib )?" 
Kalla's question was met with silence, but the meeting moved on nonetheless and a few 
of the delegates drew up the text of the ten point Malino Declaration. 30 
MALINO DECLARATION FOR POSO 
(preamble and concluding remarks abridged) 
With God's mercy, we, the representatives of the Muslim and Christian communities of 
Poso .... agree: 
1. To stop all forms of conflict and dispute 
2. To obey all forms and efforts of law enforcement and to support legal sanction 
against any offenders 
3. To request that the state apparatus take firm and just action to maintain security 
4. To maintain the creation of a peaceful atmosphere, to reject the enforcement of a civil 
emergency, as well as to reject interference by foreign parties 
5. To dispense with all slander and dishonesty directed at any party and to uphold a 
stance of mutual respect and mutual forgiveness, for the sake of living together in 
harmony 
6. The Land of Po so (Tana Po so) is an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia. As 
such, every citizen has the right to live, arrive and reside peacefully and respect local 
customs. 
28 In offering an apology, the Christian delegation had also sought prior assurances from the government 
mediators that Muslims would also apologise. 
29 Jihad fisabi/illah -jihad in the path of God with death leading to martyrdom. See Chapter Four, 
footnote 67. 
30 Details of the talks in this paragraph drawn from Lashido et al., Suara dari Paso, p. 79-80. 
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7. All rights and property must be returned to their rightful owners, in accordance with 
the situation before the conflict and disputes 
8. To return all IDPs to their original place of residence 
9. Together with the government, to comprehensively rehabilitate economic 
infrastructure 
10. To implement the respective laws of each of our religions guided by the principle of 
mutual respect, and to obey all the regulations that have been agreed upon, be they 
legislation, government regulations or other stipulations. 
We state our agreement on these matters sincerely and with genuine intention of 
implementing them. 
Drafted in: Malino 
Date: 20 December 2001 
A timetable was also agreed upon for several follow-up programs in Poso. 
"Socialisation" efforts would commence almost immediately after the agreement to 
inform communities of the outcome of the talks and make them aware of follow-up 
programs. A period where weapons could be handed over without penalties for their 
owners was set for 7 January - 7 February 2002.31 This period would be followed 
immediately by a five month law enforcement operation, as well as a one month period 
during which migrants without appropriate documentation to live in Poso could 
voluntarily depart.32 Infrastructure and housing reconstruction, resettlement of displaced 
persons and compensation payments to the families of those killed were each set to start 
in January or February 2002.33 
Despite all of the problems inherent in the process - in particular the failure to involve 
direct representatives of all combatants, and the lack of dialogue during the talks, 
meaning that many difficult issues were not addressed - the accord did bring about some 
significant short-term improvements in the atmosphere in Poso. The positive symbolism 
of the agreement - including what became an iconic image of Rinaldy Damanik and 
Sofyan Lemba holding hands - generated a degree of goodwill around the district. 34 
Reinforcing this positive symbolism, some of the signatories, whose local prestige now 
depended largely on the success and continuing relevance of the accord, spoke 
31 Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare, Report on Paso Conflict Reconciliation (report 1), 
(Jakarta: Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare, 2003), p. 24. 
32 Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare, Report on Paso Conflict Reconciliation (report 1), pp. 25-
26. 
33 Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare, Report on Paso Conflict Reconciliation (report 1), p. 96. 
34 The image is not without its problems. Damanik is pictured with a beaming smile, but Lemba's 
expression is somewhat less enthusiastic. Moreover, many community members in Poso would not 
readily have recognised Lemba, who lived in Palu. Whether for these reasons or because of other artistic 
considerations, the image often appeared as a silhouette on posters promoting peace in Poso after the 
accord. Image reproduced in "Deklarasi Malino, Riwayatmu Kini", Media Sangkompo, October 2002, pp. 
13-14 and Damanik, Tragedi Paso, p. 88. 
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enthusiastically of what had been achieved in Malino. The agreement also provided 
combatants with a formal avenue to cease violence: they could commit to the agreement 
rather than continue to fight. 
The improvement in atmosphere produced some concrete results. Security in Poso was 
much-improved during the period after the talks: a bombing in Palu and a beating in 
Poso notwithstanding, there was only one fatal incident in the first four months after the 
talks. As a consequence of the safer situation, some roads that had been effectively 
Image 1: Rinaldy Damanik and Sofyan Lemba, Malino Talks, December 2001 35 
closed to one or the other religious group could now be used by all. 36 The lessening of 
tensions also opened a space for non-government organisations to begin peace-building 
activities such as community discussions to discourage community members from 
taking part in future clashes and to attempt to re-establish interaction between different 
religious groups. The central government sought to consolidate the short-term 
improvements by channelling large sums of assistance to Poso for post-conflict 
reconstruction: the initial post-Malino budget commitment alone included almost Rp 2 
35 Image reproduced from Media Sangkompo, October 2002, p. 14. 
36 I am not sure of the exact process for the "opening" of a road, although I would guess that the police or 
military escorted the first vehicles through after which others began to follow. As one example of a road 
opening, Muslims had been afraid to use the inland road from Poso to Ampana, which passed through 
Sepe village, and instead used a badly damaged coastal road. They started to use the inland road again in 
the weeks after the accord was signed. 
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billion (approximately $300,000) just for socialisation and coordination, Rp 24.5 billion 
for housing reconstruction, Rp 11 billion for IDP relief programs and compensation 
payments, Rp 3 billion to rebuild places of worship and almost Rp 2 billion for 
education and health. 37 The government subsequently allocated many times this initial 
amount for further reconstruction and social rehabilitation programs in Poso. 
In the longer term, however, the agreement was undermined by the failure of the 
government and each community to ensure that all key combatant groups were 
represented at the talks. Even during the period of much improved security following 
the signing of the Malino Declaration, it was readily apparent that some combatant 
groups were disappointed that an agreement had been reached, or at the very least that 
they expected that violence in Poso would eventually resume. Of the groups excluded 
from the talks or represented only indirectly, the outside mujahidin from Java and 
Sumatra were the most significant. Among these groups, ICG indicates that Jemaah 
Islamiyah as an organisation were happy with the Malino Declaration, as its leaders 
perceived that more peaceful conditions in Poso could be more conducive to 
proselytising than continued conflict.38 The commentary on the accord in the 
publications of jihadist networks, however, made it clear that some members of these 
networks were rather less happy with the settlement. For instance, reflecting the fact 
that the talks were convened at a point when Muslims had established a clear military 
advantage over the district's Christians, the now defunct jihadist website mubarizin.net 
described the post-Malino period as "A new episode [for Poso's Muslims] as a player 
who is forced into a draw, when he had previously almost won."39 In another example, 
Malino Declaration signatory Adnan Arsal, in an interview with BUNYAN conducted 
immediately before the Malino talks but published in January 2002, asserted that Poso's 
Christians had often betrayed previous agreements, and that it would be better if 
residential settlements were no longer mixed. He concluded with the following remark, 
which does not give the impression that he felt the conflict was drawing to a close: 
37 Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare, Report on Poso Conflict Reconciliation (report 1), pp.45-
46. 
38 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, pp. 14-15. 
39 The item's author then asserted that the lesson Poso's Muslims could take from the conflict was that the 
best way to earn respect was through jihad. The research report of a Y ogyakarta-based NGO quoted a 
local Muslim man expressing similar sentiments to those of the Mubarizin article: "Before we had won, 
they asked for peace." See mubarizin.net dated 13 January 2002, accessed via www.waybackmachine.org 
on 16 June 2007; La Ode Arham et al, Laporan Investigasi Sosial: Live in Paso (Yogyakarta, Komunitas 
Tikar Pandan, 2002), p. 15. 
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My message to members of the Muslim community, wherever they may be, is that we are 
caught between strong enemies who are helping each other to break our struggle. We can 
often win battles, but then lose the war. It is bitter ... but this is our situation, and we must 
foster ta 'awun (Muslim solidarity) and be more patient. Don't forget us in your prayers, 
information and help. If you do, there may be no Muslims left in Poso.40 
The statistics on weapons collected immediately after the accord was signed provide a 
general picture of community expectations regarding the possibility of further violence. 
Among the several thousand weapons collected under the follow-up program to the 
talks, there was only one factory-standard firearm.41 More expensive to obtain and more 
reliably lethal than homemade firearms, these factory-standard guns were seemingly 
still needed by their owners. 
This dissatisfaction with the Declaration and uncertainty as to whether the agreement 
would hold did not immediately result in renewed large-scale violence. There were 
several impediments that discouraged those dissatisfied with the Declaration from 
immediately perpetrating further violence. The increased goodwill between 
communities was one impediment. There also appeared to be a reluctance among some 
combatants for their community to be the first to strike after Malino, and thereby be 
perceived to have betrayed the agreement.42 Perhaps the most significant impediment, 
however, was the swathe of new security measures introduced by the central 
government to coincide with the accord, including the deployment of 4, 100 police and 
military in the district in early 2002. The next section will discuss the impact of these 
security measures on the pattern of violence in Poso after Malino. In particular, I will 
seek to explain how violence could again escalate in Poso in August 2002 - a mere 
eight months after the Malino Declaration- despite these security measures. 
40 Given the general phrasing of much of this comment, which contrasts with the Poso-specific content of 
the interview, it is possible that this passage was added to embellish the interview. Even if this was the 
case, however, the comment reflects the message the magazine wished to convey regarding Poso. See 
"Adnan Arsal (Panglima Mujahidin Poso): 'Mereka Mau Menang Sendiri"', BUNYAN, January 2002, p. 
22. 
41 For a list of the weapons collected, see Damanik, Tragedi Kemanusiaan Paso, p. 127. Damanik and 
Human Rights Watch each quote a figure of39,000 weapons handed in, but most of the "weapons" on the 
list are ammunition or arrows. The one factory-standard weapon was reportedly an SS-1 rifle, Human 
Rights Watch asserts it was found under a bridge. See Human Rights Watch, Breakdown: Four Years of 
Communal Violence in Central Sulawesi, p. 31; Harley, Penembakan Misterius, Kekerasan di Paso: Ada 
Korupsi di Balik Berbagai Proyek Kemanusiaan, unpublished manuscript, no date. 
42 Christians may have been additionally constrained by the calculation that they would lose in any 
renewed fighting. 
195 
Security after the Malino Talks 
The massive security force deployment that accompanied the Malino Declaration may 
have initially convinced those intent on perpetrating further violence in Poso to lie low. 
The death toll in the immediate aftermath of the Declaration suggests as much, with 
only one fatality in the first four months of 2002, although two more people were then 
killed in May. But by mid-2002, it had become clear that the central government was 
not devoting the sustained attention to Poso that may have made its security 
intervention a comprehensive success. Programs that could have weakened the military 
capacity of combatant groups were not thoroughly implemented, and few of the 
incidents of violence that did occur were properly investigated. As the perpetrators of 
violence became more sure of the limits of the action security forces would take against 
them, the number and seriousness of sporadic incidents of violence in Poso gradually 
increased in June and July. After the security forces took no stem action in response to 
these disturbances, violence escalated further in August 2002 and reached an intensity 
and scale similar to the major periods of fighting in 2001. 
The rhetoric of senior government officials in December 2001 gave the impression that 
a crackdown on perpetrators of violence in Poso was imminent. On 12 December, the 
head of Indonesia's State Intelligence Agency (BIN - Badan Intelijen Negara), 
Hendropriyono, told the press that Poso had become a site for "international terrorists 
and domestic [Islamic] radical groups" to link up, and that "a training camp used twice 
by al Qaeda members from Spain" had been found in the district.43 Hendropriyono's 
statements were met with great public scepticism, even from members of the security 
forces and the government. The provincial police chief in Central Sulawesi, for 
instance, all but contradicted the intelligence chief, saying that he personally had turned 
the area upside down in a search for the camps, but had found nothing.44 The 
Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
also immediately qualified the BIN chief's remarks, saying the government was still in 
43 Hendropriyono's statements appear to have been based on a Spanish judge's description of the 
interrogation depositions of captured al Qaeda members; his remarks also came after several senior US 
officials had commented on the importance of combating terrorism in Indonesia. See "Kepala BIN 
Hendropriyono: Poso Jadi Ajang 'Link-Up' Teroris", Kompas, 13 December 2001; "Sidang Kabinet: 
Sedang Diteliti, Keberadaan Jaringan Terorisme di Poso", Kompas, 14 December 2001. On the comments 
by U.S. officials, see van Klinken, Small Town Wars, p. 86; Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad, p. 214. 
44 
"Kapolda Sulteng Belum Temukan Keterlibatan Al Qaidah", tempointeraktif.com, 14 December 2001. 
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the process of confirming this "intelligence information".45 Nevertheless, Yudhoyono 
made it clear that the government was ramping up its security efforts in Poso, as he 
announced a multi-part conflict resolution effort including reconciliation, social 
rehabilitation, security restoration and law enforcement components. The latter two 
components would include efforts to repatriate "outside groups from Poso" and to 
disarm the parties to the conflict, both measures that might have been intended to 
specifically target outside mujahidin.46 
The government began to implement its repatriation and disarmament measures after 
the Malino Declaration was signed, as both measures were included in the work plan 
associated with the Declaration. Despite Hendropriyono' s statement, there does not 
appear to have been concerted central government pressure to make either measure a 
success, as discussed below. There could have been several reasons for the 
government's failure to firmly implement these measures: they may have feared that 
stem action against outside mujahidin would anger Muslims in Poso and undermine the 
apparent initial success of the Malino talks; they may not have appreciated that outside 
mujahidin were continuing to work with local Muslims to prepare for violence even 
after Malino; it also simply may have been that Poso district did not remain the focus of 
attention once the Malino Declaration was signed, particularly as the central 
government had commenced new efforts to broker peace in Maluku province by early 
2002.47 I have already discussed the poor implementation of the weapons collection 
program, in which only one factory-standard firearm was recovered.48 The repatriation 
of outsiders was even less well implemented. Under the Malino work plan, repatriation 
was initially to be achieved by a one month voluntary departure period from 7 February 
- 7 March 2002 for those without valid permission to reside in Poso. The spokesperson 
for the provincial police, Agus Sugianto, threatened that those found in Poso without a 
"clear aim" after this period would be subject to Article 505 and 515 of the Criminal 
45 "Sidang Kabinet: Sedang Diteliti, Keberadaan Jaringan Terorisme di Poso", Kompas, 14 December 
2001. 
46 "Kepala BIN Hendropriyono: Poso Jadi Ajang 'Link-Up' Teroris", Kompas, 13 December 2001; 
"Menko Polkam Ungkapkan Rencana Pelucutan Senjata di Poso", kopitime.com, 13 December 2001. 
47 The central government brokered a round of peace talks for Maluku in Malino in February 2002. 
48 A police document faxed to me by the Central Sulawesi Provincial Police in 2004 indicates that only 
six factory-standard firearms had been recovered in Poso between December 1998 and 31 January 2003, 
compared to 1,751 homemade guns. The first major seizure of factory-standard weapons in Poso took 
place when seven factory-standard guns were recovered in police operations after major attacks in 
October 2003. The next major cache of factory-standard firearms was not recovered until two police raids 
in January 2007. See Sangaji, Peredaran Ilegal Senjata Api di Sulawesi Tengah, p. 45; ICG, Jihadism in 
Indonesia: Paso on the Edge, p. 17. 
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Code.49 Anyone who read the text of the two articles would have seen that Sugianto's 
statement was a particularly empty threat. Article 505 stipulates a few months 
imprisonment for vagrants who do not have a job; by contrast, outside mujahidin were 
able to live with local residents in Po so, and many of them also engaged in petty trades 
while in the district. Article 515 potentially was more readily applicable, threatening 
penalties against persons who had moved residence without informing authorities in 
either their place of origin or their destination. Outside mujahidin were unlikely to have 
attended to all of the bureaucratic requirements of moving to Poso, but the penalties 
under this article were extremely light: a maximum of six days imprisonment or a fine 
not exceeding Rp 750 (approximately ten cents), less than the cost of a single bullet. 5° 
Moreover, in reality, Article 515 was completely unenforceable. Anyone could obtain a 
local identity card from corrupt or sympathetic local officials, who would readily issue a 
card in any name for a small fee. Many outside mujahidin in Poso in fact had several 
different identity cards. The ease of obtaining an identity card was widely known, and 
whoever formulated the Malino work plan could not have been ignorant of this practice. 
In addition, Point 6 of the main text of the Malino accord - "every citizen has the right 
to live, arrive and reside peacefully and respect local customs" - appeared to affirm the 
right of outside mujahidin to remain in Poso. Iu light of the weak formulation of the 
repatriation provision, and the equivocal stance of the main text of the accord regarding 
the right of outsiders to remain in Poso, I believe it is unlikely that anyone genuinely 
expected that the provision to remove outsiders could be enforced. 
Given that the failure of weapons collection and repatriation programs had left the 
military capacity of Poso's Muslims undiminished, the main restriction on violence in 
early 2002 was the sheer number of security forces personnel deployed in the district. 
The Sintuwu Maroso I operation, which ran from 1 January - 31 July 2002, involved 
more than 4,000 police and soldiers, with many of these personnel placed in guard posts 
along the main road in each village in the district. These guard posts made it more 
difficult for crowds to gather and clash; the presence of so many security forces 
49 "Psikolog Periksa Aparat Keamanan di Poso", tempointeraktif.com, 25 February 2002. Both articles are 
explicitly cited in the Malino work plan. 
50 Most fines in the Indonesian Criminal Code have not been updated to account for inflation, and as such 
are comically small. 
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personnel may also have convinced those intent on perpetrating violence that it would 
be prudent to lie low in the short term while waiting for the deployment to be reduced. 
Once sporadic individual shootings and bombings resumed, however, it quickly became 
evident that the guard posts were not well placed to prevent these incidents, apprehend 
the perpetrators or even to subsequently investigate each attack. When a Christian man 
was shot dead near Malei village in Lage-subdistrict on 16 January 2002, for instance, 
the police did not identify or arrest the perpetrators. The murder of two Christian men in 
Poso Pesisir sub-district in mid-May was also not successfully investigated. These 
murders were followed by the bombing of a bus plying the Palu-Tentena route on 5 
June, in which four people were killed, and a murder in Kayamanya four days later.51 
Indeed, some observers questioned whether the security forces had any interest in 
preventing these attacks, given the financial rewards units deployed in Poso could reap 
from illegal businesses and ·security payments. 52 Whether or not such suspicions were 
justified, the failure of the security forces to take action over these incidents must have 
emboldened the perpetrators. 
Although jihadist networks perpetrated little violence in Poso during the early months 
of 2002, they nevertheless continued to try to consolidate their support base and build 
the military capacity of Poso' s Muslims. Both Laskar Jihad and JI/Mujahidin Kompak 
established anti-vice (anti-maksiat) squads in Poso shortly after Malino. Laskar Jihad 
called its squad Satgas Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Mungkar (Embracing Virtue and Rejecting 
Vice Task Force), whereas JI/Mujahidin Kompak called its unit Satgas Khoirul Umah.53 
Most of the members of each squad were local men. 54 The squads beat those whom they 
found drinking or gambling, and they were a crude instrument to "promote" the moral 
standards outside mujahidin demanded. The beatings had an ironic side to them, 
51 An anonymous list titled "Pelanggaran Terhadap Deklarasi Malino untuk Poso", the copy of which in 
my possession was faxed from a number in Tentena, indicates that one suspect was arrested for the 
murder in Kayamanya. 
52 On the fmancial opportunities in Poso for the police and military, see Sangaji, "The Security Forces 
and Regional Violence in Poso", pp. 276-279. 
53 ICG, Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, p. 4, interview with former senior member of Satgas 
Khoirul U mah, July 2007. 
54 One local combatant who fought with Laskar Jihad asserted that all locals recruited by Laskar Jihad 
became members ofSatgas Amar Ma'rufNahi Mungkar rather than Laskar Jihad members per se, which 
would imply that the task force has a broader set of activities than just moral policing. Unfortunately, I do 
not have sufficient comparative information to judge the validity of this account. Interview with a Poso 
man, July 2007. 
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however, given that many of the task-force members themselves had an all too recent 
background in petty thuggery and "vice".55 
Outside mujahidin in Poso also continued to help local Muslims organise for violence, 
despite the apparent efforts to repatriate them and the heavy deployment of police and 
soldiers. ICG reported that Jemaah Islamiyah set up a "special forces" unit in Poso 
called the "Team ofTen" (Tim Sepuluh) in early 2002, although the unit was disbanded 
after only a few months.56 Kompak followed JI's lead, according to same report, setting 
up its own local special forces team in August 2002.57 
With the security forces not making a concerted attempt to prevent violence, and some 
of the district's residents still intent on perpetrating attacks, it is not surprising that 
violence eventually escalated to a level similar to the clashes in late-2001. This 
escalation took place in August 2002 and lasted for approximately two weeks, during 
which at least 14 people were killed. Each of the attacks that targeted villages during 
this period were perpetrated by Muslims, but Christians also murdered several 
individuals and ambushed several buses as they passed through Christian territory. The 
largest attack during this period was the 12 August attack on Silanca village, one of the 
last Christian strongholds in the district that had not been attacked and burned after the 
May-June 2000 violence. Five Christian villagers were killed in the attack, and an 
estimated 400 houses were burned. Contemporary press reports suggest that both 
Muslim and Christian residents re-established guard posts and road-blocks around the 
district in response to this violence, and maintained these road blocks for some weeks 
after the violence ended. 
The first man killed in August 2002 was Sukiman, a Muslim resident of Tegalrejo ward, 
who was found beheaded on 3 August after he had been missing for several days. Police 
55 For instance, Yusman Said alias Budi, arrested in connection with a February 2006 armed robbery, 
gave the following description of what he termed the Tanah Runtuh group: "The Tanah Runtuh mujahidin 
group was established a fair while ago. The members I know of are I pong, Bojel, Yusuf, Basri, and their 
activities are conducting roving operations to beat up people who they find drinking alcohol, gambling or 
engaging in other forms of vice (maksiat)." Among these men, Ipong is renowned to have had a 
premanistic background, whereas Basri told interviewers after his arrest that he continued to drink 
regularly during the conflict. It is possible his remarks were tongue-in-cheek. See Interrogation deposition 
ofYusman Said alias Budi in interrogation dossier ofOpo alias Ustad Aan, 24 March 2006, p. 3. 
Coincidentally Budi is the brother of Dedi and Didi, the twins imprisoned for faking injuries in the early 
moments of the second phase of the conflict. 
56 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 18. 
57 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 19; 
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did not identify the perpetrators, but ICG suggests that Sukiman was killed by co-
religionists after being mistaken for a Christian.58 Next, before dawn on 4 August, a 
crowd of Muslims attacked Matako village in Tojo sub-district, approximately twenty 
kilometres east of the city. Two churches were burned, seven villagers were injured, and 
dozens of houses were burned. 59 Contemporary press reports noted that the village was 
a surprising target because its Christian and Muslim residents lived together in relative 
harmony (membaur). 60 But an outside mujahid said that the village was in fact attacked 
precisely because it was a symbol of peace (much as the Baku Bae market in Maluku, 
which served as a meeting point between Muslims and Christians, was burned down in 
renewed violence in the province in 200461 ): 
The Muslim community was disappointed in Muslims [in Matako] themselves, because 
they had engaged in what in Ambon would be called pel a gandong, brotherhood, brought 
together by the district head. There was a pilot project between Muslims and Christians, 
who had begun to establish one community together, whereas our friends with their 
uncontrolled idealism hated this arrangement, and so the village was attacked.62 
Adding further weight to the interpretation that Matako was attacked in order to make a 
point about peace, the attack on the village took place the morning after Malino 
signatories had held a meeting with provincial and district authorities in Palu. One of 
the Muslim signatories who attended the meeting, Sulaiman Mamar, subsequently told 
the press that the delegates had spoken of an improving situation in Poso, "but the 
reality out in the field [i.e. the Matako attack] has now told a different story".63 Whether 
by coincidence or design, the largest attack of the August 2002 violence also coincided 
with another Malino evaluation session held in Palu a week later on 11 and 12 August 
2002. 
58 See ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 29. The ICG account states that the perpetrators were returning 
from an attack on a Christian village. It is not clear what attack this might have been. 
59 "Panglima TNI Reran Masih Ada Kelompok Pendatang di Poso", Kompas, 30 August 2002; "Warna 
Sepia di Desa Matako", Media Sangkompo, December 2002, p. 18; "Serangan Fajar di Matako", 
LPSHAM Investigative Report, 4 August 2002. The Media Sangkompo account asserts that five villagers 
were killed, but this assertion is doubtful as it is not repeated in other accounts. 
60 "Teror dalam Selimut Damai Poso", Media Sangkompo, December 2002, p. 7; "Warna Sepia di Desa 
Matako", Media Sangkompo, December 2002, p. 18. 
61 See Abubakar Riri and Mashudi Noorsalim, "Peace Market", Inside Indonesia, 82, April-June 2005. 
62 Interview with a Mujahidin Kompak member, May 2004. The interviewee actually mentioned Malitu 
as the village attacked for these reasons, but other details of the interview lead me to believe he confused 
Malitu and Matako. For instance, he asserted that Malitu was attacked before Matako (the reverse is true) 
and had alsewhere confused the names of villages. 
63 "Deklarator Malino Mengutuk Penyerangan Desa Matako", Sinar Harapan, 6 August 2002. See also 
HRW, Breakdown, p.36. 
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On 6 August, two days after the Matako incident, Malitu and Betania (neighbouring 
Christian-populated villages in Poso Pesisir sub-district) were attacked. In all, 21 houses 
. were burned. 64 Then on 8 August, Muslim combatants based around Pendolo in the 
south of the district fired on a bus as it passed through nearby Mayoa village, killing an 
Italian tourist. The tourist was apparently deliberately targeted as a suspected foreign 
spy, although four other passengers also suffered gunshot wounds.65 In what appears to 
have been tit-for-tat retaliation, Christians stopped and attacked two buses on the next 
two days, in Taripa village in the south of the district on 9 August, and in the vicinity of 
Watuawu and Tambaro villages, not far south of the city, on 10 August. Different 
reports state that either two passengers were injured or one passenger was taken hostage 
in the latter attack; no information is available regarding the former. 66 
On 10 August, the violence continued in Lage sub-district, with a clash in the vicinity of 
Malei-Lage and Tongko villages, near the border of majority-Muslim and majority-
Christian areas. One Christian was killed. 67 Whether because of this clash or by chance, 
on the same day a crowd of Christians in nearby Silanca village stopped a motorcycle 
taxi ( ojek) carrying a Muslim paramilitary policeman (Brimob) and another passenger. 
The driver escaped and reported the incident to the police, but the policeman and the 
other passenger disappeared. Security forces tried to reach Silanca village on 12 August 
to look for the men (whom it was presumed had been murdered), but Christians blocked 
their path close to the southern fringes of the city in Ranononcu village. 68 
This abduction was the direct pretext for the largest incident during August 2002, 
namely the 12 August attack on Silanca village (neighbouring Sepe and Bategencu were 
also attacked as part of the same incident).69 Five Christians were killed, 400 houses 
were burned and thousands were forced to flee in what was another cooperative attack 
between outside mujahidin, local Muslims whom the mujahidin had trained, and a 
64 ''Turis Italia Tewas Ditembak, Ada Upaya Kobarkan Lagi Konflik Poso", Sinar Harapan, 10 August 
2002. 
65 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 13. 
66 See "Kekerasan Setelah Malino", Tempo, 25 August 2002; "Seorang Penumpang Bus Disandera 
Kristen Tambaro", laskarjihad.or.id, date not recorded; "Polri dan TNI Tambah 5.000 Personel ke Poso", 
tempointeraktif.com, 11 August 2002. 
67 "Kekerasan Setelah Malino", Tempo, 25 August 2002, pp. 34-35; "Teror Born di Kayamanya", 
LPSHAM report, 13 August 2002. 
68 "Poso Tegang: Sepe, Silanca dan Bategencu Diserang", LPSHAM report, 13 August 2002. 
69 In between the abduction and the Silanca attack, two more murders took place in the city on 11 August 
and a bus was stopped and burned in Tentena on 12 August, although the passengers escaped. "Kekerasan 
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crowd of hundreds of other Muslim men. A local Muslim villager who took part in the 
attack on Silanca indicated that Brimob personnel were present as Muslims were about 
to commence their attack. Angered by the death of their comrade, they gave Muslims 
the green light to attack the village where the culprits lived, the man said, telling the 
attackers only that they should not burn the church.70 Even given the clear link to the 
abduction, it is too simplistic to say that Muslims attacked Silanca as revenge for the 
disappearances. The reasons to take revenge on Silanca had roots earlier in the conflict: 
the village was one of the last specific targets of revenge for the May-June 2000 
violence that Muslims had not by then reached. 
The attack on Silanca (and indeed the previous attacks on Matako, Betania and Malitu) 
again underlined the military superiority that Muslims had established at this point of 
the conflict. Christians could do little to repel the attack on Silanca, and for a time that 
night reportedly feared that Muslims would continue further along the road and also 
attack Tagolu village. 71 Christians did retaliate for the attack on Silanca later in the 
night, however, by burning two mosques located in Christian-populated areas.72 On the 
same night, Muslims also burned a church in the city ward of Gebangrejo and 
reportedly also stopped traffic in the city to look for Christian passengers.73 
There were no further clashes in Poso immediately after these incidents, but Mayumba 
village in neighbouring Morowali district was attacked on 15 August. Three Christians 
were killed.74 
The escalation of violence in August 2002 did regam the central government's 
attention, with the national police chief promising to send more personnel to the district 
Setelah Malino", Tempo, 25 August 2002, pp. 34-35; "Poso Tegang: Sepe, Silanca dan Bategencu 
Diserang", LPSHAM report, 13 August 2002. 
70 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. Brimob's reported behaviour in Silanca in August 2002 appears 
similar to the actions of soldiers in the December 2001 Toyado abductions, who took revenge for the 
death of their platoon commander by handing over Muslims to local Christians to be murdered. The same 
pattern of behaviour was earlier evident in the October 2001 Mapane incident, when police fatally shot 
one local Muslim and tortured others as revenge for the death of one of their comrades (See Chapter Four 
for the 2001 incidents). 
71 "Poso Tegang: Sepe, Silanca dan Bategencu Diserang", LPSHAM report, 13 August 2002. 
72 One mosque was burned in Tentena, and different reports state the other was located either in 
Sintuwulemba or Ranononcu. "Poso Tegang: Sepe, Silanca dan Bategencu Diserang", LPSHAM report, 
13 August 2002. "Teror Born di Kayamanya", LPSHAM report, 13 August 2002; "TigaDesa Diserang, 
Poso Kembali Rusuh", Media Indonesia, 14 August 2002. 
73 "Poso Tegang: Sepe, Silanca dan Bategencu Diserang", LPSHAM report, 13 August 2002. 
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and Kalla labelling the violence the work of"outside terror"?5 But I have not found any 
reports of arrests after this violence. Despite the absence of an immediate stem 
response, the Sepe and Silanca and Mayumba attacks turned out to be the last attacks 
before a narrowing in the forms of violence in Poso. After these incidents, many local 
Muslim combatants became increasingly reluctant to continue to fight, and there were 
no further attacks perpetrated by crowds during the Poso conflict. The few subsequent 
attacks on villages were perpetrated by smaller teams of men, and most sporadic 
violence instead consisted of shootings, other murders and bombings. 
Nevertheless, it is worth emphasising that the August 2002 period of violence was by 
no means the end of conflict in Poso. In the remainder of 2002 alone, there were at least 
seven fatal shootings, which between them caused eight fatalities, as well as several 
bombings in Poso and Palu in which no-one was killed. 
The pattern of the decline of violence in Poso - an overall decline in conflict but with 
sporadic violent incidents persisting - requires us to examine the motivations of two 
different groups. First, in the following section, I will consider why many local Muslim 
combatants chose to stop fighting at some time after the August 2002 escalation of 
violence. Second, I will discuss the motivations of the local Muslim men and outside 
mujahidin who continued to perpetrate violence in Poso. 
After August 2002 - The De-escalation 
In the previous chapter, I described 2000-2001 as the "good times" for perpetrators of 
jihadist violence in Poso. Fatalities among Muslim ranks when Muslims were the 
aggressors were rare, there were few arrests, there was a strong perception that fighting 
was necessary and strong peer pressure to participate in attacks. By late 2002, however, 
many local Muslim combatants appear to have judged that the good times were coming 
to an end. There were several reasons. Many local Muslims perceived that the risk of 
arrest was beginning to increase in late 2002, or else were concerned that continued 
large-scale violence may lead the security forces to intervene more sternly in Poso. At 
74 Some reports say there were four fatalities. See "Kerusuhan Poso Merembet ke Morowali", 
satunet.com, 20 August 2002. 
75 See "Kapolri Akan Kerahkan Pasukan ke Poso", Pos Kupang, 13 August 2002; "Turis Italia Tewas 
Tertembak, Ada Upaya Kobarkan Lagi Konflik Poso," Sinar Harapan, 10 August 2002. Kalla's claim 
that the violence was the work of 'outside terror' was intended to make the point that the local 
communities were no longer fighting and, presumably, that the local reconciliation programme had 
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the same time, the decision of Christians to cease large-scale attacks in the face of the 
military advantage that the district's Muslims had established meant that fighting was 
no longer viewed as the necessity that it had been during 2001. Once fighting appeared 
a choice rather than a necessity, some local Muslim combatants and their communities 
preferred to try to re-establish a more routine life. 
In hindsight, few perpetrators of violence were apprehended in Poso during late 2002 
and 2003, but several developments may have contributed to an impression that the risk 
of arrest had increased. First, police did make some high-profile arrests in Poso. For 
instance, Rinaldy Damanik was taken into custody in Jakarta in September 2002 after 
police had found fourteen home-made guns in his vehicle on 17 August 2002 while he 
was assisting with the evacuation of Christian villagers from Peleru village in Morowali 
district. He was sentenced to three years in prison.76 Around a month after Damanik was 
taken into custody, outside mujahid Farihin Ibnu Ahmad was arrested in October 2002 
as he disembarked from a passenger ship at Pantoloan port in Palu. Police found several 
thousand rounds of ammunition intended for use in Poso in Farihin's luggage, and he 
received a two and a half years' sentence.77 Subsequently, in April 2003, Andi Ipong 
and Nanto Bojel were arrested in connection with an armed robbery in neighbouring 
Parigi-Moutung district in April 2003. Both men were local Muslims who had trained 
and fought with outside mujahidin; one of the men was sentenced to two and a half 
years' imprisonment, the other received a two year sentence. 78 
Second, the October 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali spurred a nation-wide manhunt for 
the perpetrators and conspirators. This man-hunt impacted on Central Sulawesi in a 
number of ways: several Jemaah Islamiyah members were arrested in Palu in April 
2003; the man who had led JI's presence in Poso until late 2002, Mustofa alias Pranata 
Yudha was arrested in Java on explosives charges in July 2003; Mustofa's replacement 
worked, Although he was correct to identifY a major role for the outsiders, local men were nonetheless 
significantly involved in the violence. 
76 
"Damanik Tetap Divonis Tiga Tahun", Radar Sulteng, 11 August 2003; J. F. Mona Saroinsong, 
"Resuma Proses Perjalanan Advokasi Kasus Pendeta Rinaldy Damanik, M.Si." in Rinaldy Damanik, 
Tragedi Kemanusiaan Paso: Menggapai Surya Pagi Melalui Kegelapan Malam, (Jakarta: PBHI; Palu: 
LPS-HAM Sulteng, 2003), pp. 268-282. 
77 Decision ofPalu District Court No. 90/ /Pid.B/2003/PN .PL in case of Farihin Ibnu Ahmad alias Yasir. 
78 "Dua Pelaku Penembakan Divonis", Radar Sulteng, 4 November 2003. For commentary on the overall 
pattern of arrests following the Malino Accord, see McRae, "Criminal Justice and Communal Conflict", 
pp. 111-112. Ipong was re-arrested in 2005 and is now serving a nine year sentence for the 2001 murder 
of a Hindu journalist, Bojel is wanted in connection with the October 2005 beheading of three Christian 
schoolgirls. 
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as head of the JI division responsible for Poso, Nasir Abas, was also arrested near 
Jakarta in April2003.79 In addition to hunt for the perpetrators of the Bali bombing, the 
December 2002 bombing of a McDonalds restaurant and a car showroom in Makassar, 
South Sulawesi, triggered another extensive police investigation. Several of the men 
arrested in connection with the Makassar bombing had fought or trained in Po so. 80 
Third, in June 2003, the Central Sulawesi police announced that they were seeking men 
on a list of 38 suspects for (post-Malino Accord) violence in Poso. 81 The police did not 
disclose who was on this list of 38 men, leaving local men to guess whether they might 
be being pursued.82 One local combatant, who suspected he may have been on the list, 
acknowledged that these developments had led him and his friends to try "not to be too 
active, [so that we can] evade [capture/detection]". In an indication of the impact of the 
Bali bombing and Makassar manhunts on Poso, the man said that he thought that the 
police were looking for links between Mujahidin (his generic term for jihadist groups in 
Poso) and Jemaah Islamiyah. As such, he guessed the primary targets for arrest would 
be mujahidin from Java or men from Poso who had gone with outside mujahidin to train 
in Ambon.83 
The police response to two serious violent incidents in October 2003 also may have 
served as a further warning against larger-scale attacks. In the first of these two 
incidents, a group of around 30 Muslim men attacked Beteleme village in Morowali 
district on 10 October, killing two people and burning 36 houses.84 The men appear to 
have targeted Beteleme because a key Christian combatant, Fabianus Tibo, had lived in 
the village prior to his arrest in 2000. Two nights later, before dawn on 12 October, a 
separate group of Muslim men attacked several Christian-populated villages in Poso 
Pesisir sub-district. In these attacks, nine people were killed as a result of gunshot or 
79 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 7, 17; "Kisah Tukang Krupuk", Tempo, 28 April2003. 
80 On links between Poso and the Makassar bombings, see ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 17; "Sidang 
Kasus Peledakan Born di Makassar: Saksi Sangkal Keterangan Dalam BAP", Kompas, 22 Juli 2003; 
"Pelaku Peledakan Born Makassar Ditangkap di Palu", Tempo interaktif, II April2003; "Kelompok 
Imam Diringkus", Pikiran Rakyat, 10 December 2002; "Poso Antisipasi Kabumya Napi Teroris dari 
Makassar", Kompas, 11 January 2008. 
81 "Tersangka Kasus Poso Bertambah Menjadi 38 Orang", Kompas online, 29 June 2003. 
82 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
83 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
84 Details for Beteleme attack taken from Palu District Court Decision no. 138/PID.B/2004/PN.PL in case 
ofSafri Ambo Bokori, Hamdan, Abdul Haer Pantua and Andang Bado, 28 August 2004, and Palu District 
Court Decision no. 136/PID.B/2004/PN.PL in case ofHendra, Suhardi and Mat, 28 August 2004. 
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knife wounds. 85 The police took swift and severe action, particularly against the 
perpetrators of the Beteleme attack. By mid-November they had shot dead seven 
suspects for the two attacks in the course of a determined man-hunt, and had also 
arrested at least seventeen suspects. Those arrested were brought to trial under 
Indonesia's anti-terrorism law, the first time the law had been applied to violence in a 
conflict area. Although we do not know for certain why police acted more sternly in 
response to these attacks than to previous violence, several factors may have 
contributed to their response: the police reaction may have been a product of greater 
attention to Poso after the arrests of JI members in Palu earlier that year; the high death 
toll in the Poso Pesisir attacks may have increased the attention of senior police and the 
central government to the case; the police may also have acted more sternly because the 
attacks, although large-scale, were perpetrated by relatively small groups of assailants, 
making the scale of the required man-hunt manageable. 
At the same time that intermittent stern action by the security forces began to make the 
risks of perpetrating violence appear higher, the pattern of violence in Poso in late-2001 
and particularly 2002 may have made violence seem less necessary. Christians in Poso 
were no longer perpetrating large-scale attacks, whether because they lacked the 
capacity to do so in the face of the military advantage Poso's Muslims had established, 
feared possible reprisals or were otherwise disinclined. Most often, violence perpetrated 
by Christians after Malino took the form of reprisal murders or arson attacks shortly 
after attacks on their co-religionists. Without much of a threat that they would 
themselves be attacked, and having already struck back against most local Christian 
strongholds, some local Muslims began to question what they would gain out of 
continuing to fight. One popular saying captured this mood, "Win and you're charcoal, 
lose and you're ash."86 After four years of conflict, communities needed to begin to 
rebuild livelihoods, and some villagers began to see outside mujahidin as an 
impediment to efforts to generate income. 
We became aware that it was us who would suffer the fall-out (imbas). They [outside 
mujahidin] would just come, and after causing something to happen [i.e. an attack], they 
would go back to their home towns. 87 
85 "Setelah Beteleme, Giliran Poso Pesisir dan Poso Kota Diserang", rkp news, 13 October 2003. Some 
reports of these incidents list eight people killed. See "Orang Bersenjata Serang Poso, Delapan Orang 
Tewas, Lainnya Luka Berat", Radar Sulteng, 13 October 2003. 
86 "Menangjadi arang, kalahjadi abu." 
87 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
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I said if they [outside mujahidin] are always wanting to make things chaotic [through 
attacks], when are we going to go to our gardens, to our cocoa plants. If things are 
chaotic, with attacks, it's clear that they [Christians] will think that if they can't face up to 
us along a front [of battle], then they will wait in our gardens, and when we go to pick 
cocoa beans, knife us from behind. Who wants that! 88 
Such disillusionment with the continuing sporadic violence in Poso was compounded 
when local combatants saw that other people were profiting from the unrest. In 
particular, local officials from the provincial right down to the village level were widely 
suspected to have been embezzling assistance funds intended for displaced communities 
at least since the Malino Declaration, if not even earlier. 89 Another popular saying 
summed up the difference in fortunes between local communities and government 
officials as follows: "We get supermie (instant noodles), they get superkijang (sports 
utility vehicles)."90 
An awareness of the irritation some local Muslims expressed at the insecurity generated 
by protracted low-level violence balances accounts that adopt an instrumental 
interpretation of this violence. As an example of the instrumental perspective, ICG has 
observed that sporadic attacks on Christian populations in Poso may have suited Jemaah 
Islamiyah's leadership, because these attacks could serve as a tool "to keep the jihad 
spirit strong".91 Certainly, the opportunity to perpetrate sporadic violence did help to 
retain some local recruits and attracted new youths to the cause, as will be discussed 
further in the next section. But as this insecurity lasted longer and longer, the sporadic 
attacks also appear to have driven a wedge between some Muslims and outside 
mujahidin. The irritation of some local Muslims at these attacks highlights the 
importance not only of the experience of violent incidents, but also the times in between 
these violent incidents, to the decision of combatants as to whether to keep fighting. 
Even a "victorious" combatant in a protracted conflict may look at what he experiences 
in between the violence - the state of his day to day life - and decide that the incentives 
to continue to perpetrate violence are outweighed by the personal costs of doing so. 
Once the threat from Christians lessened, the outside mujahidin's commitment to 
continue to perpetrate sporadic attacks was not the only the source of tension between 
88 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
89 On suspicions of profiteering from assistance funds see, for instance, "Ada Madu di Dana Pengungsi", 
Media Sangkompo, October 2002, pp. 11-12; Lorraine Aragon, "Profiting from Displacement", Inside 
Indonesia, January-March 2004. 
90 "Kami dapat supermie, mereka dapat superkijang." 
91 ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 16. 
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them and local Muslims. The puritanical lifestyle that outside mujahidin demanded of 
local communities also began to cause divisions. Many local youths had accepted the 
moral and religious teachings of outside mujahidin at the peak of the fighting, as part of 
overall instruction on jihad. The standard ofbehaviour that outside mujahidin required-
no drinking, regular prayer, regular religious study sessions- was antithetical to the pre-
conflict lifestyle of many local Muslim youths. Once the situation became more secure, 
several of these youths indicated that they began to return to their old habits: 
We told them to go home, we didn't want to be annoyed (diganggu) [anymore], they 
came with a million rules, whereas in the village we had never had all those rules, and 
they [outside mujahidin] made the situation unstable.92 
Some local financial donors also appear to have been less willing to support further 
jihadist activities once the threat posed by Poso's Christians decreased significantly. 
These donors had been interested in protecting Po so's Muslims while the conflict was at 
its peak, but were not so committed to longer-term proselytisation or the ambitions of 
some jihadist organisations to make Poso a "beach-head" in a struggle to establish an 
Islamic state in Indonesia.93 As an outside mujahid recalled, 
The help people will give is limited. At first they say they will help continually, but then 
in the middle of the road, they tire of it. "What for now [more donations]? The riot in 
Poso is already over!"94 
What was the extent of the split between outside mujahidin and local Muslims, and 
what were the implications of this split? I cannot quantify precisely how many people 
decided to stop fighting: one estimate provided to the press in late 2003 by a local 
combatant was that more than 75 per cent of Muslim combatants had "tobat" (literally, 
repented, i.e. stopped fighting). 95 Because of their objections to continued instability 
and the moral standards demanded by outside mujahidin, some local men said their 
communities eventually asked outside mujahidin to leave their villages. Other men 
simply noted that the outside mujahidin had left by mid-2003, although one man said 
that some mujahidin still periodically came to his village to proselytise.96 For its part, 
Laskar Jihad, disbanded at the beginning of October 2002 after internal divisions led 
some of the organisation's members to seek afatwa (non-binding religious ruling) from 
92 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
93 On these ambitions, see Fealy, "Radical Islam in Indonesia, p. 32; ICG, Weakening Indonesia's 
Mujahidin Networks, p. 3. 
94 Interview with a Mujahidin Kompak member, April2004. 
95 
"Ikhwanudin: Dendam Mereka Tak Habis-Habis", Tempo, 2 November 2003, p. 37. 
96 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
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a Saudi scholar which recommended that the militia should disband. 97 Most of those 
members ofLaskar Jihad who were still in Poso then left the district later that month.98 
But in general, the unwillingness of the majority of local Muslim combatants to 
participate directly in violence did not equate to active opposition to those who 
continued to do so. Many Muslims in Poso appear to have continued to support violence 
against Christians tacitly, primarily because of anger at the scale of violence perpetrated 
by Christians in 2000-2001. Other Muslims who did oppose the violence may not have 
known the identity of the perpetrators of sporadic attacks, or otherwise not have been in 
a position to try to stop these attacks from continuing. Alternatively, even opponents of 
the violence may have been reluctant to assist police with their enquiries, because of 
anger at past inaction on the part of the security forces, wrongful arrests or the common 
practice of beating of suspects. Without widespread active community opposition to 
their activities, those intent on perpetrating violence were still able to do so. 
Continuing the Fight - Sporadic Violence after August 2002 
The second part of an explanation of the decline of violence is to examine why some 
local Muslims continued to perpetrate violence after August 2002, how they organised 
this violence and what form attacks during this period took. As a result of police 
investigations and other research, in particular the work of the International Crisis 
Group, we have a good idea of the identity of the perpetrators of many of the violent 
incidents that took place from 2002-2006. Overwhelmingly, the sporadic attacks during 
this period were perpetrated by outside mujahidin from Darul Islam-derived networks in 
cooperation with local Muslims youths. Laskar Jihad and the local Muslims who were 
once affiliated with them played little or no role. 
Once attacks by crowds stopped, outside mujahidin from the DI-derived groups could 
no longer command all of the men whom they had trained, but a core group of local 
Muslims continued to collaborate with them. There were three main centres where 
jihadist activity continued long after 2002. Two of these centres were in the city, 
namely Kayamanya ward and Tanah Runtuh sub-ward. The third was in the south of the 
district near the shore of Lake Poso, specifically in the area around Pendolo and 
97 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 212. 
98 "Muslim Poso Kecewa dengan Pembubaran Laskar Jihad", Republika, date not recorded. 
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Pandajaya village.99 Of these areas, it was in Tanah Runtuh where jihadist groups 
remained most active for the longest - locals from the sub-ward and their JI trainers 
were in fact responsible for the majority of the violence in Poso from late-2004 
onwards. 100 Indeed, precisely at the moment that the conflict in Poso began to wane in 
late-2002 and many local combatants became less interested in fighting, the groups 
based in Tanah Runtuh were consolidating their core membership and preparing to 
perpetrate further violence. The catalyst for this consolidation was the arrival in October 
2002 of a Javanese JI member, Hasanuddin alias Slamet Raharjo, to lead the 
organisation's operations in Poso.101 
A glance at the list of incidents of violence from late-2002 to early-2007 indicates that 
those outside mujahidin who remained in Poso and the local men who continued to 
work with them had sufficient manpower to ensure that the district was never entirely 
secure. Although there were generally fewer violent incidents in each successive year, 
at least 30 people were killed in each of 2002, 2003 and 2005. 102 The violence from 
January-August 2002 has been described above; following the August 2002 period of 
violence, a further eight people were killed in Poso from September to December, all of 
them fatally shot. Overall, at least 36 people were killed throughout the year.103 
In 2003, there were at least 33 fatalities After several individual murders in 2003 
during the first half of the year, the most severe cluster of incidents in 2003 took place 
in October, when several Christian villages in Morowali district and Poso Pesisir sub-
district were attacked. After the October attacks, several shootings and mob killings 
took place during the remainder of the year. 
99 ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, pp. 11, 13-14. 
100 After arrests in 2006 and January 2007, the police announced that they had solved 32 cases, most of 
which they specifically attributed to members of the Tanah Runtuh-based group. (One of the 32 cases-
the murder of two Muslim fish traders, was perpetrated by Christians. In a February announcement, the 
police increased their estimate of solved cases to 46.) The men held in custody have confessed to 
involvement in many of these incidents, but most of these men were only tried for a small selection of the 
attacks they confessed to. See "Polisi Ungkap 32 Kasus Kekerasan di Poso", Media Indonesia, date not 
recorded; "Polri Tahan 56 Tersangka Kekerasan di Poso", Antara, 20 February 2007. 
101 ICG, Jihadism in Indonesia: Paso on the Edge, p. 5. Hasanuddin lived in Tanah Runtuh and in 2003 
married the daughter of Adnan Arsal, a key local Muslim leader. Immediately prior to his arrival in Poso, 
he had trained and fought in the Philippines for several years. 
102 Fairly complete lists of incidents are provided in appendices ofiCG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi; ICG, 
Weakeningindonesia 's Mujahidin Networks. The 2004 ICG report contains at least one erroneous 
incident - a 28 August 2002 attack on Sepe - which appears to be a repeated reference to the 12 August 
2002 attack. 
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2004 was an exception to the overall pattern of fatalities from 2002-2005, with "only" 
fifteen people killed. 104 After smaller clusters of murders in March and July, the highest 
intensity sequence of violence coincided with the fasting month. In the worst incident of 
the year, six Christians were killed when a bomb was detonated in a public transport 
van parked outside Poso's central market on 13 November. 
The death toll rose sharply again in 2005, with at least 40 people were killed in seven 
different fatal incidents. 105 Most of those killed died in two major bombings: two 
explosions in Tentena on 28 May killed 23 people, and another bombing in Palu on 31 
December caused nine fatalities. Both bombings targeted markets where the attackers 
could be sure that most shoppers would be Christians. There were also two high-profile 
attacks on school-girls in October and November; each perpetrated by men from Tanah 
Runtuh. First, three Christian schoolgirls were beheaded on a foot-track near the city 
several days before the end of the fasting month; just over a week later a Christian and a 
Muslim school-girl were both shot in the head (each girl survived). 106 In another new 
pattern of violence, between August and October men from Tanah Runtuh also 
executed three Muslim men who they suspected were police informers as well as a 
Muslim policeman. 
103 See Darwis Waru, "Potret Poso Pasca Malino", Radar Sulteng, 19 December 2002. Waru provides a 
figure of33 dead, between May and 6 December 2002, to which I have added one man killed in January 
2002 and two men killed in the remainder of December. 
104 This figure includes two people shot dead in Palu, because the perpetrators in each case were local 
men from Poso. 
105 In his discussion of religious violence throughout Indonesia, Sidel insists that by 2005, religious 
violence in Indonesia had been reduced to a "single annual explosion". The data from Poso demonstrates 
clearly that his statement is false. There were also several deadly incidents in Maluku in the first half of 
2005. See Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad, p. 210. On the Maluku violence, see ICG, Weakening Indonesia's 
Mujahidin Networks, pp. 4-9,29. 
106 The perpetrators may not have realised they were shooting a Muslim girl. Each of the perpetrators 
asserted in their court trials that they had intended to target Christian men who frequently drank alcohol 
in the vicinity of the shooting, but that by chance the men had not been at the planned site of the shooting 
when the attack was to take place. In explanation of why he proceeded with the shooting if the intended 
target was not present, one of the perpetrators asserted that he had thought "Rather than go home empty 
handed ... [better to shoot at the two girls and a man sitting in front of the house]". This version of events 
does not ring entirely true, and it is possible the perpetrators were concerned that the judges would 
consider a deliberate attempt to target the girls to be more incriminating. See recording of testimony of 
Rahman Kalahe alias Wiwin and Yudi Heryanto Parsan alias Udit and response of Basri and Ardin to this 
testimony in the trial of Muhammad Basri alias Ayas alias Bagong and Ardin Djanatu alias Rojak, South 
Jakarta District Court, 4 October 2007; recording of testimony of Rahman Kalahe alias Wiwin in his own 
trial, South Jakarta District Court, 10 October 2007. 
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The October 2005 beheadings spurred a renewed central government intervention in 
Poso, with the result that the first eight months of 2006 were relatively peaceful. The 
main exception was a failed attempt to assassinate the Poso police chief in January, and 
the robbery of a gold shop in Palu in February in which the shopkeeper was shot dead. 
The execution of three Catholic men in September for their role in the May-June 2000 
violence then aggravated existing enmities. Clashes between crowds were narrowly 
averted in the south of the city, and Christian youths killed two Muslim fish traders who 
happened to pass through their village near Taripa, southeast of Tentena. Soon after 
these murders, there were several violent incidents during the fasting month. First, a 
Palu-based JI member shot dead the acting head of the Central Sulawesi Christian 
church in mid-October. A week later, a police operation near Tanah Runtuh quickly 
escalated into clashes between police and local Muslims, in which police shot dead a 
local youth. 107 Despite these incidents, the death toll for 2006 was much lower than in 
previous years, with a total of seven fatalities. 
The only attacks in Poso in 2007 were several non-fatal bombings. Nevertheless, at 
least 17 people were killed, but in two police raids on Tanah Runtuh sub-ward in 
January.108 The raids were the culmination of an effort to apprehend those who 
continued to perpetrate violence that was initially spurred by the October 2005 
beheadings, but only re-intensified after the violence in Poso in October 2006. In the 
first raid on 11 January, police fatally shot a local man and a Javanese mujahidin, while 
arresting seven other men. 109 The fatalities in this raid led to several days of clashes 
between police and local Muslims who were angered by the attacks. Such clashes 
ceased after a second, larger raid on 22 January, in which 13 Muslim men were killed 
along with one policeman. 
Many of those responsible for the incidents described in the preceding paragraphs have 
now been arrested, and their court testimony and interrogation depositions provide an 
indication of the motivations of the men who continued to perpetrate violence in Poso 
107 Coincidentally, the man killed was the younger brother of Lilik Pumomo, one of the perpetrators of 
the October 2005 beheadings. 
108 One of these seventeen people was actually a policeman who was killed on 11 January when he was 
beaten to death by members of the funeral procession of one of the men killed during the police raid that 
day. See "Densus 88 Periksa Dua Tersangka Teror Poso", Sinar Harapan, 12 January 2007. 
109 One of the seven men, Thoyib alias Ibnu Tsalits, was shot in the stomach and taken to the Poso 
hospital. he escaped from the hospital after two days, but was then re-arrested during the 22 January 2007 
raid described below. See deposition ofThoyib alias Ibnu Tsalits alias Ustad Ibnu in his own dossier, 24 
January 2007, p. 3. 
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even after the conflict waned. In contrast to most local Muslim combatants' perception 
that the threat of Christian violence had lessened markedly, these men continued to 
view Poso's Christians as an ongoing threat to the district's Muslim population. Both 
outside mujahidin and local Muslims thus justified attacks on Christians as a preventive 
measure to ensure that Muslims remained safe. For instance, a perpetrator of the 
beheadings told the court that the attack was intended to "warn Christians in Poso not to 
plan, let alone perpetrate, massacres of Muslims". 110 The men who have stood trial have 
also expressed their frustration that the Christian perpetrators of violence in earlier 
periods of the conflict have not been brought to account, and have identified this 
frustration as part of their motivation to continue to perpetrate attacks. The men's 
statements also revealed their perception that Muslims in Poso had still perpetrated less 
violence than Christians, "What pushed me to perpetrate the bombing was a feeling a 
solidarity with my fellow Muslims in Poso, who have been tyrannised, whereas there 
has not been reprisal in equal measure against those responsible for this tyranny."111 
Such statements corroborate anecdotal information that some Muslim combatants hoped 
to trigger renewed large scale violence in an attempt to "even up" the number of 
fatalities each religious community had suffered. Other anecdotal reports suggest that 
some local Muslims continued to perpetrate violence simply because they had become 
accustomed to fighting, and found it hard to stop when the conflict waned. As ICG has 
observed, for some of these men, "the combination of military training and active 
combat may have been the most meaningful experience of their lives". 112 An Indonesian 
observer familiar with the motivations of some of these men also suggested violence 
could serve as a way to atone for lapses in behaviour, such as drinking, by 
demonstrating their continuing commitment to jihad.113 
The perpetrators of at least a few of the incidents of sporadic violence also had financial 
motivations. As violence in Poso began to wane, some local officials began to use their 
funds to attempt to influence combatants to direct violence at targets of the donors' 
110 Testimony of Lilik Pumomo alias Haris in trial of Hasanuddin alias Slamet Raharjo, Central Jakarta 
District Court, 17 January 2007 (direct observation by author of trial). 
111 See personal defence plea of Syaiful Anam alias Mujadid alias Idris alias Joko alias Deni alias 
Brekele, submitted to South Jakarta District Court, 14 November 2007. The personal defence plea of 
Lilik Pumomo and Irwanto Irano provides another example: "The armed conflict has caused social, 
economic and psychological problems. In particular, these problems have been very severe for Muslims, 
because the number of Muslims killed was far greater." Personal defence plea ofLilik Pumomo and 
Irwanto Irano, submitted to Central Jakarta District Court, 5 March 2007. 
112 For more discussion of this point, see ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, p. 3. Also c.f. 
Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, pp. 409-411. 
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choosing, particularly in relation to corruption cases. The clearest instance of an attack 
ordered by a local official was the detonation of bombs outside the offices of two local 
NGOs in Poso in April 2005. The NGOs had been campaigning for the arrest of the 
acting district head, whom they believed to have embezzled IDP assistance funds in his 
capacity as head of the Provincial Social Office. It was widely suspected that the district 
head used an intermediary to pay a local man from Tanah Runtuh to place the bombs. 
The intermediary admitted as much to police, but no charges were ever laid. 114 Two 
other incidents in 2004 also raise particular suspicions of a link to local embezzlement 
of IDP assistance funds. 115 In the first incident, one of the men convicted of corruption 
over the embezzlement, Andi Makassau, took part in an October 2004 shooting outside 
a church in Poso. 116 Next, a Christian village chief who received some of the August-
September 2004 funds on behalf of his village was beheaded in November 2004, 
although it is not certain the killing was linked to the embezzlement. 117 Beyond these 
incidents, the number of incidents of violence linked to corruption in Poso remains 
unclear, with more rumours than solid proof.118 The number of incidents directly linked 
to corruption is likely to have been much smaller than those linked to the desire for 
revenge or religious motives. 
Financial motives of a different type were responsible for a proliferation of armed 
robberies perpetrated by Muslim combatants. These robberies were referred to as fa 'i -
113 Personal communication with an Indonesian observer, 2005. 
114 This intermediary, Mad Haji Sun alias Ahmad Ali, admitted to police that he had been contacted by the 
caretaker district head ofPoso, Andi Asikin Suyuti, who requested that he put a stop to NGO protests regarding 
suspected corruption. Sun told police that he then met with a Poso man, Andi Ipong, and they agreed that the 
NGOs "need[ed] to be taught a lesson". Two days after this meeting, Sun told police, the bombs exploded 
outside the two NGO offices. Neither Sun nor Ipong were charged with the bombing, although Ipong is 
currently serving a nine year sentence for the 2001 murder of Hindu journalist I Wayan Sumariasa. See 
deposition of Ahmad Hi. Ali alias Mat Sun, 22 September 2005. 
115 For details of this embezzlement, see McRae, "Blood Money". 
116 Makassau was originally arrested in 2004 in connection with the shooting but was "released" without 
charge and immediately re-arrested on corruption charges. After the October 2005 beheadings in Poso, 
the investigation into the case was re-opened and Makassau was convicted to six years imprisonment in 
2006 in a trial held at the Central Jakarta District Court. See McRae, "Blood Money"; "Saat Ditahan 
Mabes Polri Ditawari Uang: Pelaku Penembakan Poso Divonis Enam Tahun", vhrmedia.com, date not 
recorded (probably 11 September 2006). 
117 The first suspect arrested for the beheading was one of the men later convicted in the corruption case, 
but he was never charged with the beheading. An alternative explanation suggested the village chief was 
killed because he was believed to be spying on Muslims in his village. The two explanations are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. See McRae, "Blood Money"; deposition of Subur Sugiyarto in the case of 
Sunarto alias Ustadz Sahl alias Ustadz Athoillah, date not recorded. Thank you to Sidney Jones for 
providing this deposition. 
118 Apart from the cases listed in the main text, rumours in Poso have linked both the October 2003 
Beteleme attack and the May 2005 Tentena bombing to corruption, although neither interpretation may be 
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the targeting of non-Muslims to finance jihadist activities. Fa'i took place at least as 
early as 2003, but there appears to have been a particular concentration of incidents in 
2005-early 2006: 
Men carrying the payroll of the Poso district government were held up in April 
2005, with the robbers seizing Rp 583 million in cash. 119 
On 4 October 2005, the treasurer ofPoso Pesisir sub-district was shot and killed. 
This time the robbers stole approximately Rp 54 million. 120 
On 28 February 2006, robbers followed a cocoa bean buyer to her parents' 
house in Bugis village, Parimo district and robbed her at gunpoint.121 
On 10 February 2006, a gold shop on one ofPalu's main commercial streets was 
robbed. The owner of the shop was shot several times during the robbery and 
later died.122 
These robberies varied in the extent of their direct links to jihadist organisations in Poso 
- all of the perpetrators described them as fa 'i, but in some of the robberies all of the 
proceeds appear to have been kept for personal enrichment.123 In others, such as the 
payroll robbery, it is clear that a proportion of the funds were used to finance jihadist 
activities, although I do not have reliable information on the breakdown of the funds. 
Who did outside mujahidin and local Muslims consider to be legitimate targets for 
sporadic attacks? Clearly one group were Christians with a link to Poso or to the 
conflict in the district. Sometimes this meant targeting ministers of the church or 
shooting at church congregations, but often targets appeared to be selected just because 
they were Christian. Locations may have been attacked because of an association with 
previous violence, but there does not appear to have been a special effort to target key 
correct. For a discussion of corruption rumours surrounding the Tentena bombing, see Dave McRae, 
"Blood Money", Inside Indonesia, January-March 2006. 
119 ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, p. 11. 
120 ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, p. 28. 
121 For a narrative of the robbery, see deposition of Mohammad Fadli Barasalim Bin Zakir alias Opo alias 
Ustad Aan in his own dossier, 17 March 2006, p.p 5-7. The same deposition records Opo telling police 
that he had ordered two members of the gang to perpetrate another armed robbery in Parimo district 
January 2006. 
122 "Di Palu, Pedagang Emas Ditembak", Sinar Harapan, 11 February 2006. 
123 For instance, Opo alias Ustad Aan told police that none of the funds gained from two armed robberies 
in 2006 had been set aside for jihadist activities, although he had told his gang members that one fifth of 
the proceeds should be reserved for such purposes. See deposition of Mohammad Fadli Barasalim Bin 
Zakir alias Opo alias Ustad Aan in his own dossier, 17 March 2006, p. 15. It is possible Opo may have 
denied setting aside funds for fear that such an admission would result in a terrorism conviction. 
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Christian perpetrators. 124 In some attacks- for instance, the bombing of a market selling 
pork in Pa1u on 31 December 2005 and the armed robberies that took place outside Poso 
district - being Christian alone, without any link to Poso, appeared to make the victims 
legitimate targets. For a brief period, Muslim combatants even targeted fellow Muslims, 
specifically several community members who were suspected to have been passing 
information to police. There were also a handful of incidents where combatants targeted 
individual prosecutors or police. 
Although we know the identity of many of the perpetrators of violence between 2002-
2006, and some of their motivations, it is important to acknowledge that there are many 
aspects of the sporadic violence that we can not yet satisfactorily explain. For instance, 
we do not yet understand what factors, if any, distinguished local Muslims who 
continued to perpetrate violence from those who had stopped fighting by late 2002. At 
the time of writing, there was no good dataset to evaluate whether there was a 
correlation between continuing participation in violence and factors such as the 
background of local Muslim combatants, their social networks prior to the conflict, the 
degree of training each combatant had received, the number of their relatives killed or 
injured or their own personal experience of earlier periods of violence. Were such a 
dataset available, it may still emerge that chance personal decisions rather than 
quantifiable background factors account for local Muslim combatants' continued 
involvement. 
Nor do we know in most cases why perpetrators selected particular forms of violence -
why on occasion they bombed targets, at other times shot their victims or shot at 
churches, and sometimes even used knives or machetes to murder their victims. 
Observers also have not been able to explain in detail the considerations that determined 
how frequently sporadic attacks were carried out, why the perpetrators chose to attack 
precisely when they did. For instance, we can see that the number of incidents generally 
decreased from year to year - despite no apparent decrease in military capacity - but we 
cannot yet explain why this reduction took place. Nonetheless, there are several patterns 
regarding the timing of sporadic violence that we can identify from the information 
available at the time of writing: 
124 For instance, local Muslims and outside mujahidin consistently called for the arrest of the sixteen men 
named by Tibo and his co-defendants, rather than attempting to murder the men on the list. 
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The coincidence of attacks with Ramadan, which outside mujahidin considered 
to be a particularly auspicious month for jihad, and other religious occasions. 
There was also a bombing on New Year's Eve or New Year's Day every year 
from 2001-2005, although among these bombings only the 31 December 2005 
bombing of a pork market in Palu caused fatalities. 
The May 2005 bombing of a market in Tentena appeared to be an anniversary 
attack, as it took place exactly five years after the 28 May 2000 Walisongo 
massacre (see Chapter Three). 125 No other violent incident readily stands out as 
an anniversary attack - there have not been large-scale incidents to mark the 
anniversary of the 3 July 2001 Buyung Katedo massacre, for example.126 
There is a weak correlation between sporadic incidents of violence and moments 
of political transition or opportunity. Several violent incidents immediately 
preceded each of the two main moments of political transition in Poso. There 
was a sequence of three shootings spread over four days roughly a week prior to 
the legislative elections on 5 April 2004, in which the composition of the 
district, provincial and national legislatures were determined. There were also 
two small bomb explosions immediately prior to the 30 June 2005 election of a 
new district head in Poso, including one explosion outside a campaign office of 
one of the candidates. Neither bomb contained shrapnel, indicating that the 
intention was to scare or provoke rather than to kill. Although these incidents 
did coincide with elections, and may have been intended to influence voter 
intentions, in neither case were the pre-election incidents the major periods of 
violence for the year. Although some individuals may have been seeking 
political gain from violence, these individuals do not appear to have been in a 
position to control the majority of sporadic attacks. 
To further illustrate what may have motivated some men to continue to perpetrate 
sporadic violence, and what the interaction was between the agendas of local men and 
outside mujahidin in these attacks, I will conclude this section by discussing one case of 
violence in some detail, namely the October 2005 beheading of three Christian 
schoolgirls. The attack provides a good opportunity to explore the relative authority of 
125 In an alternative explanation, one of perpetrators asserted in court testimony that they had chosen to 
bomb the market on a Saturday simply because it was the busiest market day. 
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locals and outside mujahidin and how their interaction was manifested in violence, 
because the successful criminal investigation and prosecutions that followed this 
incident have placed a wealth of information on how the attack was planned and 
executed on the public record. The attack demonstrates several features that I believe to 
be common to the violence in the later years of the conflict: a high degree of planning; 
the belief that any Christian was a legitimate target of violence; selection of target to 
maximum provocative effect rather than to maximise casualties; and the importance of 
revenge as a motive, seemingly even for outside mujahidin. 
The October 2005 beheadings 
In the early morning on 29 October 2005, five days before the end of Ramadan, a group 
of seven local Muslim men ambushed four female Christian high school students as 
they walked to school along a foot track down to the city from Bukitbambu village in 
the hills on the eastern fringe of Poso town. Wielding half metre long machetes, the 
men beheaded three of the girls; the fourth girl suffered a deep gash wound to her right 
cheek but was able to jump down a steep embankment and escape. The attackers took 
their victim's severed heads back to Tanah Runtuh sub-ward, where outside mujahidin 
were waiting. These outsiders then arranged for the heads to be dumped by the roadside 
in two different Christian villages, along with notes threatening that Poso's Muslims 
would still take another 100 Christian heads. News of the brutal attack drew immediate 
condemnation throughout Indonesia and abroad, and spurred genuine political will from 
Jakarta to track down the perpetrators. Three of the perpetrators were arrested in May 
2006: they were Hasanuddin, the Javanese Jemaah Islamiyah member who had headed 
the organisation's operations in Poso since late-2006, and two Poso men, Lilik Purnomo 
alias Haris and Irwanto Irano alias Iwan. Three more local men, Mohamad Basri, Agus 
Nur Muhammad alias Agus Jenggot and Rahman Kalahe alias Wiwin, were arrested in 
January - February 2007. All six men received sentences of between fourteen and 
twenty years, among the heaviest prison terms handed down for violence in Poso. 127 At 
the time of writing, police were continuing to seek three outside mujahidin and three 
local men in connection with the attack . 
126 A Christian man was shot dead on 3 July 2002, the first anniversary of the Buyung Katedo massacre, 
but given the small scale of the attack and the number of violent incidents that took place in July 2002, 
the precise timing of this shooting may have been a coincidence. 
127 The men received the following sentences: Hasanuddin- twenty years, Haris- fourteen years, Iwan-
fourteen years, Basri- nineteen years, Wiwin- nineteen years, Agus Jenggot- fourteen years. The 
punishment meted out to Basri and Wiwin was not solely for the beheadings, as the two men were also 
convicted of involvement in several other violent incidents, 
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The JI member, Hasanuddin first broached the idea of an attack to coincide with the 
fasting month, which he described as a "Ramadan gift" for Poso's Christians. He raised 
the idea in early October 2005 with a few local local men who had previously trained 
and cooperatively perpetrated violence with JI. In suggesting a "Ramadan gift", 
Hasanuddin was copying an established practice from the southern Philippines, where 
jihadist forces had often attacked military posts during the fasting month.128 The local 
context of inter-religious conflict added an additional dimension to the idea in Poso. By 
perpetrating a provocative attack near the end of Ramadan, the perpetrators could 
ensure that any immediate Christian retaliation would coincide closely with the Idul 
Fitri festival, also known in Indonesia as Lebaran. A Christian attack at Idul Fitri would 
be particularly poorly received by Poso's Muslims, and could help to build wider 
support for jihadist actvities. The perpetrators may even have hoped to trigger renewed 
open conflict, which would give them the opportunity to "even up" the death tolls 
suffered by the two religious communities. 
It is difficult to assess who came up with the idea for the Ramadan attack to be a 
beheading. In their trials, Hasanuddin and I wan accused each other of first making this 
suggestion. What was not disputed in the trial was that Iwan came up with the idea to 
target the Christian schoolgirls, after he saw the girls walking to school one day near his 
home in Sayo ward. (Sayo ward is at the bottom of the hill below the girls' village.) 
I wan informed Hasanuddin of his suggestion; Hasanuddin then turned to another local 
man, Haris, to arrange the details of the attack.129 By 2005, attacks in Poso were 
typically preceded by an extensive survey of the intended location and target. In the 
case of the beheadings, Haris and I wan undertook this survey, watching covertly on at 
least four separate locations as the girls walked to school each morning. 130 While 
128 Hasanuddin had trained and fought for several years in the Philippines immediately prior to his arrival 
in Poso. During his trial, Hasanuddin denied that he had introduced the idea of a Ramadan gift to Poso or 
that he had suggested the idea to the local men. He alleged that another Indonesian veteran of the 
Philippines, Sanusi, had raised the idea and that he had merely asked the local men what they thought of 
the suggestion. One of the local men who stood trial for the beheadings contradicted this testimony, 
however, saying that it had been Hasanuddin who raised the idea. Testimony oflrwanto Irano in trial of 
Hasanuddin and Hasanuddin's response to this testimony, Central Jakarta District Court, 17 January 2007 
(direct observation by author of trial). 
129 Testimony oflrwanto Irano in his own trial and testimony ofHasanuddin in his own trial, Central 
Jakarta District Court, 24 January 2007. Haris told a different version- he said Iwan brought the idea to 
him and that he had taken the idea to Hasanuddin. 
130 As another example, according to the court testimony of the perpetrators, the 28 May 2005 bombings 
in Tentena were preceded by three separate surveys of possible locations to place the bombs. See record 
of testimony of Ardin Djanatu, Irwanto Irano, Amril Ngiode alias Aat and Mujadid alias Brekele in 
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watching the girls, the two men planned how they could conduct the attack and 
monitored who else besides the girls used the foot-track. 131 
In between conducting surveys, the two men also bought six new machetes, all from the 
one Muslim trader, bought twenty plastic bags to use to collect their victims' severed 
heads, and recruited five other local Muslim combatants, initially telling them only that 
they would take part in an unspecified attack. In his trial, Haris asserted that he kept 
Hasanuddin informed of these preparations, an assertion which Hasanuddin denied. 
This denial notwithstanding, Hasanuddin admitted to making two contributions to the 
planning of the attack. Just before the attack was to take place, Hasanuddin met the 
team of local men whom Haris and Iwan had assembled and provided them with 
religious guidance (tausiah) concerning the attack. A key topic of this tausiah was to 
address the permissibility of attacking females, and female children at that. It must have 
been clear to the perpetrators that their choice of target would be controversial. 132 
Jihadist doctrine normally forbade the targeting of women or children, a point that local 
Muslims indicated had been conveyed during ta 'lim sessions. One of the local Muslim 
combatants whom I interviewed told me in 2003 that he had withdrawn from 
perpetrating violence after he saw that the victims of a particular shooting attack in Poso 
were all women. 133 Hasanuddin' s tausiah that preceded the beheadings thus explained 
to the local men why it was permissible to attack young girls in this particular instance. 
Different men who were present have given different versions of who spoke and what 
was said; here I will analyse a hand-written statement Hasanuddin read out and then 
submitted to the court during his trial. Hasanuddin's version of his tausiah asserts the 
advice was much less specific than what some other men present have indicated, but his 
version is sufficient to illustrate how the attack was justified, and his statement is a 
convenient source because it is clear that it was not made under duress. 134 Hasanuddin 
Sentencing Request in case of Syaiful Anam alias Mujadid alias Brekele alias Idris alias Joko, submitted 
to South Jakarta District Court, 7 November 2007, pp. 29-34, 37-38. 
131 Iwan testified that he and Haris conducted four "surveys" of the foot-track prior to the attack. 
Testimony oflrwanto Irano in trial ofHasanuddin, Central Jakarta District Court, 17 January 2007. 
132 As a comparison, part of the reason that the July 2001 Buyung Katedo massacre became a particular 
symbol of injustice among Muslims in Poso was that most ofthe victims were women and children. 
133 Interview with a Poso man, July 2003. 
134 Hasanuddin read the statement out with some gusto, and also brought along photographs to attempt to 
illustrate his claims regarding Christian violence. Direct observation by author of trial ofHasanuddin 
alias Slamet Raharjo, Central Jakarta District Court, 15 November 2006. 
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asserted that the tausiah was merely general advice regarding the "rules of war" and 
"jurisprudence of jihad" in Islam. He said he made the following points: 
- It is permissible to kill in the same form/to the same level/to achieve balance during 
war, as is stated in the Qu'ran (An Hahl: 126): "And if you strike back, strike back in the 
same [form] as the torture visited upon you." 
-Do not wage war based on [a desire for] vengeance, but truly because of Allah. 
- Do not cut up your enemy [into small pieces]. 
-Increase your dzikir [chanting in praise of Allah] to Allah while waging war. 135 
Even if Hasanuddin's tausiah was as general as he maintained, the significance of his 
first point on striking back in equal measure would have been clear to all present. In the 
context of their plan to behead the schoolgirls, Hasanuddin's advice could only be 
interpreted to mean that it was permissible to attack and behead women (normally 
proscribed), because Christians had also beheaded women in the past in Poso.136 
The choice of beheadings as the form of this Ramadan attack indicates that the attack 
was intended to provoke and send a message, rather than to maximise casualties. 
Hasanuddin's second contribution to the planning contributed to this end: he admitted to 
giving Haris several hand-written notes to put in the bags that the severed heads would 
be stored in. 137 The police recovered four of these notes, three of which had slightly 
different text and different handwriting. The following is the text of the note that 
matched Hasanuddin's hand-writing: 
At no time can we [illegible word], perhaps because our [desire for] vengeance has not 
been healed. We are still looking for 100 Christian (Kongkoli) heads, be they children, 
youths, adults, men or women. Those heads will be for Lebaran gifts/Lebaran presents for 
our party at Lebaran. Our [desire for] vengeance still bums as you sadistically, cruelly 
and barbarically slaughtered our fathers/mothers and our fellow Muslims. You cut open 
our fellow [Muslims] stomachs and took their genitals in front of our eyes. Blood must be 
avenged through blood, a life for a life, a head for a head. You still [owe us] a great debt. 
We are not afraid to die, to at any time and any place defend our rights, our [desire for] 
revenge, our dignity (harkat dan martabat). We have suffered, we had to flee, we were 
135 Personal Sural Eksepsi (Response to Indictment) ofHasanuddin alias Slamet Raharjo submitted to 
Central Jakarta District Court, 15 November 2006, p. 2. 
136 The more detailed account ofHasanuddin's tausiah in his interrogation deposition suggests that he 
specifically raised this point: ."In truth, basically this deed- to murder women and children- is not 
permitted by Islamic law ... but ... but it certain circumstances such a deed is permitted, to strike back 
against what they have done and we are permitted to do [to them] what they have done [to us], as set out 
in the verse of the Quran which permits [us] to strike back in equal form ... the aim of this activity is to 
demand justice for our fellow [Muslims] who were sadistically and inhumanly slaughtered, such as 
happened at Buyung Katedo and at the Walisongo pesantren (boarding school) and in other places, which 
deeds have not been fully investigated. Do this deed sincerely and not with thoughts of revenge and 
frequently [chant in praise of Allah]." Deposition ofHasanuddin alias Slamet Raharjo in his own dossier, 
12 May 2006, pp. 7-8. 
137 Hasanuddin nonetheless maintained that another outside mujahid, Sanusi, had provided the text for the 
notes and that Hasanuddin had only copied an example that Sanusi gave to him. 
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cheated, because of the massacres perpetrated by Christians. This reprisal is nothing 
compared to your sadism, your barbarism. You will not be safe or calm until our [desire 
for] vengeance has been healed. Before [we?] feel safe and calm. At any time and any 
place we will [continue to] strike back until our grandchildren's [generation]. We have a 
lot more heads, and we are spreading them in other places, in part as a party and in part to 
inflame our burning [desire for] revenge. We are everywhere and we are ready to heal 
(mengobati) our [desire for] vengeance. Pass on this message to Piet [Inkiriwang, the 
Po so district head], Damanik, Irian to Kongkoli [a prominent Christian minister who was 
murdered in 2006] and S. Pelima [a Malino signatory and the head ofPoso legislature]. 138 
The most interesting feature of the note is its emphasis on "dendam" - vengeance or 
revenge. One of the basic tenets of jihadist doctrine is that attacks must not be 
motivated by a desire to satisfy revenge. The item on jihad published in a Palu tabloid 
in mid-2000 made this point; Hasanuddin asserted that he advised that revenge could 
not be the motive during his tausiah. Yet the description of motives in this note is not 
confined to the permissible notion of striking back in equal measure, which is 
nonetheless mentioned. Instead, there are three references to healing (mengobati) a 
desire for revenge, two references for a burning desire for revenge, and an additional 
reference to a desire for revenge. In fact, the focus on revenge was noted in the 
interrogation deposition of one of the local perpetrators of the attack, Lilik Purnomo 
alias Haris. The deposition records Haris as telling police that he did not approve of the 
notes' text because "it gave the impression that there was an element of revenge [in the 
motivations for the attack]". 139 
The attack on the girls was intended to take place on 26 October, the morning after 
Hasanuddin gave his tausiah. Early that morning, the seven local men who had been 
selected to perpetrate the attack set out for I wan's house in Sayo ward. Their plan did 
not go smoothly: when they walked up into the hills behind Iwan's house intending to 
ambush the girls, they were spotted hiding in the bushes by a woman who happened to 
walk along the foot-track that morning. Consequently, the men fled and aborted the 
attack. After they had retreated to Tanah Runtuh, Iwan was sent back to the vicinity of 
Sa yo to see if there were now more police or military deployed to the area. After he saw 
no sign of increased vigilance, Haris and I wan conducted a fifth early-morning survey 
of the foot-track to check that their plan was still feasible. The men then repeated their 
138 Translation of photocopy of letter in interrogation dossier of Hasanuddin. 
139 Deposition ofLilik Pumomo alias Haris in dossier ofHasanuddin alias Slamet Raharjo, 11 May 2006, 
p. 14. Haris's statement was not specifically confirmed in his court trial. During the trial, however, Haris 
concede hat he had seen the content of the notes and that he disapproved of them, however, confirming 
another statement from his interrogation deposition, that "the contents were too over the top [ menyolok, 
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attempt on 29 October. This time there were no last-minute surprises, and when four 
school-girls- aged sixteen, nineteen, fifteen and sixteen - walked down the foot-track, 
the men killed three of the girls and wounded the other.140 
What broader insights can we draw from the beheadings attack to help us to understand 
how and why sporadic violence was perpetrated in Poso? First, the attack was highly 
premeditated - the idea for the attack came weeks before the actual incident, and the 
preparation involved at least four surveys as well as the purchase of specific equipment 
for the attack. The extent of preparations evident in this attack may have been one 
limiting factor on the number of sporadic violent incidents in Poso. 
Second, the organisation of the attack involved both outsiders and locals, but it was 
locals who carried out the attack. This division of labour appears to have been a 
common feature of many of the sporadic attacks perpetrated by this group. The May 
2005 Tentena bombing was one exception, as there was one outside mujahid among the 
four men who transported the bombs to the Christian town and placed them in the 
market there. 
Third, the men did not kill with the deadliest weapons available to them. It is clear that 
the group responsible for the beheadings had extensive stocks of firearms - when Tanah 
Runtuh was raided twice in January 2007 police recovered nineteen factory-standard 
firearms, including a grenade launcher, and they continued to find more factory-
standard weapons in the days after the raids. The men's choice to behead the girls 
cautions us against adopting any simple analytical framework such as that the 
availability of more sophisticated weapons will result in increasingly high numbers of 
fatalities. 141 Some sporadic attacks in Poso - particularly the major bombings - were 
aimed to maximise casualties. But the perpetrators of this attack chose a specific form 
of violence to maximise the provocative effect of the attack, and because they believed 
beheadings were justified because Christians had killed in the same way earlier in the 
Poso conflict. 
literally "conspicuous"]". Direct observation by author of trial of Lilik Pumomo and Irwanto Irano, 
Central Jakarta District Court, 24 January 2007. 
140 Based on their surveys of the location, the men had actually expected a group of six girls, but by 
chance only four of the girls walked to school together that morning. 
141 c.f. Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, p. 419. 
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Fourth, the perpetrators were unconcerned about the specific identity of their victims as 
long as they were Christians. The fact that they killed schoolgirls makes the logic of 
their target selection particularly clear - it is of course nonsensical to suggest that the 
girls had contributed to violence against Muslims in Poso in any way. A judge 
challenged Haris during his trial regarding the selection as targets of people "who did 
not know [you], did not know what the problem was". His reply was that when his 
house had been burned, and Muslims had been slaughtered, he had also not know what 
the problem was.142 
Each of the two previous points highlights the perpetrators' keen awareness of violence 
earlier in the conflict [or at least a version of this violence], including for men such as 
Hasanuddin who arrived in Poso after large-scale attacks against Muslims had ceased. 
The emphasis on previous violence in Poso makes this particular attack appear local in 
scope, and an act of revenge; it is difficult to discern how the attack served any 
particular strategic agenda. Indeed, a senior JI leader disowned the beheadings as an 
example of the Java-based leadership's "lost [sic] of command" in Poso, although we 
must evaluate this statement critically given that the leader made the comment only 
after he was himself arrested, and as such he may have been mindful of avoiding legal 
sanctions. 143 
Another feature of the beheadings was the absence of reprisal attacks on Muslims after 
the incident, even if the attack reportedly generated fears among some Muslims that 
their children would become victims of retaliation. The decreasing community response 
to major attacks over time - communities stopped establishing road-blocks after attacks, 
and there were no reprisals after major bombing attacks in Poso in 2004 and 2005 - is a 
clear sign of the lessening of conflict between communities, and suggests that to some 
extent, Christians did not hold the entire Muslim community responsible for the actions 
of those continuing to perpetrate violence. 144 The trend also reflects the efforts of NGOs 
and some community leaders to channel anger over attacks towards the security forces 
142 Directobservation by author of trial ofLilik Pumomo alias Haris and Irwanto Irano alias !wan, 
Central Jakarta District Court, 24 January 2007. 
143 See "Abu Dujana: Saya Marah Kepada Noor Din", Tempo, 24 June 2007, p. 39. 
144 By contrast, there were two apparent reprisal attacks after the October 2003 attacks on Beteleme and 
Poso Pesisir. A Muslim fish trader, Susanto Jafar went missing on 12 October after he had set off to sell 
fish in a Christian area - his body was found several days later. In what appears to have been another 
reprisal, shots were fired at several houses near the Al Amanah pesantren in Tanah Runtuh on 17 
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and the government for their failure to prevent violence - after the beheadings, 
Damanik commented that the perpetrators may not have been civilians. 145 Whatever the 
causes of the trend, the lack of reprisals meant that the hopes of some perpetrators that 
sporadic attacks could generate renewed open conflict were disappointed. 
Finally, the attack also highlights the poor capacity of the security forces in Poso to 
detect preparations for attacks or to prevent violent incidents. A key part of the eventual 
fruition of this plan was the lack of increased vigilance around the site of the attack after 
the failed attempt on 26 October - a visible increase in the deployment of personnel 
may have deterred the attack. The confidence of the perpetrators in returning to the 
same site three days later to carry out their attack highlights the space that even a large 
scale deployment of police and soldiers still left for sporadic attacks. 
Even if the security forces were not able to prevent the beheadings, this attack was the 
most important trigger for a renewed central government intervention in Poso that 
eventually brought sporadic violence to at least a temporary end. 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to explain the process by which violence declined in Poso, as well 
as the reasons for the decline. I have focussed on two factors: first, the central 
government intervention in late-2001 that marked the start of the decline and reduced 
the space available to local actors to perpetrate attacks; second, the differing response of 
different parts of the alliance of outside mujahidin and local Muslims in Poso to the 
space left for violence. 
The sections of this chapter that specifically addressed the government interventions 
were largely confined to the initial effects of the Malino talks and the increased 
deployment of troops. In conclusion, I would like to employ a wider-angle lens to 
examine the overall pattern of central government interventions in Po so from late 2001 
until 2007, as well as the motivations for and the effects of these interventions. 
October. See "Susanto Ditemukan Tewas", Radar Sulteng, 17 October 2003; "GPK Serang Pesantren 
Amanah Gebangrejo", Radar Sulteng, 18 October 2003. 
145 "Ketua Majelis Sinode GKST: Pelaku Mutilasi 3 Siswi di Poso Mungkin dari Luar Sipil", detik.com, 1 
November 2005. 
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One interpretation of the December 2001 intervention has been that the security force 
deployments and Malino talks were symptomatic of a closing of the "opportunity 
structure" for violent inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflict in Indonesia. Van Klinken 
and Sidel, who are in their own ways both advocates of this interpretation, each identify 
the impeachment of President Abdurrahman Wahid and consequent rise of Megawati 
Soekarnoputri to the presidency as the crucial political development behind this closing. 
Their explanations of the importance of the Megawati presidency nonetheless differ 
slightly. Van Klinken sees the initial temporal context of the post-Soeharto conflicts to 
have been a "weakening of the repressive capacities of the state and the fragmentation 
of its ruling elites as a result of the multiple crises of 1998": the Megawati presidency 
was thus important because her rise to power signalled the emergence of a new ruling 
coalition in Indonesia. 146 With her government stronger than her predecessor's as a 
consequence, she was also better placed to take repressive action to counter violence in 
the sites of conflict. For Sidel, Megawati's presidency was important because her rise to 
power had entailed the cooptation of Islamic parties that had opposed her run for 
president in 1999. With these parties on board, Sidel argues, Megawati had a free hand 
to extend protection to non-Muslims in sites of conflict by cracking down on jihadist 
networks and their supporters.147 
Throughout this dissertation I have argued that we must make a place for the national 
context in our analysis of Po so. I do not intend to argue against Van Klinken and Side I' s 
identification of the importance of the Megawati presidency as one background factor to 
the December 2001 intervention in Po so. But there are two aspects of the central 
government intervention that we tend to underplay if we adopt the interpretation that 
this intervention marked a closing of the opportunity for further conflict. 
The first aspect is local motivations for security force behaviour. In Chapter Four, I 
gave two examples of the security forces taking severe action against men they 
suspected to be perpetrators of violence before there was strong pressure from the 
central government to intervene. Each case was an illegal reprisal. In this chapter, the 
example was reversed - with a police unit wanting revenge for the murder of their 
146 Van Klinken, Small Town Wars, pp. 33, 141. 
147 Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad, pp. 212-213. Sidel describes violence perpetrated by jihadist networks as 
essentially separate from conflicts between communities in Poso, which he argues also stopped in late-
2001 because three years of fighting had re-established clear boundaries between religious communities 
and consolidated each community's internal hierarchy. 
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comrade near Silanca village, they reportedly let an attack happen on 12 August 2002 
despite increased pressure from the government for effective intervention. Although 
each phenomenon is difficult to quantify, there are two other ways the local context 
may have lessened the resolve to act of security forces posted to Poso, except when 
central government pressure was particularly strong. The first was the opportunity for 
local units to profit from their posting in a conflict area, a point which van Klinken 
himself discusses. The second was a tendency identified by a senior police figure in 
Central Sulawesi for rank-and-file personnel to become bored and lose motivation to 
intervene, particularly during a long-term posting in Poso. 148 A reluctance to intervene 
was a particular problem when such intervention could involve risking becoming a 
target themselves. 
The second aspect is the uneven character of the government intervention in Poso over 
time. When viewed over the time period covered in this chapter, the government 
response to Poso appears crisis-driven. That is to say, the government did not take 
concerted action to halt violence in Poso unless it was affected by a sense of crisis. Such 
a sense of crisis on occasion may have been sparked by events outside the district - for 
instance when the manhunts that followed the Bali and Makassar bombings also 
impacted indirectly on Poso. More typically, however, each sense of crisis was 
generated when violence in Poso crossed an invisible psychological line. Once each 
sense of crisis faded, the space for violence re-opened. 
The October 2003 attacks in Beteleme and Poso Pesisir crossed this line. The police 
immediately launched a determined manhunt, arresting 18 suspects and shooting seven 
others dead. But the government response did not extend beyond these short-term 
efforts to catch the perpetrators to a more systematic attempt to investigate violence in 
Poso and bring those most responsible to account. The result was that most of the 
networks perpetrating violence were left intact. The May 2005 Tentena bombings - the 
deadliest bombing in Indonesia since the 2002 bomb attacks in Bali - also crossed the 
unseen line. Jusuf Kalla, who was by that point vice-president, set police a seven day 
deadline to apprehend the perpetrators. 149 Kalla's deadline soon generated more than a 
dozen arrests, but none of those in custody were the perpetrators of the attack, and 
government pressure relented amid criticism over the wrongful arrests. 
148 Interview with Central Sulawesi police chief, February 2006. 
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The October 2005 schoolgirl beheadings and subsequent shooting of two other 
schoolgirls took a giant stride across the invisible line. The widespread condemnation of 
the two attacks spurred senior police to become personally involved in Poso and 
resulted in the establishment of two ad hoc security bodies to tackle the violence in 
Poso. As a result, the beheadings prompted a much more concerted intervention than 
the response to the Beteleme/Poso Pesisir or Tentena attacks. Police rounded up 
suspects for some of the many unsolved cases that had occurred during the preceding 
two years - including the arrest of three of the perpetrators of the beheading. They also 
announced their intention to more systematically investigate twelve priority cases, 
including some of the more prominent incidents of violence perpetrated by both 
Muslims and Christians. Nevertheless, even after the beheadings the government's 
resolve to act appeared to fade once the initial crisis had passed, and the ad hoc security 
bodies were disbanded. Not until after the heightened tensions caused by the September 
2006 Tibo executions and the murder of the acting head of the GKST the following 
month did the police finally acted decisively to bring sporadic violence in Poso to at 
least a temporary end. They first announced a list of 29 men wanted over recent 
violence, all Muslims, and when only a handful of these men turned themselves in, 
police launched two raids on 11 January and 22 January in an attempt to capture the 
rest.tso 
With the exception of the January raids, these periodic interventions did not 
significantly restrict or directly reduce the capacity of those responsible for attacks to 
perpetrate violence - although the arrests and seizure of weapons were nonetheless a 
blow. Instead, the limiting effect of these interventions on violence in Poso is better 
thought of as a caution to perpetrators not to go too far. The uneven pattern of 
intervention thus helps to explain why the decline of violence was also uneven - to 
some extent it was left to perpetrators to judge what space was still available to them to 
perpetrate violence. We know that this judgement differed between different local 
Muslim men who had joined with outside mujahidin to perpetrate violence in 2001 and 
2002. With a slightly elevated risk of arrest (and many of the main targets for retaliation 
already attacked) many men began to perceive perpetrating violence to be no longer 
149 "Saya Sangat Marah dan Sedih", Kompas, 30 May 2005, p. 1. 
150 Police also arrested and charged sixteen Christian suspects for the reprisal murder of two Muslim fish 
traders after the Tibo executions. 
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worth the costs. For another group, we are left to assume that they would have 
continued to perpetrate violence indefinitely if their network had not been forcefully 
dismantled in 2007. 
Government security interventions were not the only factor that contributed to the 
decline in violence in Po so. A reduction in the threat to Muslims posed by the district's 
Christians was also an important limiting factor. On the one hand, the absence of further 
large-scale attacks by Christians by 2002 meant that violence no longer appeared to be a 
necessity to many local Muslim men, who consequently stopped fighting. But the 
absence of large-scale reprisals arguably also limited the amount of violence that 
outside mujahidin and the local Muslims still working with them could perpetrate. 
Without a descent into renewed open conflict that large-scale reprisals would have 
constituted, manhunts became an increasingly important component of successive 
government interventions, even if significant resources continued to be devoted to 
establishing guard posts throughout the district. 
The passage of time, and in particular community fatigue after the experience of years 
of instability, also played a factor. The role of fatigue is an important counter-point to 
my focus in this chapter on the ways in which earlier incidents of violence generated 
further violence and even sometimes affected the specific forms that later violence took. 
While earlier violence can be an important source of motivations to seek revenge, the 
experience of the costs of violence can also be an incentive to seek to avoid further 
fighting in the future. When violence began in Poso in December 1998, local 
communities probably had only a very partial understanding of just how high the costs 
of fighting could be. By the time violence began to decline in 2002, many members of 
both communities had personal experience of being forced to flee from their homes or 
even seeing their homes burned, losing access to fields, their businesses or their jobs, 
and seeing family members of friends killed or injured. Such concrete experience can 
easily make conflict intractable, and may at some point in the future serve as renewed 
motivation for some people in Poso to fight. But when winning means becoming 
charcoal, and losing ash, lived experience of conflict can also serve as a disincentive to 
taking up arms again. 
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CHAPTER SIX- CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has examined the escalation of the Poso conflict from 1998 to 2002, 
and the decline in violence from 2002 to 2007. In the preceding chapters, I have focused 
on the processes by which the escalation and decline took place, arguing that we must 
focus on these processes not only to understand why the violence followed a particular 
course in Poso, but also to understand why violence took place at all in the district. 
The fighting in Poso started with two riots in December 1998 and April 2000, which 
each occurred before the escalation of the Poso conflict to mass killing. This escalation 
took place during two weeks in May-June 2000 in which several hundred people, 
mostly Muslims, were killed as the violence spread beyond the city limits to other parts 
of the district. This period of violence marked the shift to protracted conflict in Poso, 
and spurred the entry of outside mujahidin into the district. Together with these newly 
arrived outside mujahidin, the district's Muslims then established a military advantage 
over Poso's Christians over the course of two major periods of fighting in June-July 
2001 and particularly in November-December 2001. Although the central government 
intervened in the conflict in late 2001, another major period of attacks followed in 
August 2002. Thereafter, most perpetrators decided that it no longer served their 
interests to continue to fight, and most violence from late 2002 until the end of 2006 
was perpetrated by outside mujahidin together with a core group of local Muslims who 
continued to collaborate with them. 
In the body of this dissertation, I have treated this violence in chronological order. In 
this Conclusion, I will change tack and focus on the six elements of analysis that I 
introduced in the Introduction: how the violence was organised, the role of identity, the 
relative importance of national and local contexts, the forms of violence, the effect of 
previous violence on local actors, and the motivations of perpetrators of violence. 
In addition to appraising the findings of each element of analysis, this conclusion will 
also address two other interpretive issues. First, I would like to return to a point raised 
in the Introduction regarding the shortcomings of structural analysis, and seek insights 
regarding the agency of local actors and its limits in the Poso conflict. The chapter will 
then conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of the analysis of this 
dissertation for future developments in Poso. 
SIX ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS 
How Violence Organised 
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Overall in the Poso conflict, at least 600 people were killed, thousands of houses were 
destroyed and tens of thousands of people were displaced. Perhaps the most sobering 
detail to arise from this dissertation is that the majority of this violence, including the 
periods of mass killing and protracted communal fighting, took place without being 
underpinned by a permanent organisation or by particularly long-term planning. 
The violence of December 1998 and April 2000 appeared the least organised. In 
contrast to later periods of fighting, rival crowds in the first two periods lacked a group 
of core combatants who had trained together. To follow a leader's directions in these 
periods did not bind a crowd member thereafter to continue to recognise the leader's 
authority; each individual retained considerable autonomy to act on their own initiative. 
After these two initial periods of violence, Christians swiftly assembled a more 
organised combatant entity - the kelompok merah - to coordinate clashes and provide 
key combatants for the May-June 2000 fighting. Some of the members of the kelompok 
merah had trained for up to several weeks and manufactured rudimentary weapons to 
prepare for the fighting, but these core combatants remained weak without large 
numbers of ad hoc recruits to either fight along side them or to cause the genera break 
down of law and order that allowed core combatants to operate. After the May-June 
2000 period of violence, outside mujahidin and local Muslims began to establish an 
alliance that over time achieved a greater degree of organisation than the kelompok 
merah. Nevertheless, ad hoc recruitment remained a crucial part of large-scale attacks 
by Muslims in 2001 and August 2002. Only after the majority of combatants stopped 
fighting during 2002 was violence primarily organised by a more permanent 
organisation, consisting of outside mujahidin and those local Muslims who were still 
prepared to fight. This more permanent organisation was still capable of perpetrating 
attacks that inflicted significant casualties - causing up to 40 fatalities each year - but 
nonetheless never expanded to become a fighting force of similar size to the crowds that 
gathered when ad hoc recruiting was still possible. 
If not by means of a permanent organisation, how did the violence in Poso take place? I 
indicated in the Introduction that the role of leaders would be an important part of the 
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explanation. The leaders identified in the body of this dissertation were not confined to 
the political and religious establishment and their business cronies, nor to challengers of 
the local establishment. During the conflict various other individuals were able to draw 
on different sources of authority to exercise leadership: 
martial prowess and a willingness to perpetrate violence could both become 
sources of authority when the community perceived there to be a need to fight -
in this way, individuals could emerge as leaders on account of their actions 
during the conflict; 
certain individuals could lead by giving orders to family members - consider the 
family clusters at the core of the kelompok merah during the violence in May-
June 2000 - or by virtue of their family connections; 
the training that each side began to organise in 2000 also reinforced a hierarchy 
between trainers and trainees. 
This dissertation also demonstrated that "leaders" was not a category with fixed 
membership during the conflict. Several factors caused changes in leadership. Some 
leaders were arrested - such as Herman Parimo in 1999 and Hasanuddin in 2006 - or 
even killed - for instance A. L. Lateka in 2000 and the outside mujahid Abdullah in 
2001. When misfortune befell a particular leader, family members were sometimes 
motivated to step into positions of authority, for instance when A. L. Lateka emerged as 
a kelompok merah leader after his brother-in-law Parimo died in custody. As mentioned 
above, individuals could become leaders or increase their prominence as leaders on 
account of their actions during the conflict. For instance, both Rinaldy Damanik and 
Adnan Arsal gained much greater authority within their communities because of their 
perceived boldness in stepping forward or in remaining in Poso during times of peril to 
represent their communities. The entry of new actors into the conflict could also cause 
shifts in leadership, with the clearest example being the arrival of outside mujahidin in 
Po so. 
The experience and preferences of the rank-and-file also drove changes in leadership. 
Although leaders exercised greater influence as individuals on the course of violence 
than did members of the rank-and-file, the rank-and-file were able to exercise agency 
through their choice of whom they would follow as a leader. In the body of this 
dissertation, I have challenged the "big fish" metaphor for the organisation of violence, 
233 
in which the rank-and-file are largely duped into violence by clever leaders. While 
acknowledging that some leaders did consciously attempt to frame their appeal for 
action in terms that would suit the rank-and-file, I have called in general for a shift in 
our understanding of the relation between leaders and rank-and-file towards the model 
of a coincidence of interests. Under this model, we would understand the rank-and-file 
to have chosen to fight because doing so suited their interests. The model did not 
require an absolute coincidence of interests: instead, both leaders and the rank-and-file 
needed to perceive that their interests were in some way being served. 1 I will discuss the 
question of how individuals assessed their interests in Poso in the section on 
motivations below; here we might briefly note that some of these interests may have 
included enmity towards the other religious community, responding to perceived 
affronts, the desire to loot, a desire for revenge and an interest in perpetrating violence 
in response to the perceived threat of themselves being attacked. The importance of a 
coincidence of interests between leaders and rank-and-file was perhaps plainest in its 
absence: during the decline of violence, leaders promoting violence lost much of their 
authority once community members decided that it was no longer in their interests to 
fight. 
Thus far this section has dealt with the question of how authority was exercised in the 
absence of a permanent organisation; I would like to conclude by considering how the 
organisation of violence enabled the escalation to large-scale killing. In the body of this 
dissertation I have emphasised the importance of crowds to each of the major periods of 
violence. Crowds did not themselves kill large numbers of people, but the breakdown of 
law and order precipitated by the mobilisation of large numbers of people created a 
space for core combatants more intent on killing to operate. (The mobilisation of 
1 In the context of Islamist social movements, Bayat proposes the concept of an "imagined solidarity" 
between social movement leaders and their followers. He suggests that the unity of social movements 
arises from partially shared interests between different actors, and that in an information poor 
environment, actors will "tend to converge on the generalities [of their shared interests, e.g. a movement's 
slogan], but are left to imagine the specifics, to envision commonalities." One of his key examples is the 
1979 Iranian revolution, in which different actors converged on the need for "change", with many groups 
discovering only after Ayatollah Khomeini had gained power that they had different understandings of 
what change should entail. The idea of different actors imagining at the time of fighting that they shared 
greater commonality than what they later discovered seems applicable in broad terms to the coincidence 
of interests in Poso. There is a difference, however, with Bayat's example of the Iranian revolution: 
leaders in Poso did not attain institutionalised power that would have left them able to exert authority 
without the continued cooperation of the rank-and-file. If the rank-and-file in Poso realised that they did 
not share interests with leaders, then the leaders were unlikely to remain as leaders. On "imagined 
solidarities" see AsefBayat "Islamism and Social Movement Theory", Third World Quarterly 26,6 
(2005): 891-908 (particularly pp. 90 1-905). 
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crowds also increased the chance of anonymity - and with it impunity - for 
perpetrators.) In the context of the third period of violence, for example, I argued that as 
many as half of those killed in May-June 2000 may have been prisoners murdered by 
the kelompok merah, and suggested that it would more likely be core combatants rather 
than ad hoc recruits who perpetrated most of these murders. In the context of the 
protracted communal fighting from mid 2000 to 2001, we saw that clashes between 
crowds continued to cause only a few fatalities even when increasing numbers of more 
reliably lethal factory-standard firearms became available. Outside mujahidin or the 
local men who had trained with them would have been the most likely to have been 
holding these factory-standard firearms; although I do not have firm data for many of 
the sporadic incidents of violence, it might be assumed that core combatants on each 
side were likely to be behind many of the sporadic individual killings as well. 
The different roles and levels of participation within combatant entities and crowds 
meant that many community members could have participated in clashes without being 
required themselves to kill. As an example, we might recall the comment of a local 
Muslim combatant in Chapter Four that many youths were satisfied simply to hear the 
sound of their (often wildly inaccurate) home-made gun firing a shot. I would argue that 
the different available roles - only a few killers among a much larger crowd, and core 
combatants perhaps doing much of the killing outside of large-scale clashes - aided the 
rapid escalation to widespread killing, because the majority of each community needed 
only to tacitly approve of killing, without themselves directly confronting the reality of 
murdering an opponent. It is likely only a small sub-section of each community - in 
total amounting to a few hundred individuals at the most - personally perpetrated 
murders. 
Identity 
As a general pattern, "Christian" and "Muslim" became sole and sufficient identity 
markers to determine whether an individual was friend or foe during the Poso conflict. 
This observation is not to say that Christians and Muslims fought each other because 
they were in some way natural enemies - the "totalisation" of these identities took place 
only over time. I must stress, however, that totalisation is an abstraction to help us trace 
trends in the salience of identity to violence at a community level. The concept does not 
provide an accurate description of the salience of religious identity for every individual 
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m Poso - we should expect to see vanance between individuals and even m the 
behaviour of a single individual over time.2 
From the outset of the fighting in Poso, religious identity determined which side an 
individual could be on, but did not oblige individuals to take sides. In the first period of 
violence and most of the second period, a person's status as a Muslim or a Christian 
generally was not sufficient reason for that person to be attacked. An additional factor 
was required: the individual may have chosen to come to a site of confrontation, or may 
have lived in a particular ward of the city, or else may have been a member of a certain 
family. By the May-June 2000 period of violence, alternative identity markers such as 
location of residence were almost irrelevant. Any Muslim who remained in Poso, with 
the possible exception of women and children, could be deemed a "rioter" and thereby a 
legitimate target of violence. During the reprisals perpetrated by Muslims after the 
May-June 2000 violence, villages renowned as Christian strongholds were particular 
targets, but any Christian in Poso was a legitimate target for violence (again, generally, 
with the exception of women and children). For those Muslims who continued to 
perpetrate violence after the conflict had waned, the group of legitimate targets 
broadened further to include Christians with no apparent connection to Poso or to the 
conflict in the district, as well as Muslims who were believed to be passing information 
to the police or who were agents of the law. 
During the conflict, certain in-group identities also developed that provided positive 
reinforcement for perpetrators of violence. On the Christian side, the revival of the 
symbol of the long defunct youth movement, GPST, may have helped to motivate some 
combatants to mobilise in December 1998 in loose emulation of the imagined deeds of 
their elders. In the May-June 2000 period of violence, various oft-repeated phrases 
promoted the idea of "the stoic Christian" pushed over the edge by what was now 
imagined as repeated Muslim attacks. This identity construct neatly cast previous 
defeats as the result of stoic restraint, while providing justification for an all-out attack. 
2 On the point ofvariation in the behaviour of a single individual, see Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary 
Men: Reserve Police Battalion 1 OJ and the Final Solution in Poland, (New York: Harper Perennial, 
1998), p. 187. The limits oftotalisation as an approximation are also evident in the examples of dissent 
against totalised identities at times when these identities were most strongly formed. Just one example is 
the categorisation by a Christian minister of individuals planning to attack Muslims as "GPK" (See 
Chapter Three). 
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On the Muslim side, the clearest example was the promotion of a notion of the conflict 
as an arena for jihad and more particularly of an obligation for a Muslim to become a 
mujahid and fight. Various actors raised the idea of jihad in each of the first three 
periods of violence, but it was not until after the third period and the great losses 
suffered by Poso's Muslims that the notion that jihad was obligatory was greatly 
strengthened. Outside mujahidin in particular promoted the idea that all Muslims in 
Poso were obliged to become mujahidin; the effects of their proselytising were evident 
in repeated recollection of local Muslims that they newly understood that it was haram 
to flee. 
Van Klinken calls such in-group identities "prototypes", and in his discussion of 
violence in West Kalimantan in 1997 and 1999 proposes the concept of "frame 
alignment" to explain why these prototypes only sometimes lead to violence. 3 The 
concept, taken from social movement theory, is that leaders must "frame the 
contemporary problem in such a way that it [i.e. the leaders call to action] resonates" 
with what the audience already believes, thereby motivating their audience to act.4 
Under the concept of frame alignment, leaders determine the success of mobilisation: 
either they are clever enough to frame their interests appropriately or they are not. For 
the Poso case, I would like to build on the concept of coincidence of interests, described 
in the previous section, to shift the focus away from leaders. My reason for doing so 
derives from the observation that the same people responded to the same frame 
differently over time. For instance, local Muslims found the identity of mujahid 
compelling when the cost of fighting was low and their desire to fight was strong, as 
was the case in 2001. Many of the same local Muslims found the same identity far less 
compelling, however, when the costs associated with fighting increased and when they 
perceived that they were gaining little from continuing unrest in Poso. If we consider 
what may have motivated the rank-and-file to align themselves with a particular frame 
at a particular time, then the mobilisation for violence of the rank-and-file appears less 
the result of skilful manipulation and more the result of decisions made by the rank-and-
file. 
Before proceeding further, it is worth emphasising the limits of the totalisation 
argument, as raised most explicitly in the context of the violence in May-June 2000. 
3 Van Klinken, Small Town Wars, p. 66. 
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The information gathered for this dissertation suggests that there was widespread 
adherence to totalised identities at the peak of the fighting in Poso. Nevertheless, this 
dissertation found that at local level, individuals' new perception of their neighbours as 
a threat did not in itself lead them to perpetrate violence. It appears to have taken an 
additional stimulus for villagers to perpetrate violence - in the third period typically the 
arrival of co-religionists from elsewhere in the district. 
Having established that totalisation approximates the process of increasing salience of 
religious identity to violence in Poso, we are left to question what drove totalisation. 
Overall, I do not believe we have a comprehensive answer to this question, but a 
number of factors can be identified. Violence raised the stakes for misidentification of 
one's foe - it was safer to consider a member of a different religious group to be an 
enemy than to wrongly trust them and by so doing risk falling victim to an attack. When 
certain individuals from one community perpetrated attacks and few co-religionists 
spoke out in condemnation, their silence also may have encouraged the targeted group 
to perceive the entire religious community of which the perpetrators were members to 
be complicit in the violence.5 To the extent that perpetrating violence became a "habit", 
individuals may also have become less sensitive to the individual identity of their 
victims as a result. Peer pressure also supported the development of an in-group identity 
that made violence appear obligatory, as discussed most explicitly in the context of 
violence during 2001. 
Forms of Violence 
This dissertation has set out the diverse forms of violence that were perpetrated during 
the Poso conflict, and noted the points at which the forms of violence changed. To recap 
some of the patterns that were observed, murder became a feature of the conflict in the 
April 2000 violence, after which murder escalated to become mass killing a month later 
in the May-June 2000 violence; clashes between crowds were a common form of 
violence from December 1998 until August 2002, but then ceased after the August 2002 
period of violence. 
4 Van Klinken, Small Town Wars, p. 69. 
5 Thankyou to Robert Cribb for pointing out this interpretation. The January 2000 riot in Mataram in 
West Nusa Tenggara province may provide a comparative example of this phenomenon. Immediately 
prior to this riot, according to an ICG report on the violence, Muslims in Mataram circulated a petition 
demanding that local Christians publicly condemn the actions of their co-religionists in Maluku. See ICG, 
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The· aim in highlighting these and other patterns in the form of violence went beyond 
merely recording each violent event. For instance, we were able to derive insights from 
the forms of violence regarding the meaning of each violent act to the targeted 
community. For instance, revulsion at the killing of women and children in the July 
2001 Buyung Katedo massacre gave this an attack a significance over and above what 
might be expected from the simple number of deaths. This attack, and others in which 
people were brutally killed with machetes or in which the bodies of victims were 
haphazardly disposed of, became particular motivations for revenge for the targeted 
community. 
Brutal violence could also produce imitation: for instance, the perpetrators of the 
beheading of three schoolgirls in October 2005 justified their choice of target and 
method of killing because Christians had also sadistically killed women and children 
earlier in the conflict. In instances such as these beheadings, the form of violence had 
meaning to the perpetrators as well as to the targeted group. Indeed, attacks such as 
beheading, and the absence of a pattern in Poso of perpetrators always using the most 
sophisticated weapons available to them, caution against interpreting the escalation of 
violence in Po so by the sort of general pattern identified by Horowitz of the availability 
of modem firearms leading to greater numbers of fatalities. An alternative pattern that 
better describes the Poso violence might be that the more organised the violence 
became, the more thought was given to form. 
In examining the violence from May-June 2000 until the end of2001, we were also able 
to derive another insight regarding the motivations of combatants by observing that 
most clashes between crowds led to only a few deaths, even after increasing numbers of 
factory-standard firearms were available for use in these clashes. By considering this 
feature of the violence in comparison with Horowitz's observation of the "risk 
aversion" of rioters, we were able to conclude that in general, combatants in Poso 
stayed and fought only when they felt they had a reasonable chance of winning. Absent 
this chance, most people fled. 
The Perils of Private Security in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok, Asia Report no. 
67,7 November 2003. 
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Attention to forms of violence also enabled us to trace shifts in the set of actors 
responsible for attacks in Poso, even if the forms of violence was not the only method 
by which such shifts could be traced. To recount several examples: 
the killing of prisoners and disposal of bodies in mass graves in the May-June 
2000 violence was one sign of the operation of a more organised core of 
Christian combatants at the heart of the fighting; 
the arrival of mujahidin in Poso starting in mid-2000 could be traced through 
observing new forms of violence, particularly the bombings of public transport 
vehicles and public places that began in early 2001, but also the increasing use 
of factory-standard weapons in clashes between crowds and sporadic attacks; 
the disappearance of attacks by crowds after August 2002 marked a narrowing 
of the set of people in Poso willing to directly perpetrate violence. Thereafter, 
the perpetrators of most attacks were drawn exclusively from the ranks of 
outside mujahidin and a limited subset of local Muslim youths. 
Effects of Violence 
As noted in the Introduction, observers of ethnic and religious conflict in South Asia 
have asserted that in sites where riots "persist", "form a series" or "recur", the effects of 
each riot are observable in subsequent incidents. Poso did not form a series of riots - the 
violence became protracted rather than persistent - but tracing the effects of previous 
violence on subsequent incidents has been an important element of analysis in this 
dissertation. There was no simple pattern to the effects of violence in Poso - in the 
preceding chapters we have observed examples both of violence producing and also 
inhibiting further violence. The common significance to both the productive and 
inhibiting effects of violence, however, is that the effect of violence was to alter the 
motivations and priorities of local actors. 
Violence in Poso had "productive" effects both for the group responsible for each 
incident as well as for the targeted group. The experience of perpetrating violence 
generated further violence when the success of the initial enterprise encouraged a repeat 
performance, or when perpetrating violence became habitual, as it may have done for 
some of the local Muslims who continued to perpetrate violence long after the level of 
conflict in Poso had declined. The Poso case also appears to bear out the phenomenon 
observed in larger scale incidents of mass killings, in which perpetrators become 
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desensitised to the act of perpetrating violence and so are able to perpetrate bloodier and 
bloodier acts. 6 I explicitly raised this phenomenon as a possible part of the explanation 
for the Sintuwulemba and Buyung Katedo massacres; it may also help account for the 
beheading attacks in November 2004 and October 2005. Violent acts also motivated the 
targeted group to themselves perpetrate further violence when earlier incidents became 
a source of indignant anger, convinced local actors that it was necessary to perpetrate 
violence to head off possible future attacks, or when violence generated a desire for 
revenge. 
Conversely, violence inhibited further participation in attacks by the perpetrators when 
they became convinced that violence perpetrated by their side was not legitimate, 
became disillusioned by the experience of violence, or even by the experience of the 
effects of violence on their everyday lives. Much as the fear of attack caused by 
violence became a motivation for some people to perpetrate attacks, violent incidents 
also inhibited further violence when attacks generated what appeared to the targeted 
group to be insurmountable fears, or when perpetrators became fearful for their lives 
after perceiving that they had survived a near miss during an attack. 
Once we recognise that violence affected the motivations of actors in Poso, and in fact 
of itself became a new motivation to perpetrate violence, we must question accounts 
that explain the conflict through a single model. For instance, Wilson has identified a 
tendency in certain studies of violent conflict to identify the prominent characteristics of 
the conflict at the peak of fighting and deduce from these characteristics a causal model 
for the entire conflict;7 other studies similarly extrapolate from the initial circumstances 
or prior tensions in a site of conflict. The overall models that have been proposed to 
explain the violence in Indonesia that followed Soeharto's fall- local politics by other 
means, fighting structurally determined by two shifts in the position of Islam in public 
life, violence as the result of renewed competition over the terms of access to and 
inclusion in the state for ethnic and religious groups - have proved inadequate to 
explain the motivations behind the escalation and decline of violence in Poso. This 
dissertation instead suggests that the factors that initially stimulate or enable violence 
may not be those that sustain it or determine its changing character. Close study of the 
6 See Browning, Ordinary Men, p. 161, Jean Hatzfeld, Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak, 
trans. Linda Coverdale, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), pp. 47-51, 74, 129. 
7 Wilson, Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God. 
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processes by which violence escalates and declines within a conflict situation is thus 
necessary to explain why violence occurred. 
National and Local Contexts and Actors 
The Poso conflict was overwhelmingly the result of the actions of local actors, with the 
obvious exception of the operations of outside mujahidin in the district. This 
dissertation has found unconvincing the schools of analysis that interpret the violence in 
Poso as the result of the clandestine manipulation of national level actors. Nevertheless, 
I have considered the influence of the national context on developments in Poso, and 
have discussed three key mechanisms by which external actors and developments could 
influence the escalation and decline of violence in Poso. The national structural context 
could have played a determining role in producing violence in Poso; outside 
interventions could have determined the course of the conflict; or the violence in Poso 
could have snowballed from elsewhere in the country. 
Throughout this dissertation I have acknowledged the role of the structural context Poso 
shared with many other parts of Indonesia in enabling violence, but I have also set out 
at some length how local actors determined that violence would take place. A key factor 
that opened a space for local actors to exercise agency, even in defiance of national 
trends, was Poso's peripheral position in Indonesia. The district was peripheral 
geographically - a remote district in a remote province - and, in part as a result of its 
geographical position, peripheral in perceived importance to national affairs. News of 
the worst violence in Po so in 2000 and 2001 did not always generate particular 
coverage in the national media; it was only during the post-conflict phase of violence 
from 2002 onwards that large attacks in Poso were more likely to grab the attention of 
Jakarta-based news outlets. 
Nevertheless, there were two important instances of outside intervention in the Poso 
conflict. Awareness of the importance of these interventions means that we cannot 
explain the Poso conflict entirely by examination of Poso alone. First, outside mujahidin 
came to Poso in response to the May-June 2000 violence, a consequence of this period 
that the district's Christians had not anticipated. Thereafter these outside mujahidin 
greatly increased the military capacity of local Muslim youths and it is not possible to 
discuss the conflict from 2001 onwards without considering the interaction of these two 
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groups. Second, the central government's intervention in the conflict contributed to a 
marked decline in violence staring in 2002, as the government brokered peace talks, 
maintained a significant security force deployment and provided recovery funds. The 
late-2001 government intervention and those that followed were in part triggered by 
major attacks in Poso, but these interventions were also enabled by changes in the 
national context such as the consolidation of power by President Megawati 
Soekamoputri and the increased attention to terrorist networks generated in particular 
by the October 2002 Bali bombing. But the central government intervention in Poso is 
also one example of how the peripheral position of the district created space for actors 
in Poso to act. Jakarta-based officials typically exerted strong pressure for action in 
Poso only in the aftermath of serious incidents of violence. Once the perception of a 
crisis faded, security forces posted in Poso were able pursue local initiatives or 
otherwise tend to inaction. The absence of concerted and constant national pressure left 
a space for perpetrators in Poso to continue to carry out attacks, and indeed to guess 
where the limits of their impunity lay. 
The snowballing of violence from other conflicts to Poso, or the borrowing of tactics 
from elsewhere by actors in Poso appears to have been very limited. The most 
significant effect of another conflict on the violence in Poso arose from a coincidence of 
timing: outside mujahidin had been prepared by their experience in the Maluku conflict, 
where a serious escalation of violence took place sooner than in Poso, to mobilise to 
travel to Poso after the third period of violence in May-June 2000. Outside mujahidin 
continued to move back and forth between Maluku and Poso after their arrival in the 
district, and even took a few local Muslim combatants from Poso to Maluku. 
Nevertheless, outside mujahidin in general could not be said to have travelled to Poso 
because of the Maluku violence: their reasons or coming to Poso still primarily related 
to attacks perpetrated by members of the district's Christian community. 
Motivations 
A key feature of protracted conflict is the shifting nature of and lines of confrontation. 
Leaders, actors, the salience of identity and forms of violence all change over time. 
Although the motivations of perpetrators are harder to observe than some of these other 
aspects of the Poso conflict, this dissertation indicates that the motivations for violence 
also changed over time. If we accept that different individuals perpetrated violence for 
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different reasons, and that the motivations of each individual changed as they 
accumulated experience of the conflict, then it appears unlikely that any single idiom 
will adequately capture the motivations for violence in Poso. In this dissertation I have 
argued that a more promising approach is to develop a model of motivations that 
explains how individuals continually reached and reappraised their decision to fight. I 
set out this model most explicitly in the context of the violence in May-June 2000, 
arguing that we must refrain from imposing a dichotomy between "rational", cool-
headed interests and "irrational", emotional feelings when examining individual 
motivations. Instead it is more effective to analyse how individuals constantly reassess 
their interests and reorder their priorities by incorporating emotional responses to their 
circumstances into their rational decisions. 
Although my key conclusion in this element of analysis is that individuals incorporate 
different motivations in constant reassessment of their interests, I have not abrogated 
the task of identifying various motivations that were relevant to perpetrators' decisions 
to fight. Without asserting that the following is a comprehensive list of motivations, nor 
proposing an exact "calculus" of the contribution of each of these motivations to the 
violence in Poso over the duration of the conflict, let us briefly recap some of the 
insights we have gained during the preceding chapters regarding each of these 
motivations: 
Pre-existing enmities in themselves did not explain the occurrence of violence, 
but these enmities were not irrelevant as a motivation once the violence began. 
Throughout the Poso conflict, certain individuals were seeking political gain, 
which is not to say that these individuals were in a position at all times to control 
the course of the violence. As discussed in the context of the December 1998 
and April 2000 riots, however, political gain is often an incomplete explanation 
even of the actions of politically-interested individuals. 
Indignant anger exposed the role of violence in generating further violence and 
shifting the priorities of actors. The desire for revenge was another motivation 
spurred by previous violence. 
The fear of being attacked was one motivation for actors to launch pre-emptive 
attacks or to prepare defences. Horowitz's concept of "risk aversion" 
contributed to an important insight on fear in the Poso conflict - that fears would 
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typically lead individuals to prepare to fight or stay and fight only if they 
perceived that their fears were surmountable. 
Religious identity, as discussed in a separate section above, provided impetus 
and a source of courage to fight. Religious identity could also spur indignant 
anger when places of worship or other symbols of religion were attacked or 
denigrated. 
Peer pressure, including that exerted by family members, increased the costs of 
choosing not to fight when support for violence was widespread. 
Impunity, or at least a reasonable chance of not facing legal sanctions, is most 
apparent as a motivation by the effect of its absence. When combatants 
perceived the risk of arrest was increasing, many became reluctant to fight. 
Certain individuals could gain financial profit if further violence ensured that 
the government would continue to remit assistance funds to the district, if the 
individuals were paid to perpetrate specific incidents of violence, or if the 
conflict situation provided an opportunity for armed robbery. 
AGENCY AND ITS LIMITS 
This dissertation has placed the actions, choices and motivations of local actors in Poso 
at the centre of its explanation of the Po so conflict. Despite the focus on the role of local 
actors in bringing about the escalation an decline of violence, it has not been my 
intention to propose a model of unlimited agency. Throughout this dissertation I have 
acknowledged a role for the structural context - in enabling certain actions, contributing 
to motivations or contributing to the consequences of a particular act - without 
subscribing to a structural determinist position. In this section, I would like to explore to 
other aspects of agency and its limits that this dissertation has raised, but which bear 
further elaboration: the implications for agency of the collective character of the 
organisation of violence in Poso, and the importance of circumstances to the decisions 
that actors in Poso made. 
Petersen provides us with a straightforward definition of agency to aid this discussion: 
"Actors possess a range of options and they actively and consciously choose among this 
range of options."8 For the purposes of this dissertation we can enhance Petersen's 
8 Petersen, "Review of Paul Brass", p. 110. 
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definition by adding a condition paraphrased from Pomper - that the choices and 
actions of actors must effect change.9 From Petersen we also gain three simple tests to 
establish if actors do not have agency: "[i]f actors have only one realistic option, if they 
follow one option unconsciously or if the options have been obfuscated or 
manipulated". 10 
This dissertation's rejection of the idea of an unseen manipulator as the author of the 
conflict leads to the first constraint on agency: that the Poso conflict in its entirety was 
not a pre-conceived plan - the violence escalated and declined as a collective enterprise 
in which actors could only make their decisions in response to the actions of others. 
Under such circumstances, Sewell reminds us that the agency each individual is able to 
exercise varies greatly: by virtue of their social position, their position within collective 
organisations (or in the Poso case, the more fluid combatant entities formed for each 
period of violence), their geographic location and their personal characteristics, people 
have different capacities to "coordinate ... [their] actions with others and against others, 
to form collective projects, to persuade, to coerce, and to monitor the simultaneous 
effects of .... [their] own and others' activities."11 
During the Poso conflict, many or most people in the district were making decisions not 
in the attempt to persuade or to coerce large numbers of people or to direct the overall 
course of the conflict, but on whether or not to fight at times and even sometimes places 
not of their choosing. And yet, while the agency of these individuals was consequently 
reduced, in most instances they still retained at least a limited range of options and their 
actions and decisions had significance. 12 For instance, the many combatants who fought 
in local clashes, or who gathered in Tagolu during the third period, made an important 
contribution to the escalation of the violence because they helped create a space for 
combatants bent on larger-scale violence to operate. Similarly, whereas the decision of a 
single combatant to stop fighting may have been insignificant, when the majority of 
community members became reluctant to fight their decisions were an important factor 
in the decline of violence. 
9 Philip Pomper, "Historians and Individual Agency", History and Theory 35,3 (1996): 283. 
10 Petersen, "Review of Paul Brass", p. 110. 
11 Sewell, "A Theory of Structure", pp. 20-21. 
12 lt could be argued any violent act is significant in its own right, but here I will focus on significance to 
the escalation and decline of violence. 
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Nor should we conceive of leaders and core combatants as having been in complete 
control of the course of the conflict. During major periods of violence, leaders 
admittedly did achieve notable successes in mobilising rank-and-file or in influencing 
those who had mobilised, and in so doing exercised significant agency. But a range of 
factors limited the agency of leaders. Their reliance on ad hoc recruits presented a 
constraint on their agency, even if the decision of the rank-and-file to mobilise created a 
space for core combatants to organise. Bound primarily by a coincidence of interests, 
rather than organisational ties, leaders could not exercise particularly direct control over 
the actions of the ad hoc recruits that made up crowds, nor could they be sure that these 
recruits would mobilise day after day. 
Leaders were also not able to develop a strong enough organisation to resist the power 
of the state, with the result that their interests were always vulnerable to central 
government and security forces intervention. This weakness meant that although each 
side developed a clear military advantage at different stages during the conflict -
Christian combatants during the May-June 2000 violence and Muslim combatants in 
late 2001 - each side was forced to halt or greatly reduce violence before their leaders 
may have chosen to do so.13 
The circumstances of violent conflict affected the decisions that actors made and 
formed part of the motivation for perpetrating violence, a point I made explicitly as a 
part of the "effects of violence" element of analysis. Individuals in Poso did not decide 
to fight in a vacuum, nor in general did they fight entirely because of motivations that 
they held prior to the start of violence. 14 Indeed, the contribution of circumstances to 
their decision to fight has been raised in their defence by some of the men who have 
stood trial for violence in Poso. In a personal defence plea, for example, two of the 
perpetrators of the October 2005 beheadings of three Christian schoolgirls asserted that 
they "WOULD NEVER have conceived of let alone BE PREPARED to perpetrate this 
13 Leaders also may have been forced to stop in any case because rank-and-file combatants were most 
strongly committed to violence when they perceived fighting to be necessary. 
14 A similar point in the context of an altogether different episode of violence is made by Moses in his 
illuminating review of Daniel Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust. Moses refutes Goldhagen's thesis that the extreme circumstances under the Nazi regime 
during the Second World War released the inhibitions that had previously prevented Germans from acting 
on what Goldhagen asserts was their long-held desire to murder Jews, instead arguing that "these extreme 
circumstances are not the occasion for the release of pre-existing preferences, but the occasion for the 
development of new ones." See A. D. Moses, "Structure and Agency in the Holocaust: Daniel J. 
Goldhagen and his Critics", History and Theory 37,2 (1998): 216. 
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violence [i.e. the beheadings; capital letters in original]" but for the violence against 
Muslims in 2000: 
We had no thoughts ofbreaking the law, let alone murdering or perpetrating other violent 
acts. But the conflict in 2000, of which to this day we do not know the cause and of 
which it is clear that the two of us were NOT the cause, changed our mental state and our 
way ofthinking.15 
The purpose of the two men in raising this point, of course, was to absolve themselves 
of responsibility for their actions. Although I think we need to acknowledge the 
contribution of circumstances to the decisions of actors in Poso, we go too far if we 
concur with these men and see these circumstances as removing their agency. The 
emotional responses evoked by violence and the circumstances of violent conflict -
such as indignant anger, fear, the desire for revenge, and, over time, fatigue- affected 
the choices that actors made and may have limited the number of options they were 
likely to choose, but they did not generally reduce the options available to an actor to a 
single course of action. Instead, numerous authors have noted that individuals interpret 
the one situation differently, and so decide upon different courses of action. 16 In the 
variety of responses to the circumstances of the conflict in Poso lies evidence of 
individuals' retention of agency. 
Violence in Poso thus was a collective enterprise, mostly perpetrated by local actors, for 
which individuals bear responsibility but in which no-one was in complete control. The 
lack of complete control is not to say that the escalation of violence was the result of 
unimagined consequences - I have attempted to demonstrate that those leading attacks 
at the times that violence escalated intended to effect an increase in the scale of the 
15 Lilik Pumomo and lrwanto lrano, Pembelaan Pribadi Personal Defense Plea read out by Lilik 
Pumomo during trial at Jakarta District Court, 5 March 2007 (capital letters in original). 
16 Sewell makes this observation in the context of explaining how changes in structure are possible. 
Arguing that structures consist of schema (generalisable procedures) and actual resources, and that 
schema and resources mutually reproduce, Sewell introduces the concept of the "polysemy of resources" 
to describe the ability of human actors to derive different meanings from a single array of resources. (To 
use Sewell's example of such an array, "the new prestige, wealth and territory gained from the brilliant 
success of a cavalry charge" might be interpreted as the success of the entire cavalry officer core, or be 
attributed to a single general.) Reddy makes a similar point in the course of refuting a determining role 
for culture over human action. The susceptibility of any rule or term to multiple interpretations makes it 
impossible for culture to play such a role, Reddy argues. To assert otherwise would be "as if there were a 
set of rules so clear that everyone judged their application to specific action situations in the same way. It 
is as if there were a magical set of laws for which the interpretive problems of jurisprudence did not 
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conflict - but the motivations of both leaders and rank-and-file derived in part from 
their experience of the conflict and not simply from pre-existing interests and 
intentions. This conclusion derives from the six elements of analysis outlined above. It 
is not my contention, on the basis of this dissertation, that this model will also 
adequately explain the escalation and decline of the other inter-religious and inter-ethnic 
conflicts that took place after Soeharto resigned. Nevertheless, the six elements of 
analysis that I propose in this dissertation are not derived from specific events in Poso, 
and it should be possible to apply this approach to other conflict settings. Similar 
histories of the Maluku, North Maluku and possibly the West and Central Kalimantan 
conflicts, produced by attention to these six elements of analysis, could provide a 
stronger basis to understand the extent to which these conflicts share similar reasons for 
and processes of escalation and decline. 
THE FUTURE FOR POSO 
In the previous section, I argued that the constraints on individual choice and action 
during the Poso conflict were not sufficient to render the agency of individuals in Poso 
insignificant in the escalation and decline of violence. In many circumstances, the 
granting of agency to a group of people -particularly the rank-and-file- is taken to be 
an empowering process, because to do so brings the masses back from "outside 
history". 17 In Poso, however, it is unlikely community members would see the granting 
of agency in an analysis of the conflict to a broad group of individuals as empowering. 
Emphasising the space for individuals in Poso to make choices that contributed to the 
escalation of conflict potentially opens questions of responsibility for the past violence 
that few in the district would necessarily welcome. 
But if agency potentially implies unwelcome responsibility in the context of past 
violence, the recognition of the agency of local people may be more empowering when 
we tum our gaze to the future. If we limit the influence of structural factors to 
something less than a determining role, and reject the idea that invisible and powerful 
conspirators were responsible for past violence, the implication is that whether or not 
violence again escalates in Poso is largely within the control of local people. The 
arise." See Sewell, "A Theory of Structure", pp. 18-19.William M. Reddy, "The Logic of Action: 
Indeterminacy, Emotion, and Historical Narrative", History and Theory 40,4 (2001): 27. 
17 For example, see Gyanendra Pandey, "In Defense of the Fragment: Writing About Hindu-Muslim Riots 
in India Today", Representations 37 (Winter 1992): 41. 
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conclusion that local people will determine whether they again engage in a large-scale 
violent conflict is in tum cause for guarded optimism, in the light of two trends 
identified in Chapter Five. The judgement of many combatants that they were gaining 
nothing from continued fighting, as well as the lack of reprisals for even the most 
provocative attacks both suggest that a renewed escalation to widespread fighting is 
unlikely in the short-term. 
The conclusion of this thesis regarding the potential impact of the central government 
interventions in Poso is another cause for optimism. The crisis-driven pattern of 
interventions in Poso left a space for perpetrators to continue to organise attacks, but 
this pattern also suggested that concerted intervention could stop the violence. Two sets 
of arrests in May 2006 and then November-February 2007 represent the most concerted 
central government intervention to date. Through these sets of arrests, the police have 
broken down much of the network of outside mujahidin and local Muslims who were 
responsible for most of the violence since at least 2004. The courts have handed down 
stem sentences to many of those arrested - taking these men out of the conflict and 
providing a disincentive to others considering violence. 
We can gain a comparative insight on the possible slightly longer-term effects of such 
an intervention from the Maluku conflict, where police launched a similar round-up of 
perpetrators and planners of sporadic violence in May 2005. The arrests and trials in 
Maluku came at the end of twelve months of violence in which at least thirteen people 
were killed, with this year-long sequence of violence itself immediately following the 
most recent riotous episode in that province in April 2004. At the time of writing, there 
had been no conflict deaths in Maluku since the arrests were made (with the exception 
of a bombing suspect shot dead by police), with only a handful of minor bombings 
causing injuries during that period. 
The initial signs of the effect of the arrests and trials in Poso have also been good. 
Shortly before this dissertation was completed, the pattern of recurrent attacks in Poso 
each Ramadan was broken, as the Islamic fasting month in 2007 passed without a single 
violent incident. At the time of writing, just over a year with no fatalities in Poso had 
passed since the January 2007 police raids. The people of Poso still live every day with 
the long-term impacts of eight years of fighting, and renewed sporadic attacks are 
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always possible, but such a long period free of violence is a significant step in the right 
direction for the district's future. 
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GLOSSARY 
TERM EXPLANATION 
ad at custom, customary law 
B.A.P. Berita Acara Pemeriksaan, police interrogation dossier 
Bappeda Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah- Regional Development 
Planning Board 
BIN Badan Intelijen Negara- State Intelligence Agency 
Brimob Brigade Mobil, police paramilitary unit 
da'i Islamic preacher 
dakwah Islamic proselytising 
DI Darul Islam 
DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah - district or provincial level 
legislature 
dum-dum a home-made bazooka 
fa'i robbery targeting non-Muslims to finance jihadist activity 
fa twa non-binding religious advice issued by an Islamic religious scholar 
FKASWJ Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah- Ahlus Sunnah Wal 
Jamaah Communication Forum 
FKMTP Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Tana Poso- Communication 
Forum ofthe Community ofthe Land ofPoso 
GKST Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah- Central Sulawesi Protestant 
Church 
Golkar Golongan Karya- Functional Groups, the regime political party 
during Soeharto 's rule 
GPK Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan - Security Disturbing Gang, or 
Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan, Security Disturbing Movement 
GPST Gerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah - Central Sulawesi Youth 
Movement 
IDP Internally displaced person 
JI Jemaah Islamiyah 
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jihad In the context ofthis dissertation, a holy war 
kelompok merah red group, a name for the Christian side in the Poso conflict 
kelompok putih white group, a name for the Muslim side in the Poso conflict 
KNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia- Indonesian National Youth 
Committee 
Kodim Komando Distrik Militer- District Military Command 
KomnasHAM Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia- National Commission on 
Human Rights 
Kompak Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis - Action Committee to 
Overcome the Impact of Crises, an Islamic charity, sometimes 
written Komite Penanggulangan Krisis - Committee to Overcome 
Crises 
KPPSI Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam Committee for the 
Preparation oflmplementation oflslamic Law, a South Sulawesi 
based organisation. 
Laskar Jihad a Java-based Islamic militia that brought several hundred people to 
Poso in 2001 
Malino Declaration government sponsored peace accord for Poso signed in December 
2001 in the South Sulawesi hill town, Malino 
mujahid fighter in a holy war (plural is mujahidin) 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Indonesian Democracy Party 
PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan- Indonesian Democracy 
Party-Struggle 
pasukan merah red force, see kelompok merah 
pasukan putih white force, see kelompok putih 
peluncur launcher, a weapon used to fire arrows 
pesantren Islamic boarding school 
Polda Kepolisian Daerah- provincial-level police 
Polri Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia- Indonesian police 
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posko pos komando - command post 
ppp Partai Persatuan Pembangunan- United Development Party 
preman thug 
salafist a strict adherent of Islam as practiced by the early generations of 
Muslims 
Satgas Khoirul Umah anti-vice squad in Poso formed by JVMujahidin Kompak 
Satgas Amar Ma'ruf anti-vice squad in Poso formed by Laskar Jihad 
Nahi Mungkar 
SSK Satuan Setingkat Kompi - company equivalent unit 
senjata rakitan homemade firearm 
Sulawesi Tengah Central Sulawesi 
tadrib physical training 
ta'lim Islamic religious instruction 
tausiah Islamic religious guidance 
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia- Indonesian armed forces 
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